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en-gb2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00proiect@nospam.comhourly12000-01-01T12:00+00:00Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Ideea de a deschide acest topic mi-a venit, dupa cum cred ca este lesne de ghicit, in timpul in care scriam ultimele replici avand ca subiect SAS din Marea Britanie. Am ales aces titlu pornind de la cateva impresii culese de-a lungul timpului scurs de la momentul in care am avut placerea de a deveni membru al forumului. Inainte de asta, as dori sa precizez ca nu intentionez sa polemizez cu nimeni cu privire la aspectul disciplinei; cred ca inteleg foarte bine ratiunile ei. Constat uneori, insa, ca alegerea unui anumit topic introduce opiniile noastre in liniile unui anumit camp de forte care le reteaza elanul. Este propriu gandirii sa ia mai curand forma unui fenomen organic decat a unuia construit cu rigoare geometrica. Ea are volute, bucle, reveniri, digresiuni, se structureaza asociativ si asa mai departe. Lucru care, totusi, nu ne apara impotriva depasirii limitelor topicului propus. Gandirea este rizomica, ramificata, pentru ca asa este structura ei. Asta nu inseamna ca propun abandonarea rigorii, caci fara ea totul ar cadea in haos, in amorf. Putem compensa, insa, macar partial, aceste neajunsuri, prin largirea temei de discutie. La inceput m-am gandit sa o numesc simplu: 1st SFOD-D. Apoi mi-am dat seama ca sunt inevitabile trimiterile la unitati, fie din US Army, fie din alte categorii de forte, cu care istoria acestui detasament a interactionat in cele peste trei decenii de existenta si a caror evocare devine inevitabila daca dorim ca demersul sa fie rotund. Vezi aici, ISA, DEVGRU, AFSOC, Green Berets, Rangers. In anumite contexte, discutia despre Delta devine indisociabila de activitatea unor unitati care nici macar nu apartin Pentagonului, cum este cazul SOG din SAD al CIA sau HRT din cadrul FBI. Si, pentru ca SUA si Canada sunt vecine si aliate, nu exclud introducerea in discutie si a unitatilor acesteia din urma: JTF2, CSOR si, in general, tot ce tine de CANSOFCOM. Mentionez, insa, ca tema centrala ramane Delta Force, si ca postarile noastre ar trebui sa o vizeze in special. Dar sunt binevenite toate referirile la unitati conexe.Stiu ca s-a mai vorbi aici despre 1st SFOD-D aka CAG aka Headquarters Company USASOC, dar nu a existat inca o tema consacrata special unitatii. Si cred ca loc mai este destul. Stiu ca politica externa a SUA este cel putin discutabila, macar sub anumite aspecte si ca armata, si mai ales Special Missions Units (SMU) cum mai sunt numite CAG, DEVGRU, ISA, 24th Special Tactics Squadron din cadrul USAF, au fost instrumentele acestor politici. Propun insa, sa ne limitam abordarea la aspectele militare ale chestiunii, pentru ca daca o 'politizam', teama mi-e ca alunecam spre alt gen de discutii. Eu unul nu ma simt capabil si nici suficient de informat ca sa le port.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSi cate putin despre istoria USSOCOM si (printre altele) 'incurcaturile' financiare in care numele lor a fost implicat/The Special Forces' BuildupThe organizational response to the administration's demands for special operations forces and doctrine was in practice rather similar to that made in 1961 to President Kennedy's demands for a coordinated military response to the threat of insurgency. The manpower of elite special warfare units was rapidly built up to surpass mid-1960s levels. Special Forces personnel had peaked at some 13,000 men in seven SF Groups in 1969 dropping to three active groups in 1974. The 1980 force level of some 3,000 was less than the peak strength of just one Special Forces Group in 1968, the Vietnam-based Fifth, with 3,542 men.1 Active-duty special operations forces in the three services rose from 11,600 in 1981 to 14,900 in 1985, with force levels, including reserves, reaching some 32,000 in 1988.2 Active duty forces were scheduled to reach 20,900 by 1990, with total available forces numbering 38,400.3Much of the buildup took place in the army's Special Forces, which the new administration tried to bring up to wartime strength. The army added 1,200 places to Special Forces in 1982, bringing its force level up to 4,000 in four active groups by 1984.4 Each group had a nominal strength of 776 men, divided into three battalions. Although all four groups are stationed within the United States, three battalions and two other Special Forces detachments are permanently based overseas. A fifth group (the Third) was scheduled to be established in 1990-1991 with special responsibilities for Sub-Saharan Africa.5 Army special operations forces in July 1986 were reported to include 4,800 Special Forces, 1,500 Rangers, 800 men in a Psychological Warfare Group, 250 in a civil affairs battalion, and about 800 in the aviation section.6 By 1987, the manpower of the army's special operations forces was estimated at 9,100 on active service, with 12,400 in the reserves.7 The Reagan administration also rapidly moved to rebuild the CIA's paramilitary capability, rehiring many of those laid off by Admiral Turner in 1977.The special warfare revival was spurred on by a coordinated media offensive comparable to that of the first year of the Kennedy administration—the Green Berets were once again basking in the limelight.Not surprisingly, they benefited from a dramatic rise in the funds earmarked for special operations forces in the defense budget. From an estimated $500 million for special operations forces in 1981, funding rose to some $1.2 billion in 1987 and $1.5 billion in 1990.8 Construction projects alone for special operations facilities at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Fort Bragg, and Hunter Army Airfield in the mid-1980s were budgeted at $236 million.9 The funding of the army's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which was $250 million in 1982, its first year of operations, was projected to go to $700 million by 1990.10Although civil affairs units were a part of the new special operations formula, they remained, as always, a minor part of special warfare. The army's 172-man 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, assigned to SOCOM in l 982, was and still is, in fact, the only active civil affairs unit in the army, and continues to provide support for the entire army. The 96th's four companies each specialize in a geographical region but work both with conventional and special operations forces. The Army's small standing force for civil affairs in the 1980s reflects the limited role for such specialists beyond the context of conventional warfare; some 97 percent of the total army civil affairs manpower is to be found in the reserves, available for call up in time of need.'' In the meantime, the full-timers were subordinated to the more arcane requirements of special warfare.A strong civil affairs component could reasonably have been encouraged as a means to temper the army's new involvement in unconventional warfare and low-intensity conflict; the civil affairs experience in postwar Europe might have offered a more promising route to counterinsurgency, for one, than the guerrilla approach associated with special operations forces. But the uneasy accommodation of a policy of galloping interventionism with the political requirement of appearing to work only at the invitation of overseas partners precluded any occupation-style approach. In practice, the chosen arrangement subordinated civil affairs more fully to the merely cosmetic needs of unconventional warfare. In Vietnam, the military's need for a strong civil a affairs role was resisted by political fiat. In the spring of 1965 the Joins Chiefs of Staff proposed, in return for the commitment of American troops to Vietnam, that the military command deploy U.S. military civil affairs teams, "as in World War II," to take charge of provincial administrations. The suggestion was shrilly opposed by American civilian agencies and firmly slapped down.12The air force also took part in the special operations buildup, bringing most of its special operations and search and rescue units together under the 23d Air Force; in 1983, the 23d's First Special Operations Air Wing was established, and based at Eglin Air Base in Florida.13 By 1987, there were some 4,100 air force special operations forces on active duty and 2,500 reservists. Five other SOF squadrons (and three in the reserve) were based at Eglin, Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany. A helicopter detachment was based at Howard Air Force Base in Panama.14By 1986 the navy's SEALs—Sea, Air, Land forces—had reached some 1,700 troops, organized into two special warfare groups based at Little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California, respectively. Arguably the best-trained of the elite units, SEALs continue the traditions of the underwater demolition teams (UDTs) created by the navy in 1942 to clear the way for amphibious landings; their role expanded in Korea to include reconnaissance and covert landings for deep-penetration raids.15 The SEALs, which draw recruits from underwater demolition personnel, date to 1962 and first saw action in Vietnam. The characteristic SEAL force of sixteen-man units; navy plans in 1987 reportedly aimed at increasing the number of units from forty-one to seventy over five years.16 Larger units included six SEAL Teams.17 SEAL Team 6, with from 175 to 200 men, is believed to specialize in counterterrorism.18 Secret navy units like Task Force 98 reportedly work out of eight bases, including the British Royal Air Force base at Machrihanish, Scotland.19The Multipurpose Training MissionDefense Secretary Weinberger observed in 1983 that the military skills required to meet the challenge of low-intensity conflict were found "chiefly . . . in our special operations forces." Army Special Forces took "a very large share of the burden . . . to instruct others in providing for their own defense" and to help give the people "a stake in the future" (through "civic action").20 In another statement, Weinberger explained that the special operations forces' advisory role had both a training objective—to organize counterparts and impart skills—and an operational role: "to reduce the probability that United States armed forces could be committed in foreign battles, and to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to fulfill its commitments."21The special operations concept of the 1980s retained the full range of functions assigned to the Special Forces in Vietnam, the so-called triplex Special Forces Mission of special unit, clandestine, and paramilitary operations.22 In the 1980s,, the three functions would remain fused in the repertoire of special operations forces. The Special Forces had also acquired a major role in the training of foreign conventional forces in the 1960s—a role that would be sustained and increased. By the end of the Reagan years, Special Forces personnel had assumed most of the responsibilities for training and advising the regular forces of Third World countries, instilling conventional infantry with the skills and attitudes of the unconventional warrior.The rapid expansion of special operations forces, their increased role in foreign military training and assistance, and the vigorous promotion of overseas military assistance in potential conflict areas were similar to the ferment of activity at the height of the 1960s counterinsurgency era. Four to twelve-man Military Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), which had provided a principal vehicle of training and assistance in the 1960s, also served as the workhorses of low-intensity conflict. According to former Joint Chiefs special operations chief Colonel Roger Pezzelle, training and advisory MTTs worked with "host country regular units, militia, reserve forces, and security units" (for militia and security units one might read paramilitary forces and intelligence groups). At the same time, Colonel Pezzelle noted, "a major part of all MTT activity" was carried out by special operations units, whose training "encompasses a wide range of activity from ordinary military combat and counterguerrilla operations to building bridges and counterterrorist operations."23The number of MTTs abroad proliferated after 1980 just as it had in 1961. Army Special Forces provided most of the trainers. Some 130 Special Forces MTTs were scheduled for deployment in 1982, up from 53 four years before.24 In 1986, 260 Special Forces MTTs provided assistance to 35 countries.25 The expansion of training activities, measured in "man-weeks, " was estimated to have been fivefold between 1 1980 and 1984, from 1,161 to 5,787.26 By comparison, in duly 1962, just eighteen months into the counterinsurgency era, the Joint Chiefs had announced that counterinsurgency MTTs comprising 1,512 men were operating in nineteen different countries.27Special Forces' role as trainers to foreign armies and paramilitary police, whether at home or abroad, was often undertaken in the glare of publicity. The Special Forces were expected to play both the "Rambo" role and that of the consummate professional, the winner of hearts and minds. The public, fed a diet of Green Beret feature films and staged interviews with Fort Bragg's commanders, were confronted by seemingly contradictory visions of the elite force and its multiple missions: as the merciless purveyors of counterterror and as the wholesome trainers sent to "civilize" their brutal foreign counterparts.Somehow, Pentagon media managers reconcile these image shifts A Time feature, on "A Warrior Elite for the Dirty Jobs," stressed that low-intensity conflicts were more commonly known as "dirty little wars."28 The Special Forces, who are presented as ideal for the job, are characterized as ruthless commandos with no time for winning hearts and minds: "These unorthodox struggles require a special type of soldier: bold and resourceful, often trained in the black arts of stealth and sabotage, suitable for an elite unit that can vanish into alien territory or strike anywhere with speed and surprise."29 Write-ups on the role of special operations forces in countering terrorism went considerably further in stressing their bloodthirsty nature, as well as that of other elite units. A 1985 NBC television report on the 2,000-strong antiterrorist elite stated that the unit's core consisted of 160 people (presumably Delta Force) "psychiatrically screened for their willingness to kill."30" A Newsweek feature on special operations forces reported an exchange at the Los Angeles Olympics: A National Guardsmen on duty asked a Task Force 160 pilot about his mission; " 'If I tell you, I'll have to kill you,' [the pilot] replied."31 The ferocious image was by and large consciously cultivated, and matched by a set of skills and mission orders that indeed required a measure of ferocity. When that image was inconvenient however, Special Forces could be presented in a radically different light.When presented to the press in their role as trainers of regular armies (or paramilitary police), Special Forces were characterized as cosmopolitan professionals handpicked for their human rights sensitivity. A Newsweek feature on Special Forces trainers in El Salvador presented a picture of a conventional boot camp aiming to produce "tough, flexible counterinsurgency units . . . able to hit and pursue guerrillas into the hills," while also "offering lessons in humanity: how to treat civilians fairly and how to take prisoners as well as tally body counts." (The villain of the piece was "history," the Salvadoran army's traditional brutishness, which Special Forces were steadfastly fighting.32) The same themes were systematically harped upon in much of the mainstream media's reporting on American training of Salvadorans.A New York Times feature on Green Beret training for Salvadorans, "Salvador Gets Rights Lesson From the U.S.," described the training of cadets in "the rudiments of military operations, with a heavy emphasis on human rights and antiguerrilla techniques. "33 Major Roger Slaughter, a Spanish- speaking officer from the Special Forces detachment in Panama, "tapped his pointer against the chart listing the do's and don'ts of gaining the support of the people in a fight against guerrillas," and told his visitors that "an army cannot violate the individual rights of the people they are sworn to protect." And so, [w]ith that admonition, drawn from the doctrine of the United States Army, Major Slaughter summed up the message that he and other American instructors have been trying to impress on the army of El Salvador through officer candidates.... Major Slaughter said that winning the allegiance of peasants ... means respecting them.... He said that it meant avoiding what he called "indiscriminate acts of violence."34The problem of reconciling real special warfare skills and attitudes, notably those involving illegal tactics, to the planners' multipurpose expectations is less easily managed than are public relations. Can Special Forces really be expected to switch from selective assassination one day to civic action the next while standing by to serve as light infantry in a conventional rapid deployment scenario? Should they be expected to? The special operations advocates appear to see no contradiction between the Special Forces' extralegal and unmilitary covert action role, in which military ethics and the rules of war are jettisoned, and their main role in the training of foreign military and paramilitary forces.Special Forces' heavy responsibility for advisory and training assistance to foreign forces has had some influence on the manner in which this role is seen by the institutional armed forces. A comment by General Paul F. Gorman at a 1986 symposium suggests that the traditional lack of enthusiasm of the mainstream military for unconventional warfare now also extends to advisory assistance. On the one hand, there was a "significant, largely overlooked congruence between our key cadres for Security Assistance and those for Special Operations Forces." On the other, special operations personnel and "those on Security Assistance duty abroad [largely the same people] are up against two or three times as hard a problem in obtaining recognition for their contributions."35The implication was that this role, too, fell to Special Forces by a process of elimination—and by the trend through which advisory assistance since the 1960s had centered increasingly on counterinsurgency. Once Special Forces came to field the bulk of overseas trainers, the curriculum, perhaps naturally, became increasingly skewed toward the unconventional skills and attitudes for which Special Forces are unique.The Elite GenreThe turn to the more glamorous elite special forces for counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in the 1970s and 1980s responded in large part to the need for the appearance of tough action being taken against an increasingly ubiquitous enemy. Defense analyst Eliot Cohen identifies three motivations for the creation, support, and deployment of elite units: "The first is military utility—rational, non-political reasons for having elite units. The second. . . the irrational and romantic sources of support for elite units. The final type . . . stems from the increased politicization of war and military actions in the past half-century."36 However complex the blend of motives for their creation (or revival), elite units are powerful symbols—a means through which signals of resolution and intent can be sent both at home and abroad. In particular, governments have traditionally "sought to cultivate the heroic image of elite units to build up domestic morale."37 But, as the military is aware, this can backfire. Cohen adds two riders on the symbolic role of elite units: First, a democratic government cannot easily control the publicity that surrounds elite units; a government can initiate such publicity, but finds it hard to limit it.... Secondly, elite units may be misleadillg or ambiguous symbols, distorting serious public and governmental discussion of complex issues, encouraging instead a preoccupation with martial theatre.38The latter concern is perhaps more important; the psychological impact of elite organizations and operations on policymakers and public alike can radically skew perceptions of a particular conflict, substituting the romance of the image-makers for the reality. Cohen cites the French paratroops ("Paras") in Algeria as a case in point; from a solution they promptly became the crux of the problem. And the public's view of the war, too, focused increasingly on whether one was for or against the Paras: "[T]he paratroops were a simpler topic to deal with than the philosophical, political, and strategic complexities of the Algerian problem. The average Frenchman's feelings toward the whole Algerian problem could be reduced to his feelings toward the paratroops."39" The American equivalent was, if ultimately to less effect, to make the Green Berets (via John Wayne) a symbol of American patriotism in Vietnam; the romanticized Green Beret made disengagement just that much harder and contributed to America's feeling of betrayal by its own leaders.As a small force with a highly specialized, highly dangerous mission, the army's special warfare experts naturally developed with the characteristics of an elite, like the commandos or rangers of wartime— though with the added elements of shadow and secrecy of the intelligence operative. The characteristics of the army Special Forces were later shared by other American special warfare units, and an affinity with the elite forces of other nations developed. Modern elite military units can be distinguished by their assignment to unusual, extremely hazardous missions, their requirements for forces small in number but highly trained and physically exceptional; and their all-important image—as Cohen notes, "an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation, justified or not—for bravura and success."40Another traditional feature of elite units which the Special Forces embraced was the cultivation of a "hard-boiled" self-image, both through training and through public relations. Image serves an important psychological warfare function. As well as intimidating adversaries, an elite force's tough self-image, its familiarity with death and destruction, can build unit morale and remove combat inhibitions. The French Foreign Legion—"the brides of death"—and the Paras each developed a cult of death as part of their esprit de corps. The Paras' prayer illustrates their professedly abnormal mindset: Give me, my God, what you have left Give me what no one else would ever ask I don't want riches Not success, nor even health . . . I want insecurity and unquiet I want torment and chaos.41American psy-war chief General Robert McClure, an advocate of tactical terror,42 was also aware that a ruthless reputation could backfire on a unit, perhaps inducing an adversary to fight to the death rather than to surrender to a foe not known for taking prisoners. McClure acknowledges the role of self-image as a motivator, but questions the usefulness of its public dissemination: I fully recognize that our troops must adopt a tough, hard-boiled killer attitude If they arc going to not only survive, but to win these battles I wonder, however, If that indoctrination, which, I repeat, is very necessary, needs to be widely publicized in the press and broadcast to our enemies?43McClure's concern was prompted by the small number of prisoners taken in the Korean conflict and widespread publicity on Operation KILLER and the Hunter-killer Teams there. It might well apply to the more common scenarios in which elite units are deployed in counterinsurgency, In close contact with the civilian population.The issue of terror and elite elan is particularly relevant to counterinsurgency/counterterrorism forces, forces that are in constant contact with the public. Both the training methods of special forces (including public exercises in towns and cities) and their public image (from threatening billboards and gory regimental insignia, to the standard-issue uniforms) may serve to cultivate an aggressively antisocial orientation, such as that of the colonialist Foreign Legion. They may also prepare the ground for atrocity.Psychological Screening—and "Modeling"—for EliteSince 1961, U.S. military procedures for the selection of personnel for specialized counterinsurgency and covert action tasks have been the objects of intensive research in army, air force, and navy programs.44 In 361, an air force project was initiated to develop "psychological selection methods for dangerous counterinsurgency missions"; a similar program followed that was conducted by the U. S. Army Personnel Research Office (USAPRO) at Fort Bragg's Center for Special Warfare. The first testing of active-duty Special Forces personnel who were considered successful candidates was already under way in early 1961 and provided the basis for a profile that would be used to develop tests to determine the probable performance of Special Forces candidates. By 1962, three series of tests were in use: the "special forces suitability inventory" was designed to assess personality characteristics considered appropriate for the discipline; the "critical decisions test" measured risk-taking; and the "locations test" assessed spatial perception.45 By the 1970s, the military could count on sophisticated means to establish personality and skill profiles for the ideal counterinsurgent or covert operator.Another branch of military psychology applicable to the elite counterterrorist units was "atrocity research," studies of why atrocities occur and the personality traits associated with killers. A navy research project led by psychologist Sigmund Streufert was the subject of awkward questions in 1971 by Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, who found the research to be "designed to measure how different individuals value human life; in other words to screen for those who, attaching little value to life, might make good killers."46' More disturbing is evidence of research into means of conditioning military personnel into more efficient killers. Peter Watson, in his study of the military use of psychology, refers to a 1975 NATO-sponsored conference on stress and anxiety in which U.S. Navy doctor Thomas Narut lectured on "symbolic modeling," by which people could be taught to cope with certain stresses, techniques that he said were "being used with 'combat readiness units' to train people to cope with the stress of killing."47 The methods were reportedly used for commando teams and special navy operatives, and they involved the screening of "films specially designed to show people being killed in violent ways. By being acclimatized through these films, the men were supposed eventually to become able to disassociate their emotions from such situations. "48 Other aspects of the program included training aimed at "stress reduction" and "dehumanization of the enemy." Dr. Narut reportedly also described the screening procedure for men with "passive aggressive personalities" suitable for "commando tasks": They are people with a lot of drive, though they are well-disciplined and do not appear nervous, who periodically experience bursts of explosive energy when they can literally kill without remorse. Dr. Narut said that he and colleagues had therefore been looking for men who had shown themselves capable of killing in this premeditated way.49The Trouble with ElitesThe regular military was still not prepared to open the Pandora's box of special warfare tactics to conventional American forces, and it remained largely dependent on the disciplines and elite forces of special warfare. The implication was that the regular services remained unhappy about degrading the services as a whole when the dirty work could just as well be left to the "elite" personnel of Special Forces.The alienation of the political warriors of the postwar period from the mainstream military had been a consequence of both their elite status and the professional "impropriety" of their role in special, political, or "dirty" warfare. An officer at the Army War College, writing in 1983 recounts the case of a Fifth Special Forces Group commander relieved of his command "largely because of the collision of two competing impulses: that of the Army officer who doesn't lie, cheat, or steal, and that of the intelligence operative who always has a cover story to disguise his true function or intent. Some problems refuse to go away. " In short he concludes, the U.S. Army "has demonstrated institutional antipathy to elites and continues to do so."50The disquiet over special warfare can be traced back to the confusion of unconventional warfare with psychological warfare in postwar doctrine, and at the inception of Special Forces. Colonel Russell Volckmann in a 1969 letter concerning the Special Forces' subordination to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, recalled the concern of officers promoting the Special Forces concept: "Behind-the-line operations and the 'dirty-tricks game' had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost thatEuropean experience has shown that elites need not be specialists in the clandestine aspects of warfare to engender institutional unease and to assume characteristics deemed threatening to military order and discipline. Institutional resentment and preoccupation can be stimulated by separate formations of a distinctly higher status (and potentially decisive power, on the lines of the French Paras). A second cause for institutional distrust IS quite different, and involves those special units that have beenassigned roles at the bounds—or beyond the bounds—of the permissible in the laws and usages of war; the snipers, raiders, and irregulars that since the nineteenth century have pushed back the limits in modern warfare. Forces with unique, elite skills may be set apart because they are elite in status or isolated from the regular services on the grounds of military decorum and discipline.The Elite within the EliteThe Fort Bragg-based Delta Force was the primary antiterrorist force for the high-profile actions of hostage rescue and terrorist interdiction. An agreement with West Germany was reported in late 1986 permitting Delta to use facilities there as a forward reconnaissance and intelligence gathering base for a twelve-man unit, and to carry out joint operations with the German GSG9 and British SAS forces.52 Delta was an elite within an elite. The existence of other secret antiterrorist units drawn from the military's elite forces would gradually be revealed over the years.The army's secret counterterror detachments were most often exposed in the 1980s when things went wrong through an excess of zeal, by military disasters that could not be hushed up, or when corruption— encouraged by the use of untraceable, unaccountable funds—became too serious to be overlooked. Delta's secret role in the Grenada invasion became known largely because of scathing critiques by military insiders of its poor planning. Intended to secure the main airstrip before the arrival of the army Rangers, Delta arrived precisely two hours late, supposedly because planners misread Grenada's time zone.Delta Force received further unwanted exposure in October 1985, in the wake of the Achille Lauro hijack. The diversion by U.S. Navy jets of an Egypt Air airliner to an airfield in Sicily had already incensed the Italian government. Delta threw relations even more out of joint by precipitating an angry, armed face-off with Italian troops on the ground after the diversion. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi told the press a week later of the tense moment in which Italian troops were ready to fire on Delta Force troops who had rushed out of a C-141 transport that landed right behind the Egyptian aircraft.53 Delta's involvement had hitherto been a secret.Delta's problems were not limited to its military operations. In 1985, an army inquiry found evidence that Delta personnel had embezzled up to $500,000, with one Special Forces colonel and three associates accounting for at least $60,000.54 An internal army inquiry into the matte was put off in the fall of 1985 on the grounds that it could cripple the unit's planned operations in the Mediterranean.55 The army ultimate!, announced that eighty Delta men received "nonjudicial punishments; and seven were facing courts-martial.56 Lt. Col. Dale Duncan, who headed an army special operations proprietary, Business Security International (BSI), was charged with submitting a series of false invoices. including one bill for $56,230 in electronic equipment that had been paid for by another army intelligence unit.57 These were the first of what Newsweek called "a growing number of investigations, prosecutions and courts- martial focusing on alleged financial impropriety by members of Delta and other super-secret units spawned by the Reagan administration. "58The prosecutions that ensued brought to light some of the contradictions between covert action accounting, where the rule of thumb was to eliminate the paper trail, and democratic accountability. Colonel James E. Noble, an army judge on the court martial which acquitted Special Forces Master Sergeant Ramon Barron of charges pertaining to his work with BSI, concluded: "The Army chose this extraordinary means to circumvent accountability for money.... By so doing they also chose to risk losing the money."59 John Prados, in commenting on the Delta Force's disdain for standard accounting procedures, observes wryly that "items procured for supposedly clandestine missions included a Rolls-Royce and a hot-air balloon."60Two years after the Delta corruption inquiry, fresh investigations revealed more information on Business Security International, which suggested that it had operated quite apart from Delta Force. BSI was described as a front for army covert actions, set up in 1983 and code-named " Yellow Fruit, " to provide security for joint army-CIA operations in the Middle East and Central America. An April 1987 CBS News report linked " Yellow Fruit" to the covert operations of the National Security Council that were coordinated by Lt. Col. North and retired General Richard Secord.61 In its reporting on the Iran-contra affair, CBS tied BSI (" Yellow Fruit") to a Swiss bank account used by North and Secord to lease a cargo ship for arms movements. The army halfheartedly disputed the bank account charge, but CBS stood by its story (the account number had been provided to CBS by a former member of the unit). "2 BSI / "Yellow Fruit" was most likely an operation run by the newest of the Pentagon's covert intelligence agencies, Intelligence Support Activity (ISA).The top-secret ISA was created as the army's Foreign Operations Group (FOG), in response to the crisis in Iran after the fall of the Shah. It operated over a year unbeknownst to the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, or Congress. The unit, renamed Intelligence Support Activity, was formally established in October 1980 by then-army chief of staff General Edward C. Meyer. Initially established for covert intelligence collection to support operations during the Iran crisis, ISA was subsequently employed for covert operations considered too sensitive for the army's special operations and intelligence establishment.63 Although ISA was allegedly unknown to congressional intelligence oversight committees until 1982, it had already engaged in major covert operations.The first hills of ISA's existence emerged in March 1983, when Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz testified to a congressional subcommittee about his abortive raid into Laos early that year. Gritz said that in 1981 he had been approached by "a special intelligence (group) referred to as 'The Activity' " concerning a covert mission into Indochina aimed at freeing any American MIA's still held there.64 Although neither Congress nor the Pentagon would confirm the account—or the existence of the ISA— by May 1983, press inquiries established that Gritz had received some support in the intelligence area from a new army agency, the ISA. The New York Times concluded that the ISA had participated in the January 1982 rescue of General James Dozier from Italian Red Brigade kidnapers and was "operating missions against leftist forces in El Salvador and supporting anti-government forces in Nicaragua."65 Other sources credited ISA with unspecified operations concerning hostages in Lebanon.66The current status of the ISA—which may now exist under another name—is unclear. Like Delta Force, some of its personnel exploited its clandestine operations for personal gain. In 1985, the ISA was reportedly disbanded after FBI investigators "discovered lavish trips being taken by some officers and their wives."67 But the Washington Post reported that in 1986 the ISA had carried out a number of classified actions in coordination with the intergovernmental "Operations Sub- Group" (OSG) set up to coordinate counterterrorist operations.68 John Prados has suggested that the Counterterrorist Joint Task Force at Fort Bragg, a unit of less than twenty men, may be "an operational component of ISA.""' Another source has suggested that ISA, rather than just a tight group of operatives, is probably "a computer data base of operatives with special skills who can be assigned for covert operations."70 In the past, special operations personnel were kept on call after their formal discharge from active duty.The army's top-secret special operations air arm, Task Force 160— or the "Night Stalkers"—was exposed to the public gradually, mainly In consequence of casualties that could not wholly be concealed. A battalion-strength unit, TF160 supported covert Special Forces and Delta operations on detail from the 101st Air Assault Division. Based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Task Force 160 crews worked in civvies and flew a range of high-tech helicopters for "black operations. " Its involvement in the Grenada invasion—as the helicopter airlift component of Delta Force—was revealed after one of the helicopters was shot down. Photographs taken of the downed chopper and of others dropping off commandos showed they were Hughes 500 models, which were not officially in use by the army.71' Authorities eventually acknowledged the death of one Task Force 160 helicopter pilot in Grenada; subsequent Defense Department budget requests for the replacement of equipment lost in the operation suggested that up to ten other helicopters, some of them Task Force 160, may have been lost.72 Investigators of the web of CIA and Defense proprietaries involved in the "Contra-gate" affair subsequently attributed the covert transport of the helicopters to Barbados—in anticipation of the invasion—to a proprietary headed by retired Air Force Lt. Col. Richard Gadd, who would also preside over the airlift of assistance to the contras in partnership with retired Gen. Richard Secord.73Task Force 160 next appeared in the news in December 1985 after the Detroit Free Press interviewed the friends and families of sixteen army men reportedly killed in helicopter accidents in the unit.74 Although the inquiry did not tie specific deaths to covert operations, it concluded that the unit had "flown missions into Nicaragua and other hostile Central American zones, despite U. S. laws forbidding such military activity. "75 The father of Warrant Officer Donald Alvey, age 26, who was reported killed in a chopper crash off the Virginia coast on 20 March 1983, recounted his son's stories of his clandestine exploits: "Don flew a bunch of missions into Nicaragua.... He'd go somewhere and pick up a group of people in a clearing in the jungle . . . armed troops, speaking Spanish—and take them to another clearing in the jungle."76 Relatives said the unit members wore civilian clothes, flew by night, and were instructed to destroy their aircraft it they were forced down; they were also told "that the U.S. government would disavow them if captured or killed."77 A Fort Campbell spokesman responded, stating that "no Fort Campbell units have been involved in any military operations."78 The stories were consistent with the accounts from relatives of earlier U.S. covert action casualties in Nicaragua during the last years of Anastasio Somoza Debayle's regime. The secret units involved in the United States' war on Nicaragua found more comprehensive exposure in the course of the Iran-contra hearings. 1. John M. Collins, U.S. and Soviet Special Operations, Draft Committee Print for Special Operations Panel, House Armed Services Committee (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress: Washington, D.C., 23 December 1986), p. 24; Shelby Stanton, The Green Berets at War: V. S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986), p. 174. 2. Stephen Goose, "Low-intensity Warfare: The Warriors and Their Weapons," in Peter Kornbloh and Michael Klare, Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 82. 3. Ibid. These projections were nearly met: see Epilogue, p. 449, in this volume. 4. Secretary of the Army John Marsh, in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, in cooperation with National Defense Information Center, 1984), p. 19; John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War 11 through Iranscam (NCW York: Quill/William Morrow, 1986), p. 386. The fourth was created around a nucleus comprised of one "A" Detachment hived off from each company in the three active groups (Collins. U.S. and Soviet Special Operations, p. 24). Four more reserve Special Forces groups with about the same force level provided a manpower pool for covert operations. 5 Collins, U. S. and Soviet Special Operations, p. 24. The Seventh, with a Latin American regional focus, is based at Fort Bragg. Delta, First Special Operations Operational Detachment "1)," is directed from the closed installation adjoining Fort Bragg, Pope Air Base. The Fifth (with the Middle East and Africa its regional specialties), was based at Fort Bragg until 1986, when its transfer to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was initiated. A battalion of the Seventh operated out of Panama and provided most of the detachments detailed for training duties to Honduras. The Tenth, with an orientation toward European and Mediterranean theaters, was based at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, with a battalion stationed at Bad Tolz, West Germany. The First SF Group, oriented toward Southeast Asia and the Pacific, was based at Fort Lewis, Washington, with a battalion based on Okinawa. 5. H. Jason Brady, "US Special Forces Revamp, "Jane's Defence Weekly (26 July 1986), p. 126. 6. Lilia Bermúdez, Guerra de baja intensidad (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1987), p. 95, citing Center of Defense Information statistics. 7. James Adams, "US Plans To Add Punch," (12 October 1986). 8. Brady, "US Special Forces Revamp," p. 126: $139 million was earmarked for a five-year construction program at Fort Bragg, to include $23.5 million for facilities for the new Third Special Forces group in 1989. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., p. 127. That the subordination of the 96th to special operations might result in a reorientation of army civil affairs (rather than representing a change in the nature of special operations) is suggested by the requirement in 1986 that Civil Affairs personnel undergo parachute training; "Now 164 positions within the battalion are jump slots," according to Lt. Col. Rance Farrell, commander of the 96th in mid-1986. 11. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1986), p. 117, citing the 1971 official edition of The Pentagon Papers, vol. 6.C.5, p. 20. President Johnson had himself apparently suggested that civil affairs teams "be integrated into provincial governments on an experimental basis," but he did not press the point. 12. Bermúdez, Guerra de baja intensidad, pp. 100, 102. 13. Ibid., p. 100. 14. Ian V. Hogg, "Special Forces Update," Jane's Defence Weekly (17 November 1984) 15. Bermúdez, Guerra de baja intensidad, p. 99, citing "US Special Operations Revisited, " Defense and Foreign Affairs (October 1985), p. 32. Prospective SEALs are put through a one- year course. 16. Ibid. 17. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 392. 18. James Adams, "US Plans to Add Punch" (12 October 1986); Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 392, reports the planned deployment of SEAL teams of less than 200 men to forward bases in Puerto Rico, Scotland, and Hawaii. 19. Caspar Weinberger, "The Phenomenon of Low-Intensity Warfare, " in Department of Defense, Proceedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference 14-15 January 1986, p. 16. 20. Bermúdez, Guerra de baja intensidad, p. 94, citing a statement in Col. John M. Oseth, "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict," Naval War College Review (November-December 1984), p. 21. Training was also devised to permit "foreign armies to confront instability and aggression land] to increase the capability of our friends to confront Soviet expansionism" (translation from the Spanish by the author). 22. Stanton, The Green Berets at War, p. 37. Exhaustive reviews of the Special Forces role can also be found in Colonel Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies Series, 1973).). On the prisoner rescue mission, the latter (p. 148) notes that "while several camps were overrun, they were found to be deserted. Operations to recover prisoners of war were a constant objective, even though they were unsuccessful." 21. Roger M. Pezzele, "Military Capabilities and Special Operations in the 1980s," in Barnett,, Tovar, and Shultz, Special Operations in U.S. Strategy, pp. 142-43. 22. Richard Halloran, "Army's Special Forces Try To Rebuild Image," New York Times (21 August 1982).). 23. James Adams, "US Plans to Add Punch" (12 October 1986). 24. Bermúdez, Guerra de baja intensidad, p. 93, citing "America's Secret Soldiers: The Buildup of U.S. Special Operations Forces," The Defense Monitor 14, no. 2 (1985; Washington, Center for Defense Information), p. 2. See also Stephen 1). Goose, "Low-Intensity Warfare," in Kornbluh and Klare, Low Intensity Warfare, pp. 8384, who adds that special operations forces operated MTTs during the same period "in over three dozen nations, including Grenada, Honduras, El Salvador,, Costa Rica, Colombia, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco, Liberia, Zaire, the Philippines, and Thailand." Special operations forces made up "25 to 35 percent of all MTT's, including virtually all of those employed in counterinsurgency training." 25. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 July 1962, "Memo for the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs," enclosing "A Summary of US Military Counterinsurgency Accomplishments Since 1 January 1961," Carrollton Press Declassified Documents Reference System ((R)242C). All but nine of the teams had been working in Latin America and Southeast Asia. 26. "A Warrior Elite for the Dirty Jobs," Time (13 January 1986), pp. 16-19. 27. Ibid., p. 17. The Special Forces' training role was fairly accurately described in this account as training friendly forces "in the art of guerrilla warfare," offensive and defensive. 28. Cited in "US Said To Field Counter-Terrorist Force," Reuters (2 January 1985). 29. "America's Secret Military Forces," Newsweek (22 April 1985), p. 22. 30. "Teaching the ABC's of War," Newsweek (28 March 1983), pp. 30-31. 31. Richard Halloran, "Salvador Gets Rights Lesson from the U.S.," New York Times (18 April 1982). 32. Ibid. 33. Gen.. Paul Gorman, "Low-intensity Warfare: American Dilemma," in DOD, Pro ceedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference 14-15 January 1986, p. 26. 34. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modem Democracies, Harvard Studies in International Affairs (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), p. 29. 35. See, in particular, ibid., pp. 60-65, "Elite units as symbols." 36. Ibid., pp. 64-65. Cohen also refers to the failures at Dieppe, Dien Bien Phu, and Amem as a consequence of generals who "thought that a quick victory could be achieved by relying on elite troops alone." The Dieppe raid, a "reconaissance in force" of some 5,000, was commemorated by awarding the commandos their first green berets. A modern equivalent is the 1980s hype over special operations forces— and the rejuvenation and perpetuation of the idea that a quick fix can be made in low-intensity conflict through the short sharp shock of elite forces. 37. Ibid., p. 63. 38. Ibid., p. 17. 39. Ibid., p. 69. 40. Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origin (Washington, D.C./Fort McNair: National Defense University, 1982), p. 96. 41. Ibid., p. 98. 42. This is discussed at length in British psychologist Peter Watson's study War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin 1978; rev. ed. 1980). 43. Ibid., pp. 279-80. 44. The exact purpose of the study (and of the 135-part questionnaire produced to assess "value- of-life") was not clarified, however, and Strenfert was himself "not convinced that these questions did adequately separate the 'efficient' killers from the nonkillers" (ibid., p. 36 end pp. 179-81, citing "Gallagher proposes study of ending Navy Department's project: Group Technology," correspondence inserted in the record by Cornelius Gallagher, Congressional Record, 2 March 1971, pp. E1295— E 1202). 45. Ibid., pp. 181-82, citing statements made by Dr. Narut in the conference, in a conversation with Watson and a colleague (Dr. Alfred Zitani) and in a subsequent interview. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. Tests reportedly used by Dr. Narut included the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, "especially its subscales measuring hostility, depression and psychopathy, and the Rorschach...." 48. Lt. Col. Henry G. Gole, US Army War College, reviewing Paddock's U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, in Parameters (September 1983), pp. 93-94. Gole also notes the career element as an indicator: "To invest time and energy in special operations was—and continues to be—a career gamble.... Psychological operations are for the poet or career deviant; Special Forces are for hopeless romantics; long-range reconnaissance is a sideshow." 49. Volckmann, and others, were opposed to having the Special Forces brief include psychological warfare, because the behind-the-lines specialty was already a sufficient problem: "We felt that there was in general a stigma connected with Psychological Warfare, especially among combat men, that we didn't care to have 'rub off on Special Forces" (cited in Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, p. 151). 50. James Adams, "Delta Force Gets Base in Europe," Sunday Times (London, 28 September 1986). Delta reportedly took part in yearly maneuvers (code-named "Flintlock") with German and Italian special forces previously; SAS reportedly demurred, despite NATO sponsorship (in keeping with its low-profile attitude). James Adams, "Delta Force: The High-tech Way To Get Behind Enemy Lines— and Back," Sunday Times (London; 14 April 1985). 51. Charles R. Babcock and Caryle Murphy, "Army Reportedly Put off Probe of Elite U. S. Unit, " Washington Post Service, International Herald Tribune (22 November 1985). 52. " 'Black' Funds; Elite Army Troops Face Charges," Time (2 December 1985). 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid.; David M. Alpern, "Delta Force under fire," Newsweek, 16 December 1985. 56. Alpern, "Delta Force," Newsweek (16 Decmber 1985), p. 31. 57. Ibid. 58. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 391. 59. Charles R. Babcock, "Army Probe Finds No Link between Secret Unit, Swiss Account, " Washington Post (3 July 1987). A former member of the unit, William T. Golden, served as a prosecution witness in the criminal trial of leaders of the unit on corruption charges. Lt. Col. Dale C. Duncan was indicted by a federal grand jury for fiddling expense account advances; at the time of indictment he had already been court-martialed by the army. 60. Ibid. The army argued that the number had two digits too many for a Swiss account. 61. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, pp. 391-92, gives ISA's origins as FOG and casts General Richard Stilwell (retired), then the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, as the éminence grise of army intelligence who stimulated ISA growth. Jeff Gerth and Philip Taubman, "New Covert U.S Commando Units Said To Raise Concern in Congress,"," New York Times Service, International Herald Tribune (12 June 1984), dates Meyer's creation of ISA proper to October 1980. 62. Christopher Hanson, "Pentagon Forms New Spy Agency, " Reuters (11 May 1983). Gritz said ISA had been convinced in 1981 that there was sufficient evidence U.S. troops were still held captive in Indochina "to warrant a rescue mission, to be code-named 'Grand Eagle.' " He said planning went on for months and involved sending agents into the region to search for secret detention camps but that the official project collapsed because of a turf battle between ISA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 63. Cited in ibid. 64. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 392. 65. Alpern, "Delta Force," Newsweek (16 December 1985). The FBI investigation was first reported in Newsweek, 22 April 1985. 66. "Despite bad publicity in 1982 over leek of oversight and mishandling of some of its $10 million budget, the ISA continues to function throughout 1986." National Security Archive, The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras (New York: Warner, 1987), p. 234, citing Washington Post (17 and 20 February 1987). 67. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 392. 68. National Security Archive, The Chronology, p. 16, citing interviews and New York Times (11 May 1983). 69. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, p. 389. 70. Ibid. 71. National Security Archive, The Chronology, pp. 233-34. 72. The article, by Frank Greve and Ellen Warren, appeared on 16 December 1984 in the Detroit Free Press; it is cited in Christopher Dickey, With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p. 263, and "Missions by U.S. Unit in Nicaragua Reported," International Herald Tribune (17 December 1984). 73. Ibid., citing the Detroit Free Press and AP and UPI cables. "Death Waits in the Dark, " Newsweek (22 April 1985) focused on the hazardous training drills of the unit; the cooperation of unit commander Colonel Terence Henry with Newsweek appears to have been an exercise in damage control after the Free Press allegations. Although Henry provided details on reported training accidents said to have led to the deaths of sixteen "Night Stalkers" in 1983 (60 percent of all army helicopter fatalities in the year, although the unit fielded only 2 percent of the helicopters), the account did not wholly dispel what Newsweek described as "speculation that some of the 1983 training accidents were staged to cover up fatalities the unit incurred in Central America. " 74. "Missions by U.S. Unit," International Herald Tribune (17 December 1984). 75. Ibid. 76. Harold Jackson, "Reagan Battles for 'Contra' Funds," Guardian (London; 18 December 1984).sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAsadar, sa incepem. Delta ForceThe 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D) — commonly known as Delta, Delta Force or the Combat Applications Group (CAG) by the United States Department of Defense, is an elite Special Operations Force (SOF) and an integral element of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). It is the United States' primary counter-terrorist unit.Delta Force's primary tasks are counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and national intervention operations, although it is an extremely versatile group capable of assuming many covert missions, including, but not limited to, rescuing hostages and raids. [1]HistoryThe initial concept of Delta was a direct result of numerous, well-publicized terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1970s. As the threat of terrorism was on the increase and the United States being particularly targeted by enemies abroad, the administration felt it needed a counter-terrorist capability.Key military and government figures had already received briefing on a model for the unit. Charles Beckwith, a member of the US Army Special Forces had served as an exchange officer with the British Special Air Service (22nd SAS Regiment) in the early 1960s. US Army Special Forces in that period focused on unconventional warfare, but Beckwith was impressed with the SAS direct action and counter-terrorism capabilities. He briefed military and government figures, who were also impressed with the SAS concept.Beckwith had estimated that it would take 24 months to set up the unit. As the threat of terrorism was increasing, the administration needed a counter-terrorist capability until Delta became fully operational. The 5th Special Forces Group created Blue Light as a small contingent of men that would train for this mandate. Blue Light existed into the early 1980s until Delta Force was fully operational.November 4, 1979, shortly after Delta had been created, 53 Americans were taken captive and held in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. The unit was assigned to Operation Eagle Claw, with the goal to covertly insert into the country and recover the hostages from the embassy by force on the nights of April 24-25 and 25-26, 1980. The whole mission was a disaster. The review commission which examined the failure found 23 issues with the operation, among them unbriefed weather phenomena encountered by the aircraft, command and control problems between the multi-service component commanders, a collision between a helicopter and a ground-refueling tanker aircraft, and mechanical problems that reduced the number of available helicopters from the initial eight to only five (one fewer than minimum required) before the mission contingent could leave the transloading/refueling site to stage for the attack.[2]After the failed operation, the US government reassessed its counter-terrorist capabilities and as a result created new units including the Navy's SEAL Team Six and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), also known as the "Nightstalkers", particularly focused towards the type of mission like Operation Eagle Claw. The Joint Special Operations Command was also created to control and oversee joint training between the counter-terrorist assets of the various branches of the US military.In 2006, Mark Bowden published, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America's War with Militant Islam, which chronicles the events of the Iran hostage crisis. The book contains first-hand accounts of Delta Force's involvement in the failed rescue attempt. An accompanying piece on The Atlantic Monthly's web site contains pictures and interview videos from some of the participants.[edit] Organization and structureWith most information regarding the unit being highly sensitive, there is no official information regarding specific details. The unit is under the organization of the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) but is controlled by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). A number of sources including the book Inside Delta Force by Command Sergeant Major Eric L. Haney (ret.), suggest the unit’s strength ranges from between 800 to 1000 personnel which includes the following operational elements:[edit] Detachment designations * D - Command and Control (The Headquarters) * E - Communications, Intelligence and Administrative Support (includes finance, logistics, medical detachment, research and development, technology and electronics, etc.) * F - Operational Arm (The operators themselves) * Medical Detachment maintains special doctors at Fort Bragg and various other bases around the country secretly, to provide medical assistance as needed. * Operational Support Troop, or "The Funny Platoon", is the in-house intelligence arm of Delta. They grew out of a long-running dispute/rivalry with the Intelligence Support Activity. They will infiltrate a country ahead of a Delta intervention to gather intelligence. * Aviation Squadron, although Delta relies heavily on the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and US Air Force assets to transport them to and from operational deployments and training exercises, within the unit there is a small aviation squadron used for limited in-house air transportation. The aviation squadron consists of twelve AH-6 Attack and MH-6 Transport helicopters (although this figure may have increased). It is not known if pilots are recruited from the Air Force, 160th SOAR or if they are Delta operators trained as helicopter pilots. The benefit of having enlisted Delta operators flying aircraft is that they could act as “shooters if needed."[3] * Operational Research Section * Training wingDelta Force's structure is similar to the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, the unit which inspired Delta's creator, Charles Beckwith. In Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, Army Times staff writer Sean Naylor describes Delta as having nearly 1,000 operators.[3] Naylor wrote that approximately 250 of those are operators trained to conduct direct action and reconnaissance missions.[3] There are three main operational squadrons: * A Squadron * B Squadron * C SquadronThese squadrons are based on the organization of the SAS "Sabre Squadron" and each contains 75 to 85 operators[4]. Each sabre squadron is broken down into three troops, one Recce/Sniper troop, and two Direct Action/Assault troops, that can either operate in teams or in groups as small as four to six men.[edit] Recruitment and training[edit] RecruitmentMost recruits come from the United States Army Special Forces and the 75th Ranger Regiment, but some operators have come from other units of the Army.[5] Since the 1990s, the Army has posted recruitment notices for the 1st SFOD-D[6] which many believe refers to Delta Force. The Army, however, has never released an official fact sheet for the force. The recruitment notices placed in Fort Bragg's newspaper, Paraglide, refer to Delta Force by name, and label it "...the U.S. Army’s special operations unit organized for the conduct of missions requiring rapid response with surgical application of a wide variety of unique special operations skills..."[7] The notice states that all applicants must be male, in the ranks of E-4 through E-8, have at least two and a half years of services, be 21 years or older and score high enough on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test to attend a briefing to be considered for admission.[edit] Historical selection processAt its inception the selection process was based on the UK SAS model.[8][9] Eric Haney's book Inside Delta Force described the selection course in its inception in detail. Haney writes the selection course began with standard tests including: push-ups, sit-ups, and a 3-mile (4.8 km) run. The selection candidates were then put through a series of land navigation courses to include an 18-mile (29 km), all-night land navigation course while carrying a 35-pound (16 kg) rucksack. The rucksack's weight and the distance of the courses are increased and the time standards to complete the task are shortened with every march. The physical testing ended with a 40-mile (64 km) march with a 45-pound (20 kg) rucksack over very rough terrain which had to be completed in an unknown amount of time. Haney wrote that only the highest-ranking members of the Pentagon are allowed to see the set time limits, but all assessment and selection tasks and conditions were set by Delta training cadre.[9][10] The mental portion of the testing began with numerous psychological exams. The men then went in front of a board of Delta instructors, unit psychologists and the Delta commander, who each ask the candidate a barrage of questions and then dissect every response and mannerism of the candidate with the purpose to mentally exhaust the candidate. The unit commander then approached the candidate and told him if he had been selected. If an individual was then selected for Delta, he underwent an intense 6 month Operator Training Course (OTC), where they learned counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence techniques. This included firearm accuracy and various other munition training.[10] The Central Intelligence Agency's highly secretive Special Activities Division (SAD) and more specifically its elite Special Operations Group (SOG) often recruits operators from the Delta Force.[11][edit] TrainingOn occasion in the past, Delta Force will cross-train with similar units from allied countries such as the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, British Special Air Service and Special Boat Service, Canadian Joint Task Force 2, French GIGN, German GSG 9, and Israeli Sayeret Matkal,[12] as well as helping to train and currently training with other U.S. counter-terrorism units, such as the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team and the Navy's DEVGRU, formerly known as SEAL Team Six.[edit] UniformAmbox outdated content.svg This article's factual accuracy may be compromised because of out-of-date information. Please help improve the article by updating it. There may be additional information on the talk page.The Pentagon tightly controls information about Delta Force and publicly refuses to comment on the secretive unit and its activities.Delta operators are granted an enormous amount of flexibility and autonomy. They will rarely wear any general uniform and civilian clothing is the norm on or off duty.[10] This is done to conceal the identities of these "secret soldiers".[10] When military uniforms are worn, they lack markings, surnames, or branch names.[10] Hair styles and facial hair are allowed to grow to civilian standards in order for the force to be able to blend in and not be immediately recognized as military personnel.[10] This special status, which sets the force apart from the "regular army," is mentioned in the book Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden (though less so in the film of the same name).[13][edit] Operational deploymentsThe majority of the operations assigned to Delta are highly classified and may never be known to the public. However, there are some operations in which the unit has been involved where certain details have been made public. There have been many occasions that Delta have been put on standby and operational plans developed but the unit was stood down for various reasons. These are the known operations the unit has been involved in:[edit] Achille Lauro HijackPresident Ronald Reagan deployed the Navy's SEAL Team Six and Delta during the Achille Lauro Hijack to Cyprus to stand-by and prepare for a possible rescue attempt to free the vessel from its hijackers.[edit] Central American operationsDelta has seen action extensively in Central America, fighting the Salvadoran revolutionary group Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and assisting the Central Intelligence Agency-funded Contras in Nicaragua.[10][edit] Operation Round BottleDelta had planned an operation to go into Beirut, Lebanon to rescue Westerners held by Hezbollah.[edit] Operation Urgent FuryA second Delta mission launched in the early daylight hours of the first day of Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada was to assault Richmond Hill Prison and rescue the "political prisoners" being held there. Built on the remains of an old eighteenth-century fort, the prison cannot be approached by foot from three sides except through dense jungle growing on the steep mountainside; the fourth side is approachable by a narrow neck of road with high trees running along it. The prison offers no place for a helicopter assault force to land. Richmond Hill forms one side of a steep valley. Across and above the valley, on a higher peak, is another old fort, Fort Frederic, which housed a Grenadian garrison. From Fort Frederic, the garrison easily commanded the slopes and floor of the ravine below with small arms and machine gun fire. It was into this valley and under the guns of the Grenadian garrison that the helicopters of Delta Force flew at 6:30 that morning.The helicopters of Task Force 160 flew into the valley and turned their noses toward the prison. Unable to land, the Delta raiders began to rappel down ropes dragging from the doors of the helicopters. Suddenly, as men swung wildly from the rappelling ropes, the helicopters were caught in a murderous cross-fire from the front as forces from the prison opened fire, and more devastatingly, from behind, as enemy forces in Fort Frederic rained heavy small arms and machine gun fire down from above. According to eyewitness accounts by Grenadian civilians who were in houses and in the mental hospital situated above the ravine, a number of helicopters that could, flew out of the valley. In at least one instance, a helicopter pilot turned back without orders and refused to fly into the assault. Charges of cowardice were filed against him by some members of the Delta Force but were later dropped.[edit] Operation Heavy ShadowIn his book Killing Pablo, Mark Bowden suggests that a Delta Force sniper may have eliminated Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar. There is no hard evidence of this though and credit is generally attributed to Colombian security forces.[edit] Aeropostal Flight 252On July 29, 1984 Aeropostal Flight 252 from Caracas to the island of Curaçao was hijacked. Two days later, the DC-9 was stormed by Venezuelan commandos, who killed the hijackers.[14] Delta Force provided advice during the ordeal.[15][edit] Operation Just CauseBefore Operation Just Cause by US forces took place, there were key operations that were tasked to Special Operations Forces. Operation Acid Gambit was an operation tasked to Delta to rescue and recover Kurt Muse held captive in Carcel Modelo, a prison in Panama City. Another important operation that was assigned to Delta was Operation Nifty Package, the apprehension of General Manuel Antonio Noriega.[edit] Operation Desert Shield/Desert StormDelta was deployed during Desert Storm to the region and tasked with a number of responsibilities. These include supporting regular Army units that were providing close protection detail for General Norman Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia. Army relations’ officers tried to play down Schwarzkopf’s growing number of bodyguards. Delta was also tasked with hunting for SCUD missiles alongside the British Special Air Service and other coalition Special Forces.[edit] Operation Gothic SerpentOn 3 October 1993, members of Delta Force were sent in with U.S. Army Rangers in the conflict in Mogadishu, Somalia codenamed Operation Gothic Serpent.They were tasked with securing several of Mohammed Farah Aidid's top lieutenants, as well as a few other targets of high value. The mission was compromised after two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were shot down by RPGs. This resulted in an ongoing battle and led to the death of five Delta operators (a sixth was killed by mortar fire some days later), six Rangers, five Army aviation crew, and two 10th Mountain Division soldiers. Estimates of Somali deaths range from 133 by an Aidid sector commander[16] to an estimate of 1500 to 2000 by the US Ambassador to Somalia.[17] In 1999, writer Mark Bowden published the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, which chronicles the events that surrounded the October 3, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.[13] The book, in a short brief, relates Delta Force's involvement in the operations that occurred before the events leading to the battle.[13] The book was turned into a film by director Ridley Scott in 2001.[edit] Seattle WTOMembers of Delta Force were also involved in preparing security for the 1999 Seattle WTO Conference, specifically against a chemical weapon attack.[18][edit] Counter-terrorist trainingIn January 1997, a small Delta advance team and six members of the British SAS were sent to Lima, Peru immediately following the takeover of the Japanese Ambassador's residence.[19][edit] Operation Enduring FreedomDelta Force was also involved in the offensive against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.[20] Delta Force has formed the core of the special strike unit which has been hunting High Value Target (HVT) individuals like Osama Bin Laden and other key al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership since October 2001, the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. One such operation was an airborne assault supported by the 75th Ranger Regiment on Mullah Mohammed Omar's headquarters at a Kandahar airstrip. Although Delta Force's mission was a failure in capturing Mohammed Omar, the Rangers had captured a vital strategic airstrip. [21]. The strike force has been variously designated Task Force 11, Task Force 20, Task Force 121, Task Force 145 and Task Force 6-26. The Delta Force have also increased operations in eastern Afghanistan in 2009. SFOD-D along with DEVGRU have achieved many victories against the Haqqani newtork, which is a strong faction of the Taliban, moving across the Pakistani border if needed. [22]Operation Iraqi FreedomOne of several operations in which Delta Force operators are thought to have played important roles was the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[23] They allegedly entered Baghdad in advance and undercover. Their tasks included guiding air strikes, and building networks of informants while eavesdropping on and sabotaging Iraqi communication lines. They were also instrumental in Operation Phantom Fury in April 2004 when they were attached to USMC companies, usually as snipers.[24]Delta were also present in the siege in Mosul where Uday and Qusay Hussein were killed, and were also involved in the hunt and eventual capture of Saddam Hussein. It has also been reported that Delta was on the ground north of Baquba on June 7, 2006 surveilling a compound where Al-Zarqawi had been staying. After a long manhunt, Delta had Zarqawi in their sights and had called in an airstrike [25]sursa:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_ForceDelta ForceThis super-secretive US Army outfit goes by several names * Delta Force * 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D) * Combat Applications Group (CAG) * DeltaDelta operators themselves simply refer to their organization as 'the Unit'.Delta Force - RoleDelta's main mission is counter-terrorism (CT). This includes: * hostage rescue * the capture / elimination of terrorist forces * intelligence gathering on terrorist threatsOther roles include: * close protection (guarding VIPs) * unconventional warfareSince their inception, Delta have become masters at the dark arts of counter terrorism. The unit's operators are highly skilled in sniping and close quarters combat (CQB), dynamic and covert entry, explosives and hand-to-hand combat. Over the years, Delta have developed a working knowledge of systems on aircraft, trains, ships and vehicles that enables them to intervene and take control of any scenario in any environment. Regular exercises with US and foreign CT units keeps their skill-set and knowledge-base up-to-date. A Delta Force team is reportedly on immediate standby to respond to a terrorist threat. Delta's CT role overlaps to some degree with the Navy unit, DEVGRUDelta Force - OrganizationDelta Force's structure is similar to the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment, the unit which inspired Delta's creator, Charles Beckworth. The unit is based a Fort Bragg, NC.Delta Force is reportedly organized into 3 Squadrons : * A Squadron * B Squadron * C SquadronEach squadron is made up of 3 Troops * 1 x Recce / Sniper Troop * 2 x Direct Action / Assault troopsDelta is under the command of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and is considered a 'Tier One' Special Mission Unit (SMU).Delta Force - SelectionSoldiers wishing to join Delta Force must undergo a tough selection process.more info : Delta Force selectionAviation PlatoonIt is believed that Delta Force is supported by an Aviation Platoon which operates a small fleet of AH-6 and MH-6 helicopters, some painted in civilian colors. The Aviation Platoon is not to be confused with the 160th SOAR, who also provide helicopter support to Delta Force. The aviation platoon is understood to also fly missions for the CIA.Support elementsDelta are supported by dedicated signalers (radio communications), logistics, medical and intelligence personnel. * signals squadron * support squadronDelta Force - Notable OperationsSince their inception, Delta Force have been involved in a series of operations.more info : Delta Force OperationsDelta Force - WeaponsAside from standard US military weapons, Delta have used a number of specialized firearms.sursa: LINKOpportunitiesOfficer Assignment Opportunities in Delta Force(From: US Army PERSCOM Online)The U.S. Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1stSFOD-D) plans and conducts a broad range of special operations across the operationalcontinuum. Delta is organized for the conduct of missions requiring rapid response with surgical applications of a wide variety of unique skills,whilemaintaining the lowest possible profile of U.S. involvement.Assignment to 1st SFOD-D involves an extensive prescreening process,successful completion of a 3 to 4 week mentally and physically demandingAssessment and Selection Course, and a 6 month operator Training Course.Upon successful completion of these courses officers are assigned to anoperational position within the unit.As an officer in 1st SFOD-D, you will have added opportunities to command at the CPT, MAJ, and LTC levels. You may also serve as an Operations Officer.Afterservice with 1st SFOD-D there are a wide variety of staff positions availableto you at DOD, JCS, DA, USASOC, USSOCOM, and other joint headquarters becauseof your training and experience. In addition, there are interagency positionsavailable to you as well.The prerequisites for an officer are:#Male#Volunteer#U.S. Citizen#Pass a modified Class II Flight Physical#Airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training#Pass a background security investigation and have at leasta secret clearance.#Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), FM 21-20,75points each event in the 22-26 age group, (55 pushups in two minutes,62situps in two minutes, and a 2 mile run in 15:06 or less), wearing yourunit PT uniform.#Minimum of two years active service remaining upon selectionto the unit.#Captain or Major (Branch Immaterial).#Advance Course graduate.#College graduate (BA or BS).#Minimum of 12 months successful command (as a Captain).1st SFOD-D conducts worldwide recruiting twice a year to process potential candidates for the Assessment and Selection Course. Processing for the March Course is from October through January. Processing for the September Course takes place April through July.Assignments with 1st SFOD-D provide realistic training and experiences that are both personally and professionally rewarding.sursa: LINKsi referintele pot continua (mai ales din carti)Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuInceputurileMai intai, imagini surprinse in timpul operatiunii 'Eagle Claw`Tipul inalt si solid cu fes negru si camasa de culoare deschisa este fondatorul si primul comandant al 1st SFOD-D, colonelul Charlie 'Chargin' Beckwith. Langa el, mai mic si mai subtirel, cu camasa de culolare inchisa, generalul-maior James B. Vaught, comandantul intregii operatiuni si fost ofiter din cadrul Rangers. In poza a 3-a de sus, in dreapta, tipul inalt si cu barba (care apare si in poza a 5-a de sus, dar unde nu se distinge prea bine) este actualul general-locotenent in retragere William 'Jerry' Boykin, care a comandat 1st SFOD-D intre 1992-1994 (a fost ranit la Mogadishu, in Somalia, in 1993) si care a particpat, ca maior, la operatiunea Eagle Claw. Tinuta pe care au avut-o operatorii Delta in aceasta misiune: blue jeans, jacheta militara vopsita in negru, fes negru din USNavy si bocanci cu suprafata mata.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuImagini realizate in timpul antrenamentelor de la sfarsitul anilor '70. sfod-d_70s.docRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuImi pare rau ca le dau sub aceasta forma, dar nu am mai gasit adresa de un le-am procurat. Orice ajutor in acest sens ar fi binevenit.In timpul operatiunii "Urgent Fury", din Grenada, in 1983:In timpul operatiunii "Just Cause", in Panama, decembrie, 1989:In "Desert Storm", 1991:[link]Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuImagini suprinse in 1993, in Somalia:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn Afganistan, in 2001 si dupa:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn Irak, 2003 si ulterior:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn Irak, 2003 si ulterior: a_delta_force_soldier_and_a_british_sas_soldier.doc[link]Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuTot din Irak, Iraqi Freedom:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuTask Force 20/121:Cele doua fotografii deloc placute sunt facute dupa operatiunea de la Mosul din iulie 2003, parca, in care au fost ucisi cei doi fii ai lui Saddam Hussein. Ultima fotografie a fost realizata in timpul acelei operatiuni. Operatorii Delta Force se vad mai in fata, au veste tactice mai inchise la culoare si casti de tip MICH2002, tot de culoare inchisa, si sunt incaltati cu ghete de sport.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCompletare pentru Somalia Afganistan si IrakSomalia:Afganistan:In aceasta fotografie, realizata in decembrie 2001, apar operatori Delta imbarcati intr-un camion care ii transporta spre Tora Bora. Din sursa foarte sigura. Irak:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu Patrascu1st SFOD-D la instructie:antrenament comun cu Batalionul 707 pentru Misiuni Speciale "White Tiger" din Coreea de Sudalaturi de jandarmii italieni:imagini mai vechi, antrenamente HALO/HAHORe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCharlie BeckwithBiografie si fotografiiCharles Alvin BeckwithFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, searchCharles Alvin BeckwithJanuary 22, 1929(1929-01-22) – June 13, 1994 (aged 65)Charles Beckwith.jpgNickname "Chargin' Charlie"Place of birth Atlanta, GeorgiaPlace of death Austin, TexasAllegiance United States of AmericaService/branch United States ArmyYears of service 1952—1981Rank ColonelCommands held Support Company, 504th Airborne Infantry RegimentSpecial Forces Detachment B-52 (Project DELTA)2nd Battalion/327th Parachute Infantry Regiment1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-DeltaBattles/wars Korean WarVietnam WarOperation Eagle ClawAwards Distinguished Service Cross ribbon.svg Distinguished Service CrossSilverStar ribbon.jpg Silver Star with Oak Leaf ClusterLegion of Merit ribbon.jpg Legion of MeritBronzeStar ribbon.jpg Bronze StarPurple Heart BAR.svg Purple HeartOther work Security consultantColonel Charles Alvin Beckwith (January 22, 1929 – June 13, 1994), known as "Chargin' Charlie", was a career United States Army soldier and Vietnam veteran, credited with the creation of Delta Force, a branch of the U.S. Army. Although he is held in high regard by various members of the military Special Operations Forces, the general public know him best due to the ill-fated Operation Eagle Claw in Iran, 1980.Early lifeBeckwith was born in Atlanta, Georgia in 1929, and was an all-state football player for his high school team. He later enrolled in the University of Georgia where he played football for the Bulldogs and was a member of the Delta Chapter of the Sigma Chi Fraternity. He joined the university's Army ROTC program and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1952. He was drafted by the Green Bay Packers in 1952 as well but turned it down to stay in the army.[1][edit] Military careerIn 1955, Beckwith joined the 82nd Airborne Division as commander of Support Company, 504th Infantry Regiment. Two years later Beckwith transferred to the Army Special Forces and in 1960 was deployed to South Vietnam and Laos as a military advisor.Beckwith served as an exchange officer with the British Special Air Service (22 SAS Regiment) in the early 1960s. US Army Special Forces in that period focused on unconventional warfare, but Beckwith was impressed with the SAS direct-action and counter-terrorism capabilities.Beckwith commanded a Special Forces unit code-named Project Delta in Vietnam. He was critically wounded in early 1966 (he took a .50 caliber bullet through his abdomen), so badly that medical personnel initially triaged him as beyond help.[2] After recovery, he took over the Florida Phase of the US Army's Ranger School, transforming it from a scripted exercise based upon the Army's World War II experience, into a Vietnam-oriented training regimen.In the late 1960s, Beckwith returned to Vietnam, where he commanded a battalion. In the 1970s he was stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina where he commanded training operations.[edit] Delta ForceDelta Force was founded in November 1977 as an overseas counter-terrorist unit whose main mission is in hostage rescue, barricade operations and specialized reconnaissance. Its first mission (the aforementioned Operation Eagle Claw) ended in abject failure. After the "debacle in the desert" the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment was formed specifically to provide transport for Delta Force, and eventually other Special Operations Forces, worldwide.[edit] Later lifeFollowing his disappointment at the failure of the Iranian operation, Beckwith retired from the army. He started a consulting firm and wrote a book about Delta Force. He died at his home of natural causes.Charles Beckwith was married to Katherine Beckwith, and they had three daughters.Charles Beckwith's remains are interred in the Fort Sam Houston National Cemetery, San Antonio, Texas.[edit] Quotes"My men and I have decided that our boss, the President of the United States, is as tough as woodpecker lips."[citation needed]"I was not about to be party to half-assed loading on a bunch of aircraft and going up and murdering a bunch of the finest soldiers in the world."[citation needed]"I learned that Murphy is alive and well. He's in every drawer, under every rock and on top of every hill."[citation needed]"I'd rather go down the river with seven studs than 100 shitheads"surse: 1. LINK 2. LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuPoveste despre cum poate sa iti scape din mana 'porumbelul' din mana. Am citit cartea tipului asta, 'Dalton Fury'. LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu Patrascu1st SFOD-D nu au insemne distinctive. Pe maneca stanga a vestonului uniformei clasa A (care ocicum va fi inlocuita de Army Service Uniform) se poarta aceasta emblema, care este de fapt insemnul USASOC (US Army Special Operations Command):Acvest tip de emblema, conceput de membrii unitatii, nu a fost adoptat oficial niciodata:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNici acest design nu a fost adoptat in mod oficial:Mai pot fi recunoscuti dupa emblema de boneta care apartine, de fapt, tot USASOC:Nu stiu de ce, D-boys poarta pe tinuta de camuflaj, pe scaiul care de obicei se prinde emblema unitatii, aceste insemne, marcate cu X:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuScuze, rectific: emblema se poarta la bereta, nu la boneta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00roninSunt buni. Imi plac si emblemele lor. Destul de multi sunt americani naturalizati. Hispanicii sunt buni. Si altii. Au si umor !Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisDaca nu sufeream de lene,faceam eu un astfel de topic.Ca un spectator in tribuna,comentez si eu ca daca tot ai tema pe America de Nord,e mai cuprinzator si mai aproape de realitatile politice si militare sa fie pt. ABCA(America,Britain,Canada,Australia).Pe multi i-am auzit spunand ca de fapt,cand vine vorba de facut ceva la modul serios,NATO=ABCA.Structurile militare sunt pregatite cam la aceleasi standarde,integrarea e la un nivel avansat(de ex. un ofiter canadian va prelua comanda unei unitati americane daca rangul sau e superior ofiterului american cel mai inalt in grad)etc... Ca tot aminteam de dezastrele yankeilor,sa incepem cu unul din cele mai recente:operatiunea Redwing LINK .Cartea singurului supravietuitor,Marcus Luttrell,face toti banii,desi ca pt. orice memorii care nu pot fi verificate,anumite semne de intrebare apar. p.s Radu,ai scris cevaRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisUn articol al maiorului John Gant,SF.Cum se indeplineste o misiune clasica a SF.E de remarcat ca parte din principiile care au stat la baza succesului SF se regasesc in strategia COIN a generalului McChrystal. p.s Ce as fi eu curios sa aflu este in ce masura autoritatile centrale afgane(si reprezentantii lor in teritoriu) sunt date la o parte(cu toata deferenta,desigur).Pt. ca e clar ca aia sunt in cel mai bun caz un obstacol.In cel mai rau... Adevarul este ca fara o legatura directa intre autoritatile tribale(sfatul batranilor) si militarii vestici nu se va face nimic bun. one_tribe_at_a_time.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMembri 1st SFOD-D cazuti in diferite conflicte: LINKMaster Sergeant Gary Gordon, mort la 3 octombrie 1993 in MogadishuEste vorba, aici, de Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, mort, alaturi de Gary Gordon, in aceeasi misiune in care au salvat viata pilotului Michael Durant. Iata-i impreuna in fotografia de mai jos: Cei care urmeaza au murit in Irak incepand cu 2003. Detalii privind biografia lor pot fi aflate in pdf-urile de mai jos: Cel din imaginea de deasupra este Master Sergeant Ivica Jerak, croat inrolat in armata americana, devenit operator Delta. usasoc_andres_bio.pdf usasoc_coronett_bio.pdf usasoc_fernandez_bio.pdf usasoc_horigan_bio.pdf usasoc_jerak_bio.pdf usasoc_kolath_bio.pdf usasoc_mcnulty_bio.pdf usasoc_sfc_langmack_bio.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuFosti comandanti ai 1st SFOD-D:Major General William Garrison (1985-1989)Biografie: LINKGeneral Peter Schoomaker (1989-1992)primul ofiter din 1st SFOD-D ajuns general cu 4 stele si, pana acum, singurulBiografie: LINKLieutenant General William Boykin (1992-1994)Un Patton ca temperament, dar animat de fervoare religioasaBiografie: LINKColonel Bernard McCabe (1994-1996)Biografie: LINKCa ofiter, are una dintre cele mai indelungate, daca nu cea mai indelungata cariera din SFOD-D -19 ani !Major general Eldon Bargewell (1996-1998)Primul comandant 1st SFOD-D care si-a inceput cariera ca simplu soldat; a luptat ca sergent in Fortele Speciale in Viet Nam. Biografie: LINKMajor General Garry Harrell (1998-2000)Biografie: LINKA participat in decembrie 1989, ca maior si comandant de troop, la operatiunea "Acid Gambit" in Panama, in urma careia a fost salvat Kurt Muse. Cateva cuvinte care dau seama de intelepciunea acestui batran comandant:LINKBrigadier General James Schwitters (2000-2002)Biografie: LINKBrigadier General Bennett Sakolick (2002-2004) bg_sacolick_bio.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuElite force operates in Kandahar shadowsIf you hear about JTF2, something's gone wrongPublished On Fri Feb 26 2010OTTAWA–There are facts – few and far between – about the exploits of JTF2 in Afghanistan and then there are the long, dark shadows.The unknown is as black as the operations that Canada's premier counterterrorist force conducts in Afghanistan. The facts, relayed by Col. Bernd Horn, former deputy commander of the military wing that runs Joint Task Force Two, are shocking to the uninitiated."Few realize Canadian (special operation forces) personnel have removed an entire generation of Taliban leadership in Kandahar, many of whom were responsible for the deaths of Canadian service personnel," he wrote in the Canadian Military Journal."For individuals who have no understanding of special operation forces, that they exist, how they operate, what they do ... sure it is (a surprise)," Horn said in an interview Thursday from Kingston, where he is now a professor at the Canadian Defence Academy.JTF2, which originally trained for hostage rescue and stealth missions at a base outside Ottawa, has been working alongside British, American, German and other special operation teams since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.Its elite soldiers were honoured by former U.S. president George W. Bush in 2004 for heroism. Along with U.S. Navy SEALs, Delta Force and other nations attached to Task Force K-Bar they killed more than 100 Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters over six months and destroyed training camps."The warriors of ... Task Force K-Bar established an unprecedented 100 per cent mission success rate across a broad spectrum of special operations under extremely difficult and constantly dangerous conditions," the commendation read.But if JTF2 makes it into the news, it often means something has gone wrong. A 2002 photograph showing members of the unit exiting a U.S. military airplane with Afghan detainees is one such example. Then-prime minister Jean Chrétien's Liberal government had denied Canadian soldiers were even taking prisoners at the time.As reported in the Star Thursday, another problem occurred in the winter of 2007 when three of four detainees captured by JTF2 could not be found by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which was tasked with investigating prisoners' well-being. The incident is contained in censored government documents that are at the centre of the Afghan detainee saga.In early 2007, a contingent of Canadian special forces was operating from the former compound of Taliban cleric Mullah Omar west of Kandahar city. Canadians knew the base as Graceland but it was better known by its U.S. name of Camp Gecko or Firebase Maholic.Apart from U.S., Canadian and other international special forces, the base is believed to house CIA officers and, some suspect, Canadian spies who operate in Kandahar.Sean Maloney, a historian at the Royal Military College, said the difficulty as an academic is sorting out whether the rank-and-file army or the secretive work of JTF2 should get credit for battlefield victories."This is spy-versus-spy stuff," he said. "There's two wars. There's the conventional war and there's the shadow war and they intersect."Horn says the strategic boost that special operation forces have provided to the Canadians in Kandahar is like an "invisible hand.""You don't hear about them. However, they are having a dramatic effect in the operational theatre." Sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuJoint Task Force Two (JTF 2)Welcome to Joint Task Force TwoJoint Task Force Two (JTF 2) is the Canadian Forces (CF) Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit responsible for a broad range of missions, which could include counter-terrorism operations and armed assistance to other government departments. This mandate was inherited from the Special Emergency Response Team of the RCMP, who maintained this responsibility from 1986 until 1993, at which time the federal government transferred the role to the CF.MissionJTF 2 is responsible for providing to Canada a force capable of rendering armed assistance in the resolution of an issue or a potential issue that affects national security. While JTF 2’s primary role is counter-terrorism, its personnel can be employed in any type of military operations, which include, but are not limited to, surveillance, security advice and close personal protection.Background InformationCanadians served with distinction in several types of Allied Special Forces units during the Second World War. One such unit was the legendary U.S. and Canadian combined 1st Special Service Force or, as it was commonly known, "the Devil's Brigade." It achieved a sterling combat record despite overwhelming odds. While tactics, weapons and technology have changed, today's JTF 2 soldiers are perpetuating the basic qualities that define such units.JTF 2 was created on April 1, 1993, when the Canadian Forces (CF) accepted responsibility for federal counter-terrorism operations from the RCMP. Since its inception, the unit has continuously evolved to meet modern-day threats. As the events of 11 September 2001 have shown, the threat of terrorism comes from an elusive, sophisticated and determined enemy. In order to maintain an edge in this operational environment, JTF 2 is continuously developing new capabilities, technologies, and tactics.The year 2001 marked an important milestone in the history of JTF 2. The unit was committed to the international Special Operations Forces coalition in Afghanistan, completing its operations there in November 2002. This deployment was the first time JTF 2 was used in a major combat role outside Canada. The unit played a critical role in coalition Special Operations Forces and earned the respect of Canada’s allies for its professionalism.Unit AccountabilityJTF 2 is a unit of the CF and is subject to exactly the same code of conduct, military discipline and overriding Criminal Code statutes as any other military unit. Due to the strategic nature of its operations, the unit answers directly to the Commander of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. This allows for very timely command and control, access to strategic intelligence, and the oversight considered essential for military operations undertaken to meet national objectives. The Commander Canadian Special Operations Forces is accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff who, in turn, is responsible to the Minister of National Defence.Like other units of the CF, JTF 2 follows Rules Of Engagements (ROE) authorized by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Its members are entitled to the same support and health services as other service members, they are accountable to the military and civilian justice systems, and they must follow the same regulations and orders as the rest of the CF. Like any other CF unit, internal oversight bodies such as the Chief of Review Services, the Military Police Complaints Commission, the Pay and Allowances Review Board, the Access to Information Office and the CF Ombudsman all have access to JTF 2, if required, to carry out their duties.SecurityJTF 2 is subject to very stringent security procedures in order to protect the unit and its mission. Indeed, the type of operations assigned to JTF 2 naturally captures the interest of the public but there are many risks involved with information disclosure. The CF recognizes the need to inform Canadians about the measures put in place by their Government to protect them against the threat of terrorism. Since its creation, JTF 2 has conducted numerous capability demonstrations for appropriate authorities that need to be aware of unit capabilities as part of their position or appointment. Such audiences include the CF chain of command, Members of Parliament, government officials and police authorities. The Government has also informed Canadians about JTF 2 by notifying the public about its creation in 1992, its expansion following 11 September 2001, the JTF 2 commitment to Afghanistan in 2001 and 2005, awarding of the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation to unit members and by responding to media questions about the unit within the limits of the security policy. However, being open and transparent about certain aspects of the unit could seriously compromise the effectiveness of Canada's counter-terrorism capability. History has shown only too clearly that terrorist organizations will use information about a unit's personnel, weapons, tactics and procedures to great effect by modifying their methodologies to counter the very forces designed to defeat them.JTF 2 has established itself as a well-regarded Special Operations Forces unit. It has done so over its short history because of the outstanding quality and ability of its members, its proven operational effectiveness and its stringent operational security policy. This reputation has allowed the unit to develop strong relationships with its allied Special Operations Forces counterparts, relationships built on trust and confidence. These relationships assist JTF 2 in providing the best possible counter-terrorism defence for Canada. The CF security policy for JTF 2 is primarily based on Canada's situation, and is designed to safeguard information sharing and most importantly to protect Canada's counter-terrorist capability.The FutureThe Federal Budget of December 2001 allocated approximately $120 million over six years to expand unit capabilities, as part of the Government of Canada's overall plan to enhance security for Canadians following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Since then the unit has embarked on a program of expansion and capability enhancement while at the same time maintaining its high operational and training standards.JTF 2 must be ready to respond immediately to any task assigned by the chain of command at home or abroad. The unit maintains the highest operational readiness standards in order to defend Canada against terrorism. On land, at sea and in the air JTF 2 challenges itself to ensure it's ready to defeat a multitude of potential threats. Canadians can take great comfort in the knowledge that as an integral part of Canada's Special Operations Forces community, JTF 2 stands on guard 24 hours a day to defend Canadians, and Canadian interests at home and abroad.The Ideal CandidateThe strength of JTF 2, like any CF unit, lies in the quality of its personnel. JTF 2 personnel are often placed in situations where their lives or the lives of others are at stake, and as such, the consequences of selecting the wrong person for service with JTF 2 can be grave. Personal attributes that contribute most to success at JTF 2 are: * A high level of maturity in both one’s professional and personal life; * Excellent overall fitness, agility and reflexes; * The ability to work independently and as a member of a team; * The ability to communicate effectively; and * A high degree of dedication and determination.Categories of PersonnelThe unit is comprised of various categories of personnel: * Special Operations Assaulters (SOA) are personnel of the Regular Force (Ref F) who are directly employed in the tactical aspects of special operations and other high value tasks; * Special Operations Coxswain (SO Cox'n) who are selected from the NCM Regular (Reg) and Reserve (Res) Force (F) occupations to fulfil JTF 2 requirements of Coxswains (SO Cox’n); and * Support Personnel (SP) and Specialists (Spec) are personnel who are selected from Reg and Res Force MOS to fulfil JTF 2 requirements in Staff Officer, support, and specialist positions.Special Operations Assaulters (SOA)Special Operations Assaulters are responsible for conducting a wide variety of Special Operations and counter-terrorism tasks such as hostage rescue operations, special operations patrols, surveillance, offensive actions, and close personal protection. In order to be fully prepared to work in all types of environments when deployed on operation, JTF 2 personnel train extremely hard in world-class facilities.In order to be ready to carry out their taskings, Special Operations Assaulters must possess physical strength and stamina as well as mental endurance. They must function well in team settings, demonstrate maturity, assume responsibility well beyond that normally expected of them in a traditional CF role, be able to exercise integrity and honesty, and be emotionally stable.The SOA category is open to Regular and Reserve Force volunteers of both genders belonging to any MOS and may range in rank from Pte/AB to WO/PO1, and Lt/SLt to Capt/Lt(N). Sgt and WO will have to relinquish their rank to the rank of MCpl/MS upon completion of the Special Operation Assaulter Course (SOAC). Regular Force personnel must be MOS qualified and have a minimum of two (2) years of service. Reservists must be MOS qualified, have a minimum of three (3) years service, and be prepared to complete a component transfer to the Reg F and commit to an initial four (4) year period of service on completion of the Special Operations Assaulter Course (SOAC). Reserve Force officers must be fully MOS qualified to Reg F standards and are required to forward a resume and a copy of their Primary Reserve Record Resume (PRRR) to the JTF 2 Recruiting NCO prior to applying for a SOA position in order to screen for eligibility. All applicants require a minimum medical category of 322225.Although Base or Wing PSOs (B/WPSO) screen CF volunteers on a continuous basis, a CANFORGEN is promulgated each year that announces the cut-off date for applications.Special Operations CoxswainThe Special Operations Coxswain (SO Cox’n) is now open to NCM and Officer. The primary responsibility of the SO Cox’n is to operate the units’ boats and Special Operations Craft (SOC) in open ocean environments during maritime counter-terrorism operations and training, under adverse conditions and with minimal supervision.SO Cox’n employment is very challenging and extremely demanding. Coxswains spend a considerable portion of their time away, training to improve their abilities to maneuver and maintain high-speed boats in order to support JTF 2 maritime operations. SO Coxn’s also must develop their shooting and insertion skills.In light of the above-mentioned responsibilities, SO Cox’ns must possess physical strength and stamina to fulfill their mandate. They must be resistant to motion/sea sickness, have no fear of heights, water, or confined spaces, have good hand/eye coordination, and be emotionally stable.This specialty is open to both genders of any MOS, ranging in rank from Pte/AB to Sgt/PO2 and Lt/Slt to Capt/Lt(N). Regular Force personnel must be MOS qualified and have a minimum of two years of service. Reservists must have a minimum of three (3) years service, and be prepared to commit to a four (4) year period of service upon completion of the Special Operations Craft Course (SOCC). All SO Cox’n applicants require a minimum medical category of 322225.Note: The SO Cox’n position is only open on an as-required basis. When more specialists are required, the announcement will be made through the promulgation of a CANFORGEN.Support Personnel (SP) and SpecialistsJTF 2 also employs Officers and NCMs from a variety of occupations to support daily operations and in specialists’ positions. In addition, Combat Storeman and Squadron Quartermaster positions are open to Combat Arms MOS and Regimental Police positions are available to applicants from any occupation at the rank of Cpl/MCpl.A variety of positions for officer applicants are also open on an as-required basis. Interested personnel should contact the Support Recruiting NCO for more information on those positions available each year, as this is not promulgated in the yearly CANFORGEN.SP and Spec positions are open to both genders of any MOS listed above. At a minimum, NCMs must have their QL5 qualification in their current MOS. Applications from Sig Op, Sup Tech and RMS Clk will be accepted from candidates who have completed QL3 in their current occupation and be of the rank of Pte(T). MP must have completed QL3 and PEP to be eligible. Officers (Reg and Res) must be fully qualified to Reg F standards in their current MOS. All SP and Spec applicants must meet the required medical standards for their current MOS.Selection Update***Due to operational requirements, members with a criminal record must receive a pardon prior to applying to JTF2.Special Operations AssaulterTraditionally, JTF2 has conducted its Assaulter selection in the Fall with the Special Operations Assaulter Course (SOAC) being held in Jan of the following year.Henceforth, JTF2 will conduct its Assaulter selection during the Apr-May timeframe (exact dates TBA). The SOAC will be held from Sep of the same year to Jun of the following year in order to better synchronize with the CF’s APS.The first spring selection will be held in Apr - May 2010. Applications for phase III, Assaulter selection, must be received by the JTF2 Recruiting and Selection NLT 5 Mar 2010.The SOAC course originally scheduled for Jan - Oct 2010 will now be held Sep 2010 - Jun 2011.Special Operations CoxwainSelection will be held 9 -15 Apr 2010.The course will be held 18 Apr to 31 Jul 2010.Applications for phase III, Cox’n, must be received by the JTF2 Recruiting and Selection NLT 5 Mar 2010.Support and Specialist PositionsAll members selected for specialist positions and all deployable support personnel within JTF2 will be required to complete conduct after capture (CAC) training as well as a unit indoctrination course which will further assess the member’s suitability to serve with JTF2.All other support personnel will be required to complete the unit indoctrination course.Special Operations Assaulter Selection ProcessApplicants for employment as Special Operations Assaulters must be prepared to complete a rigorous screening and training process. This is comprised of four (4) phases:Phase I: Members apply at the unit level through their chain of command completing both the Application for Service with JTF 2 form, which includes a verification of their medical category as well as a signature from their Adjt/XO/AdminO that authorizes the applicant to proceed with the selection process, and the Consent for Disclosure of Criminal Information form. These application forms are also available through the B/WPSO.Phase II: Applicants must successfully complete the JTF 2 physical fitness test and the CF Swim Test administered by PSP staff. A JTF 2 physical fitness-training program has been developed and is available at PSP offices. It is strongly recommended that interested members follow this program, as recent unit research confirmed that those who adhere to the program generally enjoy greater levels of success. In addition, upon successful completion of the physical fitness test, members must contact the B/WPSO’s office in order to undergo a screening process, which includes completing a cognitive ability test and a selection interview with the B/WPSO to assess attributes identified as being critical for JTF 2 applicants.Phase III: Members who are invited to attend Phase III selection undergo a seven-day assessment process designed to assess whether candidates are likely to succeed during the SOAC, and to assess if they possess the personal attributes required for employment with JTF 2. The process is very demanding and pushes candidates to their physical and mental limits. Candidates are assessed on numerous criteria, which include: physical fitness (aerobic and anaerobic); performing effectively at heights, in water and in confined spaces; working as a member of a team; problem solving; and interpersonal skills. Assessments are conducted in high stress tactical settings to assess an applicant’s ability to recall directions, identify and react to threats, handle weapons safely, and make decisions under physical and mental duress.Officer Selection: Officers are required to successfully complete the initial seven-day assessment process and an additional three-day session, which is designed to assess the members’ organizational, analytical, communication, and presentation skills.Phase IV: Special Operator's Assaulter Course (SOAC).ServiceSuccessful JTF 2 applicants will attend a SOAC that is approximately seven months long. Following successful completion of the SOAC, members can expect to serve with the unit for an indeterminate period. A recently implemented “Managed Specialty” now allows for assaulters to sign on in that capacity after a three-year journeymen period (SOAC plus two years), have their career managed by the JTF 2 Career Manager and follow a specific assaulter career progression model. Special Operations Assaulters receive a monthly productivity award in addition to the same financial benefits as other CF members.Job SkillsAn entry-level Assaulter may be expected to employ various skills that include: * Proficient and safe handling of a variety of civilian and military weapons; * Proficient and safe handling of a variety of explosives which include basic and breaching charges; * Operating a variety of communications equipment; * Providing an initial response to various casualty victims; * Performing fieldcraft, patrolling and navigation; * Working as a member of a team to perform insertion and extraction drills using land, sea and air equipment; and * Performing fast rope and rappelling descents.Note: Junior officers will become proficient in Assaulter skills and, in addition, will be responsible for leading tactical groupings.Special Operations Coxswain Selection ProcessApplicants for employment as SO Cox’n must be prepared to complete a rigorous screening and training process. This is comprised of four (4) phases:Phase I: Members apply at the unit level through their chain of command completing both the Application for Service with JTF 2 form, which includes a verification of their medical category as well as a signature from their Adjt/XO/AdminO that authorizes the applicant to proceed with the selection process, and the Consent for Disclosure of Criminal Information form. These application forms are also available through the B/WPSO.Phase II: Applicants must successfully complete the appropriate JTF 2 Physical Fitness Test and the CF Swim Test administered by PSP staff. A JTF 2 physical fitness-training program has been developed and is available at PSP offices. It is strongly recommended that interested members follow this program. Upon successful completion of the physical fitness test, members must contact the B/WPSO’s office in order to undergo a screening process, which includes completing a cognitive ability test and a selection interview with the B/WPSO to assess attributes identified as being critical for JTF 2 applicants.Phase III: Members who are invited to attend SO Cox’n selection undergo a four-day assessment process designed to determine whether candidates are likely to succeed during the SOCC, and to assess if they possess the personal attributes required for employment with JTF 2. The process is very demanding and pushes candidates to their physical and mental limits. Candidates are assessed on numerous criteria, including, physical fitness (aerobic and anaerobic), performing effectively at heights, in water and in confined spaces, working as a member of a team, emotional stability, interpersonal skills and boat handling. Assessments are conducted in high stress tactical settings to assess an applicant’s ability to recall directions, handle watercraft, and make decisions under physical and mental duress.Phase IV: Special Operations Craft Course (SOCC).ServiceSuccessful SO Cox’n applicants will attend a SOCC that is approximately three (3) months in duration. Following successful completion of training, members can expect that their initial tour length to be a fixed four (4) year posting. SO Cox’ns receive a monthly productivity award in addition to the same financial benefits as other CF members.Job SkillsAn entry-level SO Cox’n may be expected to employ various skills that include: * Preparing, launching and high speed tactical driving of the SOC; * Navigating to/from operational and training objectives; * Performing user maintenance on the SOC, vehicles and trailers; * Special Insertion / Extraction Techniques; * Proficiently and safely handling a variety of civilian and military weapons. * Advanced shooting, medical and communications skills.Support and Specialist Selection ProcessApplicants for employment in a SP and Spec role at JTF 2 must be prepared to complete a selection process, which is comprised of a number of steps:Phase I: Members apply at the unit level through their chain of command completing both the Application for Service with JTF 2 form, which includes a verification of their medical category as well as a signature from their Adjt/XO/AdminO that authorizes the applicant to proceed with the selection process, and the Consent for Disclosure of Criminal Information form. These application forms are also available through the B/WPSO.Phase II: Applicants must successfully complete a physical fitness test, administered by PSP staff. Specs’ positions require the JTF 2 physical fitness test and most SP positions require CF EXPRES, exempt level preferred.Phase III: A copy of the application form, fitness test results, the member’s MPRR (PPE 806), and a signed Consent for Disclosure of Criminal Information form are to be forwarded to the JTF 2 Support Recruiting NCO.Phase IV: JTF 2 will review applications and invite members for an employment interview based on their superior trade skills, job performance, and personnel profile. Members who are invited for screening will undergo a formal job interview and psychological assessment at JTF 2.Note: If successful on Phase IV, the members on completion of posting instructions and In-Clearance at JTF2 will attend a Unit Indoctrination Course of two weeks for Support personnel and three weeks for Specialists. This course is aimed at new members joining the unit to introduce them and familiarize themselves with all aspects of the unit day-to-day operations and its routine.ServiceSuccessful applicants for SP and Spec positions are generally posted with JTF 2 for a period of four to six years, depending upon rank and experience. All eligible Reg and Res Force personnel are welcome to apply, and applications are considered valid for a period of one year. However, only those individuals who are invited for formal processing will be informed of their file status. While employed at JTF 2, SP and Spec receive the same financial benefits as other CF members, in addition to a monthly productivity awardNote: that SP and Spec positions are open on an as-required basis.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCounter-TerrorismNational Counter-Terrorism PlanThe Solicitor General of Canada, under the authority of the Government of Canada, is responsible for the National Counter-Terrorism Plan. The plan establishes lines of communication and policy to guide officials in resolving a terrorist incident. It also describes the authorities and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies in a counter-terrorism situation, and outlines the legislation, conventions and agreements to which Canada is a party. The procedures for employing a military unit in a counter-terrorism situation are also detailed in the National Counter-Terrorism Plan.The Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions (CFAAD) establishes the procedures for the request and provision of armed assistance by the CF to the RCMP to resolve disturbances affecting the national interest. Provisions have also been made to ensure that CF resources can be expeditiously positioned close to the site of a disturbance while the situation is developing, and before any armed assistance is authorized.The CFAAD come into play on the basis of a request by either: * The Commissioner of the RCMP submitting to the Chief of the Defence Staff for the positioning of a military force in anticipation of a request from the Solicitor General; or * The Solicitor General of Canada submitting to the Minister of National Defence for the provision of such assistance by the CF to the RCMP, and for the purpose of assisting in suppressing, preventing or otherwise dealing with the disturbance.CF members engaged in armed assistance activities would be given the status of peace officers.As with any unit of the CF, JTF 2 can be called upon to support or respond to disturbances in Canada. However, the unit’s counter-terrorism mandate is to provide an immediate response, as a force of last resort, to terrorist events or major disturbances affecting the national interest. To ensure the appropriate use of JTF 2, this formal request procedure is in place to guide officials when asking for assistance.Myths Regarding JTF 2Myth 1 - JTF 2 is a para-military organization.Answer - No, JTF 2 is a military organization comprised of Canadian Forces personnel from a wide range of occupations. The unit was created on April 1, 1993 when the Canadian Forces accepted responsibility for federal counter-terrorism operations from the RCMP.Myth 2 - JTF 2 only selects combat arms members.Answer - JTF 2 is comprised of assaulters and supporting members, all of whom are Canadian Forces personnel from a wide range of military occupations and all elements of the Canadian Forces. All members are carefully screened for service in the various elements that comprise JTF 2.Myth 3 - JTF 2 does not accept female applicants.Answer - Any Canadian Forces member, irrespective of gender, who completes the JTF 2 selection process and is deemed eligible for service may be given an opportunity to serve with the unit. The standards established for selection and employment with JTF 2 are scientifically designed and validated at the Canadian Forces Dwyer Hill Training Centre in order to ensure that the members selected will be capable of accomplishing all tasks assigned to the unit. These standards are not gender specific and encompass the individuals’ physical abilities, professional skill sets, integrity, psychological profile, mental aptitude, discipline, and maturity. These standards are not just used for selecting new members, they are maintained throughout the unit and are ingrained in the JTF 2 ethos.Myth 4 - As a member of JTF 2, your family will never know where you are.Answer - Many of the missions assigned to JTF 2 in support of Canadian security necessitate a stringent operational security policy. As such, many unit missions require that JTF 2 members provide little to no deployment details to their family. Despite these security precautions, every opportunity is made to ensure adequate communication between unit members and their family during deployments. Also, like any other CF unit, JTF 2 ensures that a number of support services are available to unit member’s families at all times.Top of PageMyth 5 - JTF 2 members have a higher than average divorce rate.Answer - Divorce rates for JTF 2 members are comparable to those of the Canadian Forces average.Myth 6 - You must know someone within JTF 2 to get into the unit.Answer - Any Canadian Forces member who successfully completes the JTF 2 distinctive selection process for assaulter/supporter training and is deemed eligible for service may be given an opportunity to serve with the unit. The JTF 2 selection process has been scientifically validated, and knowing someone within JTF 2 will not provide prospective candidates with an advantage over others.Myth 7 - You must be single to serve in the unit.Answer - The marital status of a Canadian Forces member has no bearing on their eligibility for service with JTF 2.Myth 8 - You cannot have any tattoos to be eligible for service with JTF 2.Answer - Tattoos or other physical identifiers do not have any bearing on a Canadian Forces member’s eligibility for service with JTF 2. A prospective candidate who successfully completes the JTF 2 selection process and is deemed eligible for service may be given an opportunity to serve with the unit.Myth 9 - Recruiting for JTF 2 is done outside the unit chain of command.Answer - Recruiting for JTF 2 is coordinated and conducted under the authority of the unit chain of command. Recruiting drives are conducted throughout Canada, permitting prospective candidates an opportunity to ask questions about service with the unit and counter similar myths.Top of PageMyth 10 - Once posted to JTF 2 you cannot leave the unit.Answer - Canadian Forces members who successfully complete the JTF 2 selection process and are deemed eligible for service with JTF 2 may be given an opportunity to serve with the unit. Although time served with the unit varies from member to member, regulations require members to serve a minimum amount of time with the unit prior to returning to their home units.Myth 11 - JTF 2 conducts activities outside the law.Answer - All JTF 2 activities are conducted within the bounds of Canadian Law. Furthermore, the Government of Canada authorizes the overall missions and tasks undertaken by JTF 2, at all times. The unit is accountable to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Chief of the Defence Staff is accountable to the Minister of National Defence who, as a Minister of the Crown, is responsible to the Prime Minister of Canada. canadian_special_forces_jtf2_training.flv joint_task_force_2_deeds_not_words.flvRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn ultimele 6 fotografii, operatorii JTF2 sunt in misiune de escorta a premierului canadian Stephen Harper.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuJTF2 il escorteaza pe ministrul canadian al Apararii, Peter MacKay.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuFilmul unei misiuni de salvare din Irak la care au participat si operatori 1stSFOD-D. 1st_sfod_rescue.flvRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMda, vad ca nu merge. Din pacate, se pare ca acest filmulet nu se mai gaseste pe net. Iata altceva, in schimb. Sper sa mearga. LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00ronin*********************************************************************Military Intelligence Professional BulletinAici puteti gasi buletinele informative trimestriale (Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin) ale spionajului militar american.Buletinele informative cuprind perioada oct.-dec. 1995 - apr.-iun. 2009.LINKLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMultumesc, Ronin. Foarte interesant link. Voi incepe sa citesc pe indelete articolele existente in portalul respectiv.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00roninRadu Patrascu wrote ...Multumesc, Ronin. Foarte interesant link. Voi incepe sa citesc pe indelete articolele existente in portalul respectiv. Cu placere Radu P.La tine m-am gandit atunci cand l-am preluat.(printre altii)Iti asteptam cartea. Sper sa prinzi bine legatura dintre "humint" si "operatii speciale".Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00spyologyDraga Ronin,Dupa cum ai observat deja, pe forumul pe care il conduc de ceva timp (spyology) ruleaza un script care ataseaza un link automat atunci cand tu utilizezi copy/paste ca sa produci postari in numele tau pe alte forumuri. Ar fi fost civilizat sa utilizezi ghilimelele sau macar sa indici sursa. Eu chiar muncesc la postarile de acel gen, nu plagiez pe nimeni. Faptul ca ai sters voit link-ul automat nu iti face cinste.Forumul pe care il conduc este departe de a avea valoarea celui de fata. Tocmai de aceea ma simt onorat de existenta unui link permanent spre Spyology. Si da, spre deosebire de tine eu nu adaug singur link-urile spre forumul meu. Nu ma intereseaza nici traficul, nici numarul de utilizatori, nici numarul de postari. Nu fac insa rabat la calitate si nu admit ca munca mea (fie ea putina su nu) sa fie insusita de altii.Trebuie sa intelegi ca lumea este mica, ne calcam pe bombeu in acest domeniu. Cu certitudine link-ul infiintat de catre administratorii Semperfidelis este vizitat de cei interesati. Nu numai de catre tine.Si inca ceva: ceea ce nu ai inteles este ca eu nu "am preluat" acea mica postare. Pur si simplu am adunat informatiile, m-am documentat cu ajutorul colaboratorilor de la Intellforum si am postat un link cu un mic comentariu. O viitoare polemica pe aceasta tema nu are rost, motivele sunt meschine si cronofage.Stiu, postarea mea este off topic, insa am considerat ca acesta este locul potrivit pentru a raspunde.Utilizatorului Radu Patrascu ii cer scuze pentru faptul ca m-am abatut cu mult de la topicul deschis.Cu stima,the shadowRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00ex-adofftopic: mi se pare un pic exagerata replica ta, spyology, pentru o simpla propozitie postata de ronin, cu atit mai mult cu cit a fost introdus si link-ul catre postarea din forumul tau... ronin s-a dovedit mereu corect pe site-ul nostru, drept pentru care mi-e greu sa cred ca pe altele ar proceda altfel...in al doilea rind, nimeni nu se calca pe bombeu cu nimeni, fiindca forumurile noastre sint complet diferite atit ca tematica, cit si ca anvergura (cum tu singur ai spus-o)... link-ul catre spyology l-am bagat in prima pagina in semn de apreciere a muncii depuse de tine pe o nisa pe care nu multi se incumeta sa intre...Radu, scuze si pentru replica mea, sper sa nu ne bagi in seama si sa continui postarile tale, fiindca e unul dintre cele mai bune topicuri de pe acest forum...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00roninputin off:@the shadow LINK"nu este nervos, ci calm; stăpân pe stările interioare; optimist; tip controlat; răbdător;" LINKon:Cartierul general NSA, undeva langa Washington DC."Iata ca NSA (National Security Agency) s-a gandit la comemorarea criptologilor care au "servit in tacere" interesele SUA si au cazut la datorie sau si-au dedicat viata criptologiei si criptografiei. Zidul, ridicat in 1996 cuprinde un numar de 161 de numeale personalului militar si civil din Armata, Marina, Fortele Aeriene care si-au dat viata servind interesele USA."Cred ca (si) la acest capitol, romanii exceleaza.Citeşte mai mult: LINKvizitati spyology - intelligence online spyologyRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuUn D-boy in Irak.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuFata de britanici, in SUA lucrurile se petrec in mod diferit. Asta si pentru ca dimensiunile USSOCOM pot satisface ambitiiile celui mai compentent ofiter. Numai JSOC (structura care comanda 1st SFOD-D, DEVGRU, ISA, JSCU etc) are in fruntea sa 5 generali: unul cu 3 stele, doi cu 2 stele si inca doi cu o stea. Asadar, cariera unui ofiter se poate desfasura de la intrarea in serviciu pana la retragere doar in USSOCOM (au existat cazuri). In ceea ce priveste specializare, la 1 oct. 1984, US Army a creat specializarea Special Forces pentru subofiteri, career management field 18 (CMF 18), urmata, la scurt timp, de cea a maistrilor militari -traducere aproximativa a termenului de "warrant officer" (18 OA), iar la 9 aprilie 1987, pentru ofiteri (18A). Mi se pare interesant nu doar modul in care militari ajung din Special Forces, de exemplu, in 1st SFOD-D, ci si drumul in sens invers, dinspre Delta spre Special Forces (asta este valabil pentru ofiterii din Delta care anterior nu au fost in SF -multi provenind din batalioanele regimentului 75 Rangers). (2) Alternate accession method. As an alternate accession method,an officer may branch transfer to Special Forces by first joiningone of the Army’s SMUs, such as the 1st Special Forces OperationalDetachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D). This unit is specially accessed,trained and organized to conduct a broad range of specialoperations missions. Officers volunteering for 1st SFOD-D mustmeet the following prerequisites:(a) Be a captain or a major.(b) Be a Captains Career Course (OAC) graduate.(c) Be a college graduate.(d) Have successfully commanded for a minimum of 12 monthsat the captain branch qualifying level.(e) Have passed a High Altitude Low Opening (HALO)/Selfco n t a i n e d U n d e r w a t e r B r e a t h i n g A p p a r a t u s ( S C U B A ) p h y s i c a lexamination.(f) Have passed the Army Physical Fitness Test and be able toswim 100 meters while wearing combat boots and the BDU.(g) Have successfully completed both the 1st SFOD-D Assessmentand Selection program, and the 1st SFOD-D Operator TrainingCourse.(h) Must branch transfer to Special Forces branch at the grade ofcaptain or, on a case by case basis, at the grade of major if branchqualifying standards can be met prior to selection to lieutenantcolonel. If the officer elects to branch transfer to Special Forces, 1stS F O D - D t r o o p c o m m a n d e r d u t y w i l l c o n s t i t u t e S p e c i a l F o r c e sbranch qualification at the grades of captain and major. The officermust successfully complete SFDOQC prior to branch transfer. Allofficers who volunteer for an extension of their current SFOD assignmentsor volunteer for follow-on SFOD assignments must meetthe standards of 1st SFOD-D’s Formal Periodic Assessment Process or Follow-on Reassessment Process. Repetitive assignments to 1stSFOD-D should be consistent with the needs of the Army, the unitand the officer’s professional development.sursa: Department of the Army Pamphlet 600–3, CommissionedOfficer Development and Career Management, p. 80-81Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDaca un capitan din SFOD-D, comandant de troop (numarul operatorilor care servesc in acest esalom este secret, dar se pare ca depaseste 20) doreste sa intre in SF, unde va comanda un SFOD-A de 12 militari, va fi asadar, nevoit sa absolve SFDOQC (Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course) care ii aduce specializarea 18A, nefiind obligata sa parcurga SFAS (Special Forces Assessment and Selection, presupunandu-se ca selectia pentru Delta a fost mai grea. Maiorii di locotenenti-coloneii din SFOD-D care doresc sa patrunda in Special Forces nu sunt obligati, in schimb, sa absolve niciunul din aceste cursuri, dupa cum o dovedeste fragmentul de mai jos:Special Forces Operational Detachment-D, although not an SF unit, is auniquely trained, highly responsive, low-profile special-operations unit withmany SF officer authorizations. Chapter 14 of DA Pam 600-3, Officer ProfessionalDevelopment, dated June 8, 1995, discusses the integration of SFODDservice into the SF officer’s career life cycle. It may be summarized as follows:A non-SF branch member may be accessed into SF after beingaccessed into SFOD-D. He must complete the SFOD-D Assessment andSelection and the SFOD-D Operators Training Course. If the officer elects totransfer to the SF Branch, SFOD-D troop-commander service will fulfill SFcaptainbranch qualification. SFAS is waiverable, but the officer must completeSFDOQC to branch-transfer. A qualified SF Branch officer who volunteersfor SFOD-D must attend the SFOD-D Assessment and Selection andthe SFOD-D Operators Training Course. SF branch-qualifying positions inSFOD-D are squadron operations officer (major); SFOD-D deputy commander(lieutenant colonel); and squadron commander (lieutenant colonel — an“additional qualification,” per DA Pam 600-3).SF officers are encouraged to seek SFOD-D assignments but to balanceassignments between “black” and “white” SOF. A combination of assignmentscan enhance an officer’s professional qualifications and career opportunities,especially for command selection. Officers who spend most of theircareers either in SFOD-D or in SF groups are unlikely to be “best-qualified”for DA selection as a commander in the other type of unit.sursa: Special Warfare. The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare and School, October 1995 Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 43. De observat flexibilitatea care i se recomanda ofiterului in managementul carierei sale.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn interiorul comunitatii pentru operatiuni speciale americane exista alte probleme. Acestea sunt legate, mai ales, de subutilizarea capacitatilor asociate razzboiului neconventional, specific Fortelor Speciale, in raport cu cele care le revin unitatilor cu expertiza in actiuni directe (SFOD-D, DEVGRU, SEALs, Rangers, 160 SOAR etc). Comandantii acestora din urma, aflate sub umbrela JSOC, au o buna relatie cu fortele mainstream. Datorita acestui fapt, numerosi ofiteri din structura JSOC sunt promovati, fapt care se reflecta asupra modului de a actiona al USSOCOM. In schimb, un singur ofiter din Special Forces, John Mulholland, actualul comandant USASOC (US Army Special Operations Command) a ajuns la gradul de general cu 3 stele. Vocile celor din USSF, care pledeaza abordarea indirecta ca metoda adecvata de contrainsurgenta se pare ca se fac tot mai putin auzite, daca este cazul sa dam crezare cel putin urmatorului document: Demise of the Green Berets?Soldier of Fortune | Maj. Gen. James Guest, USA | April 16, 2008Bookmark and ShareFor a glimpse into the future of Special Forces, read the Capstone Concept for Special Operations on the USSOCOM web site. Read through it carefully. Can you find the words "Special Forces" anywhere? Or "Special Forces group?" Can you find "ODA" (operational detachment - alpha)? Or "ODB" (operational detachment - bravo)? Or "Special Forces battalion?" You can't find these words. We can read that as a strong signal that you won't be able to find Special Forces anywhere before very long. Many other signals suggest that the senior leadership in both United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Department of the Army (DA) are working to do away with the Green Berets. The generals at USSOCOM and in the Pentagon have been blurring the distinctions between Special Forces and special operations forces (SOF) units (Rangers, JSOC, SEALs, Delta, et al.) for some time. We now see references to "Air Force special forces," "Navy special forces," and "Marine special forces" but we rarely see the term "U. S. Army Special Forces." We do see "Army SOF," which only describes a grouping of forces, not a capability. We do see SF ODAs referred to as "special operations detachments," another sad precursor of the future. The Capstone Concept for Special Operations being developed for USSOCOM includes the concept "global expeditionary forces," and all indications point to the intent to replace the SF groups with this new concept. The organizational charts are changing, too, and the plans are for these global expeditionary forces to work directly for USSOCOM worldwide in a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)-like configuration. Although the security assistance force (SAF) concept is a much more streamlined and effective mechanism for utilizing U. S. Army Special Forces-the SAF is regionally oriented and works directly for the combatant commander-it has been discarded.Is USA SF Being Eviscerated? Is this a ploy to be able to take the ODAs and use them operationally without going through the group headquarters (HQ), including the group Special Forces operating bases (SFOB)? Since 1952, conventional force headquarters have attempted to neutralize Special Forces command and control by treating the group and battalion HQ as non-operational administrative units, the purpose of which is to maintain ODAs in order that conventional units, such as JSOC, can cherry-pick them to use as support for their own missions. Reportedly, SF troops are already under the operational control of JSOC. JSOC is using the Green Berets for JSOC's own ends, whether to gather intelligence for JSOC missions or to carry out "special missions" that, if successful, JSOC can take the credit for. You can imagine who will suck up the blame if such a "special mission" goes south. How can Special Forces be neutralized in this way? If those who want to do away with the Green Berets are successful, they will need the full support of the senior leadership of the U. S. Army. Will they do away with the Special Forces officer branch? The Special Forces warrant officer branch? The Special Forces NCO career management fields (CMF)? To date, we merely have the unusual spectacle of a relatively small unit (USSOCOM)-however joint they may be-taking control of an entire United States Army branch. The Army transferred control of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (SWC) and School from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) in 1990. USASOC has since taken the combat developments capability out of SWC and made it a staff section of USASOC HQ. Bear in mind that this office is the heartbeat (perhaps also the brain) of the force developments and requirements process, and therefore has a major, if not controlling voice in all future concept development, acquisitions, organization, and support doctrine for Special Forces. This, in turn, impacts recruitment, promotions, training, and equipping the force; doctrinal studies and publications; and concept developments to support Special Forces. This also impacts U. S. Army psychological operations and civil affairs concepts and developments. Since this power node was moved from SWC to USASOC, SWC is now a pygmy in the lineup of U.S. Army schools. A harbinger of the future is the recent cut of 13 million dollars from the SWC budget.Marine Specops IntrudeAnother indication that SWC's leadership position in the unconventional warfare (UW) arena is disappearing is that on 27 June 2007, the USMC formally activated the Marine Special Operations School. The stated intent of the USMC senior leadership is that it will become "the premier FID [foreign internal defense] and Unconventional Warfare University in the entire SOF community." Approval from USSOCOM was required for this duplication of effort, as well as for the above-quoted statement. There can be no true duplication for many years, if ever. The culture of the USMC will be even less amenable to the necessities of working with, through, and by indigenous people than the culture of the conventional Army. The Marines are a world-class service and a superb fighting force, but they are new to FID and new to unconventional warfare. Many a harsh lesson awaits them if they are going to try to replace the Green Berets. U. S. Army Special Forces has been increasing in proficiency and experience in counterinsurgency (COIN), FID, UW, and international security assistance missions for more than a half century.Are the Marines willing to take the slots out of their own hide and form up more than 300 Special Forces-type operational detachments? Why would USSOCOM leaders be willing for the USMC to start this effort from scratch, when time is of the essence? Is USSOCOM willing to hand over U. S. Army Special Forces personnel authorizations to the USMC so they can become the premier FID and UW warriors of the future? Is somebody selling wolf tickets? Specops Tactics Turned Upside DownIn the USSOCOM Capstone Concept, the TTP for conducting Special Forces operations are turned on their heads. This developing concept speaks in terms of pulling everything back to the continental United States (CONUS) and of deploying JSOC units in the same way as carrier battle groups (CBG) and Marine expeditionary units (MEU), instead of doing what has worked so well for so long for Special Forces. Look on pages 9 and 10 of the Capstone Concept, under "Global Expeditionary Force." While this concept would work for raids and other direct actions (such as JSOC, Rangers, SEALs, and USAF Special Tactics Teams are trained to conduct), if USSOCOM attempts to steal the mission of Special Forces by using this model, they will merely create a "roving gnome," who will soon be calling for backup. In short, the USSOCOM Capstone Concept totally ignores the demonstrated and historically successful Special Forces operational concept of working by, with, and through those we are helping.As a result of more than fifty years of fine tuning, each Special Forces group now operates in its assigned region. Group HQ deploy joint combined exchange training (JCET) teams to enhance bilateral relations and interoperability with regional nations through military-to-military contact. These U. S. Special Forces JCET teams establish long-term relationships with indigenous personnel. They work to improve regional unit combat skills and observance of humanitarian requirements. They develop trust between host nations and the USA, with a program tailored to meet specific needs as identified by Green Berets on the ground. This capability will disappear with the Green Berets, and no SOF "shock-and awe" can replace it. Armchair SpecopsCompared to the lean organization of Special Forces, the USSOCOM model creates a bureaucracy with too many supervisors for too few workers, with the supervisors far away from the action. Money that would be better spent on the mission will be used for funding extra layers of chair-borne supervisors. Worse, an unwieldy organization will get in the way of accomplishing the mission. The men on the ground have a much better feel for what they need to do and how best to do it, while the top-down bureaucratic rigidity frustrates more than it facilitates. Will these newly created bureaucratic slots be filled with Special Forces officers and NCOs? What do you think? The conventional officers who have risen to the highest ranks through their connections with JSOC, Delta, the Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the SEALs will be in charge. There is only one Special Forces officer (newly promoted) above the rank of major general, so, once again, Special Forces are being decapitated and will be under the ultimate command of those who have never gone through selection and assessment, never attended the SFOC, never served a tour on an ODA, and never served repeated assignments in a SFG(A).The 2006 version of the USSOCOM Capstone Concept that we can access online does not show the new organizational charts that are presently proposed for the global expeditionary forces in the 2007 Capstone Concept. They are classified, but in the end there may be more than a dozen staff officers and NCOs for every soldier who will be assigned the mission on the ground. Reliable sources state that, even now, there are more than 130 (perhaps as many as 160) U. S. Army E-9s in Army special mission units assigned to JSOC. When that is compared with the 13 to15 E-9s in a Special Forces group, it does tend to raise eyebrows. What are they doing? According to the reports, thirteen of them are packing parachutes.SOF DVD w/o SFIn April 2007, USSOCOM put out a 20-minute DVD celebrating its twentieth anniversary. Even though Special Forces personnel make up the greatest part of the USSOCOM forces, the U. S. Army Special Forces are never once mentioned in this DVD. Although Special Forces is the oldest force in USSOCOM and has been the USSOCOM workhorse since its inception, not one Green Beret is seen in the montage of photographs. Colonel Banks is not mentioned in the historical overview, or General Yarborough, or General Healy. There is no reference to Colonel Bull Simons, to Colonel Charlie Beckwith, nor to General Joe Lutz. Yet without these men, the path to the present day in United States "special operations" would be difficult to imagine. Most amazingly, the DVD makes no reference to President John F. Kennedy, who supported the establishment of Special Forces in 1961. Will Special Forces exist ten or twenty years down the road? What can we do to ensure the continuing existence and contribution of the Green Berets?It is time to fight again, this time for the preservation of the force. If we do not protest the poor stewardship of the U. S. Army and USSOCOM leaders concerning U. S. Army Special Forces and its unique capability, we will certainly see this capability diminish.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAsa cum observa intr-un studiu Matthew Modarelli, 'Military Police Operations and Counterinsurgency', (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/151-modarelli.pdf) apetenta SUA pentru procedeele specifice razboiului neregulat lasa de dorit, in special in ceea ce priveste folosirea localnicilor ca sursa de informatii in mmediul in care fortele americane opereaza.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAcum vreau sa continui discutia deschisa cu Boribum referitoare la 'capitularea' rapida a americanilor din Navy SEALs in programul columbian Lancero. Subiectul este delicat si de aceea il voi aborda cu maximum de prudenta. Prin urmare, concluziile mele, daca se vor dovedi eronate, vor fi rezultatul limitelor cunoasterii mele in ceea ce priveste tema respectiva. Limita este determinata, bineinteles, de sursele pe care le-am gasit. Nu este pentru prima data cand aud aprecieri nu prea magulitoare la adresa Navy SEALs. Nu voi generaliza pe baza celor cunoscute de mine, dar aproape sigur, ceva este adevarat, de vreme ce chiar surse americane vad lucrurile astfel. Nu mai tin minte pe unde am citit (pe atunci nu eram suficient de constiincios incat sa salvez fisierele cu adresele articolelor pe care le citeam) ca de multe ori, SEALs sunt tineri, lipsiti de experienta si maturitate, iar modul lor de operare este dezavuat de cei din comunitatea operatiunilor speciale ale US Army. Aici, bineinteles, ca polemica porneste de la un meci mai vechi US Army way versus US Navy way. Disputa USArmy vs US Navy ajunge chiar pana la nivelul celor mai bune unitati, si anume 1st SFOD-D, respctiv DEVGRU (green vs blue ). Cred ca lucrurile, macar in parte, au o explicatie. Navy SEALs sunt, de multe ori, tineri de 18-19 ani, iar ofiterii care ii comanda, proaspeti absolventi ai US Naval Academy de la Annapolis, Maryland. Ei trec prin sita cursului de selectie si pregatire pentru trupele SEALs, care dureaza cam 42 de saptamani, dar aceasta se pare ca, de multe ori, nu este suficient. Cu totul altfel se prezinta lucrurile, spre exemplu, in US Special Forces. Ofiteri si subofiteri cu vechime de minimum 3 ani parcurg un ciclu de pregatire de 2 ani aproape. Si varsta medie este mai ridicata la nivel de 'recruti' 27-30 de ani. Armata americana a demarat de cativa ani si programul 18X enlistment option pentru Special Forces, care, insa, a avut un randament scazut. E vorba de posibilitatea inrolarii unui tanar direct in Special Forces. El parcurge initial OSUT (One Station Unit Training) care combina, in 17 saptamani, antrenamentul de baza pentru infanterie si cel avansat. Urmeaza, pe durata 4 saptamani, Special Operations Preparation Course (SOPC), la McKenna MOUT Site, Fort Benning, Georgia. Apoi ei urmeaza filiera obisnuita: SFAS (Special Forces Assessment and Selection) dupa a carui absolvire vine Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). Asadar, nevoia US Special Forces de mai multi militari a dus la aparitia acestor 'bibani' de 20 de ani. Asa cum am mai zis, in pofida unor declaratii oficiale nitel rafistolate, in realitate, aceste 'tinere Berete Verzi' au dezamagit, in cea mai mare parte. Nu se compara cu colegii lor mai maturi. E posibil ca lipsa de maturitate a unor luptatori Navy SEALs sa fie una dintre cauzele pentru care nu fac fata mereu unor situatii care cer anduranta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAm sa citez aici un fragment dintr-o carte cu privire la rivalitatea dintre 1st SFOD-D si DEVGRU:"Established in 1977 at Fort Bragg as the United States' premier counterterrorist unit, Delta had grown from a few dozen soldiers to a force of almost 1,000. Only about 250 were "operators", super-fit commandos who executed direct action missions. They were divides into three squadrons -A,B and C- of about seventy-five to eighty-five soldiers each. Within each squadron were three troops (not three soldiers, but three company-equivalent formations). Two were assault troops specializing in diect action. After completing Delta's six months operator training course, newcomers were assigned to an assault troop. A few handpicked veterans would graduate to the squadron's reconaissance and surveillance, or "recce" troop. Smaller than the other troops, the recce's troop's mission included penetrating enemy lines unseen, watching enemy positions and sniping. (The use of the British abbreviation 'recce' rather than the more American 'recon', reflected Delta's roots as an organization modeled along the lines of the British Special Air Service, or SAS, by its founder, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, who had served with the SAS as an exchange officer.)For reasons of operational security and and practicality, Delta, now known also by its cover name of Combat Applications Group, was a very self-contained organization. The rest of the unit consisted of superbly trained and equipped mechanics, communications specialists, intelligence analysts, and other support troops, plus a headquarters staff. In addition, Delta had an aviation squadron based elsewhere on the East Coast, which also flew missions for the CIA. The first Delta Squadron to deploy as TF Green for the war in Afghanistan was B Squadron. It came home in December (2001, nota mea). A Squadron took its place, but only for a few weeks. By January 1 A Squadron had been replaced by another commando element. But these operators were from SEAL Team 6 and went by the name Task Force Blue. Formed in 1980, SEAL Team 6 recruited its personnel from the rest of the Navy's SEAL teams. The unit's job was to conduct the same sort of antiterrorist direct action missions in which Delta specialized, but in a maritime environment. In other words, if terrorists threatened a cruise ship or an oil rig, Team 6 would likely get the call to take care of the situation. But the unit got off to a rocky start. Richard Marcinko, the unit's charismatic and hard-drinking founder and first commanding officer, was a legendary SEAL. But his flamboyant-some would say cowboylike-personality proved divisive within the team and the wider SEAl community. He changed command in 1983, but the damage to the team's reputation did not pass so easily. Marcinko's abrasive personality and freewheeling, devil-may-care attitude he imprinted on the new organization ensured that for the rest of the decade many Delta soldiers viewed their Navy counterparts with suspicion verging on scorn. In 1990, Marcinko was sentenced to twenty-one months in jail after being convicted of several charges in connection with a scheme to use his former Team 6 colleagues to bilk the U.S. Treasury of over $ 100,000. His conviction further tarnished the reputation of the organization he had built from the ground up. It took a few years, but after Marcinko's departure, Team 6 slowly gained a measure of professionalism and respect. It also expanded, but, lacking Delta's extensive support structure, it never grew to more than about a third of the size of its Army counterpart. Like Delta, the team acquired a cover name-Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DevGru-and matured so that by the early 1990a even some Army Special operators felt its professionalism matched Delta's. But as Team 6 became more proficient, the scorn Delta felt toward it evolved to antagonism as the Navy operators began to encroach on Delta's turf, takin g on land-based direct action missions that had been Delta's exclusive preserve. Some of the bitterness-which was mutual-could be attributed to the fierce rivalry that had always existed between the respective special operations communities of the Army and Navy, from whioch both units recruited most of their men. One Navy officer who worked closely with both Army and Navy special ops forces described their relationship as "at best analogous to a sibling rivalry, and at worst, to a marriage coming apart."Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the higher headquarters for both units, instituted a joint training regimen in the early 1990's that required both organizations to train each other every three months. After a few years of this routine, the leaders in each organization had grown up beside each other. A mutual respect ensued. My the mid-1990s the friction had become a healthy rivalry raher than a outright animosity. Strong friendships developed between operators in each organization. Nevertheless, JSOC commander Major General Dell Dailey's insertion of TF Blue into Afghanistan irked Army special operators, and Delta men in particular, who worried that their Navy counterparts' limited land warfare training did not adequately prepare them for the extraordinarily demanding missions presented by operations in Afghanistan. They noted, disapprovingly, that while Delta would never seek to conduct a direct action mission at sea, Team 6 had no inhibitions about taking on missions that required a deep understanding of land warfare. "A lot of the SEALs are just boat guys, and you can't shake and bake an infantry guy", an Army operator in Afghanistan said. In the eyes of Delta operators, much of the blame lay with Joint Special Operations Command, which seemed determined to treat Delta and Team 6 as interchageable, despite their vastly different area of expertise. The decision to withdraw Delta's A Squadron early and to put Team 6's squadrons into the TF11 (Task Force -nota mea) rotation before all three Delta squadrons had seen action semed nonsensical to Army types. The operators in Delta's C Squadron "were borderline suicidal thatthey weren't in the fight yet," according to an Army Special ops source.But Dailey, an Army special operations helicopter pilot who had also served in the Rangers, had little simpathy for the Delta operators. His decision to use the SEALs reflected his view that the "war on terror" had to be viewed in the same context as Cold War: a long, drawn-out marathon, not a short sprint to victory. He expected the new war to last forty years and was determined to ensure JSOC could prosecute the fight with intensity over the long haul. Therefore he decided to give Delta a rest. Committing the unit to Afghanistan indefinitely, he believed, would burn Delta out within nine months. He knew Delta was superior to Team 6 in land operations, but he thought each unit easily surpassed the standard required for succes."Extras din:Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die. The untold Story of Operation Anaconda, Berkley Books, New York, 2005, p. 30-32.Cel putin dupa cum o demonstreaza cartea in mai multe episoade, in operatiunea Anaconda, unii operatori Seal Team 6 au dezamagit (nu toti, au fost unii care au avut un comportament mai mult decat onoroabil) ramanand in urma colegilor din Delta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIata un text care ilustreaza mai ales cele bune referitoare la operatorii SEAL Team 6: Surprise attack: SEALs helped clear the way for Anaconda assaultBook excerpt from ‘Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda’By Sean NaylorTimes staff writerBy late February 2002, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan had focused their search for remaining Al Qaida forces on the Shahikot Valley. They were to attack from the west March 2, using a hammer consisting of Afghan allies stiffened with a spine of U.S. Special Forces troops. The plan was to drive enemy troops into an “anvil” formed by Task Force Rakkasan, commanded by Col. Frank Wiercinski and comprised of infantry from the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions, who were to make an air assault into the valley at dawn on CH-47 Chinook helicopters.Command of Operation Anaconda rested with 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) commander Maj. Gen. Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck, whose headquarters was at Bagram, an airbase about 30 miles north of Kabul and 100 miles north of the Shahikot. But neither Hagenbeck nor any other U.S. commander in Bagram had a firm idea of how many enemy fighters were in the valley, or how they were positioned. Delta Force Lt. Col. Pete Blaber headed up a small organization called Advance Force Operations (AFO), tasked with conducting high-risk reconnaissance missions in the search for senior Al Qaida and Taliban leaders. Blaber’s small force was made up of commandos from some of the U.S. military’s most highly classified “special mission units,” including Delta Force and the Navy’s SEAL Team 6. Based in a compound in Gardez, about 18 miles north of the Shahikot, the Delta lieutenant colonel (0-5) was convinced that a strong Al Qaida force was gathering in the valley. Ignoring the misgivings of some at his higher headquarters on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, he sent three small teams — totaling 13 men — to reconnoiter the valley in advance of the attacking forces.Two of the teams — code-named India and Juliet — were drawn from Delta Force’s B Squadron. The third — code-named Mako 31 — was made up of five men (including an Air Force combat controller) from a SEAL Team 6 reconnaissance unit. Mako 31’s leader was a lanky, gregarious senior enlisted SEAL called Mike, better known to all as “Goody.” The mission of the three teams was to penetrate Al Qaida’s lines of defense undetected by moving overland across jagged mountain ridges, and then to establish observation posts (OPs) on the mountainsides from which they would be able to monitor the entire valley. India and Juliet were assigned positions on the valley’s eastern ridge. Mako 31 picked a spot on “The Finger,” a ridgeline that poked into the valley from the south.As the teams prepared to depart the safe house, Blaber held a last face-to-face, heart-to-heart talk with Goody, whom he regarded as “a true warrior and a great guy.”“Goody, the success or failure of your mission will predicate the success or failure of the entire operation,” the AFO commander said. “You have to make it to that OP before H-Hour.” Neither man could have known how true Blaber’s words were to prove, but Goody was determined not to let his new boss down. “Sir, I’ll make it to my OP come hell or high water,” Goody replied. “If we’re hurting on time, I’ll drop our rucks. If we’re still having problems, I’ll keep dropping gear until five naked guys with guns are standing on the OP at H-Hour.”With less than 36 hours to go before the TF Rakkasan helicopters flew into the valley, both Delta teams had made it to their OPs, but Mako 31 was still about 1,000 meters short …Shortly after dawn on an overcast March 1, Goody sent two Mako 31 snipers up the Finger to scout the location the team had selected for their observation post. The two SEALs inched forward for 500 meters along the rocky ridgeline until they could put eyes on the exact spot Goody and Blaber had agreed on. As they poked their heads above the rocks to get a good look, they got the shock of their lives. Someone had beaten them to it. There, in the lee of a large, jagged outcrop, on the very patch of ground on which they intended to establish their observation post, sat a gray-green tent big enough to sleep several people. As the commandos digested this unexpected turn of events, their eyes fastened on an even more unsettling sight. About 15 meters up the rock-strewn slope, they discerned the outline of a tripod-mounted DShK (pronounced “Dishka”) 12.7mm heavy machine gun wrapped tightly in blue plastic. The discovery was momentous. The position dominated the southern end of the valley — that, after all, was why the AFO operators wanted to occupy it — and overlooked the 700-meter gap through which TF Rakkasan’s helicopters were to fly between the Finger and the eastern ridge. With an antiaircraft range of 1,000 meters, the DShK was ideally located to shoot down the infantry-packed Chinooks due to fly into the valley in less than 24 hours. It would be Frank Wiercinski’s worst nightmare come to horrifying life.The loss of even one Chinook full of Rakkasans would be a disaster from which Operation Anaconda might not recover. Troops would have to be dispatched from their previously assigned missions to secure the downed helicopter, all while enemy fire poured down on them from the mountainsides.Any reserves flown in would have to brave the same gauntlet of fire that had precipitated their arrival in the first place. But the DShK was positioned to deal an even more devastating blow to the operation. Wiercinski planned to bring his forward command post, containing himself, his command sergeant major, his aviation commander, his reserve battalion commander and his air liaison officer, into the valley on two Black Hawks and land just a few hundred meters farther north along and a little farther down the Finger from the DShK. At such close range it would be hard for the Al Qaida gunner to miss. As he emptied his weapon into the two American helicopters, even he would not have dreamed that the Black Hawks cartwheeling to the ground were carrying to their deaths not only the commander of the entire air assault force but also the commanders of his aviation task force and his only reserve, as well as his senior NCO and the officer responsible for coordinating close air support for the troops who survived the initial air assault. In the opening minutes of Anaconda a single heavy machine gunner would have dealt the operation a shattering blow.At 10:02 a.m., India Team relayed a message from Mako 31 to the safe house stating the bare facts of their discovery: an unmanned DShK and a tent sitting on the observation post. This was a lesson for anyone who thought the U.S. military’s billions of dollars’ worth of spy satellites and surveillance aircraft obviated the need for ground reconnaissance. Despite the boasts at Bagram that “every national asset” was being focused on the valley, none of the satellites or spy planes — not even the Mi-17 helicopter the CIA had flown over the Shahikot the previous day with an operative filming the valley floor — had revealed either the tent or the weapon that could have spelled defeat for the Americans in the battle’s opening moments. Maj. Lou Bello, a 10th Mountain fires planner, compared searching for a single DShK on a mountainside from the air to “looking for a needle in a haystack.” In the giant haystack that was the Shahikot Valley, Mako 31 had found a needle and it was pointing straight at the heart of Operation Anaconda.The SEAL snipers used a Nikon Coolpix digital camera equipped with an eight-power telephoto lens to snap a few photos of the DShK and the tent. They marked the position’s coordinates with a Global Positioning System receiver, then slipped away as low clouds and a sudden snowstorm appeared to cover their withdrawal. Once the weather cleared, they returned for a second look and were rewarded with an extended sighting of two fighters manning the position.One was a short, dark-haired, and bearded man with Mongol features — possibly an Uighur Chinese. The other, clearly in charge of the DShK, was a tall, clean-shaven Caucasian with reddish-brown hair — most likely an Uzbek fighter from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Qaida’s loyal allies in Central Asia. They were well equipped for the elements. A blue five-gallon gas can just outside and a pipe protruding from the roof indicated that their tent was heated. The shorter fighter wore a pale tunic, a sleeveless jacket, and what appeared to be a wool hat. The taller man wore a thick red Gore-Tex jacket, a Polartec fleece jacket tied around his waist, Russian-style camouflage pants, and Adidas sneakers. Each fighter appeared fit and healthy. The SEALs clicked off a few more photos and crept back to the mission support site, about 200 meters northwest of the DShK. From there, Goody sent several photos and a report back to Blaber using a Toshiba Libretto mini-laptop hooked via a USB port to the satellite radio. The SEALs had only seen two enemy fighters, but they reckoned as many as five might be occupying the position. Mako 31’s leader also had an urgent question for Blaber, prompted by the machine gunner’s European features: “Are there Brits up here?” He wanted to make sure he wasn’t about to get in a firefight with the British army’s vaunted Special Air Service. “It was so fantastical seeing this guy with no beard and red hair and Gore-Tex [and] BDU pants, they had a hard time believing that’s what the enemy was,” recalled an operator. Blaber assured Goody there were no Brits in the area, then he forwarded the photos to Jimmy, a Delta Force major in Bagram who was Blaber’s deputy. Jimmy in turn sent the photos to Hagenbeck and to Masirah. Blaber followed up with a call to Hagenbeck. The AFO commander underlined his view that the fighters seen by Mako 31 and Juliet were proof the enemy was in the mountains, not the valley floor where the Rakkasans expected to find them. But despite the enemy presence, Blaber told the Mountain commander that with the three AFO teams occupying dominant terrain, “we are in a position to control the valley.” “Good job,” Hagenbeck replied.Using point-to-point digital messages similar to e-mail sent via satellite, Blaber and Goody discussed what to do about the DShK position. It clearly had to be eliminated before H-Hour. Goody asked Blaber what he thought Goody should do. Blaber typed a response that turned the question around, asking Goody what he thought he should do. “I think we ought to wait until H minus two [hours],” Goody wrote. “At H minus two I start moving; I engage at H minus one, and then follow up with AC-130. I understand that you have to make the decision on this and I’ll support any decision you make.” Blaber sent him a two-word reply: “Good hunting.”Just after midnight, Goody and the other four men of Mako 31 left the hollow they had used as a hide site and crept toward the enemy observation post. Goody moved ahead of the others, scouting a site where they could drop their rucks about 500 meters from the enemy position. The explosive ordnance disposal expert assigned to Mako 31 and Andy, the team’s Air Force combat controller, remained with the rucks to minimize the chances of the enemy overhearing them as they arranged AC-130 and P-3 coverage of their assault of the tent position. Trying hard to keep to the long shadows cast by a full moon, the three SEAL Team 6 snipers advanced toward a small ridgeline on the other side of which sat the tent. They could hear the low drone of the AC-130 overhead.Once they reached the ridgeline, their plan was to wait until H minus one (i.e., 5:30 a.m., an hour before H-Hour) and then assault the tent, coordinating their attack with the AC-130. Not long after they had found cover behind some rocks on the reverse slope of the ridge from the tent, an enemy fighter appeared on the ridgeline like a ghostly apparition in the moonlight. He looked around, then turned and retraced his steps without noticing the nearby SEALs. Goody and his men settled down to wait. But at 4 a.m. the same fighter appeared, again walking up from the tent (which the SEALs could not see from their vantage point) and gazing west. Perhaps he was looking for the approaching TF Hammer convoy, word of which was undoubtedly circulating on the enemy’s radios and cell phones by now, or perhaps he was merely seeking some privacy to relieve himself. Either way, it was a fateful decision. Glancing up, the enemy fighter caught sight of the SEALs before they had time to duck behind the rocks. Yelling a warning, he sprinted back to the tent, his body’s “fight or flight” mechanism pumping adrenaline into his bloodstream.For the SEALs, it was now or never. Goody gave the order to attack. The commandos charged over the ridgeline and down toward the tent 20 meters away. From inside the tent an Al Qaida fighter fired off an entire magazine in the general direction of the Americans, who could see the Kalashnikov’s muzzle flash between the tent flaps. The SEALs dropped to their knees to return fire. A SEAL fired a single round into the tent from his M4 before the rifle jammed. Goody fired next, but he, too, only got off a single round before his rifle jammed. The two SEALs worked frantically in the frigid night air to clear their weapons as the third sniper kept the enemy at bay. Five Al Qaida fighters poured from the tent as the SEALs cleared the jams and began picking them off. The first guerrilla sprinted straight at them. In a split second a commando put the red dot of his laser sight in the middle of the fighter’s chest and squeezed the trigger. Several bullets slammed into the fighter’s body and sent him tumbling lifelessly to the frozen earth. The next man out of the tent broke right but got no more than a couple of steps before he was felled by another SEAL fusillade. A third tent occupant tried to escape over the backside of the ridge, only for the SEALs to put their long hours of marksmanship training to good use yet again.The SEALs leveled their rifles and emptied their magazines into the tent, then pulled back. Goody decided to let the AC-130 take care of any enemies left alive. Andy, the combat controller, had already alerted Grim 31, the AC-130H Spectre orbiting overhead. The aircraft reported seeing two bodies just outside the tent and a third, wounded, enemy fighter trying to crawl to safety. Grim 31 also spotted the two remaining enemy fighters, who had apparently escaped the firefight outside the tent unharmed and were now trying to outflank the SEALs. From a range of 75 meters — almost point blank for a machine gun — one of the Al Qaida survivors fired a long burst of 7.62mm bullets from a PK machine gun at the SEALs, who hadn’t noticed their maneuver. The rounds missed. It was to be the last opportunity the two Islamist fighters would have to kill in the name of Allah. Grim 31 requested permission from the SEALs to engage the enemy fighters at “danger close” range, a step required of any aircraft crew about to attack a position in such close proximity to friendly forces that they might be hurt by the airstrike. The SEALs gave their okay. Within a couple of seconds the AC-130 poured 105mm rounds down upon the mountainside, killing both enemy fighters instantly. Then the Air Force gunners adjusted their fire and opened up on the tent and the wounded fighter outside. The explosions shredded the tent and sprayed its contents across the mountainside. When the echoes had faded away, five Al Qaida corpses were left cooling on the mountainside.The sound of the AC-130 firing alerted every Al Qaida position around the valley. As they gazed upward, searching the night sky for the source of the attack, many fighters made a fatal error — they tilted their weapons skyward and fired blindly into the air, sending tracer rounds arcing into the darkness. Doing so revealed their positions to the three AFO teams, who quickly noted the location of each source of gunfire, to be passed to aircraft later that day as targets to be engaged.The SEALs moved back to the Al Qaida observation post, which they intended to occupy themselves. What they found as they searched the debris confirmed how vital their mission had been. The DShK was in great condition, clean and well oiled with 2,000 rounds of ammunition arranged neatly within arm’s reach. The guerrillas had built a rough-and-ready traverse and elevation mechanism that, in the opinion of a special operations source, would have allowed the gunner to hit targets up to 3,000 meters away and to cover “easily” the routes to be taken by the helicopters that were shortly to enter the valley. It was fortunate that the SEALs had been able to take the guerrillas by surprise, because the Al Qaida fighters had been well armed. In addition to the DShK, the five tent mates were equipped with a Soviet-style SVD Dragunov sniper rifle, AK-series assault rifles, at least one RPG-7 launcher with several rounds, a PK machine gun, and several fragmentation grenades.Scattered around were several documents handwritten in Cyrillic script and Arabic. The fact that most were in Cyrillic script — suggesting at least one or more of the fighters were Uzbeks or Chechens — with a few in Arabic, when coupled with the different ethnicities of the five fighters who had been killed, was the first indication that enemy commanders had divided at least some of their force in the valley into cross-cultural teams. (Blaber speculated that the enemy did this to prevent one ethnic group — Arabs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, or Chechens — from leaving the others in the lurch.) The documents included what appeared to be a range card for an artillery system, as well as a notebook that included sketches and instructions on how to build homemade bombs and blow up bridges, buildings, buses, and cars. But as one special operations account of the notebook’s contents later put it, “The one chapter it didn’t have was how to defend against Americans who infil over 11,000-foot peaks.” About the author“Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda” was scheduled to go on sale March 1. The book offers a deep, inside account of the battle-planning process as well as the combat itself, and reveals joint command-and-control failures that cost lives.sursa: LINKatasez aici fotografia in care apare colonelul Pete Blaber:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuInteresant mi se pare si principiul numeric care a stat la baza organizarii 22 SAS si Delta Force. 22 SAS e configurat dupa o structura cuaternara: 4 escadroane, fiecare cu cate 4 plutoane. SFOD-D are structura ternara: 3 escadroane (au existat 2 de la infiintare, in 1977, pana la sfarsitul anului 1990, cand a fost creat escadronul C iar in ultimii ani a fost anuntata crearea unui al patrulea escadron) divizate, fiecare, in 3 plutoane. Initial, se pare ca fiecare escadron Delta avea doar 2 plutoane: unul de asalt si al doilea pentru recunoastere si lunetisti. Cartea lui Dalton Fury (de fapt Thomas Greer), Kill Bin Laden, prezinta cateva lucruri legate de organizarea Delta in paginile 198 si 203 (287-288; 294 la sectiunea download).Ce este curios, este deosebirea de conceptie organizatorica dintre SAS si Delta, desi unitatea americana este aproape o 'clona' a celei britanice. Un pluton (troop) SAS are, teoretic, 16 oameni organizati in 4 patrule a 4 soldati. Comandantul plutonului si sergentul loctiitor al comandantului fac parte din aceasta structura. Plutonul de asalt din SFOD-D are un detasament de stat-major de 8 operatori, la care se adauga cele 4 patrule a cate de 5 oameni fiecare, deci cam 28 de oameni. Se pare ca plutonul de recunoastere este mai putin numeros (dupa cum afirma si Sean Naylor) fiind format probabil din 2 patrule de lunetisti/observatori al caror efectiv este, se pare, de 6 oameni (impartiti probabil in 3 binoame lunetist+observator), la care se adauga sectiunea de stat-major de 8 oameni. Asadar, cam 20 de operatori. In total escadronul ar avea circa 75 de oameni. Este normal ca cifrele exacte sa nu fie cunoscute publicului, dar cred ca nici nu este nevoie de asa ceva. Oricum, efectivul acestor unitati se ridica rareori la nivelul nominal, din cauza pierderilor si a ratei reduse de inlocuire a celor care dispar, sunt incapacitati in misiuni de lupta sau se retrag. Operatori Delta la Tora Bora in decembrie 2001In timp ce plutoanele escadroanelor SAS sunt denumite in functie de mediul in care opereaza (aerian, terestru,amfibiu si montan/arctic) ceea ce tine de caracterul initial de unitate specializata mai ales in recunoastere si razboi neconventional, escadroanele Delta sunt divizate in plutoane de asalt si recunoastere/observare, care reflecta conceptul care a stat la baza crearii ei: necesitatea de a avea o unitate aniterorista.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00PLIKKKProfesor Patrascu,bravo tie si respect.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCateva documente biner 'periate' referitoare la istoria ISA: document6.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu Patrascudocument7.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu Patrascudocument8.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu Patrascudocument10.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuOperatori Delta Force langa baza din provincia Nangarhar, in decembrie 2001, in cursul operatiunii de la Tora Bora.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIata un film in care sunt demonstrate avantajele carabinei de asalt HK 416, devenita principala arma a operatorilor Delta Force in 2004, in raport cu M4.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMai atrag atentia aici asupra unui alt film avand acelasi subiect, in speranta ca nu abuzez de trimiterile la Youtube.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuFotografii din cartea Never Surrender: A Soldier's Journey to the Crossroads of Faith and Freedom, FaithWords, New York, 2008, scrisa de William J. Boykin, comandant 1st SF0D-D intre 1992-1994. De remarcat incetineala cu care Delta Force a crescut din punct de vedere numeric. Creata in 1977, doi ani mai tarziu atingea cu greu 100 de oameni, luand in calcul si instructorii. Iata ca in decembrie 1981, cand unitatea avea doar doua escadroane, escadronul B, dupa cum se poate vedea mai sus, avea un efectiv de abia 39 de oameni.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuTinuta CQB nocturna, anii 1987-1988. Personajul mai in varsta este Command Sergeant Major Mark Gentry, unul dintre membrii fondatori ai unitatii.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuVideoclip 1st SFOD-D pentru PR cu imagini surprinse in timpul instructiei dar si in Irak.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuScuze. Acest link a mai fost postat in pagina 1 a topicului. Uitasem.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAlte fotografii facute in poligonul pentru instructie, de la inceputul anilor 80. Si iata o schita care reprezinta un operator in tinuta de internventie din perioada respectiva.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuFostul comandant GROM (13.07.1990-19.12.1995; 7.12.1997-17.09.1999) Slawomir Petelicki, in vizita la Fort Bragg alaturi de comandantul 1stSFOD-D. Dupa toate probabilitatile, personajul cu fata blurata ar putea fi colonelul Bernard McCabe. Petelicki a avut o evolutie, cel putin la prima vedere, foarte interesanta. Nascut la 13 septembrie 1946 la Varsovia, el a absolvit Facultatea de Drept a Universitatii din acelasi oras in 1969, si imediat ulterior a devenit membru al Directiei Informatii din cadrul Ministerului de Interne, in care a servit pana in 1983. Ofiter de informatii la Ambasada Poloniei la Stockholm intre 1983-1987, el a fost angajat in Ministerul de Externe in functia de comandant al serviciului de securitate al ambasadelor si consulatelor Poloniei. A mai fost membru activ al Fortelor Speciale, indeplinind o misiune in Viet Nam in 1971 si fiind trimis in China in anul urmator. In 1990 a fost insarcinat cu formarea unei noi unitati speciale ultrasecrete, JW 2305, numita GROM din 1992. Existenta acesteia a fost adusa la cunostinta publicului cu prilejul misiunii din Haiti, in 1994. Intre 14.05-13.06.1996, Petelicki a fost vicprim-ministru pentru combaterea crimei organizate. Trecut acum, in cealalta 'tabara', a devenit membru onorofic al grupurilor 5 si 10 din US Special Forces, si un bun prieten al Delta Force.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuInformatia adusa de Altair la topicul "Cunoasterea si intretinerea armamentului" legata de decizia DoD de a respinge vesta Dragon skin imi aminteste de o decizie similara luata de Pentagon in urma cu cativa ani in legatura cu inlocuirea uniformelor de instructie BDU tip Woodland si Desert. Desi Crye Precision au venit cu Multicam, DoD a ales pt US Army actualul ACU. Beneficiind de libertatea de alegere, Delta (dar si alte unitati din USSOCOM) au optat pentru Multicam. Si iata ca Pentagonul a autorizat, recent, ca militarii care lupta in Afganistan sa poarte Multicam. Mai mult, US Army a lansat competitia pentru inlocuirea ACU, printre candidati fiind prezent, bineinteles, si Crye Precision.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCapitanul William Boykin la capatul cursului evaluare de selectie in Delta Force din 1981.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuScuze, iar am gresit. Cursul de selectie este din martie 1978. Atunci, confruntat cu ordinul venit de la Pentagon de a face din 1st SFOD-D o unitate operativa cat mai curand posibil, colonelul Charlie Beckwith a organizat mai multe cursuri de evaluare si selectie la scurt interval unul dupa altul. Cu greu, in 1978, a fost alcatuit un escadron, iar in iulie 1979, s-a ajuns la un efectiv suficient pentru a se crea 2 escadroane, fiecare cu un pluton de asalt si unul de recunoastere/observare (lunetisti). Efectivul celor 2 escadroane nu atingea decat cel mult 80 de oameni, cand, la 4 noiembrie 1979, dupa o ultima demonstratie in urma careia Delta a trecut de evaluarea finala, personalul Ambasadei SUA de la Teheran a fost luat in captivitate de iranieni. Ulterior, si cred ca acest calendar este valabil si astazi, ASC SFOD-D (cursul de evaluare si selectie pt Delta) cu o durata de 3-4 saptamani, se organizeaza de doua ori pe an, incepand cu a treia saptamana a lunii martie si a treia saptamana a lunii septembrie. Cei care reusesc, sunt trimisi imediat la cursul OTC (cursul pentru formarea operatorilor) cu o durata de 6 luni.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSi pentru ca veni vorba de Eagle Claw, iata raportul comisiei Holloway, care analiza cauzele esecului misiunii. LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMisiune de salvare a unor ostatici italieni din Irak. Hostage Rescue - IraqJune 8, 2004 - IraqIn April 04, a group of foreign workers were kidnapped off the streets of Baghdad by Iraqi criminals. One of the italian hostages, Fabrizio Quattrocchi, was executed not long after that. The remaining hostages were Salvatore Stefio, Umberto Cupertino and Maurizio Agliana of Italy, and Jerzy Kos of Poland.When coalition forces received reliable intel on where the workers were being held, a daring rescue plan was put into play. On June 8th, operators from A Squadron, Delta Force, boarded MH-60k helicopters flown by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.Flying low over Baghdad's suburbs and freeways, the airborne armada approached their object, a building near Ramadi. This building had been under close surveillance following intelligence received that the kidnapped workers were inside. This info is believed to have come from Polish units, who had received it from informers, was then shared with the Americans. The intelligence pictured was further enhanced by SIGINT operations which tapped and tracked the kidnapper's cell phones. It has been speculated that the ISA may have had a hand in both the SIGINT and subsequent close target reconnaissance of the target compound. The surveillance of the building established the kidnapper's routine, allowing for the rescue operation to be timed in order reduce the danger to the hostages inside.Inside the compound, the 4 hostages heard the helicopters as they came in overhead. The MH-60Ks came in low and fast, flaring up at the last moment in order to come to a halt and allow the Delta operators to leap out. Seconds later, the rescuers were inside, clearing the rooms. The kidnappers were caught completely by surprise and offered no resistance and were rapidly restrained. The bewildered hostages were found tied up in dark and dusty rooms inside the compound. One hostage recounted how a Delta operator came in, cut off his bonds with a bolt-cutter and told him. 'You're mine', before leading him straight inside to and putting him on a helicopter.The operation had been a complete success, due to both the painstaking work done by the various intelligence agencies to the rescue itself by Delta and the Night Stalkers.A helmet-cam video was eventually released of the operation : watch video of rescue operationLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuComandantul AFO (Advanced Force Operations) din timpul operatiunii Anaconda (martie 2002), locotenent-colonelul Pete Blaber (in dreapta) si adjunctul sau si omul de legatura al AFO cu cartierul general al Task Force Mountain de la Bagram, maiorul "Jimmy"(in stanga). AFO, formata din 13 operatori 1st SFOD-D si DEVGRU a efectuat operatiuni de recunoastere pentru fortele americane si aliate in timpul operatiunii Anaconda.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumRadu Patrascu wrote ...AFO, formata din 13 operatori 1st SFOD-D si DEVGRU a efectuat operatiuni de recunoastere pentru fortele americane si aliate in timpul operatiunii Anaconda. ...si le-a efectuat prost si cu costuri mari de vieti omenesti pentru un rezultat mai mult decât discutabil. Recunoasterea traseelor de defluire (preconizate între Oldsmobile si Jeep,mai ales,în conditiile în care barbosii au luat-o mai ales spre Chevy ),preconizari facute dupa pifometru despre albiile drumurilor si un comportament de seniori ai razboiului care,în mare încurcatura fiind,aproape ca nu strigau "mamaaaaa"... . Scorul meciului de atunci : aproape nul. Altminteri niste baieti draguti cu gadget-uri hi-tec prin buzunare. Dar asta-i tot.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIata si structura de comanda americana in operatiunea Anaconda:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuACH Boribum, recunosc ca lucrurile despre care scrii nu imi sunt cunoscute. Esti sigur ca este vorba de AFO si nu de alta unitate/subunitate ? Asta pentru ca in Ananconda americanii au avut o structura stufoasa de organizare si actiune. Si, din ceea ce am citit, stiu ca forta prinicpala de atac, din diviziile 101 Air assault si 10 Mountain nu prea au tinut cont de avertismentele celor din AFO. Comanda operatiunii i-a revenit unui general de brigada din US Air Force, cu experienta de zbor pe avioanele de transport, care i-a indepartat pe cei din AFO cand acestia continuau sa continue sa trimita observatii despre pozitiile inamice (oricum, generalul Gregory Trebon nu a mai primit nicio responsabilitate dupa Task Force 11 si cariera lui s-a cam incheiat). Australienii din SASR, care au fost si ei acolo, spun ca patrulele AFO au fost introduse prea tarziu. Dar iata despre ce vorbeam (regret, dar in cazul unei referinte, nu mai am adresa, dar poate fi citita cartea lui Sean Naylor, "Not a good day to die"). 1. Surprise attack: SEALs helped clear the way for Anaconda assaultBook excerpt from ‘Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda’By Sean NaylorTimes staff writerBy late February 2002, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan had focused their search for remaining Al Qaida forces on the Shahikot Valley. They were to attack from the west March 2, using a hammer consisting of Afghan allies stiffened with a spine of U.S. Special Forces troops. The plan was to drive enemy troops into an “anvil” formed by Task Force Rakkasan, commanded by Col. Frank Wiercinski and comprised of infantry from the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions, who were to make an air assault into the valley at dawn on CH-47 Chinook helicopters.Command of Operation Anaconda rested with 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) commander Maj. Gen. Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck, whose headquarters was at Bagram, an airbase about 30 miles north of Kabul and 100 miles north of the Shahikot. But neither Hagenbeck nor any other U.S. commander in Bagram had a firm idea of how many enemy fighters were in the valley, or how they were positioned. Delta Force Lt. Col. Pete Blaber headed up a small organization called Advance Force Operations (AFO), tasked with conducting high-risk reconnaissance missions in the search for senior Al Qaida and Taliban leaders. Blaber’s small force was made up of commandos from some of the U.S. military’s most highly classified “special mission units,” including Delta Force and the Navy’s SEAL Team 6. Based in a compound in Gardez, about 18 miles north of the Shahikot, the Delta lieutenant colonel (0-5) was convinced that a strong Al Qaida force was gathering in the valley. Ignoring the misgivings of some at his higher headquarters on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman, he sent three small teams — totaling 13 men — to reconnoiter the valley in advance of the attacking forces.Two of the teams — code-named India and Juliet — were drawn from Delta Force’s B Squadron. The third — code-named Mako 31 — was made up of five men (including an Air Force combat controller) from a SEAL Team 6 reconnaissance unit. Mako 31’s leader was a lanky, gregarious senior enlisted SEAL called Mike, better known to all as “Goody.” The mission of the three teams was to penetrate Al Qaida’s lines of defense undetected by moving overland across jagged mountain ridges, and then to establish observation posts (OPs) on the mountainsides from which they would be able to monitor the entire valley. India and Juliet were assigned positions on the valley’s eastern ridge. Mako 31 picked a spot on “The Finger,” a ridgeline that poked into the valley from the south.As the teams prepared to depart the safe house, Blaber held a last face-to-face, heart-to-heart talk with Goody, whom he regarded as “a true warrior and a great guy.”“Goody, the success or failure of your mission will predicate the success or failure of the entire operation,” the AFO commander said. “You have to make it to that OP before H-Hour.” Neither man could have known how true Blaber’s words were to prove, but Goody was determined not to let his new boss down. “Sir, I’ll make it to my OP come hell or high water,” Goody replied. “If we’re hurting on time, I’ll drop our rucks. If we’re still having problems, I’ll keep dropping gear until five naked guys with guns are standing on the OP at H-Hour.”With less than 36 hours to go before the TF Rakkasan helicopters flew into the valley, both Delta teams had made it to their OPs, but Mako 31 was still about 1,000 meters short …Shortly after dawn on an overcast March 1, Goody sent two Mako 31 snipers up the Finger to scout the location the team had selected for their observation post. The two SEALs inched forward for 500 meters along the rocky ridgeline until they could put eyes on the exact spot Goody and Blaber had agreed on. As they poked their heads above the rocks to get a good look, they got the shock of their lives. Someone had beaten them to it. There, in the lee of a large, jagged outcrop, on the very patch of ground on which they intended to establish their observation post, sat a gray-green tent big enough to sleep several people. As the commandos digested this unexpected turn of events, their eyes fastened on an even more unsettling sight. About 15 meters up the rock-strewn slope, they discerned the outline of a tripod-mounted DShK (pronounced “Dishka”) 12.7mm heavy machine gun wrapped tightly in blue plastic. The discovery was momentous. The position dominated the southern end of the valley — that, after all, was why the AFO operators wanted to occupy it — and overlooked the 700-meter gap through which TF Rakkasan’s helicopters were to fly between the Finger and the eastern ridge. With an antiaircraft range of 1,000 meters, the DShK was ideally located to shoot down the infantry-packed Chinooks due to fly into the valley in less than 24 hours. It would be Frank Wiercinski’s worst nightmare come to horrifying life.The loss of even one Chinook full of Rakkasans would be a disaster from which Operation Anaconda might not recover. Troops would have to be dispatched from their previously assigned missions to secure the downed helicopter, all while enemy fire poured down on them from the mountainsides.Any reserves flown in would have to brave the same gauntlet of fire that had precipitated their arrival in the first place. But the DShK was positioned to deal an even more devastating blow to the operation. Wiercinski planned to bring his forward command post, containing himself, his command sergeant major, his aviation commander, his reserve battalion commander and his air liaison officer, into the valley on two Black Hawks and land just a few hundred meters farther north along and a little farther down the Finger from the DShK. At such close range it would be hard for the Al Qaida gunner to miss. As he emptied his weapon into the two American helicopters, even he would not have dreamed that the Black Hawks cartwheeling to the ground were carrying to their deaths not only the commander of the entire air assault force but also the commanders of his aviation task force and his only reserve, as well as his senior NCO and the officer responsible for coordinating close air support for the troops who survived the initial air assault. In the opening minutes of Anaconda a single heavy machine gunner would have dealt the operation a shattering blow.At 10:02 a.m., India Team relayed a message from Mako 31 to the safe house stating the bare facts of their discovery: an unmanned DShK and a tent sitting on the observation post. This was a lesson for anyone who thought the U.S. military’s billions of dollars’ worth of spy satellites and surveillance aircraft obviated the need for ground reconnaissance. Despite the boasts at Bagram that “every national asset” was being focused on the valley, none of the satellites or spy planes — not even the Mi-17 helicopter the CIA had flown over the Shahikot the previous day with an operative filming the valley floor — had revealed either the tent or the weapon that could have spelled defeat for the Americans in the battle’s opening moments. Maj. Lou Bello, a 10th Mountain fires planner, compared searching for a single DShK on a mountainside from the air to “looking for a needle in a haystack.” In the giant haystack that was the Shahikot Valley, Mako 31 had found a needle and it was pointing straight at the heart of Operation Anaconda.The SEAL snipers used a Nikon Coolpix digital camera equipped with an eight-power telephoto lens to snap a few photos of the DShK and the tent. They marked the position’s coordinates with a Global Positioning System receiver, then slipped away as low clouds and a sudden snowstorm appeared to cover their withdrawal. Once the weather cleared, they returned for a second look and were rewarded with an extended sighting of two fighters manning the position.One was a short, dark-haired, and bearded man with Mongol features — possibly an Uighur Chinese. The other, clearly in charge of the DShK, was a tall, clean-shaven Caucasian with reddish-brown hair — most likely an Uzbek fighter from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Qaida’s loyal allies in Central Asia. They were well equipped for the elements. A blue five-gallon gas can just outside and a pipe protruding from the roof indicated that their tent was heated. The shorter fighter wore a pale tunic, a sleeveless jacket, and what appeared to be a wool hat. The taller man wore a thick red Gore-Tex jacket, a Polartec fleece jacket tied around his waist, Russian-style camouflage pants, and Adidas sneakers. Each fighter appeared fit and healthy. The SEALs clicked off a few more photos and crept back to the mission support site, about 200 meters northwest of the DShK. From there, Goody sent several photos and a report back to Blaber using a Toshiba Libretto mini-laptop hooked via a USB port to the satellite radio. The SEALs had only seen two enemy fighters, but they reckoned as many as five might be occupying the position. Mako 31’s leader also had an urgent question for Blaber, prompted by the machine gunner’s European features: “Are there Brits up here?” He wanted to make sure he wasn’t about to get in a firefight with the British army’s vaunted Special Air Service. “It was so fantastical seeing this guy with no beard and red hair and Gore-Tex [and] BDU pants, they had a hard time believing that’s what the enemy was,” recalled an operator. Blaber assured Goody there were no Brits in the area, then he forwarded the photos to Jimmy, a Delta Force major in Bagram who was Blaber’s deputy. Jimmy in turn sent the photos to Hagenbeck and to Masirah. Blaber followed up with a call to Hagenbeck. The AFO commander underlined his view that the fighters seen by Mako 31 and Juliet were proof the enemy was in the mountains, not the valley floor where the Rakkasans expected to find them. But despite the enemy presence, Blaber told the Mountain commander that with the three AFO teams occupying dominant terrain, “we are in a position to control the valley.” “Good job,” Hagenbeck replied.Using point-to-point digital messages similar to e-mail sent via satellite, Blaber and Goody discussed what to do about the DShK position. It clearly had to be eliminated before H-Hour. Goody asked Blaber what he thought Goody should do. Blaber typed a response that turned the question around, asking Goody what he thought he should do. “I think we ought to wait until H minus two [hours],” Goody wrote. “At H minus two I start moving; I engage at H minus one, and then follow up with AC-130. I understand that you have to make the decision on this and I’ll support any decision you make.” Blaber sent him a two-word reply: “Good hunting.”Just after midnight, Goody and the other four men of Mako 31 left the hollow they had used as a hide site and crept toward the enemy observation post. Goody moved ahead of the others, scouting a site where they could drop their rucks about 500 meters from the enemy position. The explosive ordnance disposal expert assigned to Mako 31 and Andy, the team’s Air Force combat controller, remained with the rucks to minimize the chances of the enemy overhearing them as they arranged AC-130 and P-3 coverage of their assault of the tent position. Trying hard to keep to the long shadows cast by a full moon, the three SEAL Team 6 snipers advanced toward a small ridgeline on the other side of which sat the tent. They could hear the low drone of the AC-130 overhead.Once they reached the ridgeline, their plan was to wait until H minus one (i.e., 5:30 a.m., an hour before H-Hour) and then assault the tent, coordinating their attack with the AC-130. Not long after they had found cover behind some rocks on the reverse slope of the ridge from the tent, an enemy fighter appeared on the ridgeline like a ghostly apparition in the moonlight. He looked around, then turned and retraced his steps without noticing the nearby SEALs. Goody and his men settled down to wait. But at 4 a.m. the same fighter appeared, again walking up from the tent (which the SEALs could not see from their vantage point) and gazing west. Perhaps he was looking for the approaching TF Hammer convoy, word of which was undoubtedly circulating on the enemy’s radios and cell phones by now, or perhaps he was merely seeking some privacy to relieve himself. Either way, it was a fateful decision. Glancing up, the enemy fighter caught sight of the SEALs before they had time to duck behind the rocks. Yelling a warning, he sprinted back to the tent, his body’s “fight or flight” mechanism pumping adrenaline into his bloodstream.For the SEALs, it was now or never. Goody gave the order to attack. The commandos charged over the ridgeline and down toward the tent 20 meters away. From inside the tent an Al Qaida fighter fired off an entire magazine in the general direction of the Americans, who could see the Kalashnikov’s muzzle flash between the tent flaps. The SEALs dropped to their knees to return fire. A SEAL fired a single round into the tent from his M4 before the rifle jammed. Goody fired next, but he, too, only got off a single round before his rifle jammed. The two SEALs worked frantically in the frigid night air to clear their weapons as the third sniper kept the enemy at bay. Five Al Qaida fighters poured from the tent as the SEALs cleared the jams and began picking them off. The first guerrilla sprinted straight at them. In a split second a commando put the red dot of his laser sight in the middle of the fighter’s chest and squeezed the trigger. Several bullets slammed into the fighter’s body and sent him tumbling lifelessly to the frozen earth. The next man out of the tent broke right but got no more than a couple of steps before he was felled by another SEAL fusillade. A third tent occupant tried to escape over the backside of the ridge, only for the SEALs to put their long hours of marksmanship training to good use yet again.The SEALs leveled their rifles and emptied their magazines into the tent, then pulled back. Goody decided to let the AC-130 take care of any enemies left alive. Andy, the combat controller, had already alerted Grim 31, the AC-130H Spectre orbiting overhead. The aircraft reported seeing two bodies just outside the tent and a third, wounded, enemy fighter trying to crawl to safety. Grim 31 also spotted the two remaining enemy fighters, who had apparently escaped the firefight outside the tent unharmed and were now trying to outflank the SEALs. From a range of 75 meters — almost point blank for a machine gun — one of the Al Qaida survivors fired a long burst of 7.62mm bullets from a PK machine gun at the SEALs, who hadn’t noticed their maneuver. The rounds missed. It was to be the last opportunity the two Islamist fighters would have to kill in the name of Allah. Grim 31 requested permission from the SEALs to engage the enemy fighters at “danger close” range, a step required of any aircraft crew about to attack a position in such close proximity to friendly forces that they might be hurt by the airstrike. The SEALs gave their okay. Within a couple of seconds the AC-130 poured 105mm rounds down upon the mountainside, killing both enemy fighters instantly. Then the Air Force gunners adjusted their fire and opened up on the tent and the wounded fighter outside. The explosions shredded the tent and sprayed its contents across the mountainside. When the echoes had faded away, five Al Qaida corpses were left cooling on the mountainside.The sound of the AC-130 firing alerted every Al Qaida position around the valley. As they gazed upward, searching the night sky for the source of the attack, many fighters made a fatal error — they tilted their weapons skyward and fired blindly into the air, sending tracer rounds arcing into the darkness. Doing so revealed their positions to the three AFO teams, who quickly noted the location of each source of gunfire, to be passed to aircraft later that day as targets to be engaged.The SEALs moved back to the Al Qaida observation post, which they intended to occupy themselves. What they found as they searched the debris confirmed how vital their mission had been. The DShK was in great condition, clean and well oiled with 2,000 rounds of ammunition arranged neatly within arm’s reach. The guerrillas had built a rough-and-ready traverse and elevation mechanism that, in the opinion of a special operations source, would have allowed the gunner to hit targets up to 3,000 meters away and to cover “easily” the routes to be taken by the helicopters that were shortly to enter the valley. It was fortunate that the SEALs had been able to take the guerrillas by surprise, because the Al Qaida fighters had been well armed. In addition to the DShK, the five tent mates were equipped with a Soviet-style SVD Dragunov sniper rifle, AK-series assault rifles, at least one RPG-7 launcher with several rounds, a PK machine gun, and several fragmentation grenades.Scattered around were several documents handwritten in Cyrillic script and Arabic. The fact that most were in Cyrillic script — suggesting at least one or more of the fighters were Uzbeks or Chechens — with a few in Arabic, when coupled with the different ethnicities of the five fighters who had been killed, was the first indication that enemy commanders had divided at least some of their force in the valley into cross-cultural teams. (Blaber speculated that the enemy did this to prevent one ethnic group — Arabs, Uighurs, Uzbeks, or Chechens — from leaving the others in the lurch.) The documents included what appeared to be a range card for an artillery system, as well as a notebook that included sketches and instructions on how to build homemade bombs and blow up bridges, buildings, buses, and cars. But as one special operations account of the notebook’s contents later put it, “The one chapter it didn’t have was how to defend against Americans who infil over 11,000-foot peaks.”Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAl doilea material e cam lung; in fine, il voi posta si pe acesta. anacondanaylor.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMa suprinde ceea ce am citit aici, deoarece Sean Naylor spunea altceva. E vorba de doar 13 oameni grupati in 3 echipe (Julia, India si Mako 31), care se aflau pe 3 varfuri situate la distante de kilometri intre ele. Nici vorba sa isi fi tradat prezenta prin acte de teribilism adolescentin, deoarece se aflau in spatele pozitiilor inamice si au ramas acolo vreo 2 zile fara a fi remarcati. Nu este vorba aici de patrula din DEVGRU care a aterizat pe Tahur Ghar si a pierdut un om, si de QRF care a venit dupa ei si a mai pierdut ceva oameni. AFO era comandata de Pete Blaber, iar la cererea lui Trebon, cei 13 oameni au fost retrasi discret din pozitie, desi maiorul "Jimmy" aproape a innebunit de furie cand a auzit ordinul lui Trebon. Si el si Blaber nu au avut ce face si s-au supus. Inainte de a porni operatiunea pe care cow-boy-ii din 101 Air Assault o vedeau ca pe o avalansa de oameni coborand din elicoptere in pozitiile talibanilor, AFO au avertizat ca estimarile privind efectivele si pozitiile inamice sunt eronate si ca exista riscul unor mari pierderi. Despre cum a fost evitat dezastrul pe care il putea produce mitraliera DShK si cum a fost evitat, s-a putut vedea in postarile de mai sus. Asta am citit, asta scriu. E posibil insa sa mai fi fost situatii care nu apar in carte si despre care ACH stie mai multe. Posibil, nu neg.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAdresa pentru a doua referinta, documentul in pdf este:LINKMai revin si cu o erata necesara in ceea ce priveste prima postare referitoare la acest subiect, unde am scris "au continuat sa continue sa trimita". Evident, corect era "au continuat sa trimita", fiind vorba de o eroare care a fost provocata de neatentie. Nu ma pricep prea bine, dar m-am uitat pe o harta din cartea lui Sean Naylor, in care apareau pozitiile celor 3 echipe AFO. Nu prea aveau cum supraveghea traseele desemnate mai sus si care apar si pe harta postata aici. Oricum, nu aceasta a fost misiunea lor. Ei au transmis doar observatii despre pozitiile defensive ale inamicului. In faza in care americaniii au trecut la contraofensiva, ei nu se mai aflau pe pozitii, fiind retrasi la ordinul lui Trebon. Insa bilantul final al operatiunii a fost unul mediocru, asa cum bine a remarcat ACH Boribum. Repet, insa, ca potrivit informatiile mele, se poate spune ca operatorilor AFO li s-a datorat faptul ca, macar, "Anaconda" nu s-a soldat cu un dezastru general.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribum1. Primeste multumirile mele sincere pentru toate posturile tale : mult mai bine documentate si mai coerente decât multe cursuri tinute în academii cu pretentii. 2. Operatiunea Anaconda avea prevazuta în componenta aeriana un suport franco-american. Ca orice misiune aeriana în teatru de operatii,era prevazuta o acoperire C-SAR. Din diferite motive,misiunea a fost asigurata nu de CPA-30,asa cum era normal,ci de o alta unitate. Acea unitate a urmarit desfasurarea operatiunii de la H -01 pâna pe 2.03. De unde si aprecierea mea vis-à-vis de ce s-a întâmplat acolo.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuACH Boribum, iti multumesc pentru aprecieri. Venite din partea unui om cu experienta in Legiune, inseamna mult. Cu insistenta data de formatia (deformarea, daca vrei ) mea profesionala, imi voi repeta intrebarea. Aprecierile tale cu privire la comportamentul americanilor, avand in vedere misiunea C-SAR indeplinita de americani impreuna cu francezii, se referea si la AFO ? E drept ca ei au cerut interventia unui AC-130 Spectre, dar 'evenimente' au fost, se pare, doar in sectorul patrulei Mako 31 (cea constituita din operatori DEVGRU); India si Julie, din fericire pentru ele, se pare ca nu au avut asemenea probleme. Un membru al uneia dintre aceste patrule, MASTER SGT. ROBERT M. HORRIGAN (in carte apare cu nume 'codificat') a murit la 17 iunie 2005 in Irak, intr-o operatiune impotriva insurgentilor. usasoc_horigan_bio.pdfRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiahoy,Radu.foarte interesant topicul,l-am citit cu placere.pe topicul despre SAS insa e ceva care mi-a zgariat retina.scriai :'Insa, mi se pare ca, desi au poate cele mai bune unitati pentru operatiuni speciale din lume, britanicii nu manifesta niciun interes fata de strategia utilizariii lor. Nu am gasit niciun document care sa dea seama de o astfel de preocupare. Abunda, in schimb, cele americane. Nu comentez rezultatele, dar un fapt imi pare a fi cert: americanii au fost si sunt foarte preocupati de elaborarea unei strategii, a unei doctrine integrate a operatiunilor speciale.'exista un sambure de adevar in ce spui:britanicii (MoD) nu-si publica pe internet materialele despre unitatile speciale.dar asta nu inseamna ca ele nu exista.gandirea lor strategica referitoare la fortele speciale este foarte,foarte avansata.au avut un rol esential in Irak.iar strategia din Afghanistan este bazata pe ideile unui fost ofiter SAS (un general stralucitor).sa nu crezi ca sunt un fan neconditionat al britanicilor.primele carti despre SAS le-am citit cam pe la 10 ani,iar de-atunci am studiat tot ce-am putut gasi despre ei.cand am intalnit prima oara pe cineva de la ei a fost ca si cand l-as fi vazut pe Mesia ).a urmat o dezamagire destul de mare in momentul in care am realizat ca si ei sunt oameni.la pomul laudat...la nivelul trupei,tehnic si tactic sunt foarte buni,din punct de vedere uman,lasa de dorit(ma refer la trupa,nu la ofiteri).dupa niste ani am realizat ca asta este unul ditre criteriile de selectie: la nivelul lor totul se face stiintific.americanii sunt mult mai de gasca.si ei sunt oameni:la primul exercitiu care a fost in Romania cu cei din Seal-NSWU-2,doi dintre ei mai ca s-au luat la bataie sus la Diham .dar sunt si omenosi,buni camarzi.cei din seals si mai ales cei din ussf.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuVorbesti de Graeme Lamb, nu ?Aaaa, in ordine. Mai intai, bine te-am regasit. Long time no see. E bine ca am 'fortat' un pic, zic eu nota. Pentru ca, uite, a aparut cineva mai informat decat mine si astfel am mai aflat ceva. In tot ceea ce afirm eu aici imi asum mereu o oarecare marja de eroare, in sensul ca enunturile mele sunt corecte atat cat imi permite informatia la care am acces. Stiu ca orice opinie de-a mea este amendabila in orice moment, ea este constructia pe care o elaborez si o sustin in functie de stadiul documentarii mele. Dar o postez pentru ca astfel, prin confruntare, ea isi dovedeste viabilitatea sau, daca nu, cineva mai informat ma poate corecta. Uneori insist cu punctul meu de vedere chiar si dupa ce mi se aduc obiectii deoarece ceea ce stiu nu imi da pace, nearticulandu-se cu ceea ce aflu, si, din nevoia de coerenta si armonizare (desi realitatea nu e una singura, cred ca realitatile relativ la un subiect trebuie sa fie totusi 'compatibile')nu renunt (din prima)la opinia mea. As vrea, insa, sa se inteleaga ca nu e vorba de vanitate (cu atat mai putin, avand in vedere ca sunt un outsider). Daca parerea mea e gresita, cu atat mai bine ! Am ocazia sa aflu, atunci, adevarul, bineinteles, in masura in care o permite OPSEC. Revenind la topic, introduc in discutie cele aflate din cartea lui Mark Urban, 'Task Force Black'.Lucrarea acestui jurnalist britanic, pentru cei care nu stiu, desi oricine se poate usor documenta, a intampinat rezistenta celor din MoD deoarece dezvaluia informatii despre operatiuni recente la care a participat 22 SAS. Dupa incheierea razboiului propriu zis, britanicii au fost trimisi la vanatoare de FRE (former regime elements- ciraci de-ai lui Saddam). Dupa o perioada, au realizat ca pierd timpul, deoarece miza confruntarii era alta. Principalul adversar in Irak nu mai erau elementele fostului regim, ci insurgenta, iar americanii isi indreptasera deja atentia impotriva acesteia. Intre timp, de la conducerea JSOC au plecat aviatorii (Dell Dailey, comandant JSOC 2000-2003, era fost pilot de elicopter si nu prea i-a avut la inima pe cei din SFOD-D si DEVGRU) si a venit Stanley McChrystall. Acum voi incerca sa rezum lucrurile pentru a prezenta situatia la modul general. Voi reveni ulterior cu detalii. McChrystall a fost numit, pentru energia,austeritatea si eficienta sa, 'calugarul soldat'. La peste 50 de ani, isi incepe dimineata cu un jogging de cateva mile, doarme doar 4 ore pe noapte, e un workahoolic, dar nu un birocrat. Inca de cand era cadet la West Point a gandit 'outside the box' si a avut ceva probleme din cauza spiritului sau independent. A fost si in Special Forces, iar intre 1997-1999 a comandat Regimentul 75 Rangers. Stiu, de numele sau sunt legate si episoade controversate pentru scandalul interogatoriilor de la Camp Nama si musamalizarea cazului Pat Tillman. Ajuns in fruntea JSOC, a revolutionat, practic, modul de operare al unitatilor acestei structuri. A impus un ritm 'industrial' al operatiunilor. Unitatile din subordine atacau imediat ce aveau informatia, fara a mai fi necesar lungul sir de aprobari venite pe lant ierarhic. Informatiile obtinute in urma unei misiuni erau exploatate imediat, trecandu-se rapid la urmatoarea misiune. La centrul sau de comanda din Irak, Joint Operations Center (JOC) situat initial pe aeroportul international din Bagdad, apoi la Balad, a creat o adevarata corporatie. Ca regula generala s-a adoptat information sharing la toate nivelurile, desfiintand practic ierarhia care fragmenta tabloul general privind intelligence. Comunicarea se facea instantaneu si ii privea pe toti cei din JOC. S-a lucrat cu eficienta si rapiditate. S-au comis si multe erori (era inevitabil), dar ritmul infernal imprimat de McChrystall organizatiei a facut ca strategia JSOC in Irak sa treaca printr-o revolutie. Uneori aveau loc pana la 6-7 misiuni pe zi in Irak- vorbesc de toate unitatile aflate in structurile operative JSOC care au actionat in aceasta tara, cunoscute sub numele enigmatice de Task Force 20, 121, 145, 6-26, 88 etc. Comandantii lor aveau o mare autonomie de decizie. Puteau decide momentul declansarii unei misiuni, daca ei considerau oportun. Iar comandantul direct al acestor Task Force nu mai este, ca in operatiunea Anaconda, un pilot de avion de transport din US Air Force, ci chiar comandantul delta Force. Aceste Task Forces au mers pe conceptul Joint-grupau Delta, DEVGRU, Rangers, ISA, 24th Special Tactics Squadron (US Air Force), 160 SOAR. Au fost sustinuti de CIA-Special Acitivities Division si NSA.Structura era organizata astfel, ca sa nu lungesc vorba:"...The job of hunting Zarqawi and rolling up his al-Qaida in Iraq network falls to Task Force 145, which is made up of the most elite U.S. and British special operations forces, and whose headquarters is in Balad.The U.S. forces are drawn from units under Joint Special Operations Command at Pope Air Force Base, N.C. These include the military’s two “direct action” special mission units — the Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, known as Delta Force, and the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, sometimes known by its cover name, Naval Special Warfare Development Group; the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and 75th Ranger Regiment; and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron.After Saddam Hussein’s fall, the first order of business for the JSOC forces was capturing or killing the 55 individuals on the “deck of cards” that depicted the regime’s senior officials. Delta’s C Squadron was at the heart of the task force that captured Saddam in December 2003.The emergence of Zarqawi and his al-Qaida in Iraq group as a major threat to Iraq’s stability then gave JSOC a new priority. As the war in Iraq has ground on, and with Zarqawi still on the loose, the JSOC force in Iraq has grown steadily and undergone several name changes. TF 121 and TF 626 were two previous incarnations.TF 145 is divided into four subordinate task forces in Iraq:• Task Force West, organized around a SEAL Team 6 squadron with Rangers in support.• Task Force Central, organized around a Delta squadron with Rangers in support.• Task Force North, organized around a Ranger battalion combined with a small Delta element.• Task Force Black, organized around a British Special Air Service “saber squadron,” with British paratroopers from the Special Forces Support Group in support.Although Army Lt. Gen. Stan McChrystal, JSOC commander, spends much of his time in Iraq, his job there is to coordinate with Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of Central Command, and other senior leaders. The man in charge of TF 145 is the Delta Force commander, a colonel Military Times agreed not to name.Each TF 145 element operates largely autonomously.The O-5 commander (locotenent-colonel in US Army/Air Force, commander in US Navy -nota mea) of each task force can authorize a raid without seeking TF 145 approval.This freedom, combined with the amount of intelligence generated on missions, creates a furious operational tempo for the TF 145 elements, which average well over a mission per day.From 6 at night to 10 the next morning, “We’re going balls to the wall, doing hits all over the place,” the special operations source said."extras din:SpecOps unit nearly nabs ZarqawiBy Sean D. NaylorTimes staff writerArmy Times April 28, 2006Am ales acest articol deoarece rezuma informatiile din cartea lui Urban.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuConducerea MoD si chiar directorul UKSF (e vorba de cel care l-a inlocuit pe Graeme Lamb) aveau mari reticente (nu mereu neintemeiate) fata de stilul americanilor de a actiona. Acestia declansau misiuni pe baza unei singure surse de informatii, pe cand britanicii actionau dupa ce aveau cel putin 3. Important era, insa ritmul, deoarece organizatiile insurgente castigau teren si adepti, iar aici americanii nu greseau. Delta si SAS stateau in Bagdad in doua cladiri separate de un singur zid pe care l-au spart, pentru a se vizita reciproc cu mai multa usurinta. Insa 22 SAS erau in continuare angajati in misiuni de capturare a FRE si erau, astfel, condamnati la marginalizare. Lucrurile s-au schimbat in 2005, cand la conducerea 22 SAS a venit energicul locotenent-colonel Richard Williams. Mark Urban nu face niciun secret din admiratia britanicului fata de McChrystall si afinitatile dintre cei doi. Williams dorea sa ofere 22 SAS sansa de a se afirma, iar acest fapt era posibil doar dub umbrela JSOC. Nu e vorba nici o secunda de o presupusa superioritate a celor din Delta fata de SAS, ci de cadrul care era mult mai favorabil americanilor. Directorul UKSF, extrem de reticent in fata planurilor lui Williams, a vrut sa il demita. A renuntat atunci cand seful statului major al fortelor terestre, generalul Sir Mike Jackson, i-a pus in vedere directorului ca, in cazul in care il demite pe Williams, sa ii gaseasca un inlocuitor la fel de capabil. In cele din urma, SAS au intrat sub comanda JSOC si au intrat in ritmul impus de aceasta organizatie. Fiecare escadron din 22 SAS a operat, prin rotatie, cate 6 luni (termen marit de la 4 luni, in timp ce compoenentele JSOC se 'roteau' la 90 de zile), in Irak, sub autoritatea JSOC. Personalitatea fiecarui escadron era foarte diferita. Comandantul escadronului D (provenit mai ales din fostii parasutisti, oameni cunoscuti pentru impulsivitatea lor) era un fost genist, om reticent si prudent. In schimb, comandantul escadronului A din 2007 era poate chiar mai plin de elan decat Williams. Acum maior, acest comandant de escadron mai luptase in Irak in 2003, avand gradul de capitan, in fruntea unui troop (pluton SAS). Daca in trecut tinerii capitani din SAS (numiti cu ironie Ruperts) rareori participau la o misiune si erau, mai curand, o bataie de cap in plus pentru mult mai experimentatii lor subordonati, in perioada 2003-2008, lucrurile s-au schimbat, scrie Urban. Tinerii ofiteri au luat parte, in subordinea JSOC, la un numar la fel de mare de misiuni ca si subofiterii si trupa. Intre tinerii capitani si sergenti a aparut un spirit de emulatie care nu isi gaseste termen de comparatie in trecutul regimentului. Asa cum am mai spus, multi capitani din 22 SAS au revenit in Irak ca maiori comandanti de escadron. Insusi Richard Williams, maior fiind in 2003, actionase in Irak ca ofiter cu operatiile al regimentului.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuM-am cam abatut de la topic, asa ca voi continua discutia (desi subiectul este strsns legat de americani) pe pagina dedicata SAS.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihainu cred ca ai fortat nota,Radu,doar ca parerea mea e ca ai fi usor dezamagit de cei din SAS.repet,nu ma refer la ofiteri.probabil ca eu aveam si niste idei mai romantice despre SAS si niste asteptari mari (desi citisem tot ce exista in Romania despre ei).insa cred ca multi din militarii nostri din fortele speciale sunt din anumite puncte de vedere peste nivelul unui militar tipic SAS.ei fac selectia dupa anumite caracteristici.au fost prima unitate speciala din lume care a introdus un model stiintific de selectie.si au trecut niste zeci de ani de-atunci.in plus,cei care se inroleaza in R.A. in U.K. nu vin din asa-numita 'fast lane'a societatii.multi vin din medii violente,cu betii,batai etc. (si la noi inainte de '89 se recrutau la cercetasi tineri din medii mai 'descurcarete'.de exemplu la inceputul pregatirii i se spunea militarului ceva gen 'ai 5 minute sa-mi aduci o conserva de peste din Alimentara'.pare usor la prima vedere, dar asta implica:-iesi din unitate fara bilet de voie;-'completeaza' la Alimentara, pentru ca militarul n-avea bani la el;-intra inapoi in unitate.si 'intamplator' cei din garda erau avertizati .)la britanici imi plac mai mult cei din SBS (cred ca am mai discutat acum cativa ani pe tema SAS-SBS).un prieten a facut un curs la RM si a fost foarte, foarte impresionat.cei din RM au fost si la noi de nenumarate ori,au tinut cursuri,au reparat cabana Diham...si ei cam chitrosi (in general britanicii sunt asa),dar uniti intre ei,au ceva din mentalitatea marinarilor.cat despre generalul McC. cred ca e o personalitate foarte misto,un tip cu viziune.are multi admiratori (gen Andrew Exum, fost Ranger,o stea care urca),dar si critici (gen Michael Yon,fost bereta verde).vezi ca ambii au bloguri interesante.povestea cu vanarea insurgentilor e foarte complexa.'manhunting'-ul ca domeniu de studiu in fs a aparut recent,deci s-a pornit de la hartie si creion.practic problema era urmatoarea: cum pot sa aflu unde este 'Tango'?pentru ca daca stiu unde e,pot trimite pe cineva sa-i sparga usa sau o drona,direct (mai operativ si eficient).ma rog,daca are usa ,pentru ca poate fi si-n pestera.domeniul e fascinant si s-a dezvoltat enorm in ultimii ani.s-a pornit inclusiv de la remote view-eri care faceau pase pe harta si s-a ajuns la analiza bayesiana sau cea a retelelor sociale.la nivelul actual baietii de peste ocean pot identifica pe cineva care foloseste de trei ori acelasi calculator (poate folosi si mama Tor-ului sau a Skype-ului).in cazul telefoanelor mobile,in 2-3 ani se va obtine identificare+localizare (indiferent daca e schimbata cartela).doar ca e cam greu sa-i faci pe teroristi sa foloseasca tehnologia.in Somalia au fost mari probleme cu asta.si e esential ca in momentul in care stii unde e omul,sa actionezi imediat,pentru ca nu se stie cand vei mai avea ocazia (daca o vei mai avea ).in manhunting,informatie=actiune.aia cu 3 surse e poveste.e suficienta doar una.in cel mai rau caz(info e falsa),macar ai taiat de pe lista o sursa si o ipoteza.exista un vechi principiu in cercetare (o diciplina care se bazeaza in multe privinte pe metoda lui Descartes) care spune ca pentru a afla o realitate trebuie sa controlezi mai multe ipoteze:eliminand ipoteze,ajungi la adevar.in toata treaba cu manhuntingul,sunt extrem de importante unitatile gen ISA,SRR,CPIS plus alea despre care povestea Dalton Fury ca au fost 'first in' in Afghanistan.aia fac in ziua de azi cam ce facea SAS in anii '40.daca ar exista un Oscar al fortelor speciale,cred ca anul asta l-ar lua cei din USAF Special Tactics (pentru misiunea din Haiti).cred ca au salvat niste mii de vieti acolo.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribummihai wrote ... Diham . ...Belvedere,bere Azuga,ciuperci pe plita,Gp.Cc.Mis.Spc,tinerete si sperante...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiACH Boribum wrote ...mihai wrote ... Diham . ...Belvedere,bere Azuga,ciuperci pe plita,Gp.Cc.Mis.Spc,tinerete si sperante... sper ca sperantele au ramasRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumIntacte.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:001\*mihai wrote ...[...].in cazul telefoanelor mobile,in 2-3 ani se va obtine identificare+localizare (indiferent daca e schimbata cartela)[...]daca te referi la acelasi terminal, asta se face de ceva vreme, chiar si la noi(se misca mai greu ultimul operator intrat pe piata) identificare+localizareRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribummihai wrote ...ma refer la faptul ca Abu-... isi cumpara telefon mobil nou nout,vorbeste cu o cartela fara istoric,o arunca,vorbeste cu alta cartela fara istoric,o arunca si pe a doua.atat si e suficient pentru a fi identificat si localizat.fireste,nu in timp real. Identificarea se face dupa IMEI-ul telefonului (ca asa si-a luat si Djohar "Didi" Dudaev o racheta : fix în IMEI) si nu dupa cartela. Cartela e buna pentru altele...dar nu e baza trebii.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihai1\* wrote ...mihai wrote ...[...].in cazul telefoanelor mobile,in 2-3 ani se va obtine identificare+localizare (indiferent daca e schimbata cartela)[...]daca te referi la acelasi terminal, asta se face de ceva vreme, chiar si la noi(se misca mai greu ultimul operator intrat pe piata) identificare+localizarema refer la faptul ca Abu-... isi cumpara telefon mobil nou nout,vorbeste cu o cartela fara istoric,o arunca,vorbeste cu alta cartela fara istoric,o arunca si pe a doua.atat si e suficient pentru a fi identificat si localizat.fireste,nu in timp real.azi nu exista un sistem de genul asta nicaieri in lume.localizarea se face gps/sim,identificarea dupa amprenta vocala,'amprenta telefonului',numar sunat etc.e ceva gen 'triangulatie',dar mult mai complex.daca te intereseaza subiectul,vezi cazul recent din Dubai.in cazul ala fara camere de luat vederi nu era posibila identificareasi probabil nici localizarea.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumScuzele mele,amintirea lui Mihai mi-a trezit-o pe a mea (despre amintiri vorbeam,fireste) . Scuze înca o data.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00ex-adsi inteleg ca discutati despre experienta nord-americana, nu?deschideti topic dedicat comunicatiilor mobile si nu-l mai poluati p-asta.mihai si bori, schimburi de replici precum cele din pagina precedenta isi au loc pe chatbox. multzam.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiACH Boribum wrote ...mihai wrote ...ma refer la faptul ca Abu-... isi cumpara telefon mobil nou nout,vorbeste cu o cartela fara istoric,o arunca,vorbeste cu alta cartela fara istoric,o arunca si pe a doua.atat si e suficient pentru a fi identificat si localizat.fireste,nu in timp real. Identificarea se face dupa IMEI-ul telefonului (ca asa si-a luat si Djohar "Didi" Dudaev o racheta : fix în IMEI) si nu dupa cartela. Cartela e buna pentru altele...dar nu e baza trebii.e partial corect ce spui,dar:-e o mare diferenta intre identificarea aparatului si identificarea persoanei care il foloseste.identificarea persoanei se face cu ajutorul identificarii aparatului (dar nu numai).-identificarea aparatului se face prin accesul la registrul identificare echipamente(RIE).IMEI-ul se aloca telefonului propriu-zis.dar in afara de el mai exista si IMSI si TMSI (TMSI se aloca de catre RAV-registrul de apartenenta abonati vizitatori).date despre abonati se stocheaza in RAL-registru apartenenta abonati locali.-cand suni pe cineva,se trimite IMEI-ul RAV-ului.RAV-ul trimite IMSI-ul (si nu IMEI-ul) RAL-ului etc,nu mai intru in detalii.-IMEI-ul e inutil in speta la care ma refeream,pentru ca aparatele nu vin cu numele posesorului stantat pe ele.-Dudaev folosea un telefon prin satelit si a fost localizat prin triangulatie.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:001\*asa da, acum avem explicatia tehnica mai detaliata, si cred ca e ok daca ne oprim prin zonaRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAsadar: Pe site-ul armatei australiene, la rubrica "Special Forces", era mai de mult o statistica cu date comparative privind rata selectiei in diferitele forte pt operatiuni speciale din USA si Australia. Am gasit-o:LINKSe poate vedea ca rata de selectie in cazul Special Forces si Rangers, mai putin la Navy SEALs, este mult mai mare decat in cazul SASR.La acestea adaug alte informatii. Aflu de pe un forum militar francez ca la un curs efectuat de Para commandos belgieni au luat parte 30 de americani din USSF. Doar 3 au trecut de acest curs. Cineva de pe site comenta ca americanii pun accent pe ceea ce stiu sa faca oamenii respectivi si mai putin pe conditia fizica. Dar, intreb eu ca outsider, cele doua nu sunt legate ?Adaug sursa citata in link-ul respectiv, un articol publicat de organizatia RAND:LINKObserv aici datele despre US Air Force Special Operations Forces. In special combat controllers, unde rata de selectie e de doar 10 procente. Mihai vorbea de ei cu ceva timp in urma, elogiindu-i in doua randuri. Colonelul Pete Blaber, unul dintre cei mai apreciati ofiteri din Delta, acum in retragere, a facut aprecieri similare la adresa lor in cartea sa "The men, the mission and me".Apoi, mai multi Rangers au clacat fizic la un exercitiu in zonele desertice din Northern Territory, Australia, acolo unde aussies folosesc unitati din armata teritoriala.In fine, ceva evocat si de Boribum, si gasit tot pe un site francez, referitor la Navy SEALs retrasi de la cursul de Lanceros efectuat de armata columbiana, dupa ce au cedat la cateva zile de la inceperea exercitiului. Nu cred ca ma invinuieste cineva, cel putin de pe acest forum de antiamericanism. Fara a risca sa trag concluzii cu privire la relevanta/autenticitate unora dintre aceste informatii, cum se explica ele ? Ce imagine se contureaza ? Oare, indraznesc sa speculez, nu e cumva sita selectiei cam prea putin deasa in USA ?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMultumesc pentru explicatie. Este logica, dar...Acum o sa spuna lumea ca sunt greu de cap. E adevarat ca aceste filtre succesive vor cerne pe cei mai buni oameni. Insa Delta sunt vreo 250 (poate 300 si un pic daca a fost creat intre timp escadronul D, cum anuntau acum vreo cativa ani) iar ISA, cred eu, si mai putini. Asta dintr-o armata terestra care numara acum peste jumatate de milion de oameni. In pofida redundantelor si suprapunerilor in materie de misiuni, totusi unitatile din USSOCOM au misiuni diferite. Delta/CAG/CDB si NAVSPECWARDEVGRU (fost ST-6)diferit de ISA, iar USSF diferite de acestea trei, iar Rangers, SEALs, CCT, etc au fiecare au rolul lor. Prin urmare, nu ar fi normal ca fiecare sa exceleze in domeniul sau ? Cu alte cuvinte, de exemplu, daca Special Forces nu isi fac treaba cum trebuie, o sa vina Delta sau ISA sa le-o rezolve ? Sau daca Rangers dau chix, or sa 'repare situatia' CCT/PJ sau altii ? Imi cer scuze pentru insistenta, dar nu fac altceva decat sa incerc sa inteleg.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiRadu,o sa te bag in Pareto si Gauss.exista aptitudini care se incadreaza in Gauss- 68% mediocritate-16%praf-16%exceptionali.de exemplu IQ-ul,inaltimea,forta etc.exista alte aptitudini care tin de regula lui Pareto (80-20):creativitatea de pilda.20% dintre oameni creaza 80% dintre idei.la planificare iti trebuie oameni in functie de regula Pareto,la executie in functie de Gauss.dar cum cei de la planificare urca de la executie,trebuie un compromis.in cazul de care vorbesti tu,avand o baza larga de selectie,iti poti permite sa lasi mai jos stacheta.de ce?pt ca exista alta sita dupa aia.deci ei isi permit sa distileze tuica de mai multe ori.daca n-ai baza de selectie mare,tre sa ai filtru mai bun.US Navy si US Air Force au filtre mai bune.dar gandeste-te ca US Army are inca 2 filtre de la filtrul initial: delta si isa.pune grila Gauss pe numarul militarilor din fortele speciale americane si calculeaza cati sunt cei 16% exceptionali.exceptionali la standarde occidentale,nu chinezesti sau indiene.o sa ai explicatia.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribummihai wrote ...la planificare iti trebuie oameni in functie de regula Pareto,la executie in functie de Gauss.dar cum cei de la planificare urca de la executie,trebuie un compromis. E binecunoscut faptul ca întâi începem sa planificam operatiuni speciale (planificare),si-abia mai apoi sa mergem si pe teren,la executie. Imbatabil ! N-o fi cumva invers ? Planifica generalul si executa plutonierul ? Sau planifica plutonierul si executa...tot el ? Sau generalul ? Si-apoi se schimba-ntre ei ? P.S Când vorbim din carti,e bine sa le traducem în sinea noastra,macar,sa întelegem ce spun ele.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDin ce am citit, fostul Ranger Indoctrination Program/RIP -pt cei de la E-5(Sergeant) in jos si Ranger Orientation Program/ROP (pt ofiteri si subofiteri peste E-5) erau mai dure ca rata de attrition decat Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). Mai nou, vad ca RIP si ROP au fost redenumite Ranger Assessment and Selection Program RASP 1 si RASP2 si dureaza 8 saptamani. In schimb, in timp ce Rangers mai petrec doar 7 saptamani in Ranger School la ceva timp distanta dupa selectie, pregatirea Special Forces dureaza 48 de saptamani (inainte era de 64 de saptamani, cu stagii care se intindeau pe o perioada de 2 ani).Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiACH Boribum wrote ...mihai wrote ...la planificare iti trebuie oameni in functie de regula Pareto,la executie in functie de Gauss.dar cum cei de la planificare urca de la executie,trebuie un compromis. E binecunoscut faptul ca întâi începem sa planificam operatiuni speciale (planificare),si-abia mai apoi sa mergem si pe teren,la executie. Imbatabil ! N-o fi cumva invers ? Planifica generalul si executa plutonierul ? Sau planifica plutonierul si executa...tot el ? Sau generalul ? Si-apoi se schimba-ntre ei ? P.S Când vorbim din carti,e bine sa le traducem în sinea noastra,macar,sa întelegem se spun ele. planificarea se face din varf la baza,nu invers.strategia cuprinde tactica,nu invers.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumDeci nu "urci" de la planificare la executie,ci "cobori". Voilà. Merçi. Sans rancune.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNu stiu daca fac bine ca intervin in aceasta discutie. Eu am inteles asa: oamenii care sunt initial la nivelul de executie, cand urca in grad, functie si varsta, ajung, pe baza experientei lor la planificare. Gata, piua !Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumAi înteles foarte bine Nu e o regula general valabila,în sensul ca unii ramân la executie forever iar altii la planificare,dar ideea e cea transmisa de tine. Oricum,gradele posturilor nu sunt "amestecabile" (nu ajung colonei si generali sa faca echipier pe teren...,dar un tânar locotenent care a facut teren poate va ajunge sa fie planificator),de unde si corectia mea adusa teoriei lui Mihai.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiRadu Patrascu wrote ...Multumesc pentru explicatie. Este logica, dar...Acum o sa spuna lumea ca sunt greu de cap. E adevarat ca aceste filtre succesive vor cerne pe cei mai buni oameni. Insa Delta sunt vreo 250 (poate 300 si un pic daca a fost creat intre timp escadronul D, cum anuntau acum vreo cativa ani) iar ISA, cred eu, si mai putini. Asta dintr-o armata terestra care numara acum peste jumatate de milion de oameni. In pofida redundantelor si suprapunerilor in materie de misiuni, totusi unitatile din USSOCOM au misiuni diferite. Delta/CAG/CDB si NAVSPECWARDEVGRU (fost ST-6)diferit de ISA, iar USSF diferite de acestea trei, iar Rangers, SEALs, CCT, etc au fiecare au rolul lor. Prin urmare, nu ar fi normal ca fiecare sa exceleze in domeniul sau ? Cu alte cuvinte, de exemplu, daca Special Forces nu isi fac treaba cum trebuie, o sa vina Delta sau ISA sa le-o rezolve ? Sau daca Rangers dau chix, or sa 'repare situatia' CCT/PJ sau altii ? Imi cer scuze pentru insistenta, dar nu fac altceva decat sa incerc sa inteleg. no problem.in fiecare categorie exista mai multe filtre.in Seal sunt cei din Devgru,in USAF 23rd Special Tactics etc.apoi,mi se pare irelevant ca doar 3 membri USSF au absolvit cursul paracommando belgian.e ca si cum am compara mere cu pere.daca duci de la rangeri oameni la cursul ala o sa fluiere.cum spuneam,necesita alte aptitudini.in fine,trebuie sa generalizam pornind de la niste exemple?daca un grup din Seal clacheaza inseamna ca toti ar fi clacat?nu cred ca sunt niste premise pe baza carora putem trage o concluzie.pur si simplu lucruri de-astea se-ntampla.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiRadu Patrascu wrote ...Nu stiu daca fac bine ca intervin in aceasta discutie. Eu am inteles asa: oamenii care sunt initial la nivelul de executie, cand urca in grad, functie si varsta, ajung, pe baza experientei lor la planificare. Gata, piua ! corect.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiACH Boribum wrote ... Deci nu "urci" de la planificare la executie,ci "cobori". Voilà. Merçi. Sans rancune. nu e problema mea daca tu ai inteles asta.probabil si dac-as spune ca pamantul e rotund,ai avea de comentat ceva.astept critici constructive,cu argumente.cand o sa ai dreptate in vreo problema o sa recunosc fara ocolisuri.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribummihai wrote ...ACH Boribum wrote ... Deci nu "urci" de la planificare la executie,ci "cobori". Voilà. Merçi. Sans rancune. nu e problema mea daca tu ai inteles asta.probabil si dac-as spune ca pamantul e rotund,ai avea de comentat ceva.astept critici constructive,cu argumente.cand o sa ai dreptate in vreo problema o sa recunosc fara ocolisuri. Daca ai spune ca Pamântul e rotund,desigur ca as spune ca nu este : e turtit la Poli (s-a descoperit chestia asta mai demult,zice lumea...). Nu era o critica,ci o remarca. Succes în studierea fortelor astea speciale va doresc.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00mihaiRadu Patrascu wrote ...Din ce am citit, fostul Ranger Indoctrination Program/RIP -pt cei de la E-5(Sergeant) in jos si Ranger Orientation Program/ROP (pt ofiteri si subofiteri peste E-5) erau mai dure ca rata de attrition decat Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). Mai nou, vad ca RIP si ROP au fost redenumite Ranger Assessment and Selection Program RASP 1 si RASP2 si dureaza 8 saptamani. In schimb, in timp ce Rangers mai petrec doar 7 saptamani in Ranger School la ceva timp distanta dupa selectie, pregatirea Special Forces dureaza 48 de saptamani (inainte era de 64 de saptamani, cu stagii care se intindeau pe o perioada de 2 ani). cauta programul de pregatire al USSF si pe cel al Rangers si compara-le.o sa vezi ca sunt diferente enorme.sunt pregatiti pentru lucruri diferite.sa comparam USSF cu Rangers e ca si cum am compara Politehnica ('poli') cuun liceu sportiv exceptional.desi au note foarte bune la sport,principala arma a celor din USSF este creierul.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuTocmai asta voiam sa spun, dar din comoditate am omis. Am presupus ca implicita aceasta concluzie. Sunt filozofii diferite si unitati cu misiuni foarte diferite. In felul meu, vad o asimilare lenta, metodica si plina de acribie in cazul celor din SF si o 'ordalie' brutala, sacadata si rapida in cazul Rangers. Am citit pe undeva o anecdota povestita de cineva care incerca sa sublinieze intr-o maniera anecdotica diferenta dintre cele doua categorii. Daca, spre exemplu, intr-un conflict, un inamic detine o pozitie dominanta de unde executa foc cu arme de mare calibru, o companie de Rangers va incerca un atac in forta pentru a lichida pozitia. In aceeasi misiune, un detasament Alfa de Green Berets va ghida tirul unui avion asupra aceluiasi obiectiv. O alta comparatie era aceea in care Rangers erau numiti 'bata de baseball a USSOCOM' iar SF 'stiletul'. Interesant este ca, vazand 'CV'-ul unor operatori Delta (morti, bineinteles), majoritatea au fost 'la baza' Rangers, din care o proportie semnificativa au trecut si prin SF. Asta in cazul sergentilor. Ofiterii au parcurs o singura filiera: fie Rangers, fie SF. Mai rar, mult mai rar, am mai vazut cariere in care etapele de serviciu in Delta erau intercalate cu cele in ISA.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAa, si faptul ca multi operatori ISA au fost in SF mai intai.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn sfarsit, am gasit filmul realizat in timpul operatiunii din 8 iunie 2004 de salvare a patru ostatici: italienii Salvatore Stefio, Umberto Cupertino si Maurizio Agliana, si polonezul Jerzy Kos. Italianul Fabrizio Quattrocchi, capturat impreuna cu ceilalti patru la 4 aprilie, a fost executat de rapitori. Intreaga operatiune a fost filmata cu ajutorul unei camere plasate pe o casca.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuA big blunder, as putea spune:Linda Norgrove: US navy Seal faces disciplinary action over grenade deathGuardian learns commando hurled explosive device during rescue as he had not seen UK aid worker taking cover nearbyLinda Norgrove: US navy Seal faces disciplinary action over grenade deathGuardian learns commando hurled explosive device during rescue as he had not seen UK aid worker taking cover nearby * Julian Borger, diplomatic editor * guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 13 October 2010 16.23 BST Startling details of the daring rescue mission that ended in the death of the British aid worker Linda Norgrove can be revealed today, as a joint US-UK investigation into the incident gets under way.Linda Norgrove managed to break free from her captors, but tragically was not seen by her rescuers, according to Guardian sourcesThe Guardian has learned that a US special forces soldier who is believed to have accidentally killed Norgrove is likely to face disciplinary action after failing to inform his commanding officers that he had used a grenade until long after the event.Sources in Kabul and London have confirmed that during the assault on the kidnappers' hideaway the hostage broke away from her captors and lay in a foetal position to avoid harm.The soldier from the elite Seal Team Six special forces unite failed to see Norgrove and tossed his fragmentation grenade in, which exploded next to her.It has also emerged today that:• US forces monitored the kidnappers using a network of informers and drones• Conversations were intercepted indicating Norgrove could be executed "like the Russian" or shipped across the Pakistan border• British officers working with the Americans were kept informed of the intelligence at all times• The entire mission was relayed on to six widescreen televisions back at the command centreNorgrove's death was first attributed to an insurgent detonating a suicide vest – an account that was reported around the world.The use of a fragmentation grenade was first discovered when the taskforce commander in charge of the mission reassessed surveillance video of the attack and saw the Seal toss the grenade into the compound four seconds before the blast.It is unusual to use a fragmentation grenade (as opposed to a smoke grenade or a stun grenade) in a hostage rescue. However, the rescue team carried them in this mission to give them flexibility in dealing with whatever resistance they met on the way to or back from the target.The Seals involved in the assault were summoned by their commander and asked if any of them had used a fragmentation grenade. One stepped forward and identified himself, triggering a frantic effort by embarrassed US commanders to correct the official record and alert the British government.Absolute certainty on Norgrove's cause of death will have to await the official results of an autopsy but senior officers are almost sure that the investigation will show the US grenade was responsible.Top commanders, including the head of US forces in Afghanistan and Nato's International Stabilisation Assistance Force (Isaf), General David Petraeus, are said to be greatly distressed that a misleading account of the raid was initially provided to the British government, and concerned about the potential damage to the bilateral relationship. The fact that the Seal did not admit using the grenade immediately is seen as a matter of integrity among senior officers.Petraeus insisted that Downing Street should be informed as soon the true facts were discovered, in the early hours of Monday morning. He ordered a joint investigation, to be headed by a British brigadier, Rob Nitsch, and Major General Joseph Votel, who has extensive US special forces experience."Petraeus was very clear that he wanted to flag something was wrong with the original account," a Downing Street source said. "They took another look at the video and immediately called us."Norgrove's family have expressed gratitude to US forces for "not sweeping under the carpet" the details of her death.From interviews with well-informed sources, both military and civilian, the Guardian has put together this detailed account of the failed rescue mission.Norgrove, originally from Sutherland in the Scottish Highlands, was seized on 26 September, when her car was forced off the road in Kunar province, near the Pakistan border.Soon after her abduction, she was taken to a stronghold in a steep-sided valley 8,000ft (2,400 metres) up in the mountains of northern Kunar. But her kidnappers were being watched. US intelligence had a network of informers in the area and drones circling above. They were watching Norgrove's captors and eavesdropping on their radio conversations. All that intelligence was immediately passed to a British officer.By late last week it was clear, according to sources, that Norgrove's life was in very grave danger. One group of local elders was calling for her execution, talking of killing her like "the Russian" some years before, an apparent reference to the long war with the Soviet army, in which captured soldiers were often slaughtered in horrifying ways.The other option her captors were debating was shipping Norgrove to North Waziristan, the tribal territory in western Pakistan, which is almost entirely outside the control of government forces, and where it would be virtually impossible to keep track of the British woman and her abductors.From the outset, there was little question that if there was to be a rescue mission it would be carried out by Seal Team Six, a secretive US navy unit used for high-risk counter-terrorist operations. Commanders considered the only other special forces qualified to carry out the assault were the US Delta Force and Britain's SAS, which had rescued a British-Irish journalist, Stephen Farrell, last year.However, the SAS were too far away and did not have the MH-60, a Black Hawk helicopter highly modified for special forces night operations and just about capable of functioning in such thin mountain air. Furthermore, Seal Team Six had been operating in that area of northern Kunar for months. They knew the terrain and their adversaries.The assault was launched before dawn on Saturday morning, when it was thought the insurgents would be at their most groggy. Landing the Seals some distance away and creeping of the compound on foot was impossible. There was nowhere flat to set down for miles around.The only realistic option was for the US special forces to descend on the target compound out of the night sky, sliding down ropes, guns blazing. Far away, in the taskforce headquarters, the operation was being watched on six big screens, each showing a live feed from a different source — the drones, the helicopters and even the Seals' helmet cameras. It was not the sharp green clarity as portrayed Hollywood films – sometimes a feed would be lost as an aircraft made a turn for example – but the unfolding action was clear enough.In the first few violent minutes, the plan seemed to be working. The six abductors holding Norgrove stumbled out of their huts into the central compound and were shot and killed. What the Seals did not see however, was one of the insurgents dragging Linda Norgrove out of a hut with him.She managed to break away and lay down, hunched up in the foetal position – the safest thing to do given the hail of gunfire around her – but on that moonless night, the Seals did not spot her, even with their night vision goggles.To the horror of the senior officers watching back at headquarters, the six big screens were lit up by a blast that seemed to come from the vicinity of Norgrove and the insurgent closest to her, and soon afterwards word came from the returning helicopters that Norgrove was mortally wounded. The operation had failed.The immediate assumption was that the blast had come from a suicide bomb, as it is not unusual for insurgents to slip into suicide vests if there is a risk of attack.Late on Sunday, however, the taskforce commander acted on a hunch and asked to see the video of the assault stored on the computer hard drive at its headquarters. Running through it again, he spotted one Seal, standing on the roof of one of the huts, toss something underhand into the compound. Four seconds later the screen went bright from the explosion. He called the team in and asked who had thrown a grenade. One man stepped forward.Within minutes, the Seal Team Six commander was on a secure line to Petraeus with the bad news. It was 7.30am in Kabul, 4am in London, but Petraeus quickly made the call to Downing Street, where a defence aide woke the prime minister.An operation that was supposed to draw on the strength of a close military partnership had ended with another civilian casualty in a dirty war and the bond of trust at the heart of the transatlantic relationship sorely tested.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuElite U.S. Counterterror Forces Facing CutsBy Marc AmbinderFriday, March 11, 2011 | 5:00 p.m. The nation’s elite counterterrorist forces, some facing budget cuts of up to 20 percent, are quietly telling Congress their special capabilities can’t be utilized amid the Middle East and North Africa tumult because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are already stretching their resources.Even before the uprising in Tunisia, clandestine special mission units of the Joint Special Operations Command were finishing plans to expand human intelligence collection in North Africa, and deny terrorists what one JSOC official called an "electronic sanctuary" in the region.“We’re at the point where we have multiple revolutions, [Muammar el-] Qaddafi may fall, and we can’t put the premier military intelligence unit on the ground there because they’re all on the ground in Afghanistan chasing farmers,” a military official said.JSOC resources are heavily taxed by the operational tempo in Afghanistan and Pakistan, officials said. The current commander, Vice Adm. William McRaven, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Votel, McRaven’s nominated replacement, have been pushing to add people and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology to areas outside the war theater where al-Qaida and its affiliates continue to thrive.But the elite units are facing reductions in their $1 billion-plus budget, which could significantly impact the U.S.'s ability to monitor and react to the events unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa. The problem was revealed by officials involved in negotiations between budget officials, military planners, and senior commanders for a planned expansion of the secret JSOC units. Even JSOC’s most closely-guarded unit, based on the East Coast, could see personnel reductions of up to 20 percent, people briefed on the plans say, depending on how the defense budget process plays out. The unit is scrambling to demonstrate to senior commanders that it can be efficient.Military officials requested that National Journal not disclose any further details about the particular unit because it would jeopardize the mission and personnel. The officials agreed to speak on the condition of anonymity because the matter is sensitive and classified.Since 9/11, the JSOC units and their task forces have become the U.S. government’s most effective and lethal weapon against terrorists and their networks, drawing plenty of unwanted, and occasionally unflattering, attention to themselves in the process.JSOC’s intelligence directorate, which has transformed the way the military collects and exploits intelligence, may see even its brand new Targeting and Analysis Center – TAAC – cut back. Where the National Counterterrorism Center tends to focus on threats to the homeland, TAAC, recently revealed by the Associated Press, focuses outward, on active “kinetic” – or lethal – counterterrorism missions abroad.Also since 9/11, JSOC’s size has tripled; the command now includes more than 4,000 soldiers and civilians. Once the province of the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (the Delta Force) and the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (SEAL Team Six), over the past eight years JSOC devoured a number of free-floating Defense Department entities that allowed it to rapidly acquire, test, and field new technologies. Under a variety of standing orders, JSOC is involved in more than 50 current operations spanning a dozen countries, and its units, supported by so-called "white," or acknowledged special operations entities like Rangers, Special Forces battalions, SEAL Teams, and Air Force special ops units from the larger Special Operations Command, are responsible for most of the “kinetic” action in Afghanistan.An official said some of the cuts may be eased with the Special Operations Command, to which JSOC reports, identifying ways of keeping staffing levels current with “$2.3 billion in efficiencies" over five years from its own budget."The command also looked at where and how it could use service-common equipment and systems instead of developing [special forces]-unique capabilities," the official said.Pentagon officials are conscious of the enormous stress that 10 years of war have placed on the command. Votel wants to add several squadrons to the “Tier One” units – Delta and the SEALs. Those plans are on hold for the moment. Another official predicted that SOCOM would find a way to add about 50 positions to JSOC, in part by reducing contracting staff and borrowing qualified technicians and analysts from other parts of the command.When Gen. Stanley McChrystal became JSOC’s commanding general in 2004, he and his intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, set about to transform the way the subordinate units analyze and act on intelligence. Insurgents in Iraq were exploiting the slow decision loop that coalition commanders used, and enhanced interrogation techniques were frowned upon after the Abu Ghraib scandal. But the hunger for actionable tactical intelligence on insurgents was palpable.The way JSOC solved this problem remains a carefully guarded secret, but people familiar with the unit suggest that McChrystal and Flynn introduced hardened commandos to basic criminal forensic techniques and then used highly advanced and still-classified technology to transform bits of information into actionable intelligence. One way they did this was to create forward-deployed fusion cells, where JSOC units were paired with intelligence analysts from the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.These technicians could “exploit and analyze” data obtained from the battlefield instantly, using their access to the government’s various biometric, facial-recognition, and voice-print databases. These cells also used highly advanced surveillance technology and computer-based pattern analysis to layer predictive models of insurgent behavior onto real-time observations.The military has begun to incorporate these techniques across the services. And Flynn will soon be promoted to a job within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, where he’ll be tasked with transforming the way intelligence is gathered, analyzed, and utilized.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Rafalepriviti si va minunati ”adevarat ”advance work” job well doneRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuUltima denumire prin care este 'legendata' 1st SFOD-D precum si comandantul acesteia din perioada 2006-2008. Colonel John V. ChristianUS ARMY Delta ForceColonel John V. Christian assumed duties as the Director of US Army Special Operations Command’s Compartmented Element (sublinierea imi apartine) on 12 September 2006. In his previous assignment he was assigned to 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (1st SFOD-D) better known as “Delta Force” from 2002 to 2006 and previously from 1995 to 1999. Colonel Christian was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Infantry from Siena College in 1982. Throughout his career he has served in operational assignments in Italy, the Philippines, and the United States. He has multiple combat tours in Iraq, and in other locations. He has commanded at every level from platoon through brigade sized task force.His principal staff assignments have been as USASOC ACE Director, Chief of Staff for Reconciliation, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, Operations Officer for Task Force 20 (Iraq), and Chief, Army Programs, JUSMAG Philippines.He commanded a Joint and Combined Task Force in Iraq, various commands in 1st SFOD-D, an airborne company in Vicenza Italy, a ranger training company, and a recruiting company.He and his wife, Martha, have two sons, Michael and Matthew.sursa: LINKA fost precedata la comanda Delta intre 2004-2006, de actualul general de brigada Austin S. Miller (absolvent West Point 1983):U.S. Department of DefenseOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)News ReleaseLINKIMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 600-08July 15, 2008General Officer AnnouncementsArmy Col. Austin S. Miller for promotion to the grade of brigadier general. He is currently serving as deputy director for Special Operations, J-37, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of DefenseOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)News Release LINKGeneral Officer Assignments:Brig. Gen. Austin S. Miller, deputy director for special operations, J-37, The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commander, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.U.S. Department of DefenseOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)News Release LINKGeneral Officer AnnouncementsBrig. Gen. Austin S. Miller, commander, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, to director of operations, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Rafalesi o alta perspectivaRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDupa cum remarca Sean Naylor in articolul din 2006, reprodus mai jos, se vede ca in comunitatea operatiunilor speciale din SUA, Beretele Verzi nu se bucura de cea mai mare trecere: More than door-kickersSpecial ops forces are misused as man-hunters, critics sayBy Sean D. NaylorFor the United States' special operations forces, these should be the salad days. In late 2001, a relatively small number of Army Special Forces (SF) A-teams worked with the CIA and U.S. airpower to topple Afghanistan's Taliban regime in what was universally seen as U.S. special operations forces' finest hour. They followed this triumph with a superlative performance during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, during which multiple joint special operations task forces managed to fix far larger Iraqi conventional formations, facilitating the rapid seizure of Baghdad. These successes resulted in vocal support for special operations forces (SOF) on the part of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Pentagon team, a respect mirrored on Capitol Hill. "Everyone's infatuated with SOF," said a Special Forces officer posted to Washington. "To do anything against SOF would be absolute sacrilege on both sides of the aisle." This consensus has allowed Rumsfeld to confer unprecedented authority and resources on U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom), and if the Quadrennial Defense Review released Feb. 6 is any guide, this trend can only continue. The QDR promises a 15 percent increase in special operations forces, including a "one-third" increase in Special Forces battalions. So why are so many folks in the special ops community wearing such glum faces? A major factor is a growing perception among special operators that in the Pentagon and, increasingly, U.S. Special Operations Command, senior leaders are only interested in missions and units that emphasize one set of special ops skills — namely, man-hunting and direct action, known colloquially as "door-kicking." Direct action and man-hunting have long been the preserve — indeed, the raison d'être — of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and its associated units: the Army's 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (aka Delta Force), SEAL Team 6 (aka Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DevGru), the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), among others. Direct action is also one of Army Special Forces' "seven principal missions." What troubles many special operators, particularly those from the SF community, is that another six principal missions, as well as the contributions of the Army's civil affairs and psychological operations units, are undervalued by their leaders. Those missions include unconventional warfare (fostering and promoting an insurgency, as the SF troops did with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban), foreign internal defense (helping a friendly government defeat an insurgency) and information operations. These are missions that, unlike direct action, place a high priority on Special Forces' language skills and cultural awareness (each of the Army's seven SF groups has a regional focus). "My concern is that all we're focused on is direct action, to the absolute exclusion of all other things," said Mark Haselton, a retired Special Forces lieutenant colonel. "The war we are fighting (and will be fighting for years to come) will require the ability to export training in ways that others can use to organize their own capabilities. If we spend the rest of our lives 'capturing and killing' terrorists at the expense of those SF missions that are more important — gaining access to the local population, training indigenous forces, providing expertise and expanding capacity — we're doomed to failure." An active-duty SF lieutenant colonel agreed that the Pentagon seemed more interested in direct action and man-hunting missions than in foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and civil affairs. "The direct action-type missions are usually fast and violent, and you can show effect immediately," he said. "In an insurgency, though, they're detrimental to your cause. Civil affairs, MPs, SF doing foreign internal defense, civil-military operations — those kind of things are the ones [that work]. Insurgencies by their nature last a long time, and they take a long time to defeat. So you're going to defeat an insurgency by doing the things that it takes to defeat it, which are civil-military actions, psyops, CA [civil affairs], not necessarily DA [direct action]. With DA you create more insurgents than you eliminate. For every one guy you kill, you've just created five or six more." SOCom spokesman Ken McGraw said the facts did not support the critics' contention that nondirect action special ops missions, such as foreign internal defense (FID) and civil affairs, are undervalued. He said combined joint special operations task forces with Special Forces at their core are performing foreign internal defense missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines. "FID missions are also taking place in other parts of the world," he added. "[SOCom commander] Gen. [Bryan "Doug"] Brown says all the time that civil affairs is the key to winning the global war on terror, because it attacks the underlying causes of terrorism." DEARTH OF QUALIFIED GENERALS Critics who perceive a bias toward direct action point to an apparent mismatch between the lack of Special Forces-qualified generals in leadership positions in the war on terror and those with a background in far smaller sections of the special ops community, such as the Rangers and the 160th SOAR. Of SOCom's approximately 52,000 personnel, 10,000 — almost one-fifth — are in Army Special Forces Command. This includes support personnel who are not SF-qualified but does not include all the SF-qualified soldiers who serve in the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and other headquarters. But, the critics note, of the eight flag officers at SOCom's MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., headquarters, only one — Brown — has any Special Forces time, and that was one tour on an A-team as an enlisted soldier. His special operations experience as an officer was as an aviator, commanding both the 160th SOAR and JSOC. Brown's deputy is a SEAL — Vice Adm. Eric Olson — and the director of SOCom's Center for Special Operations, which is responsible for planning and synchronizing the command's role in the war on terror, is Army Lt. Gen. Dell Dailey, who is also a former commander of the 160th SOAR and JSOC. "How can they understand ... what regular Special Forces bring to the table?" asked a special operations source rhetorically. "They've never experienced it." However, McGraw said, Brown has plenty of Special Forces experience close at hand. His executive officer, aide and senior enlisted adviser are all Special Forces men. In addition, McGraw said, four of the five theater special operations commands, which fall under the geographic combatant commands like Southern Command and European Command, are led by SF officers. The exception is the Central Command's special operations command (SOCCent), which runs all non-JSOC special operations missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The SOCCent commander is Brig. Gen. (P) Frank Kearney, who has a Ranger background and served as JSOC's operations officer during the first phase of the war in Afghanistan. Kearney's boss, CentCom commander Gen. John Abizaid, is a former Ranger company commander. The commander of Joint Special Operations Command, Maj. Gen. Stan McChrystal, is another Ranger. The Pentagon plans to expand the flag officer structure of JSOC from its current model of a two-star commander with two one-star deputies to one with a three-star commander, a two-star deputy and at least two one-stars underneath them, according to several special operations sources. Under this plan, McChrystal would remain JSOC commander and be promoted to lieutenant general, and Kearney would be promoted to major general and move from SOCCent to JSOC as McChrystal's deputy. The two one-star positions in JSOC remain in the hands of Air Force and Navy officers. Another Ranger in a leadership position is Lt. Gen. Robert Wagner, the commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which includes Special Forces Command. Special Forces officers note that the past two commanding generals of SF Command, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert and Brig. Gen. Gary "Mike" Jones, retired at the end of their tenures. Those who perceive a bias against Special Forces officers do not claim, for the most part, that the Rangers, 160th alumni and SEALs who are running the war on terror are weak officers. McChrystal and Kearney, in particular, earn high marks for their professionalism and drive. But those asking questions wonder why a branch that seems so relevant to the fight against a global Islamic insurgency seems so underrepresented at the highest levels. "I always said to myself that we will see if SOCom is serious about the war on terror and in fact considers white [nonclassified] SOF an important entity by what they do with Mike Jones after he leaves SF Command," said a former JSOC staff officer. "My thought was he would go to the CSO [center] and be in charge of it. But when he was essentially being shipped off to nothing, that really meant that ... the Ranger/JSOC mafia was the team that was going to be in charge." Beyond the four theater special operations command heads and one or two others like Maj. Gen. Gary Harrell, who now holds down a NATO job in Europe, there are few signs of a wave of SF generals on the horizon. The 31 colonels the Army selected for promotion to brigadier general last year included no Special Forces officers. The SF lieutenant colonel said the absence of SF generals from positions of influence was a topic of discussion among his peers. "A lot of SF guys talk about that, because it's noticeable," he said. "There's kind of an agreement that there is a leadership vacuum when you get to that level." However, the dearth of SF generals might have as much to do with the paucity of quality SF officers who remain from the generation that joined the branch in its infancy, he said. The Special Forces branch was created in 1987. When today's colonels and brigadier generals were company and field-grade officers, the downsizing of the Army was in full swing. "The SERB [Selective Early Retirement Board] was happening, they were giving big bonuses to folks to get out," he said. "You had this new branch that was just starting; you had a dynamic in the military of zero defects. Risk takers were not promoted and people were getting out — not good for a developing organization. Where were all your strong guys going to go? "The guys who were majors and lieutenant colonels at the time are now one-, two- and three-star generals. Those were the people that were rewarded for having no incidents in their battalion. Are those the guys that you want to lead in combat? Not necessarily." A former special mission unit operator agreed. "There's just a complete dearth of quality guys," he said. "They're just living with the hangover from those early years of the branch." This dynamic will probably change when officers in year groups 1988 through 1993 are eligible for promotion to brigadier general, according to the Special Forces lieutenant colonel. "Eighty-eight through '93, SF branch is really fat," he said. "We've got too many officers in the branch where we don't have enough positions to put folks into company command [and] battalion S-3 [operations officer]. It's very competitive now for battalion command. It's very competitive for group command. So I think what you'll see in the next couple of years is you're going to get a different crop of Special Forces officers coming up. ... I think you're going to see some good guys in the next couple of years." U.S. Army Special Operations Command spokesman Lt. Col. Hans Bush vigorously disputed any notion that Special Forces is undervalued by the senior leadership, citing the expansion of Special Forces laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review to support his case. "The QDR clearly demonstrates the value that our national leadership places on special operations forces, and Special Forces within the Army especially," said Bush, a Special Forces officer. "The desired growth and resourcing called out in that document sends a clear message to our command that our national leadership values what we bring to the table. The challenge is on us to meet these goals." There are five active-duty SF groups and two in the National Guard. McGraw said the command plans to create five new SF battalions — one per active-duty group — by the end of 2012. The two Guard SF battalions will receive a total of 500 extra soldiers, he added. DIFFICULT MISSION But several special operations sources expressed doubt that the Army, which is struggling to fill the A-teams it has now, could man those extra battalions without lowering standards. Only a mind-set that equates SOF with direct action and man-hunting could have convinced the Pentagon that it would be able to create all the extra SF battalions laid out in the QDR, the former JSOC staff officer said. "There aren't enough people in the Army to come up with the raw material for these extra battalions," he said. "So the only way this can be done, in my estimation at this time, is reducing standards and focusing on a very narrow mission set. And UW [unconventional warfare] is the most difficult mission set — you're talking about more mature folks, you're talking about language, you're talking about culture, you're talking about people who have a lot of in-country experience and are really sort of savvy in a street way, which you can't learn in school. This can't be done overnight. The QDR that came up with this requirement can only be thinking about putting more commandos on the streets; in other words, we want more Rangers, let's just do more Ranger training." Haselton agreed. "You're going to end up with five battalions of shooters," he said. "That's not the plan," McGraw countered. "The language requirement will remain the same. The mission set they're training for will remain the same. They've ramped up the schoolhouse to be able to accept a larger student load while maintaining the same standards." Michael Vickers, a former Special Forces officer now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank, is an advocate for creating more Special Forces battalions. But he acknowledged that it takes time to fill those units. He said recruiting the additional SF soldiers could be achieved, at least in part, via the 18 X-Ray program, which recruits personnel straight from the civilian world; the planned expansion of the Ranger Regiment by three companies; and improved pay and benefits. "We're creating an SOF that's basically as big as it's ever been at the height of the Vietnam War, but we had a much, much bigger Army in those days," he said. "So this is a far more SOF-intensive force, which poses big challenges." Sean Naylor, “More Than Door Kickers,” Armed Forces Journal, April 7, 2006.Sursa: LINKIata de ce:U.S. Department of DefenseOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)News ReleaseOn the Web:LINKIMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 587-11July 12, 2011General Officer Announcements Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta announced today that the President has made the following nominations: Army Maj. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland has been nominated for appointment to the rank lieutenant general and for assignment as commanding general, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Cleveland is currently serving as commander, Special Operations Command Central, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Army Maj. Gen. Keith C. Walker has been nominated for appointment to the rank of lieutenant general and for assignment as deputy commanding general, Futures/director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va. Walker is currently serving as commanding general, Brigade Modernization Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Bliss, Texas.Era de asteptat ca predecesorul domnului Charles Cleveland sa primeasca o avansare. Este vorba despre general locotenent John Mulholland.LINKSe pare, insa, ca Mulholland va trece in rezerva cu doar 3 steleRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuRecitind acest topic, am gasit ca este cazul sa fac cateva mici rectificari ale unor postari mai vechi. Recunosc ca e cam pedanta operatiunea asta, dar fiecare face ce se pricepe . Este vorba despre structura subunitatilor operative ale Delta Force. Ceea ce mi s-a parut suspect era numarul mare de membri din cadrul statului major al unui troop (detasament). In cartea sa "Kill Bin Laden", Dalton Fury a.k.a. Thomas Greer spunea ca patru oameni formau jumatate dintr-o Troop Headquarters (Tp HQs). De aici am dedus in mod eronat ca o Tp Hqs numara 8 oameni. Ulterior am observat ca din cei 4 care formeaza aceasta jumatate, doi erau de fapt din afara Delta, fiind atasati unitatii pe durata misiunii. Cei patru erau un combat medic, un sergent de transmisiuni (amandoi membri Delta) un combat controller (membru al unitatilor speciale ale US Air Force) si un "attached Arabic tactical signa intelligence collector" (nu pot decat presupune ca acesta apartine Gray Fox a.k.a. Intelligence Support Activity). Prin urmare, nu sunt 8, ci 4, de fapt, militari intr-o Tp Hqs. Logic, acestia sunt comandantul (ofiter- capitan sau maior), loctiitorul (de fapt cel mai experimentat operator, care are gradul de sergeant major E-9) si cei doi enuntati ulterior - medicul si expertul in transmisiuni. O troop de asalt (Aslt Tp) e formata din echipe (teams) de 5 operatori fiecare, dintre care unul este leader (Master Sergeant E-8). In cartea lui Dalton Fury, apar doar trei echipe de asalt (Alpha, Bravo si Charlie), deci ar fi de presupus ca o Aslt Tp are, nominal, 19 operatori. In carte apar, insa, si echipe din Recconaissance/Surveillance Troop (Recce Tp) numite India, Jackal si Kilo. Stim ca in fiecare escadron exista doua Aslt Tp si o Recce Tp. Rezulta ca fiecare fiecare Aslt Tp trebuie sa aiba patru, nu trei echipe. Prima va avea Alpha, Bravo, Charlie si Delta, iar a doua este compusa din echipele Echo, Foxtrot, Golf si Hotel. Asadar, cele doua Aslt Tp au fiecare, teoretic, 24 de operatori. Mai dificil de determinat structura unei Recce Troop. In cartea lui Dalton Fury se vorbeste de Recce Tp, dar aceasta are doar trei echipe (India, Julie si Kilo) si nu se afirma nicaieri ca nu ar mai putea exista si altele. In cartea sa, "Not a Good Day to Die", la p. 30, Sean Naylor spune ca orice operator proaspat admis in Delta este repartizat intr-o Aslt Tp. Dupa un timp, cei mai buni si mai experimentati dintre operatori sunt selectati (are loc o noua selectie, sau sunt numiti pur si simplu, pe baza performantelor dovedite ? - nu stim) in Recce Tp, care ar fi mai mica decat cele doua Aslt Tp. Aici, structura echipelor este diferita; nu poate fi vorba de 5 sau orice alt numar impar, deoarece operatorii lucreaza in binoame: observator si lunetist. S. Naylor spune ca, in mod normal, o echipa recce este formata din patru operatori. Insa in cartea lui Dalton Fury, cele trei echipe recce au efective inegale. Cu siguranta, in operatiuni, Delta, care se este renumita pentru flexibilitate, nu opereaza cu efectivele de referinta si detasamentele sunt calibrate in functie de natura misiunii. Vedem, astfel, cum cele doua detasamente MSS Grinch si MSS Monkey, conduse de Dalton Fury, au in componenta lor atat patrule de asalt cat si de recce, la care sunt atasati combat controllers din US Air Force Special Operations si agenti ISA. Patrula Jackal are 6 operatori, dintre care doi, insa, provin din patrula Kilo, India are 4, iar alti doi membri ai patrulei Kilo au primit misiuni diferite, deci in total sunt 12 operatori. Statul major al unei Recce Tp are aceeasi componenta ca si cel al unei Aslt Tp: comandant, loctiitor, medic si transmisionist. E de presupus ca o Recce Tp are cel putin 3 patrule, de unde ar rezulta ca o Recce Tp are 16 operatori. Potrivit surselor citate, un escadron Delta numara 75-85 de operatori. Escadronul are si el un mic stat-major. Cu siguranta in componenta acestuia intra comandantul (Locotent colonel), ofiterul cu operatiile (Capitan sau Maior), Command Sergeant Major de escadron, Sergeant Major pentru operatii, la care se pot adauga, probabil, un transmisionist si un medic. In total, cel putin 6 membri. Rezulta ca, in cazul in care escadronul are macar 75 de oameni, o Recce Tp poate avea macar 4 echipe de 4 operatiori, deci in total ar putea fi 20 de operatori, incluzandu-i si pe cei 4 membri ai statului-major. Cam asta ar fi. In ceea ce ii priveste pe DEVGRU/ST 6, am inteles ca este mai mica dpdv numeric decat Delta. Cele 3 escadroane (teams) sunt Red (cea care a efectuat misiunea "Neptune Spear" la 2 mai 2011), Gold si Blue. Green e pentru instruirea noilor veniti, Gray pentru transport, iar Black pentru Recconaissance/Surveillance. Am inteles ca, mai nou, ar fi aparut un al patrulea escadron operativ, Silver, asa cum si pt Delta urma sa apara, dupa cum se anunta oficial prin 2006, un al patrulea escadron, D. Fiecare escadron din Devgru ar avea 50 de operatori, deci cu o treime mai putin decat subunitatile omoloage din Delta. In loc sa grupeze detasamentele de asalt si cele de recce in cele trei escadroane operative, se pare ca ST6 au optat sa grupeze detasamentele recce intr-un escadron separat. Astfel, Red, Gold si Blue ar avea doar detasamente de asalt (probabil doua fiecare). In presa (iau aceasta informatie cu toate precautiile de rigoare) se afirma ca la "Neptune Spear" ar fi participat 24-25 de operatori, asta ar inseman un Aslt Tp. O alta ipoteza care imi vine in minte este ca Black Team ar putea fi echivalentul acelei operational support troop formata de Delta in anii 90, ca urmare a rivalitatii cu ISA. Aceasta este cunoscuta si sub numele de Funny Platoon, deoarece este singura unitate din comunitatea operatiilor speciale din SUA in care sunt incadrate si femei. Recent am vazut ca au mai aparut in Afganistan echipe formate din militari femei: US Army Cultural Support Team. Iata, mai jos, pozele in care apar cateva:Operatorii din Funny Platoon indeplineau exact genul de misiuni pentru care a fost creata ISA: infiltrarea in zonele unde urma ca opereze Delta pentru a culege informatii. Binoamele formate din doi operatori (un barbat si o femeie) ar fi urmat sa nu atraga suspiciunile celor vizati. Poza de mai jos ar putea-o reprezenta pe o femeie din Funny Platoon in misiune in Irak, dar nu garantez pentru seriozitatea informatiei; ma tem sa nu cumva sa fie vreo fata pasionata de Air Soft.In ceea ce priveste DEVGRU, tind sa creed, mai curand, fara a pune insa, mana pe inima, in prima varianta, datorita similitudinilor numerice: Black Team ar reuni trupele recce, in timp ce escadroanele Red, Gold, Blue (si poate Silver) au doar detasamente de asalt.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisAia a fost acum 10 ani.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDOD Identifies Service Members Killed In CH-47 Crash The Department of Defense announced today the deaths of 30 servicemembers who were supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. They died Aug. 6 in Wardak province, Afghanistan, of wounds suffered when their CH-47 Chinook helicopter crashed.The following sailors assigned to an East Coast-based Naval Special Warfare unit were killed: Lt. Cmdr. (SEAL) Jonas B. Kelsall, 32, of Shreveport, La., Special Warfare Operator Master Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Louis J. Langlais, 44, of Santa Barbara, Calif., Special Warfare Operator Senior Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Thomas A. Ratzlaff, 34, of Green Forest, Ark., Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Senior Chief Petty Officer (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist) Kraig M. Vickers 36, of Kokomo, Hawaii, Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Brian R. Bill, 31, of Stamford, Conn., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) John W. Faas, 31, of Minneapolis, Minn., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Kevin A. Houston, 35, of West Hyannisport, Mass., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Matthew D. Mason, 37, of Kansas City, Mo., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Stephen M. Mills, 35, of Fort Worth, Texas, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Chief Petty Officer (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist/Diver) Nicholas H. Null, 30, of Washington, W.Va., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Robert J. Reeves, 32, of Shreveport, La., Special Warfare Operator Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Heath M. Robinson, 34, of Detroit, Mich., Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Darrik C. Benson, 28, of Angwin, Calif. Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL/Parachutist) Christopher G. Campbell, 36, of Jacksonville, N.C., Information Systems Technician Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist/Freefall Parachutist) Jared W. Day, 28, of Taylorsville, Utah, Master-at-Arms Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist) John Douangdara, 26, of South Sioux City, Neb., Cryptologist Technician (Collection) Petty Officer 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare Specialist) Michael J. Strange, 25, of Philadelphia, Pa., Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL/Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist) Jon T. Tumilson, 35, of Rockford, Iowa, Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Aaron C. Vaughn, 30, of Stuart, Fla., and Special Warfare Operator Petty Officer 1st Class (SEAL) Jason R. Workman, 32, of Blanding, Utah. Sursa: LINKNu i-am trecut pe toti, ci doar pe cei care, dupa toate probabilitatile, apartineau DEVGRU. Practic, un intreg pluton (troop), in frunte cu comandantul sau. Dupa cum scrie Sean Naylor in Army Times, DEVGRU are acum 4 escadroane operative, pe langa cel destinat recunoasterii strategice (Black): Red, Gold, Blue si Silver. Iar fiecare escadron are 3, nu 2 plutoane, cum credeam. Tipul stie ce vorbeste, cred ca are surse chiar din cadrul JSOC. Sursa: LINKNSW source: Crash ‘worst day in our history’Unprecedented tragedy devastates the naval special warfare communityBy Sean D. Naylor - Staff writerPosted : Saturday Aug 6, 2011 18:44:31 EDTThe naval special warfare community was reeling in what one member called “shock and disbelief” Saturday after 22 of its own died in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan that also killed eight other U.S. service members, a civilian interpreter and seven Afghan soldiers.The CH-47 Chinook crash, which occurred during a raid in Wardak province, is believed to be the biggest single loss ever suffered by the NSW community or in the 24-year history of U.S. Special Operations Command.Of the 22 NSW members killed, 17 were SEALs and five were direct support personnel, according to the source in the NSW community. Two of the SEALs were from a West Coast SEAL unit, but the others were from Gold Squadron of Naval Special Warfare Development Group, or DevGru, sometimes known as SEAL Team 6, said the NSW source.DevGru, based in Dam Neck, Va., is the Navy’s “Tier One” special mission unit that operates as part of task forces formed under the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. It is the Navy’s equivalent to the Army’s 1st Special Forces Operational Command — Delta, or Delta Force. DevGru has four line squadrons — Blue, Gold, Red and Silver — plus a strategic reconnaissance element known as Black Squadron.Each squadron is divided into three troops. The crash wiped out an entire troop in Gold Squadron, said the NSW source.The presence of the West Coast SEALs on the mission should not come as a surprise, even though they are not part of a unit that habitually reports to JSOC, said the NSW source.“We have SEALs from the West Coast augmenting Dam Neck on every deployment,” the source said.The remaining U.S. military casualties were divided between a five-person regular Army aircrew and three Air Force combat controllers, said a special ops source who has been briefed on the incident. The use of a regular Army Chinook to fly a JSOC mission was “atypical,” the source said. Most JSOC missions involving helicopters are flown by the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne).The Defense Department has not announced which unit or units the three Air Force personnel were from, but most JSOC missions of this type are supported by members of the 24th Special Tactics Squadron.The seven Afghan soldiers who died were Afghan National Army commandos from the Afghan Partnered Unit, which accompanies JSOC forces on their combat missions in Afghanistan, according to the special ops source, who has been briefed on the mission.Although there have been reports that the twin-rotor helicopter was shot down, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has not confirmed that. An initial statement about the crash states that “reporting indicates that there was enemy activity in the area.”The personnel in the helicopter belonged to an “immediate reaction force” that was en route to support troops in contact on the ground, said the NSW member. An immediate reaction force differs from a quick reaction force in that the former is built into the mission plan and is on site during the raid, sometimes circling the action in a helicopter, waiting to be committed if needed, whereas a quick reaction force is typically brought forward from the rear, the NSW source said.There were no survivors from the crash, said the special ops source who has been briefed on the incident. “There will be multiple investigations,” the spec ops source said, noting that this was typical for an aircraft crash of this magnitude.Asked what the naval special warfare community’s initial reaction to the incident was, the NSW source answered: “Shock and disbelief. There’s no precedent for this. It’s the worst day in our history by a mile.”The source noted that twice as many NSW personnel died in the Wardak crash than were killed in Operation Red Wings, which cost the lives of eight SEALs and eight 160th soldiers when insurgents shot down their MH-47 Chinook near Asadabad, Afghanistan, on June 28, 2005. A further three SEALs were killed during a firefight on the ground.The tragedy comes two months after JSOC’s highest profile success — the May 2 mission that killed al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden in his safe house in Abbottabad, Pakistan. That raid, conducted by DevGru’s Red Squadron and air crews from the 160th, was executed without any friendly casualties.The Wardak incident also occurred less than three days prior to the change of command at U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., that will see Adm. Eric Olson relinquish command to another SEAL, Vice Adm. William McRaven, who was the JSOC commander for the bin Laden mission. (McRaven is due to be promoted to admiral immediately prior to the change of command.)Army Lt. Gen. Joe Votel has since replaced McRaven as the JSOC commander.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Leul AlbRadu Patrascu wrote ...[...] Cei patru erau un combat medic, un sergent de transmisiuni (amandoi membri Delta) un combat controller (membru al unitatilor speciale ale US Air Force) si un "attached Arabic tactical signa intelligence collector" (nu pot decat presupune ca acesta apartine Gray Fox a.k.a. Intelligence Support Activity). Dar nu e posibil ca cel insarcinat cu traducerea sa fie operativ al CIA SAD? Nu uitati ca in carte se spune de la inceput : " ...the Agency was first there".Oricum e un targ destul de bun sa le ofere cetatenia americana sau ceva avantaje materiale in loc sa caute vorbitori de engleza pe teren , pe ideea ca daca baietii patesc ceva din cauza ca arabatele a incercat sa tradeze, familia arabetelui e in State, si mai pot aparea accidente de masina s.a.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisCIA nu merge in operatiuni de rutina si mai ales nu sunt atasati direct armatei.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDa, cam asa e. CIA si SpecOps coopereaza in multe misiuni, dar pe linii de comanda diferite. Imi vine greu sa cred ca CIA ar lasa un angajat de-al sau sa intre in subordinea unui maior din US Army, fie el si din Delta Force. Sunt agentii diferite cu ierarhii diferite. In schimb, stim sigur ca cei din ISA sunt atasati micilor subunitati din JSOC. O spune Sean Naylor in "Not a good day to die", unde patrulele Delta/Seal Team Six erau insotite de combat controllers din 24th Special Tactics Squadron (subunitate US Air Force din JSOC) si de cei din Orange Task Force (ISA aka Gray Fox). In plus, rivalitatea dintre Pentagon si CIA s-a acutizat, din ce am aflat, sub mandatul lui Donald Rumsfeld. Acesta dorea ca armata sa recurga la aportul CIA cat mai putin posibil si de aceea prefera sa isi foloseasca propriile resurse de informatie, adica ISA. Poate ca aici ma insel, pentru ca, in fapt, a existat colaborare intre militari si CIA pe teren, dar asta a fost mai ales rodul initiativelor unora cu mintea deschisa, indiferent de apartenenta la o agentie sau alta. Oricum, dpdv ierarhic, un agent CIA nu poate fi subordonat unui ofiter din Pentagon. Se poate vedea si din structura acelor Task Force care au operat in Afganistan si Irak (11, 20, 121, 6-26, 145 si care or mai fi) ca erau compuse doar din militari: Delta (Task Force Green), DEVGRU (Task Force Blue), Rangers (Task Force Red) 160 SOAR (Task Force Brown), ISA (Task Force Orange). Mai curand era posibila includerea unor militari straini SAS (Task Force Black/Knight) sau SBS, SASR etc. Cooperare cu CIA da, dar nu includerea in propria ierarhie de comanda.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Leul AlbCIA a pus bazele acolo: a gasit pe al mai pus pe luat bani (Generalul Ali), s-au chinuit sa il faca aliatul lor pentru ca nu era vorba doar de bani ci si de obiceiurile afgane si pastune(nu sunt singurul care spune ca nu ii scoti cu una cu doua dintr-ale lor).Facand apel la "Kill Bin Laden", a fost demonstrata clar lipsa de traducatori: Adam Khan fusese trimis cu o echipa mixta formata din cativa operatori si ceva spargatori locali de seminte, iar maiorul a dat nas in nas cu Gen Ali, fix in noaptea cand il aveau pe Osama la 3-4 km distanta.Ali a inceput pe limba lui sa vorbeasca cu maiorul, care evident nu intelegea, dar a observat ca masinile cu oamenii lui Ali reveneau spre casa fara speranta de intoarcere...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Leul AlbIntrebarea mea este: lasand la o parte speculatiile privind decesul lui Osama, cine a executat misiunea si l-a eliminat fizic? Chiar au fost cei de la DEVGRU?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisPai daca nu-i credem pe cuvant pe yankei ce avem in loc?Oricum misiunea e treaba de tier 1,asa ca optiunile sunt limitate.Devgru ori Delta(stiu ca le zice altfel acum,ideea e ca sunt aceiasi oameni cu aceleasi misiuni).Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAn Air Force Hero In Action -- Staff Sergeant Robert GutierrezBy Michael AuslinPublished September 19, 2011 | FoxNews.comkeeps an eye out for insurgents or threats to his operational detachment team during one of many patrols he took part in while deployed to Afghanistan in 2008.On October 5, 2009, Air Force Staff Sergeant Robert Gutierrez was shot through the chest during a fierce firefight in a muddy village in western Afghanistan. Gutierrez, a 29-year old Special Forces Combat Controller, was coordinating air support for an Army Special Forces team sent after a high value Taliban target. Ignoring a sucking chest wound and collapsed lung, Gutierrez continued directing aerial attacks, almost certainly saving the lives of nearly 30 outnumbered American and Afghan forces. Now fully recovered, Gutierrez has been nominated to receive soon the country’s second-highest military honor, the Air Force Cross.SSgt Gutierrez’s story, like that of other winners of the Medal of Honor and service Crosses, reveals unimaginable gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life. It also gives a peek at the American way of fighting that integrates all elements of military power into a force that can defeat any battlefield challengers. However, it also is a system that may no longer operate as effectively after hundreds of billions of dollars are stripped from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Losing such airpower support for America’s fighting men and women should worry the politicians who send those forces into harm’s way. In the case of Gutierrez and his comrades, fire from the sky quite literally saved their lives.Robert Gutierrez was born in San Diego and grew up in Chula Vista, California. A brawny youngster, he tried to enlist in the Armed Forces right after 9/11, “not because I wanted to pay for school or anything,” he tells me during a phone conversation, “but because I wanted to fight.” His voice lacks any hint of bravado or boastfulness; rather, it is marked by a lighthearted, infectious optimism.Winding up at an Air Force recruiting booth, he told the recruiter that he wanted to be on the ground, in the thick of the fight. The Air Force steered him towards the elite air commando special tactics squadrons, ensuring that Gutierrez would serve as a critical link between the ground and the air, and that he would find himself in the middle of intense battles on a regular basis.The U.S. Air Force Special Forces commandos are the most unsung of America’s elite fighting forces. Less well known than their SEAL or Delta Force brethren, they nonetheless play a role almost unique among all Special Forces. While most Americans assume that the SEALS or Green Berets charge in alone and unprotected, the truth is that nearly every Special Forces operation has a U.S. Air Force Combat Controller, Joint Terminal Attack Controller, or Pararescueman assigned to it. Two pararescuemen and one combat controller were among those lost when an Army Chinook helicopter was shot down in Afghanistan in August, in which 25 Special Operations Command warriors died.Combat controllers coordinate all aspects of vital air support during operations like the one in which SSgt Gutierrez nearly died. They seize or establish airfields for follow on forces, link to warplanes in the sky, direct them to targets, receive battlefield intelligence from manned or remotely-piloted aircraft, decide which munitions should be fired, and fight side-by-side with their Army or Navy fellows. It is a real-life game of three-dimensional chess that only the most intellectually and physically gifted can play, who must train nearly two years for the job. Gutierrez is not only a certified air traffic controller, for example, he also is a crack shot who killed at least two Taliban insurgents during his firefight. As he says, combat controllers are a “total SOF [Special Operations Forces] package, we shoot, move, and communicate at the same time.”That firefight near Herat city that October night initially was no different from any of the other hazardous operations Gutierrez conducted. That week alone, the father of a newborn and the Army team he was a part of had conducted three raids before setting out to the village. After walking over a mile from their vehicles, they reached the compound and immediately began taking sustained heavy fire, including rocket-propelled grenades. While talking with two F-16s overhead, getting information on the location of insurgents, Gutierrez had to fight at close range with shooters surrounding him and his team. The firefight raged for three and a half hours, Gutierrez told me, but the entire mission, from beginning to his medical evacuation at the end, took nearly seven exhausting hours.Pinned down by enemy fire, SSgt Gutierrez took over from a soldier whose weapon had jammed. As he took out an insurgent firing at them from a rooftop, Gutierrez was struck. The bullet plowed through his upper chest, just missing his heart, and collapsing his lung. Gutierrez was coughing up blood and couldn’t breathe. He had seen men die of wounds like this before, he relates, and thought that he would bleed out within three minutes.What did you think about when you realized you would probably die, I asked? “I thought about [my job], what I would do before I bled out. That I would change the world in those three minutes, I’d do everything I could to get my guys out safely before I died,” he replies.Gutierrez refused to leave the fight because only he could talk with and direct the airplanes that were quickly becoming their salvation. An Army medic inserted a seven-inch needle, without anesthetic, into Gutierrez’s chest in order to inflate his lung. That allowed him to get back on the radio calling for help from above even while bleeding profusely and in extreme pain. The Americans were being fired upon by Taliban standing on top of a 20-foot wall just ten feet from Gutierrez. After fly-bys from F-16s failed to dislodge them, Gutierrez directed a strafing run by an A-10 gunship. The A-10’s bullets were fired so close to the Americans that Gutierrez’s eardrum burst. After another pass, Gutierrez and the team leader, who also was wounded, decided their target was incapacitated and that it was time to withdraw.Directing a final strafing run, Gutierrez picked up his blood-soaked equipment and began trudging over a mile back to the team’s vehicles. He radioed for emergency evacuation, suffered another collapsed lung, waited for the helicopter to arrive, and then finally passed out. He did all this while losing half of his blood—over five pints. Remarkably, and due largely to his directing air support, no American forces were killed on the mission. In fact, Gutierrez was the worst wounded of all.His recovery took 19 months, part of it spent at Walter Reed Army Hospital in Washington, D.C. Today, he is an instructor at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School in Hurlburt Field, Florida. I asked him what he wanted to do next. “Get back to Afghanistan,” he replied, “and do the same thing all day, every day.”The work of the Air Force combat controllers is a central part of why America’s fighting forces are so lethal. It is a unique combination of advanced communication, precise airpower coordination, synthesizing of intelligence, and instantaneous battlefield judgments that project an umbrella over exposed and often outnumbered U.S. forces. It also is noticed at the highest levels. “I can't say enough about our Airmen, who proudly help protect our nation and the freedoms we all enjoy,” writes Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Philip Breedlove in an e-mail to me. “Staff Sgt. Robert Gutierrez Jr.'s exceptional bravery while serving in Afghanistan is an extraordinary example of this honorable service. It is stories like his that make me proud to wear the Air Force uniform, and humbled to serve with such amazing men and women.”The motto of the combat controllers is “First There,” carving out an environment in which special operations forces can eliminate the most dangerous threats to America. One can only hope that this precisely balanced and lethal mechanism of air and ground troops continues to function in tomorrow’s smaller and budget-constrained armed forces.The politics of Washington, D.C., however, are the last thing on Gutierrez’s mind. He represents the very pinnacle of America’s warriors, and is eager to go back out into brutal combat time and again. His focus, like that of his Special Forces comrades, remains simply on making every mission the very best they have ever done.Some might wonder if any medal, even an Air Force Cross, is recognition enough for that kind of commitment and for what Robert Gutierrez did on that October night in Afghanistan.Michael Auslin is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.sursa: LINKAcum...stiu ca e vorba de Fox News, dar daca numai jumatate din ce scriu astia e adevarat, e prodigios. Pe de alta parte, cred ca Pentagonul nu da pe degeaba Air Force Cross.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuChiar daca Justme a anunat pe alt topic, reiau si eu anuntul acesta, insa dintr-o sursa diferita.U.S. forces rescue kidnapped aid workers Jessica Buchanan and Poul Hagen Thisted in SomaliaBy Debbi Wilgoren, Updated: Wednesday, January 25, 7:55 PMU.S. special operations forces stormed an outdoor encampment in Somalia early Wednesday, rescuing a kidnapped American aid worker and her Danish colleague and killing nine men who held them captive, officials said.Jessica Buchanan, 32, who is originally from Ohio, and Poul Hagen Thisted, 60, were abducted Oct. 25 by a group of armed men in Galkayo, a sleepy regional capital in north-central Somalia.Pentagon officials said there is no indication the men were connected to international terrorism or al-Shabab, Somalia’s al-Qaeda affiliate. Instead, they were criminals hoping to trade their captives for ransom, like the Somali pirate gangs infamous for hijacking ships off the coast of Africa in recent years.Buchanan and Thisted worked for the land mine clearance unit of the Danish Refugee Council, which provides shelter, protection, food and other assistance for thousands of displaced Somalis in Mogadishu. They were in Galkayo to monitor humanitarian aid activities, the council said.Buchanan and Thisted were rescued early Wednesday local time (Tuesday evening in Washington). The U.S. Africa Command, based in Stuttgart, Germany, said special operations forces received information about where they, confirmed their presence and staged the attack.The Pentagon confirmed reports that the rescue was carried out by the same Navy SEAL unit that found and killed Osama bin Laden — the Naval Special Warfare Development Group, also known as SEAL Team 6.After killing the Somali captors, the commandos found Buchanan and Thisted and freed them. Officials said the United States had been considering a rescue operation for weeks but stepped up its plans after receiving reports that Buchanan’s health was deteriorating.“We wanted to act, and we did,” Vice President Biden told NBC’s “Today” show on Wednesday. Buchanan and Thisted were brought to a safe location, and are on their way to being reunited with their families, officials said.No details of Buchanan’s health problems were provided. A spokesman for the Copenhagen-based refugee council said that neither Buchanan nor Thisted were in need of hospitalization. “Recognizing the circumstances, they’re both quite all right,” said communications officer Villads Zahle.Buchanan, who went to high school in Cincinnati, attended Valley Forge Christian College in Phoenixville, Pa., Valley Forge President Don Meyer told CNN. She first traveled to Africa as an undergraduate, Meyer said, to work as a student teacher at the Rosslyn Academy, a private Christian school in Nairobi.Buchanan became a full-time teacher at the school, which serves many children of missionaries, and “fell in love with Africa,” said Meyer. Buchanan’s sister also graduated from Valley Forge, and her brother-in-law is a student there, he said.“She could hardly talk about Africa without tears in her eyes. . .she was living out her love for Africa,” Meyer told CNN. He said Buchanan never expressed concerns about working in Somalia, where the weak central government has been unable to curb a rash of kidnappings and violence.“She was passionate to serve, passionate to give,” Meyer said. “If there were any anxieties, they were never, ever hinted at.”At Rosslyn Academy in Nairobi, where Buchanan taught fourth grade for two years, faculty and students were in tears when they heard the news of her freedom, said Rob Beyer, the dean of students. Since she was abducted, the school, where Buchanan taught from 2007-2009, was mentioning her in Sunday prayers. “We’ve been praying for this for a long time,” said Beyer. “People were crying, there were tears of joy. We’re thrilled she’s safe.”Beyer described Buchanan as “friendly, outgoing and adventurous.” Many on the staff considered her a “risk taker,” he added. “You have to be a little bit of a risk taker to come and serve in Africa, and more so to actually help and serve in Somalia.He added Buchanan met her husband in Nairobi. The school, he said, was planning a celebration in her honor, and they planed to send cards and some video of the event to her.“Today was an amazing day. She’s free, she’s coming home,” said Beyer. “Our whole community is really rejoicing.”The refugee council said Buchanan has worked for its mine-clearance unit as a regional education adviser since May, 2010. Thisted, a community safety manager with the unit, has been with the organization since 2009.“The nightmare of Poul and Jessica is now over. They are both unharmed, on their way to a secure location, where they will receive proper care and be reunited with their families,” said Ann Mary Olsen, head of the council’s international department. “I have been in contact with the families, who are of course very relieved and happy.”Since the fall of the Siad Barre regime 21 years ago, Somalia has been gripped by chaos, with non-functioning governments, warlords and militias and cycles of humanitarian crises. It is widely considered among the world’s most dangerous places, with the Islamist Shabab group fighting the weak, U.S.-backed transitional government and an African Union force.In recent years, Somalia has become the primary base for pirates who prey on ships in the strategic oil-shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean; the pirates often hold crews for months, demanding ransoms of millions of dollars. As the United States, India and other nations have beefed up patrols, however, the pirates appear to be changing tactics.Last September, Somali gunmen raided a luxury Kenyan resort, a few miles from the Somali border, shot dead a British tourist, kidnapped his wife and took her into Somalia. Three weeks later, a disabled Frenchwoman was nabbed from a resort island and taken into Somalia. She later died because of a lack of medication. Pirates also kidnapped a British couple on a yacht and held them captive for more than a year.The assaults have debilitated the Kenyan tourism industry along the coastal areas near the Somali border.Galkayo is situated 125 miles north of the pirate haven of Hobyo, where hijacked ships have been kept until ransoms are paid. It is a transit point to Somali port towns like Bossaso,where thousands of impoverished Somalis pay smugglers to sail them to Yemen in search of a better life.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSe vede ca la conducerea lui USSOCOM este un fost operator DEVGRU, amiralul William H. McRaven. Cand operatiunea Neptune's Spear le-a fost incredintata celor din ST6 (ma rog, DEVGRU), cei din Delta au marait un pic ca ei ar fi putut la fel de bine sa faca aceasta treaba. Acum, iar, ies la rampa cei din ST6, asa incat ma astept ca iarasi, membrii Delta sa fie nemultumiti.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00HannibalRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00HannibalPoate nici nu aflam daca nu erau alegerile (au facut-o publica pentru a-i creste lui Obama popularitatea).Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDoD Unveils Major Force ReductionsJanuary 26, 2012Military.com|by Philip EwingThe Defense Department could cut some 80,000 Soldiers and 20,000 Marines over the coming years as part of massive force and spending reductions announced Thursday at the Pentagon, which could also include reductions in pay and benefits for troops.Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey gave reporters a "preview" of the fiscal 2013 defense budget that will be sent to Congress next month, the first to reflect the bite of $487 billion in reduced budget growth over the next 10 years.In addition to the troop reductions, the budget would cut six Air Force fighter squadrons, leaving 54, and retire 130 of its cargo aircraft. It would decommission seven Navy cruisers, two amphibious ships and delay many of the service's planned programs, including its planned new ballistic missile submarine. It would delay, but leave mostly intact, the F-35 Lightning II fighter program, which forms the backbone of future aviation in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.The budget would likely reduce the size of the U.S. strategic arsenal, but would keep the longstanding three legs of the nuclear triad: Navy ballistic missile submarines and Air Force bombers and land-based missiles.Among other things, the Pentagon is also asking Congress to authorize a Base Realignment and Closure process to consolidate the footprint that will be left empty by tomorrow's smaller force.And for the troops that remain, Panetta hinted that DoD must tackle its burgeoning personnel costs in the next few years. Troops can expect full pay raises in 2013 and 2014, he said, but "We will achieve some cost savings by providing more limited pay raises beginning in 2015. This will give troops and their families fair notice and lead time before these proposed changes take effect."Panetta also said that troop health care and retirement are two huge issues that Washington can no longer avoid. The budget recommends "increases in health care fees, co-pays and deductibles for retirees," he said, "but let me be clear that even after these increases, the cost borne by military retirees will remain below levels in most comparable private sector plans."As for retirement, Panetta said DoD will ask Congress to establish a "commission with the authority to conduct a comprehensive review of military retirement" -- with the understanding that current troops will be protected with a grandfather clause that keeps their existing benefits.DoD's budget is expected to spark a battle royale among lawmakers, who may scramble to try to protect programs, bases and politically popular troop pay and benefits. It's also specifically calculated to scare Congress into preventing the $500 billion in automatic budget reductions that would automatically be "sequestered" in January of 2013, after the failure of last year's joint budget commission."Make no mistake, the savings we are proposing will impact all 50 states and many districts across America," Panetta said. "This will be a test of whether reducing the deficit is about talk or action. My hope is that when members understand the sacrifice involved in reducing the defense budget by half a trillion dollars, it will convince Congress to avoid sequestration, a further round of cuts that would inflict severe damage to our national defense for generations."For now, Panetta and Dempsey's announcement fills in the blanks left by President Obama's announcement earlier in January that the U.S. would pursue a new defense strategy focused on the Western Pacific and no longer plan to fight two major simultaneous wars. They tried to emphasize the areas the budget protects or expands, despite its headline-grabbing reductions."Much will be said and written about the individual decisions underlying this budget," Dempsey said. "Some may be tempted to view them through the prism of a zero-sum game, parsing through each cut, each change, to look for a winner or loser. That is the least productive way to assess this budget."Instead, Dempsey said, the submission is a "down payment" on a modernized, more capable -- if perhaps smaller -- military for the 21st century. The armed forces are not in "decline," Dempsey said, and they'll still be able to "win any conflict, anywhere."As such, the budget protects Special Operations Forces; keeps 11 Navy aircraft carriers and 10 air wings; protects unmanned surveillance aircraft; funds the Air Force's new bomber; and will improve future Navy submarines' ability to carry cruise missiles.But there were some unanswered questions. The Army's reduction in end strength, for example, reflects eight combat brigades, but DoD's presentation Thursday hinted there could be more changes in the works -- "the future organizing construct of the Army is under review."And although the Pentagon once again reaffirmed its commitment to the F-35, the largest defense program in history at more than $300 billion, it wasn't clear what its new delays would mean. The Air Force's and Marine Corps' fleets are quickly wearing out, and both services have been counting on new F-35s to take the place of their older, long-serving aircraft.Some of the specifics, including the Pentagon's latest estimates for how much its new vision will cost, will appear in its official budget submission on Feb. 13.sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSpecial Operations Expanding as Wars Recede January 27, 2012Associated Press|by Kimberly DozierWASHINGTON -- War is going back under wraps -- that's the next-generation plan put forth by the U.S. special operations commander who led the Osama bin Laden raid and embraced at the highest levels of the Pentagon and the White House.Big armies and the land invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan will be replaced by fast and light special operations raids that leave little trace, or better yet, raids by friendly local forces the U.S. has trained, helping fight mutual enemies side by side.U.S. officials say that's the plan offered by special operations chief Adm. Bill McRaven and embraced at the highest levels of the Pentagon and the White House.Defense Secretary Leon Panetta shared few details in the new Pentagon budget he outlined Thursday, but officials explained the nascent plan in greater detail to The Associated Press.As the overall military force shrinks and special operations troops return from their 10-raid-a-night tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan, they'll be redeployed to special operations units in areas somewhat neglected during the decade-long focus on al-Qaida because there were simply too few of them to go around, according to a senior defense official and to other current and former U.S. officials briefed on the program.All officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the details of the proposal and timing of implementation are still being worked out.While the idea is to work and train with foreign armies, the invigorated network would reinforce and reinvigorate special operations units in regions like the Pacific Rim.That would enable them to launch splashy, unilateral raids like the one McRaven commanded last year that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan -- and the one Tuesday that rescued an American hostage and her Danish colleague. That rescue served to drive home President Barack Obama's national security achievements in his first term as his State of the Union speech Tuesday night effectively launched his bid for a second term.As the Obama White House recommends major cuts to the size of the overall military force, the strategy would have an especially valuable aspect.The plan would mean special operations troops could increase cooperation with foreign armies, working with them to defeat local threats instead of the U.S. shouldering the bulk of such fights.McRaven started working last fall to sell defense leaders on a plan to beef up his existing Theater Special Operations commands to reposition staff and equipment for the post-Iraq and Afghanistan wars era.The idea tracks with the White House goal to transform the U.S. military into a smaller, more agile force, able to respond to a variety of threats beyond traditional military enemies. Even as U.S. officials outlined cuts to much of the military, Panetta has said funding for special operations and intelligence-gathering will increase -- both emerging as the Obama White House's preferred way to confront many global threats after a decade of costly land invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan.The special operations command's main responsibility now is to provide resources and personnel to the geographic combatant commanders. Technically, the special operations command has limited authority to respond to worldwide threats, only taking charge of individual operations if directed by the president or secretary of defense. The strengthened overseas network could serve as a practical first step to give McRaven a greater say in those overseas operations on a more frequent basis.Rather than adding troops to the overall force, McRaven wants to be able to more quickly dispatch some of the units where they are needed, according to a U.S. official briefed on the plan. Now, such moves have to filter through a bureaucratic process and layers of Pentagon authority, which in some cases can delay deploying extra special operations troops or assets where they are needed by weeks or monthsThose troops could carry out raids or, more likely, work with local allies to teach them how to target regional enemies, as well as fostering long-term relationships, soldier to soldier, that can help defuse a crisis or coup years later.The theater commands would also work to preserve close ties with allies from the NATO coalitions now breaking apart with the winding down of the wars, the officials said.Eventually, the far-flung special operations commands could also serve as a framework for boosted U.S. interagency cooperation, fusing not just regional allies, but U.S. agencies like the CIA, FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration.Proponents of the plan say this could preserve the close working relationship among various agencies that has built up in the war zones.The notion of a stronger special operations network drew a mixed review from Human Rights Watch, which has called on the Obama White House to turn over the CIA's covert action against terror suspects to military control."If it means handing more over to the military, it could be an improvement from a transparency perspective," said Andrea Prasow, counterterrorism counsel for Human Rights Watch, which has also pushed for the White House to make public how a suspect ends up on the target list. "But if the public still cannot find out what's happening, it's not good enough."Sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuOperatiunea de salvare a contractorului american Roy Hallums, la 6 septembrie 2005, dupa 311 zile de captivitate. Acesta a fost rapit in Irak la 1 noiembrie 2004. Actiunea de salvare a fost dusa la bun sfarsit de operatori 1st SFOD-D.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAlte fotografii mai recente (Irak sau Afganistan)ale celor din Delta. De remarca tinuta multicam produsa de Crye Precision a operatorilor, preferata de acestia in majoritatea cazurilor uniformei ACU, adoptate oficial de US Army, sau de tip AOR. Ulterior, US Army le-a permis militarilor care lupta in Afganistan sa adopte multicam. Variante multicam au fost adoptate de mai multe tari, printre care si Australia si Marea Britanie.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuScuze, abia acum observ ca am postat unele fotografii care au mai aparut pe acest topic.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuOperator SEAL (Devgru ?) cu HK 417Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu2Desi nu e chiar despre Delta Force sau SEAL sau Green Berets si alte Special Forces (care se cam "rivalizeaza" intre ele), sper ca Radu (care e "jupanu" topicului vad) sa nu se supere.LINKAm inteles ca infanteria marina SUA scapa de mitraliera aia usoara, Minimi M249, si se doteaza cu o alta arma, numita IAR M 27. Asta ar fi un HK 416 un pic modificat (adica o pusca automata sau de asalt) si se presupune ca e cea mai precisa arma automata usoara a lui Marines, care ar vrea sa schimbe astfel puterea de foc a lui M249 cu precizia lui IAR (care are si asta un nume interesant pentru noi romanii).S-ar schimba astfel chiar si tactica grupelor lor de infanterie.Cumva dupa mine IAR asta, ca si concept, aduce cu pusca noastra mitraliera, sau RPK-ul rusilor, careia daca ii montezi o luneta nu cred ca ar fi departe ca si precizie de IAR asta, ar fi nu cu mult mai lunga dar ceva mai grea (dar ar avea si 10 gloante in plus in incarcator, plus "bataia" ceva mai lunga).Sa fi ajuns americanii la ideea rusilor, cu un RPK la o grupa? Sa nu mai zic ca si in al doilea razboi mondial existau astfel de arme, cu rolul destul de apropiat (chiar americanii au avut ceva asemanator cumva, o pusca mitraliera numita BAR, iar noi am avut pusca aceea mitraliera ZB, pe care au avut-o si britanicii sub numele de Bren).Multe chestii mai sunt ramase sau se bazeaza inca pe experienta din cel de-al doilea razboi mondial, care a fost intradevar un razboi in care s-a experimentat totul, de la tactici la noi arme de tot felul, in toate zonele geografice si climatice posibile.O alta ideea pe care am citit-o ar fi ca cei de la Marines s-au gandit sa scape cumva de M 4/M 16, o arma care nu e totusi extrem de fiabila, asa ca au venit cu gaselnita asta, cu un HK 416 nitel modificat (si care e mai mult pusca automata sau "assault rifle" cum ii zic ei, decat orice altceva) care sa schimbe M 249. Si probabil, in timp, sa fie adoptata de "toata lumea" din grupa sau pluton, poate doar in forma "clasica" a lui HK 416.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuRadu nu are de ce sa se supere, mai ales ca este doar initiatorul acestui topic. Dimpotriva, imi doresc ca, in masura in care exista interes, sa participe si altii la el. Am citit mai demult despre M27 si, recunosc, fara prea multa atentie. Cat despre M4, am citit mai multe articole cu privire la plangerile la adresa acestei arme. Altii, dimpotriva, o apara vehement (am intrat pe un forum militar australian unde, pe langa atitudinea cam neprietenoasa daca nu de-a dreptul aroganta a membrilor, am 'nimerit' intr-o discutie pe un topic dedicat acestei teme). Insa chiar si cei care sustin ca este o arma de nadejde nu uita sa aminteasca mereu aceasta isi mentine fiabilitatea numai printr-o buna ingrijire. Bineinteles ca nu am intrebat ce fac in cazul in care situatia tactica nu iti permite sa cureti arma. Pe de alta parte, H&K 416 este foarte fiabila chiar si in conditii care fac inutilizabila daca nu de-a dreptul periculoasa M-4, asa cum aratam in niste clipuri ceva mai sus. LINKLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00nadgobm4 se poate transforma cu un kit in 416: LINKciudata alegerea de a inlocui m249 ( putere mai mare de foc, cal 7,62 mm) cu un hk ( putere mai mica de foc, cal 5.65). poate nu mai era necesara o asemenea arma .Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDin cate stiu, M249 SAW are calibru 5.56. Mitraliererele M60 si M240 au calibru 7,62.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumE în 7,62,SAW/Para al lor.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu2Radu Patrascu wrote ...Radu nu are de ce sa se supere, mai ales ca este doar initiatorul acestui topic. Dimpotriva, imi doresc ca, in masura in care exista interes, sa participe si altii la el. Am citit mai demult despre M27 si, recunosc, fara prea multa atentie. Cat despre M4, am citit mai multe articole cu privire la plangerile la adresa acestei arme. Altii, dimpotriva, o apara vehement (am intrat pe un forum militar australian unde, pe langa atitudinea cam neprietenoasa daca nu de-a dreptul aroganta a membrilor, am 'nimerit' intr-o discutie pe un topic dedicat acestei teme). Insa chiar si cei care sustin ca este o arma de nadejde nu uita sa aminteasca mereu aceasta isi mentine fiabilitatea numai printr-o buna ingrijire. Bineinteles ca nu am intrebat ce fac in cazul in care situatia tactica nu iti permite sa cureti arma. Pe de alta parte, H&K 416 este foarte fiabila chiar si in conditii care fac inutilizabila daca nu de-a dreptul periculoasa M-4, asa cum aratam in niste clipuri ceva mai sus. LINKLINKPai australienii parca au Steyr AUG, din aia bullpup sau cum ii zice, ca Famas-ul sau SA-80 a englezilor. Cel putin asa imi amintesc ca am vazut niste imagini. Sau or avea si M-4 probabil, si de aia au aparat-o. Sau poate chiar cred asta, e plin si altii de stereotipii si idei propagandisticeParerea mea e ca si americanii isi dau seama ca M-4 nu e chiar varful in domeniu, dar fiind o arma americana e mai greu de spus asta pe fata si in mod oficial.Iar HK-416 din cate am inteles e un fel de G-36 combinat cu ceva de la M-4, sa semene si sa para mai interesanta pentru piata americana.Au mai avut ei o arma care arata mai "futurist" asa, tot de la HK, numita XM-8, dar au respins-o pana la urma, cred ca tot fiindca nu era americana.Oricum am inteles ca norvegienii (care au cumparat arma asta pentru toata armata parca) s-au cam plans de HK-416 la un moment dat cica se cam bloca la anumite temperaturi sub zero, si daca te mai si tavaleai un pic cu el prin zapadaP.S.-am vazut si pretul la kitul ala, cred ca mai bine iti cumperi o arma noua la banii aia. Sau poti sa echipezi cu PA-uri md 86 o grupa de la noi, sau pe aproape. Care sa recunoastem ca nu sunt la fel de ergonomice, dar ca si fiabilitate sau putere de foc sunt cel putin la fel de bune. Vad ca printre pozele postate de Radu apare chiar si un Pm md. 63, folosit de cineva din Delta, probabil sa se integreze in peisaj mai bine, sau sa foloseasca munitie capturata de la inamic daca stau mai mult in teren in misiune, sau stiu eu ce tactici au. M-249 cred ca e varianta in 5,56, Minimi cum ii mai zice, din ce am vazut scris acolo. Stiu ca e si o varianta mai "sanatoasa" in 7,62x51, cum spuneau si domnii nagdob si boribum. Si astea sunt arme belgiene daca nu ma insel, sau cu licenta belgianaAm vazut si ca SEAL pare ca le-au cam luat fata ca si PR celor de la Delta, ceea ce probabil pe de o parte ii bucura (ca nu mai sunt in centrul atentiei), pe de alta probabil ii si supara ( ca au picat cumva pe locul doi, cel putin in viziunea publica).Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuEste pentru prima data cand aud de plangerile norvegienilor cu privire la HK416. Este drept ca nici nu m-am documentat cu privire la acesta fapt. In clipurile postate de mine mai sus care aveau ca tema fiabilitatea acestei arme erau testate rezistenta ei la apa si nisip dar, intr-adevar, nu era nimic care sa prezinte modul cum se comporta la temperaturi scazute. Probabil ca atunci cand au creat-o, s-au gandit doar la conditiile de lupta din Irak si Afganistan, ignorand testarea armei in climatul arctic. Operatorii Delta isi pot alege ce arme doresc, in functie de misiune si, aproape sigur, de preferintele personale. De aceea intalnesti o mare diversitate de armament la ei. In micul film promotional despre 1st SFOD-D aparut in urma cu cativa ani pe Youtube, in primele secunde apare un operator care poarta shemagh pe cap si este inarmat cu AKM.Unul dintre operatorii care au participat la misiunea din Tora Bora in decembrie 2001, numit "Shrek", este evocat in cartea lui Dalton Fury 'Kill Bin Laden' ca fiind inarmat cu o carabina de asalt H&K G3. Plecand spre Jalalabad, intr-o misiune, si-a lasat arma in tabara, sub sacul de dormit, si a luat cu el un AK-47. Acest personaj a fost identificatcu mai multa sau mai putina certitudine:SGM(ret) John McPhee served a distinguished career in U.S. Army Special Operations for over 20 years, retiring in 2011.Units served;1st Ranger Bn7th Special Forces Group1st SFOD-DJoint Special Operations CommandJohn has spent his adult life in Special Operations and Special Mission Units. He is a Master Instructor in all aspects of special activities, missions and operations. He has over 6 years of private special activities consulting and is a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in: Special Activities, Operational Preparations, Limited Signature Operations, Reconnaissance, Singleton Operations, High Threat Dignitary Protective Services, Extreme Long Range, Designated Marksman, Advanced Precision Rifle Marksmanship, Combat Marksmanship, Live Fire CQB/CQC, Advanced Pistol Marksmanship, Advanced Carbine Marksmanship, Ariel Gunnery (Rifles, Shotguns, Ariel Personnel and Vehicle Interdictions, Mechanical, Ballistic and Explosive Breaching, Freefall Instructor Programs, Infiltration/ Exfiltration Techniques, Ground Mobility, Unit Pre-Deployment Training, and Research and Development of; Soldier Systems, Weapons, Ammunition, Thermal and Night Optics.Qualifications;Special Forces Target Interdiction Course US Army Sniper School NRA Rifle, Pistol and Shotgun, Instructor NRA Range Safety Officer Advanced Mountain Sniper Course, InstructorAdvanced Freefall, Instructor (Ratings Current)Freefall Coach (Ratings Current) California Personal/ Executive Body Guard Certification (Rating Current)2005 Budweiser World Cup Super Heavyweight Jiu-Jitsu Champion 2004 Presidential Security Detail (Ariel Heavy) Cartagena, ColombiaHe has trained countless U.S. Special Operations forces, thousands of International Tier 1 Operators and Special Forces around the world. He is one of the handful of operators with over a decade of combat having served in multiple theaters from Bosnia and South America to recent war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.sursa: LINKSergentul poarta o arma despre care am citit ca este foarte apreciata: SR-25 Stoner, care are munitie 7,62x51 mm. Americanii au avut o arma foarte buna M1 Garand, pacat nu au mers mai departe cu acest model in loc sa adopte Colt M16. Din M1 au fost dezvoltate arme fiabile precum M14 (se pare ca Randall Shghart avea asa ceva asupra lui la Mogadishu, in octombrie 1993), M21,M24. Cat despre termenii rivalitatii dintre Delta/CAG/ACE si ST6/DEVGRU, initial, D-boys ii priveau cu superioritate si suspiciune pe colegii lor SEALs. Ecouri ale acestei neincrederi mai razbat si in cartea lui Sean Naylor, 'Not a Good Day to Die', aparuta acum vreo cativa ani. Delta si chiar Rangers puneau la indoiala profesionalismul operatorilor ST6. Insa succesele lor recente au aratat ca lucrurile nu stau chiar asa si, probabil, ca au mai efectuat numeroase misiuni despre care nu vom sti niciodata. In anii 90 s-a stabilit ca ambele unitati sa faca instructie in comun o data la 3 luni. Probabil ca legaturile dintre ei s-au sudat in Irak dupa 2003 cand au operat impreuna in multe misiuni in acele Task Force aflate sub comanda lui Stanley McChrystal.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCurand va disparea corpul V, care stationa in GermaniaPentagon Lays Out Significant Cuts to US Forces in EuropeFebruary 16, 2012Stars and Stripes|by John VandiverSTUTTGART, Germany -- It's official: The Germany-based 170th Infantry Brigade will be inactivated later this year, followed by the 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade next year as part of a broad restructuring of the military force structure in Europe that also calls for the inactivation of two U.S. Air Forces in Europe squadrons and the eventual elimination of the Army's V Corps from Wiesbaden, Germany, according to Pentagon officials.As part of the restructuring, the Army garrisons in Schweinfurt and Bamberg will close no later than 2015, U.S. European Command announced. The 81st Fighter Squadron, an A-10 unit consisting of 525 airmen from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, and the 603rd Air Control Squadron at Aviano Air Base, Italy, consisting of 336 airmen, will be inactivated by 2013."The [Defense] Department will begin a theaterwide capacity analysis as part of a comprehensive consolidation of its overseas infrastructure in light of these force posture changes," EUCOM stated in a news release. "The result could be further infrastructure adjustments."Last month, the Defense Department announced it would be eliminating two heavy brigades in Europe, but that announcement stopped short of naming the specific units. Still, with only two such brigades in Europe, it was no secret that the 170th, based in Baumholder, and 172nd, out of Grafenwöhr and Schweinfurt, were pegged for elimination.In addition, U.S. Army Europe is slated to lose another 2,500 soldiers from small support units over the next five years, military officials said. For the Army, it all adds up to a 25 percent reduction in manpower in Europe.Currently, about 80,000 U.S. troops are based in Europe. The changes outlined by the Pentagon will reduce that number by more than 11,000.Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, during a joint news conference Thursday with German Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere, said a substantial force will remain in Europe."Despite these changes," he said. "over 40,000 U.S. troops will still be based in Germany, training at state-of-the-art facilities."Maiziere, meanwhile, described the Pentagon downsizing in Europe as a move from "quantity to quality.""The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany is no complaint to me because a lot of troops will remain in Germany," Maiziere said.Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of USAREUR, said the reduction would pose some limits on the Army's ability to train with allies though the units that remain will continue to play a key role in maintaining those relationships."It's not going to really hurt, but we are going to have to reduce our partnerships," Hertling said in an interview with Stars and Stripes.Other Europe-based Army units also are critical to training allies, such as missile defense teams and signal troops, who do everything from preparing partners for an emerging missile shield mission to countering a growing cyberthreat, Hertling said."In the conflicts of the future it's going to be the other enablers that help us as much as a brigade combat team," Hertling said.As part of an effort to achieve efficiencies, the Defense Department intends to supplement the missions with rotational troops from the States. The rotational mission is still in the early planning stages, Hertling said.Hertling detailed how the restructuring of Europe-based units will unfold over the coming year.BaumholderThough the 170th Infantry Brigade, which includes roughly 3,800 troops, will be eliminated by this summer, the Army's garrison in Baumholder will remain open. The brigade will be replaced by logistics and engineering elements currently stationed at Schweinfurt and Bamberg, Hertling said."Baumholder will reduce significantly," said Hertling, referring to a 40 percent cut to the Army's footprint in the community.The move will leave Baumholder with 2,000 soldiers and about 3,000 family members, according to USAREUR.GrafenwöhrThe 172nd Brigade, which is headquartered in Grafenwöhr and also has troops stationed in Schweinfurt, will be inactivated by summer 2013, Hertling said. The community, however, will not see a significant loss of troops."Grafenwöhr is our most important enduring community," Hertling said. "We will try and keep Grafenwöhr at capacity, because of the excellent facilities, excellent housing and the training opportunities."Other units will likely be added to Grafenwöhr to fill the hole left by the departure of the 172nd, and some of those troops could be from "combat units," Hertling said.WiesbadenV Corps, which is slated to deploy to Afghanistan later this year, will be inactivated when that deployment ends, Pentagon officials said. Once the soldiers now assigned to V Corps, a headquarters of about 750 soldiers, leave Afghanistan, they will be assigned to other units.It was just last month, when Lt. Gen. James L. Terry took command of V Corps, that Hertling referred to it as rising "from the ashes like a Phoenix," referring to a decision to maintain the Army's only permanently forward-deployed corps, which originally was slated for inactivation in 2009.Other movesU.S. Army Reserve units at various bases in Europe could be relocated elsewhere on the continent, according to USAREUR. However, the number of units and soldiers assigned to those units is not expected to change.Europe could see some modest additions in the future as the Defense Department looks to forward-deploy more special forces soldiers to Europe and beyond."We will enhance regional special operations forces' responsiveness by continued partnership with the NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters," EUCOM stated.In addition, one battalion-sized task force, drawn from a U.S.-based heavy brigade combat team slated to serve as part of NATO's Response Force, will conduct multinational training exercises with allies, EUCOM said.Since 2006, USAREUR has closed nearly 100 sites with a replacement value of more than $9 billion as part of our ongoing consolidation and transformation. USAREUR is also in the process of closing an additional $5 billion worth of infrastructure in the Mannheim and Heidelberg area, which will result in annual savings of more than $100 million.Going forwardHertling said he expects this round of troop cuts to be the last for now, although he acknowledges that the military mission in Europe has its skeptics. With just two brigades left, some of those critics may question why the Army still needs a large training center in Grafenwoehr and other Europe-based units."There will be a lot of number crunchers who will ask that, and there also will be a lot of people in Congress who will ask that," Hertling said. "That was one of my concerns as I was fighting for the organizations to remain here."The Pentagon restructuring comes as it seeks to trim $487 billion from its budget over 10 years. The plan also foresees the closing of bases in the United States. That has prompted some in Congress to press for deeper cuts in Europe."And what I would say in response is there is a mission-set associated with the combatant commanders' requirements," said Hertling, referring to the work USAREUR does in support of commands ranging from European and Africa Command to Cyber Command and Special Operations Command, which maintains forces in Stuttgart, Germany."What I would suggest to you is special operating forces aren't going to get anywhere. They're not going to connect signal-wise, they're not going to have the sustainment support unless [USAREUR] is there to do it for them," Hertling said. "So it's great if you have a bunch of guys with green berets running around, but unless they get a whole lot of support from USAREUR, they can't do it."sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu2Radu Patrascu wrote ...Este pentru prima data cand aud de plangerile norvegienilor cu privire la HK416. Este drept ca nici nu m-am documentat cu privire la acesta fapt. In clipurile postate de mine mai sus care aveau ca tema fiabilitatea acestei arme erau testate rezistenta ei la apa si nisip dar, intr-adevar, nu era nimic care sa prezinte modul cum se comporta la temperaturi scazute. Probabil ca atunci cand au creat-o, s-au gandit doar la conditiile de lupta din Irak si Afganistan, ignorand testarea armei in climatul arctic. Poti sa cauti, "norwegian problems with HK-416", sunt mai multe rezultate. Din ce am inteles, daca stateau undeva la caldura, si ieseau apoi in frig cu arma, se bloca, sau ceva de genul. Unii recomandau sa foloseasca nu stiu ce ulei special sa unga arma (nu ca la noi, ulei de la parcu auto ), sau dadeau vina pe soldati, ca nu au fost instruiti sa aiba grija de arma.Nu stiu ce sa zic, arma pare destul de buna, din ce zic altiiCat despre M-27 a americanilor, daca stau bine sa ma gandesc, pare ceva intre pusca-mitraliera si PSL-ul de la noi, un fel de doua in unaRadu Patrascu wrote ...Operatorii Delta isi pot alege ce arme doresc, in functie de misiune si, aproape sigur, de preferintele personale. De aceea intalnesti o mare diversitate de armament la ei. In micul film promotional despre 1st SFOD-D aparut in urma cu cativa ani pe Youtube, in primele secunde apare un operator care poarta shemagh pe cap si este inarmat cu AKM.Unul dintre operatorii care au participat la misiunea din Tora Bora in decembrie 2001, numit "Shrek", este evocat in cartea lui Dalton Fury 'Kill Bin Laden' ca fiind inarmat cu o carabina de asalt H&K G3. Plecand spre Jalalabad, intr-o misiune, si-a lasat arma in tabara, sub sacul de dormit, si a luat cu el un AK-47. Acest personaj a fost identificatcu mai multa sau mai putina certitudine:SGM(ret) John McPhee served a distinguished career in U.S. Army Special Operations for over 20 years, retiring in 2011.Units served;1st Ranger Bn7th Special Forces Group1st SFOD-DJoint Special Operations CommandJohn has spent his adult life in Special Operations and Special Mission Units. He is a Master Instructor in all aspects of special activities, missions and operations. He has over 6 years of private special activities consulting and is a Subject Matter Expert (SME) in: Special Activities, Operational Preparations, Limited Signature Operations, Reconnaissance, Singleton Operations, High Threat Dignitary Protective Services, Extreme Long Range, Designated Marksman, Advanced Precision Rifle Marksmanship, Combat Marksmanship, Live Fire CQB/CQC, Advanced Pistol Marksmanship, Advanced Carbine Marksmanship, Ariel Gunnery (Rifles, Shotguns, Ariel Personnel and Vehicle Interdictions, Mechanical, Ballistic and Explosive Breaching, Freefall Instructor Programs, Infiltration/ Exfiltration Techniques, Ground Mobility, Unit Pre-Deployment Training, and Research and Development of; Soldier Systems, Weapons, Ammunition, Thermal and Night Optics.Qualifications;Special Forces Target Interdiction Course US Army Sniper School NRA Rifle, Pistol and Shotgun, Instructor NRA Range Safety Officer Advanced Mountain Sniper Course, InstructorAdvanced Freefall, Instructor (Ratings Current)Freefall Coach (Ratings Current) California Personal/ Executive Body Guard Certification (Rating Current)2005 Budweiser World Cup Super Heavyweight Jiu-Jitsu Champion 2004 Presidential Security Detail (Ariel Heavy) Cartagena, ColombiaHe has trained countless U.S. Special Operations forces, thousands of International Tier 1 Operators and Special Forces around the world. He is one of the handful of operators with over a decade of combat having served in multiple theaters from Bosnia and South America to recent war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.Oau, asta da calificat, am obosit numai citind toate titlurile si calificarile si specializarile lui, de la jiu-jitsu la explozivi si sniper de nu stiu cate feluri etc etc. N-am vazut ceva legat de arme albe, dar probabil a fost modest si nu a mai trecut si aia.Oricum, omu pare foarte tare dupa ce scrie acolo, cam la asa ceva te-ai astepta de la cineva din Fortele Speciale, sau cam asta ar fi imaginea "clasica" a cuiva ce face parte din astfel de unitati.Cam asa citisem si eu, ca cei de la Delta Force isi aleg ce arma vor, in functie nu doar de misiune ci si de preferintele personale si au cele mai cele dotari, in orice privinta, plus o libertate mult mai mare comparativ cu soldatii "de rand".Cred ca e si ceva influenta de la SAS aici.Radu Patrascu wrote ...sursa: LINKSergentul poarta o arma despre care am citit ca este foarte apreciata: SR-25 Stoner, care are munitie 7,62x51 mm. Americanii au avut o arma foarte buna M1 Garand, pacat nu au mers mai departe cu acest model in loc sa adopte Colt M16. Din M1 au fost dezvoltate arme fiabile precum M14 (se pare ca Randall Shghart avea asa ceva asupra lui la Mogadishu, in octombrie 1993), M21,M24. SR-25, ca si M-21, M-24 pare raspunsul american la Dragunovu rusesc (sau PSL-ul nostru), e un fel de frate mai mare si semiautomat a lui IAR M-27 de vorbiram noiM1 era deja depasita, desi a fost o arma foarte buna la nivelul celui de-al doilea razboi mondial. M-14 avea un cartus prea puternic, 7,62x51, pentru o pusca automata/arma de asalt, daca trageai in rafale reculul prea puternic iti imprastia gloantele care incotro si nu avea precizia dorita. Plus ca avea un incarcator de doar 20 de cartuse.M-16 s-a vrut sa aiba un recul mult mai mic, pentru a putea fi folosita ca arma de asalt, inclusiv la foc automat, plus precizie mai buna decat a lui AK, pentru ca avea viteza marita la gura tevii si glontul avea o traiectorie mai razanta.De aceea au redus calibrul, mai mic si decat cel al AKM-ului. Cica poti duce mai multa munitie asa, la aceeasi greutate cu munitia lui AK-47 sau M-14, dar in acelasi timp tot americanii in special propovaduiesc faza cu trasu de doua ori in "tinta" ca sa fi sigur ca ai doborat-o.Asta inseamna ca glontul e prea slabut, si ca degeaba cari mai multa munitie la aceeasi greutate cu un calibru mai mare, pentru ca daca trebuie sa tragi de doua ori ca sa fi sigur de rezultat consumi munitia aia chiar mai repede.De aia am vazut ca in ultimul timp se propun gloante de calibru 6,8 mm sau 6,5 mm, ceva intre 5,56x45 si 7,62x39, care sa aiba cate ceva din calitatile amandorura (adica o traiectorie cat mai razanta, dar sa si loveasca suficient de puternic)Radu Patrascu wrote ...Cat despre termenii rivalitatii dintre Delta/CAG/ACE si ST6/DEVGRU, initial, D-boys ii priveau cu superioritate si suspiciune pe colegii lor SEALs. Ecouri ale acestei neincrederi mai razbat si in cartea lui Sean Naylor, 'Not a Good Day to Die', aparuta acum vreo cativa ani. Delta si chiar Rangers puneau la indoiala profesionalismul operatorilor ST6. Insa succesele lor recente au aratat ca lucrurile nu stau chiar asa si, probabil, ca au mai efectuat numeroase misiuni despre care nu vom sti niciodata. In anii 90 s-a stabilit ca ambele unitati sa faca instructie in comun o data la 3 luni. Probabil ca legaturile dintre ei s-au sudat in Irak dupa 2003 cand au operat impreuna in multe misiuni in acele Task Force aflate sub comanda lui Stanley McChrystal. Da, auzisem si eu de rivalitatile astea, si intre Green Berets si SEAL deasemenea.Parerea mea e ca cei mai de succes de la americani sunt pana in prezent cei de la Green Berets, ca si rata de succese, din cate am mai citit, vazut, auzit si eu, ce a aparut si public. De la Vietnam la Afganistan, chiar daca au pierdut probabil si cei mai multi oameni, de ei nu prea am auzit de rau.Ei sunt si pregatiti sa stea "in teren" perioade mult mai lungi, sa se adapteze si sa traiasca in diferite zone, in timp ce ceilalti par croiti mai mult pe principiul "hit and run", au venit, au executat misiunea si au fost evacuati. Parca tot aici pe forum am citit de unii care spuneau ce trai au avut ei, si cum si-au spalat singuri izmenele si le-au uscat cine stie pe unde, au trait ca haiducii o perioada, ceea ce pentru altii din alte armate, chiar simpli soldati, e ceva destul de banalSi SEAL am inteles ca au mers snur in Vietnam, dar apoi au cam dat-o in bara in Grenada parca, sau Nicaragua, numai stiu, la fel Delta Force cand au vrut sa elibereze ostaticii americani din Teheran, sa numai zic de misiunea aceea din Somalia. SEAL Team 6 am inteles ca la inceput facea si cate ceva in genul fostului Batalion 404 de Cercetare de la noi, adica verifica securitatea si se infiltra prin tot felul de locuri teoretic bine pazite, dar apoi s-ar fi specializat mai ales in contra-terorism maritim, si dupa cate se vede mai nou si terestru, probabil spre ciuda celor de la Delta, care se considerau cei mai autorizati in domeniu. Desi probabil le si convine acum ca cei de la SEAL sunt in centrul atentiei si numai intreaba lumea de eiDar imi si pare ca se cam calca ei pe bataturi asa, cu atatea unitati speciale care uneori se suprapun ca si domeniu de actiune. Dar de, or sti ei ce si cum, noi suntem totusi doar niste comentatori de pe margine, fara sa cunoastem toate dedesubturile problemelorRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuOperatori SFOD-D (CAG)Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00marcinkoPozele cu Tom si Scott Spooner se pot adauga neblurateRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAsta ce inseamna ? Ca au murit sau au trecut in rezerva ? Ca altfel, din cate stiu, nu apar niciodata, din ratiuni de PERSEC.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMi-am gasit singur raspunsul: companie privata de securitate. Iata inca doua fotografii unde apare Tom Spooner:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuInteresante combinatii: multicam si AOR...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuUS Army a lansat faza a doua a competitiei in urma caruia se va gasi, eventual, un inlocuitor pentru M4.Army Launches Second Phase in Carbine Selection EffortMay 02, 2012Military.com|by Matthew CoxArmy weapons officials launched the second phase of their Improved Carbine competition on Wednesday by congratulating select gun makers that still have a chance to unseat the M4 carbine.So far, Colt Defense LLC, FNH USA, Heckler & Koch, Remington Arms Company and Adcor Defense Inc., confirmed that they received letters from the Army telling them they have been selected to move on to Phase II of the IC.Army officials confirmed that Phase II letters have been sent out, but said that federal acquisition guidelines prevent the service from commenting on how many companies will advance to Phase II and which firms did not make the cut."The Army's intent is to ensure that the competition is as fair as possible," Army spokesman Matthew Bourke said in a written response to a Military.com request."The Army does not want to adversely affect the competition in any way. Providing the names of potential offerors; the number of proposals received, and/or any details pertaining to the offerors and/or their proposals has the potential to skew the competition."The news comes on the heels of the Army awarding an April 20 contract to Remington to make 24,000 M4/M4A1 carbines. By outbidding Colt Defense -- the original maker of the M4 -- Remington may end up being the only winner in what many gun makers have labeled as the Army's well-intentioned but doomed effort to arm soldiers with a better carbine.The award is part of the M4 Product Improvement Program, an effort that focuses on evaluating commercially available components such as forward rail assembly and barrel that could improve the performance of more than 500,000 M4s already in the inventory.Despite the progress in the competition, Army leaders recently discussed canceling the competition in light of the dismal forecast for defense spending over the next decade, a source told Military.com.Phase I of the competition had nothing to do with evaluating test prototypes, but instead focused on weeding out companies that may not have the production capacity to make thousands of weapons per month.Once Phase II of the carbine competition begins, Army testers will shoot hundreds of thousands of rounds through the test weapons to assess accuracy, reliability and durability. Phase II will end with the award of contracts to three gun makers that will advance to Phase III. The Army will buy more of these weapons out of the contracts to conduct three limited user evaluations.In the end, the Army will conduct a business-case analysis to see if it is worth buying a new carbine over the improved M4.Last June, the service invited gun makers to submit proposals for off-the-shelf carbines that could replace the M4, made by Colt Defense LLC. The Army's senior leadership first announced its intention to hold a competition for a new carbine in November 2008 and directed infantry officials at Fort Benning, Ga., to update the requirement for the carbine to reflect the current and future needs of soldiers.Sursa: LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMai nou, Delta, dar si alte unitati specializate in combaterea terorismului, folosesc un tip nou de casca, Airframe. Anterior, operatorii SFOD-D au purtat TCH 2002. Iata casca airframe:Agenti HRT din FBI cu casti airframe:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAs vrea, va rog, opinii din partea membrilor forumului cu privire la acest subiect. Sunt interesante de citit si comentariileRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuEscadronul A din 1st SFOD-D in aprilie 1980. Individul din dreapta sus trebuie sa fie Peter Schoomaker.Escadronul B 1st SFOD-D in iarna anului 1982. Cel din dreapta, de pe randul de sus, este Jerry Boykin, iar cel din stanga, de pe acelasi rand, este Eldon Bargewell.40 de oameni in escadronul A plus 38 in escadronul B fac 78. Charlie Beckwith mentiona un efectiv 79 de oameni (fara cei 12 din detasamentul de selectie-instruire) in operatiunea Eagle Claw.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuErata: fotografia in care apar escadronul B si Jerry Boykin dateaza din decembrie 1981.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuC Team, Troop 1, B SquadronRandul de sus: Chris Abel, Steve Hoffman.Randul de jos: John Ginniff, Bill Zumwalt, Mike ViningRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Mihais''Diavolul din Ramadi'' a fost ucis.Acasa,de un fost camarad,suferind de soc postraumatic. LINK HOUSTON — From his perch in hide-outs above battle-scarred Iraq, Chris Kyle earned a reputation as one of America’s deadliest military snipers. The Pentagon said his skills with a rifle so terrorized Iraqi insurgents during his four tours of duty that they nicknamed him the “Devil of Ramadi” and put a bounty on his head.The insurgents never collected, and he returned home to become a best-selling author and a mentor to other veterans, sometimes taking them shooting at a gun range near his Texas home as a kind of therapy to salve battlefield scars, friends said. One such veteran was Eddie Ray Routh, a 25-year-old Marine who had served tours in Iraq and Haiti.But on Saturday, far from a war zone, Mr. Routh turned on Mr. Kyle, 38, and a second man, Chad Littlefield, 35, shortly after they arrived at an exclusive shooting range near Glen Rose, Tex., about 50 miles southwest of Fort Worth, law enforcement authorities said Sunday. The officials said that for reasons that were still unclear, Mr. Routh shot and killed both men with a semiautomatic handgun before fleeing in a pickup truck belonging to Mr. Kyle.“Chad and Chris had taken a veteran out to shoot to try to help him,” said Travis Cox, a friend of Mr. Kyle’s. “And they were killed.”Mr. Routh was captured a few hours later near his home in Lancaster, a southern Dallas suburb, following a brief pursuit. He will be charged with two counts of capital murder, law enforcement officials said.Friends of Mr. Kyle’s said he had been well acquainted with the difficulties soldiers face returning to civilian life, and had devoted much of his time since retiring in 2009 to helping fellow soldiers overcome the traumas of war.“He served this country with extreme honor, but came home and was a servant leader in helping his brothers and sisters dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder,” said Mr. Cox, also a former military sniper. “Everyone has their own inner struggles, but he was very proactive about the things he was dealing with.”In 2011, Mr. Kyle created the Fitco Cares Foundation to provide veterans with exercise equipment and counseling. He believed that exercise and the camaraderie of fellow veterans could help former soldiers ease into civilian life.Mr. Kyle, who lived outside of Dallas with his wife and their two children, had his own difficulties adjusting after retiring from the Navy SEALs. He was deployed in Iraq during the worst years of the insurgency, perched in or on top of bombed-out apartment buildings with his .300 Winchester Magnum. His job was to provide “overwatch,” preventing enemy fighters from ambushing Marine units.He did not think the job would be difficult, he wrote in his book, “American Sniper: The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History.”But two weeks into his time in Iraq, he found himself staring through his scope into the face of an unconventional enemy. A woman with a child standing close by had pulled a grenade from beneath her clothes as several Marines approached. He hesitated, he wrote, then shot.“It was my duty to shoot, and I don’t regret it,” he wrote. “My shots saved several Americans, whose lives were clearly worth more than that woman’s twisted soul.”Over time, his hesitation diminished and he became proficient at his job, credited with more than 150 kills. In his book, he describes shooting a fighter wielding a rocket launcher 2,100 yards away, a very long distance for a sniper and his farthest ever.“Maybe the way I jerked the trigger to the right adjusted for the wind,” he wrote. “Maybe gravity shifted and put that bullet right where it had to be.”“Whatever, I watched through my scope as the shot hit the Iraqi, who tumbled over the wall to the ground.”Sheriff Tommy Bryant of Erath County said investigators were still sorting out how the three men had known one another and for how long, though he said Mr. Kyle and Mr. Littlefield had been friends. The authorities said the Saturday trip was the first time the three men had been out together at that shooting range. They said they did not know the motive for the killings.The suspect’s mother was a schoolteacher for a long time,” the sheriff said. “She may have reached out to Mr. Kyle to try and help her son. We kind of have an idea that maybe that’s why they were at the range, for some type of therapy that Mr. Kyle assists people with.”In a news conference, the sheriff said: “They all went out there together in the same vehicle. The suspect may have been suffering from some kind of mental illness from being in the military.”Pentagon records show that Mr. Routh is currently a member of the Marine Reserves. He was an expert marksman and Marine corporal who had earned several medals, including a Marine good-conduct medal. He served in Iraq from September 2007 to March 2008, Pentagon officials said, and was currently listed as “individual ready reserve,” meaning he could be called back to active duty.Sheriff’s investigators said Mr. Routh was unemployed and since leaving active military duty had at least one arrest on a charge of driving while intoxicated.Mr. Kyle’s autobiography was published in January 2012 and became a nonfiction best seller. It turned Mr. Kyle into a celebrity, appearing on talk shows like “Late Night With Conan O’Brien.”The sudden success of the book surprised no one more than Mr. Kyle, the son of a church deacon who was initially rejected by the Navy when he tried to join in the mid-1990s, because of pins in his arm from a rodeo injury. His first book signing drew 1,200 people. About 850,000 print and e-book editions were sold.In an interview with The New York Times in March, Mr. Kyle — who received two Silver Stars and five Bronze Stars for Valor — said he had hesitated to write about his experiences. But he was persuaded to move forward after hearing that other books about members of the SEALs were in the works.“I wanted to tell my story as a SEAL,” he said. “This is about all the hardships that everybody has to go through to get the respect and the honor.”But he also wanted his sense of humor to come out, he said, noting that he tried to “write in a Texas drawl.”At a book signing in Kerrville, Tex., last year, Bairbre Bible, a local resident, said Mr. Kyle took a break from signing autographs to share a hug and comforting words with her husband, Jerry, a Vietnam veteran still suffering from post-traumatic stress.“Chris, just in that short meeting, was a very strong and compassionate person,” Ms. Bible said. “You felt a warmth and a special energy.”Mr. Bible, 76, who has difficulty speaking, added, “We shared personal pain.”In gatherings with other veterans, friends said Mr. Kyle would deflect the praise of the inevitable well-wishers and play up the achievements of his comrades.“He wasn’t the American Sniper to all of his friends,” Mr. Cox said. “He was Chris Kyle and he was right alongside you. He was proud to be a veteran and he would do anything he could to serve veterans.” Un interviu cu Chris KyleRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00marcinkoRadu Patrascu wrote ...C Team, Troop 1, B SquadronRandul de sus: Chris Abel, Steve Hoffman.Randul de jos: John Ginniff, Bill Zumwalt, Mike ViningViningLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusCred că ajunsese pe undeva să se creadă un soi de Walter Kurtz postmodern.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuStiam de acest portal, Marcinko, dar iti multumesc oricum pentru link. In cautarile mele din anii trecuti am "maturat" (sau cel putin asa imi place sa cred) tot ceea ce exista pe net despre 1st SFOD-D si am cumparat online toate cartile referitoare la ei. Asa ca, printre altele am dat si de acest site. Cred ca poza pe care am postat-o e luata chiar de acolo. M-a indarjit secretul care inconjura istoria acestei unitati despre care, in raport cu "unitatea mama", 22 SAS, existau putine informatii. Stiam ca multe dintre acestea sunt legendate si, poate, in mod intentionat deformate sau trunchiate. Nu mi-am dorit insa o imagine "in oglinda" ci una cat mai verosimila si apropiata de adevarul despre care, am inteles, nu e bine sa stie prea multe prea multi. Spre exemplu ma interesa structura lor organizatorica de referinta. Cartea lui Dalton Fury mi-a permis asta macar in parte. M-am gandit ca cifrele reale nu sunt, nu trebuie si nu au cum sa fie cunoscute decat de cei care au un anumit nivel de security clearance. Eu eram insa multumit. Ce conta ca o subunitate de nivelul assault troop are, teoretic 19 sau 23 de aoameni (presupun)? In realitate, efectivele de referinta nu erau acoperite niciodata, iar modul in care actioneaza presupune combinatii extrem de variate, structura fiind calibrata in functie de misiune. Vining, ca atatia altii din Delta, ma surprinde prin expresia sa bonoma. Oricum, el este operatorul care facea parte din VIP detail pentru regretatul Norman Schwarzkopf in una dintre cele mai cunoscute fotografii in care apare cunoscutul general in cursul unei deplasari pe front in timpul Razboiului din Golf. Vining este personajul care apare in prim-plan:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuStiam de acest portal, Marcinko, dar iti multumesc oricum pentru link. In cautarile mele din anii trecuti am "maturat" (sau cel putin asa imi place sa cred) tot ceea ce exista pe net despre 1st SFOD-D si am cumparat online toate cartile referitoare la ei. Asa ca, printre altele am dat si de acest site. Cred ca poza pe care am postat-o e luata chiar de acolo. M-a indarjit secretul care inconjura istoria acestei unitati despre care, in raport cu "unitatea mama", 22 SAS, existau putine informatii. Stiam ca multe dintre acestea sunt legendate si, poate, in mod intentionat deformate sau trunchiate. Nu mi-am dorit insa o imagine "in oglinda" ci una cat mai verosimila si apropiata de adevarul despre care, am inteles, nu e bine sa stie prea multe prea multi. Spre exemplu ma interesa structura lor organizatorica de referinta. Cartea lui Dalton Fury mi-a permis asta macar in parte. M-am gandit ca cifrele reale nu sunt, nu trebuie si nu au cum sa fie cunoscute decat de cei care au un anumit nivel de security clearance. Eu eram insa multumit. Ce conta ca o subunitate de nivelul assault troop are, teoretic 19 sau 23 de aoameni (presupun)? In realitate, efectivele de referinta nu erau acoperite niciodata, iar modul in care actioneaza presupune combinatii extrem de variate, structura fiind calibrata in functie de misiune. Vining, ca atatia altii din Delta, ma surprinde prin expresia sa bonoma. Oricum, el este operatorul care facea parte din VIP detail pentru regretatul Norman Schwarzkopf in una dintre cele mai cunoscute fotografii in care apare cunoscutul general in cursul unei deplasari pe front in timpul Razboiului din Golf. Vining este personajul care apare in prim-plan:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisMda,il vedeai pe strada,mai ca-ti venea sa-i dai doua capace:''ce faci bai,aragazule?'' .Astia aschimodii,cu figura nevinovata,sunt cei mai ''periculosi''. Mi-am adus aminte de nenea asta de mai jos,maiorul Gant si ma incercat curiozitatea sa vad ce s-a ales de el.Si am dat de o poveste fascinanta.Daca asta nu e capa si spada a zilelor noastre,nu stiu ce poate fi. Per total,e o dovada ca birocratia,fie ea si militara,nu poate castiga genul de conflict din A-stan.Nici macar nu pot incepe sa inteleaga despre ce-i vorba. LINK The Rise and Fall of Major Jim Gant Whether you are interested in an unusual love story or in how the United States fights protracted wars, Ann Scott Tyson’s American Spartan is an important book.. It artfully tells the story of the author and her now-husband, Major Jim Gant, a tough warrior-hero-thinker, who not only was one of the authors of the theory of Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan but became a pioneer practitioner, living among the Afghans in Konar Province for nearly two years. In the end, the Taliban tried very hard to kill him, and none other than Osama bin Laden identified Gant and his 2009 article, “One Tribe at a Time,” as a threat to the global jihad, at least according to the author. In the estimation of General David Petraeus and others, Major Jim Gant was the “perfect counterinsurgent.”Major Gant, however, was also a psychologically wounded warrior and not fit for combat. A multi-tour combat veteran, he had severe and apparently untreated PTSD before his final deployment, the result of too much close combat on previous tours in Afghanistan and Iraq. How long can one ride on the hood of a Humvee, drawing sniper fire and scouting for and finding IEDs? He was well into drug and alcohol dependence before he deployed. His condition became worse as his tour progressed. Indeed, he increasingly became the centerpiece of battles against his twin demons: the Taliban and his superior officers. His attitude about war and warfare went off the deep end, and he imagined himself a reincarnated Spartan. He told his often mystified soldiers: Who am I? I am a warrior. My physical, emotional, and spiritual self revolves around being a warrior. I believe war is a gift from God…. I am not a patriot or a mercenary. I fight to fight…. I believe if you want to kill, you must be willing to die. I am willing to do both … I pray for a worthy enemy…. I believe in the wrathful God of combat. I believe in Hecate (pp. 139-40).On one occasion, Gant stood in front of a troop formation and ritually cut himself to remember his unit’s dead. One soldier described him as “Dances with Wolves meets Charles Bronson…” (p. 140). In relation to the Afghan tribe with whom they lived, the author concluded: “The message was clear. Jim was fighting not for his country but for his family, his men, and his tribe” (p. 212). (This old soldier found the vision quest, Sparta-babble to be misdirected, dysfunctional, and more than a bit weird. Fighting to fight is not cool or macho; it’s feckless. Uncle Sam pays soldiers to fight for their country, not the love of battle.)While Gant might have seen his superior officers as an impediment to his warrior quest, the rest of the world should see them as dedicated, decorated Special Forces officers, who, in the main, have walked a mile in Gant’s shoes. Unlike Gant, they remained interested in the general orders that prohibit drinking and sexual relations in the field. They were concerned with the reputation of their storied regiment. They were also interested in spreading Village Stability Operations, and not hunkering down in one area, Gant’s apparent preference.Gant for his part encouraged his future wife to come to his area of operations, and from time to time, clandestinely engage in combat operations. This is both unethical gonzo journalism and a violation of the laws of war. Gant artfully deceived his superiors about the presence of his lover in the combat zone. For her part, Ann Scott Tyson admitted entering Afghanistan on valid visa, but not one for the work she then set out to accomplish. This grand, lovers-against-the-world escapade enabled her to write this book. The Gant-Tyson affair was stopped when a supporting infantry officer, suspicious of Gant from the beginning, turned him in for smelling of alcohol. Investigators descended on the compound, took Gant into custody, and the author exited, stage left.The resulting investigation reveals the steamy side of being a “perfect counterinsurgent”: whiskey bottles, pills, and a cozy container-for-two in the middle of an Afghan village. Gant’s case appeared headed for a general court martial, but was wisely downgraded to non-judicial punishment. Still fighting a ghost from the end of the Vietnam War, his superiors wanted to protect the Special Forces Regiment from the reputation of being a rogue outfit. The fate of the Village Stability Operations also hung in the balance. They believed strongly that Special Operations did not mean special ethics or legal shortcuts.In the end, Major Jim Gant was severely reprimanded, removed from the Special Forces Regiment, stripped of his Special Forces tab, retired from the Army at the rank of Captain, and charged a six-figure fine that will be extracted over a lifetime of smaller retiree paychecks. Major Gant — sick, worn out, charismatic, and crazy brave — ultimately defeated himself with the help of loyal junior officers and NCOs, who would follow him anywhere, but could not tell him where to stop.Major Jim Gant, however, had more enablers than those brave souls who fought with him. The commanders who seized on his fresh ideas, skill, and reputation did not look out for his welfare. I wondered, over and over, how he could pass a pre-deployment physical and maintain a security clearance. In a 22-month tour, why were there no visiting lawyers, medical officers, Inspectors General, or no-notice command inspections to catch Gant in the act of being Gant? His post was visited many times, even by Senators. But no one looked into how the people really lived there. Gant conducted his own Potemkin Village Stability Operations tour, and the VIPs saw what they wanted to see.The story of the American Spartan tells us a lot about Village Stability Operations, designed to work with tribal elements to build Afghan Local Police (ALP) units. Started in 2010, this program had great potential, but, as this book points out, people are one of its weak points. The Afghan government interface was weak. Gant’s team was well prepared for all that the mission required, but other teams were not. Gant taught himself the Pashtun language and wondered why so few Green Berets, more than a decade after the war began, spoke the language of the tribes. His replacement team leader wanted to know where the mess hall and gym were in the Afghan village where they were going to live. That leader’s new team came in wearing Kevlar — physically and mentally — and never connected with the local Afghans. They failed quickly. Other observers saw a limited talent pool available to deal with Afghans at the Gant level of proficiency. Andrew Exum, a two-tour combat veteran and then a mainstay at the Center for a New American Security, wondered: “I just don’t see how the United States can back a strategy that is predicated upon being implemented by geniuses”(p. 74).Citing Army experts, Tyson notes that today, there are 25,000 ALP in local areas, policing about 20 percent of the Afghan population (p. 347). Under the watchful eyes of Green Berets and other special operations personnel, the program has been successful. It is not clear if Village Stability Operations will continue to be a success without the presence of U.S. special operations personnel. Like most aspects of Afghan security, time will tell what lasts and what fades, what remains constant and what changes direction.When we ask ourselves why Major Gant fell from grace, we also have to look in the mirror. The all-volunteer Armed Forces — active and reserve components — are not made for a decade of large-scale, protracted warfare. That fact, however, did not and will not stop us from engaging in protracted warfare. The U.S. Government chose to wage large-scale, protracted war in part by grinding down the best and the bravest until many of them died, broke, or fell from grace. On the jacket of Tyson’s book, Gunner Sepp, himself a former special operator, writes: “There are many stories here. One of the most troubling is about what happens to elite troops after their country has kept them in combat for more than a decade.” Jim Gant’s fall is an object lesson for America and a warning to our nation’s leaders. It will also be a blockbuster movie that probably will not be as good as the book. Joseph J. Collins is a retired Colonel who teaches strategy at the National War College. A former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, he has been writing about Afghanistan since 1980.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00justmeRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00justmeRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn Raid to Save Foley and Other Hostages, U.S. Found NoneEDGARTOWN, Mass. — A secret nighttime military mission authorized by President Obama to rescue Americans held captive in Syria failed early this summer when a team of two dozen Delta Force commandos raided an oil refinery in the northern part of the country but found after a firefight with Islamic militants that there were no hostages to be saved, administration officials said Wednesday.The officials — speaking a day after the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria posted a video showing the American journalist James Foley being beheaded — described what they called a “complicated operation” in which the commandos were dropped by helicopter into Syrian territory in an attempt to rescue Mr. Foley and others being held by the Sunni militant group. The Army commandos fought their way to the spot where they believed that ISIS was hiding the hostages, the officials said. But when the team swooped in, the hostages were gone. “We’re not sure why they were moved,” a Defense Department official said. “By the time we got there, it was too late.” The official said it may have been “a matter of hours, perhaps a day or two” since the hostages had been there. One of the American commandos was slightly wounded in the skirmish, which lasted several minutes before American aircraft flew the soldiers to safety. At least one of the aircraft came under fire, but all members of the team were evacuated successfully. The administration officials said they believed a number of the terrorists were killed.The officials revealed the mission in a conference call with reporters, in which they spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the operation. It was the first time that the United States government had acknowledged that American forces had operated inside Syria since the civil war there began.Two Defense Department officials, who spoke separately on the condition of anonymity because of the operation’s delicate nature, expressed anger at the administration for revealing the mission. One of the officials said the aborted raid had alerted the militants to the Americans’ desire and willingness to try to rescue the hostages, and, in the aftermath, had probably forced the captors to tighten their security.But, the official said, the conference call on Wednesday revealed new details that ISIS is not likely to have known. “This only makes our job harder,” the official said. “I’m very disappointed this was released. We knew any second operation would be a lot harder.”Caitlin Hayden, the National Security Council spokeswoman, said the administration had “never intended to disclose this operation” but had felt that its hand was forced by news media outlets that were preparing to report on the mission. “An overriding concern for the safety of the hostages and for operational security made it imperative that we preserve as much secrecy as possible,” she said in a statement on Wednesday evening. Lisa Monaco, the president’s chief counterterrorism adviser, said that Mr. Obama approved the mission because intelligence officials feared for the hostages’ lives. “The U.S. government had what we believed was sufficient intelligence, and when the opportunity presented itself, the president authorized the Department of Defense to move aggressively to recover our citizens,” Ms. Monaco said. The officials in the conference call said the administration had kept the mission secret in an attempt to “preserve future opportunities” to conduct another one.Ms. Monaco repeated a call for the immediate release of the hostages and said the failed rescue mission should stand as further evidence of the lengths the United States will go to protect its citizens. “Their effort should serve as another signal to those who would do us harm that the United States will not tolerate the abduction of our people, and will spare no effort to secure the safety of our citizens and to hold their captors accountable,” she said.Officials declined to say exactly how many hostages the commandos were trying to rescue or to provide the names of the people who they believed were being held captive by the militants. United States intelligence agencies had been collecting information on the suspected location of the hostages, a Defense Department official said. The goal was to rescue Mr. Foley, officials said, although there was no specific intelligence that he was being held where the raid took place. “It was a long-developing operation,” a Defense Department official said. “They would move them periodically. But we decided to act then because we believed we had fidelity on their location, and we were well aware of the severity of the threats.”Officials said the breadth of the intelligence gave them confidence to go ahead with the rescue. The mission was conducted by a joint force, officials said, which included members from all of the military services. The Delta Force commandos were supported overhead by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, the officials said.“We put the best of the United States military in harm’s way to try and bring our citizens home,” said Rear Adm. John F. Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary.Intelligence is not “an exact science,” the officials in the conference call said, describing a “layered procedure” in which the agencies built a picture of where they thought the hostages might be. “It builds over time,” one senior administration official said. “We never lost sight of the plight of these hostages.”The administration has kept in touch with the family members of the Americans during the years that they have been held captive and “consistently and regularly informed” them of the efforts to find the hostages, the officials said. Families have been informed of the latest rescue attempt, the officials said, but did not say when they were told. Mr. Obama’s decision to conduct the raid in Syria underscored the difficulty in dealing with terrorists who take hostages and make demands of governments. Officials said the president did not consider making ransom payments to the Syrian captors in an effort to get the hostages released. “The United States government, as a matter of longstanding policy, does not grant concessions to hostage takers,” one senior administration official said. “Doing so would only put more Americans at risk of being taken captive.”Michael D. Shear reported from Edgartown, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Helene Cooper contributed reporting from Washington.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelUitandu-ma la alaturarea de mai sus si tinand cont de mediul unde isi executa misiunile, cred ca inteleg preferinta UKSF de a folosi MC. Cred. Si daca tot am promis o fotografie, voila:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNu e stire noua, dar parca nu a luat-o inca nimeni in discutie. Oricum, pe Military.com, lumea injura conducerea USArmy, care pare a fi cea mai sucita dintre cele care conduc cele patru categorii de forte ale SUA. Dupa 10 ani in care US Army a folosit Army Combat Uniform (ACU) cu camuflaj cu pattern digital unic Universal Camouflage Pattern (UCP), s-a luat decizia schimbarii lui. UCP a starnit numeroase comentarii si nemultumiri ca fiind inadecvat pentru mediile in care au operat militarii USArmy cu exceptia, poate, doar a mediului urban. In plus, modul de inchidere al diferitelor parti atasate (ecusoane de diferite tipuri) precum si gulerului/manecilor) cu velcro, care se deterioreaza usor sau face zgomot atunci cand iti doresti mai putin asta, a provocat, de asemenea, comentarii sarcastice. Competitia de acum 10 ani care dadea drept castigator sigur pe cei de la Crye Precision cu popularul Multicam s-a incheiat cu victoria neasteptata (am inteles ca la mijloc au fost chestiuni de ordinul "reducerii costurilor" - eufemism despre nu stiu daca sa afirm ca e mai jalnic decat pervers, folosit in general de angajatori atunci cand confunda angajatii cu sclavii) a UCP-ului asta tern.In timp ce toata lumea a preluat cu entuziasm variante mai mult sau mai putin asemanatoare cu Multicam, USArmy a ramas cu frustrantul UCP. "Specialii" lor, in schimb, care beneficiau de mai multa libertate de alegere, au optat pentru Multicam. Cu jumatate de gura, si Pentagonul a acceptat ca militarii care sunt desfasurati in teatrele de operatii din Irak si Afganistan sa utilizeze Multicam. Ma rog, specialii mai purtau si vechile BDU sau chestii mai "exotice" precum AOR1, AOR2 (considerate ca fiind superioare calitativ MARPAT-ului purtat de USMC).In sfarsit, a ajuns si conducerea USArmy la concluzia ca UCP nu e bun. Discutiile cu cei de la Crye Precision nu au decurs, insa, cum se dorea, din cauza pretentiilor companiei asupra costurilor de imprimare a pattern-ului Multicam. Asa ca armata a ales o solutie de compromis - Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) bazata pe un model mai vechi si mai putin elaborat al Crye Precision, Scorpion W2 - initiativa care iarasi i-a facut pe multi sa reia tirul de critici: faptul ca USArmy, care se confrunta ca urmare a sechestrarii cu perspectiva reducerii efectivelor pana la 420.000 de oameni, are totusi bani sa schimbe uniformele de instructie la fiecare 10 ani.S-au auzit voci care cereau revenirea la M81 varianta de desert in 3 culori, DBDU, considerat bun si practic sau chiar la vechiul Olive Drab, purtat pana la inceputul anilor 80 si care i-a "imbracat" pe soldati in Coreea si Vietnam. Iata cum arata acest model pe care eu, unul, il consider mai de Doamne ajuta decat UCP (dupa mine, cel mai neinspirat si mai urat tip de uniforma purtat vreodata de US Army):Acum nu stiu daca asta e cea mai buna alegere (criticii arata cu degetul spre conducerea USArmy pe care o acuza, nu fara temei, ca arunca miliarde de dolari pe fereastra), dar, dupa parerea mea, e de preferat fata de UCP.Iata, mai jos si o poza in care apar deosebirile dintre Multicam (in stanga) si Scorpion W2 (evident, in dreapta):Sarabanda schimbarii uniformelor de instructie a inceput-o USMC care, inspirat de modelul canadian CAPDAT, e elaborat primul model de uniforma de instructie americana cu camuflaj de tip digital. Testele au inceput in 2001, in 2002 a devenit uniforma standard, iar variatnta finala a iesit in 2005. Tot dupa parerea mea umila, e cel mai reusit model. De alfel, e cam la fel cu tot ce poarta USMC. Ma refer aici, in special, la tinuta "de oras", care la Marines a suferit cele mai putine schimbari. Bun gust, nuante potrivite, croiala cu aspect martial. Ramane valabil si pentru "marea tinuta", fie ca ma refer la cea cu pantaloni albi sau cea de seara.A urmat o "avalansa" de initiative privind schimbarea camuflajului si abandonarea vechilor BDU si DBDU. Fiecare serviciu si-a creat propria uniforma. Sa zicem ca US Army si USMC, surori in alte taratului si luptatului pe pamant aveau nevoie, dar ce nevoie aveau USNavy (nu ma refer la NavySEALS) si USAF (nu ma refer nici CCT, CRO sau PJs) de uniforme cu camuflaj? Uite asa au scos USAF si, respectiv, USNavy niste uniforme:Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisAia a marinei e numai buna sa nu te vada daca pici peste bord fara vreo vesta colorata. Marpat are 2 probleme.E destul de vizibil in spectru infrarosu(chestii ce tin de reflectivitatea culorilor si alte inginerisme).Si mai e patentat pt. Marines.Adica Army nu are voie sa-l foloseasca si nici Marines nu vor sa le dea patentul.Ei sa fie unicati. Pt. frecusul zilnic nu-i nevoie de nici un camuflaj.Iar unitatile combatante oricum au trecut pe multicam de ani de zile.Restul sunt obisnuitele magarii ale contractelor publice. In retail,din ce am vazut eu,nu mai e o mare diferenta de cost intre multicam si alte modele.Era acum cativa ani,cand multicam era pe la inceputuri.Dupa care a urmat drumul obisnuit al unui produs pe scara larga:s-a ieftinit. Producatori de multicam se gasesc acum in toata lumea.Avem la noi,sunt in Rusia,China si evident in tot vestul.Habar nu am daca au licenta sau nu,dar argumentul cu costurile era valabil doar acum 10 ani.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNu stiam de treaba asta cu MARPAT, ci doar ca AOR e mai bun. Marines nu au decat sa ramana cu ce au. Probabil ca USArmy si ce mai lupta pe unde mai lupta au toti Multicam "made solely by Crye Precision". Restul lumii doar a imitat si ca orice facatura, il iau ieftin. Englezii au creat si ei Multicam-ul lor, caruia ii spun MTP (Multi Terrain Pattern). Cu toate astea, citeam undeva(cred ca pe GEARSOC), membrii UKSF nu vor sa poarte MTP, ci Multicam.Ideea e ca bine ca dispare ACU. OCP nu e Multicam suta-n suta, da' e mai bine oricum.Mai urat, insa, mi se pare ce poarta USArmy in oras: Army Service Uniform, despre care am citit comentarii cum ca ar arata ca o uniforma de sofer de autobuz sau de politist de mall. E valabil in special pentru tinuta in camasa (class B). Iar bereta aia neagra ori s-o scoata or sa o dea inapoi Rangerilor:Nu inteleg de ce li s-a parut necesar sa schimbe Army Green, introdusa in anii 50 (nu foarte aratoasa nici ea dar decenta in comparatie cu ASU). ASU era folosita pentru ceremonii si pare prea incarcata pentru daily business. Acest aspect e accentuat de faptul ca s-a renuntat la ecusoane de unitate cusute pe maneca, inlocuite de insigne metalice prinse pe piept (nu ma refer la regimental crest care e deasupra buzunarului drept de la piept si pe Army Green). Rezulta un look asemanator cu cel al veteranilor sovietici sau al pomului de Craciun. La aceasta se adauga alte obiectii facute de comentatori care, probabil, au servit in USArmy. ASU este inspirata, clar, din uniforma purtata in cel mai acerb episod de discordie din istoria SUA: razboiul civil. Cum reprezenta tinuta armatei Nordului, ma gandesc ca este o ofensa, chiar daca neintentionata, adusa Sudului. Mai mult, remarca cineva, nu ar trebui adoptat ca marca, simbol, ceva ce rememoreaza un episod de dezbinare. Dimpotriva, si ideea mi s-a parut foarte potrivita, ar trebui adoptata o tinuta care sa reprezinte momentul de zenit pt USArmy: WWII. Tinuta kaki 1941 era mult mai martiala si, prin simplitatea sa aspra, mai eleganta, asemenea celei olive pe care USMC au pastrat-o.USAF au facut si ei niste incercari care, pentru moment au ramas la sertar cu uniforma de tip Billy Mitchell (hmm, cam vetusta cu gulerul ala mandarin, zic eu) sau din WWII, tip (doar croiala, culoarea nu) Henry Hap Arnold.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelDupa parerea unora Cadpat e mai bun decat Marpat. Problema in infrarosu nu o are doar Marpatul, ci toate tipurile de camuflaj care utilizeaza negrul (vezi Woodland si mai ales CCE).Desi par la fel (Multicam si MTP), MTP-ul difera prin nuantele mai inchise, forma si dispunerea "bulinelor" (cand ajung acasa o sa pun foto cu uniforma MTP personala). Sunt curios pe ce considerente UKSF prefera MC in detrimentul MTP?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00meun subiect foarte interesant. inteleg foarte bine cercetarile si dezbaterile privind echipamentul de lupta, dar, sincer, nu mi-as fi inchipuit ca exista o asemenea preocupare pentru tinutele de oras. pai sa faca un pitch pentru marile case de moda sa le faca niste modele unitare pentru toate categoriile de arme, ca ar fi scump, dar elegant. :-)Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIncep eu cu doua poze: Multicam (USA) in stanga, MTP (UK) in dreapta.In a doua poza e mai usor de distins: Multicam la David Petraeus, si MTP la ofiterul din RAF.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinGI Jane, personajul lui Ridley Scott LINK , devine realitate?Eight women have made it through the initial, grueling four-day assessment at Ranger School, Army officials said Thursday, raising the prospect that female soldiers could graduate from the elite course for the first time ever.The women made it through Ranger Assessment Phase, commonly known as “RAP Week,” along with 184 men, said officials at Fort Benning, Ga., where Ranger School is held. About 40 percent of students have historically made it through the phase, which includes everything from chin-ups and push-ups to an exhausting 12-mile road march and a water survival test that calls for climbing along a rope that is suspended over water.Ranger School was opened to women for the first time ever starting Monday as the Pentagon assesses which new combat assignments it should allow women to hold. Army officials said 381 men and 19 women started on Day 1, meaning 48.3 percent of men and 42.1 percent of women made it through RAP Week. Both are within historic norms for Ranger School, Army officials said.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuRanger Course dureaza 9 saptamani. Au timp suficient sa isi rupa gatul. USArmy se muta de pe un picior pe altul de cand s-a introdus cerinta privind integrarea femeilor in categoriile de arma combatante. Spun ca vor sa evalueze, sa vada daca stabilesc standarde speciale pentru femei, ca nu vor sa scada nivelul actual, ca...Pe forumuri, militarii americani spun ca se tem ca vor cobori standardele ca sa intre si femeile.Fiind, potrivit culturii lor organizationale, mai putin docili (ei, spre deosebire de USArmy, nu au inghitit niciodata si au refuzat gogorita prin care leadership-ul este inlocuit de management), USMarines au anuntat sec ca nu vor cobori standardele sub nicio forma. Drept urmare, 0 din 29 de femei au trecut de Infantry Officer Course (http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/10/no-women-pass-marines-infantry-officer-school-by-experiments-end.html). Asta e echivalent cu IBOLC-ul in USArmy. Nu ai cum sa ajungi sa faci Ranger School ca ofiter daca nu ai trecut de IBOLC (cursul de baza la scoala de aplicatie pentru infanterie). La Marines e putin altfel. Ca viitor ofiter faci Officer Candidate School (10 saptamani) sau Platoon Leader's Course (2 X 6 saptamani) in care ai ca instructori doar subofiteri si unde esti tratat la fel ca recrutii de la Parris Island. Aici se alege daca ai stofa de ofiter sau nu. Daca treci, primesti gradul de sublocotenent. Urmeaza Basic Training School, de 26 de saptamani, in care toti, indiferent de categoria de arma in care vor servi ulterior, invata deprinderile de baza pentru functia de comandant de pluton de infanterie. Asta protrivit devizei USMC "every marine a rifleman". Ajungi pilot de elicopter sau avion, ofiter de artilerie, de tancuri, de logistica etc,. nu conteaza, ai baza ca ofiter de infanterie. La nevoie te descurci ca atare. Abia apoi optezi pentru specialitate (mai curand te repartizeaza ei dupa nevoile Corpului). Daca ti s-a permis sa devii "a grunt" (infanterist), atunci mergi la cele 13 saptamani ale Infantry Officer Course. Abia dupa acest ciclu devii ofiter de infanterie. Dooar 1% dintre ofiterii USMC ajunc la batalioanele de Recon si inca si mai putini la companiile ForceRecon. Acestia sunt absolventi ai Ranger Course. Deci in USMC doamnele nu au reusit sa ajunga ofiter de infanterie macar, in USArmy deja sunt la Ranger Course.Despre formarea unui ofiter de infanterie in USMC, e interesant de citit cartea lui Nathaniel Fick, "One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer".Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDau si textul:LINKNo Women Pass Marines Infantry Officer School by Experiment's EndThe last two female Marines hoping to make their way through the Marine Corps' Infantry Officer Course as part of an experiment to integrate the program washed out on April 2, ending the research phase of the project.The two were cut during the physically and academically demanding Combat Endurance Test, along with 81 of the 90 male Marines who applied for the program, Marine Corps Times reported April 8.Female Marine officers who sought entry to IOC were not expected to meet the same physical fitness screening standards as male Marines, but they were required to match male performance in the course, Marine Corps spokeswoman Capt. Maureen Krebs told Military.com in November.The 13-week school historically averages a 25-percent attrition rate.During the first day's grueling Combat Endurance Test, Marines wear combat gear, perform various physical tasks and answer tactical questions while negotiating a land-navigation course, Krebs said.The experiment began more than two years ago as part of a broader look at the possibility of opening ground combat specialties to women. Since then, 29 women volunteered for IOC at Quantico, Krebs said Friday.Of the first group of 10 to volunteer for the course, nine failed to make it through the first day. The remaining female Marine dropped out a week later after being injured on the course.Last October, three of the seven female volunteers made it through the Combat Endurance Test. Two of those who passed were captains. However, none of the women completed the program.Of the two who washed out in April, one was a volunteer and the other was sent as a member of the Corp's recently integrated ground intelligence track. Though the IOC door has now closed for volunteers, women applying for ground intelligence officer slots will have to pass the program in order to attain that specialty, just like any male Marine would, Krebs said.The Corps opened the ground intelligence officer specialty to female Marines in July 2013.Data from the experiment will be compiled and analyzed. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford will use the analysis to issue a recommendation to Defense Secretary Ashton Carter on how the Corps intends to open up certain combat-arms jobs to women in 2016.The Corps will also be studying the results of the gender-integration experiment at the Infantry Training Battalion course at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, where enlisted female Marines have had greater success.As of February, 122 of the 358 women who entered the course graduated. Women, however, who successfully completed the program were not awarded the infantry military occupational specialty, Krebs said.The Corps will also consider data gleaned from the Ground Combat Element Integrated Task Force it established last May to research integrating women into combat jobs. The task force is modeled along the lines of a battalion landing team. Women volunteers are trained in ground combat arms skills and integrated into combat units, with a research team observing performance.-- Bryant Jordan can be reached at -email-Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuA propos de modul in care stie US Army sa isi faca "reclama". Nu stiu daca a observat cineva, dar de vreo doua daca nu chiar trei luni, cand deschizi pagina oficiala de web a USArmy gasesti asa ceva: APPLICATION BLOCKEDYou have attempted to access a blocked website. Access to this website has been blocked for operational reasons by the DOD Enterprise-Level Protection System.APPLICATION: qos-mission-critical-panContact your local Network Control Center for information on how to gain access to MISSION ESSENTIAL or otherwise authorized websites, or to report a mis-categorized website.Navy users click here for additional guidance and procedures for requesting access to blocked content.This is a DoD enterprise-level protection system intended to reduce risk to DoD users and protect DoD systems from intrusion. It will block access to high-risk websites and filter high-risk web content.You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG authorized purpose.-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests--not for your personal benefit or privacy.-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.Deasupra textului se vede emblema United States Cyber Command.Orice text sau imagine care trimite la USArmy.mil este automat blocata,aparand textul de mai sus.Aici se nasc, in mod firesc, cateva intrebari:1. De vreme ce paginile web (de pe site-ul Pentagonului) ale USNavy, USAir Force, USMarine Corps, USCoast Guard si USNational Guard pot fi accesate, de ce se considera ca accesul neingradit al publicului la pagina USArmy ar constitui un pericol?2. Din cate stiu nu suntem nici Iran, nici Coreea de Nord. Trupele noastre au luptat si mai lupta alaturi de ei "sold la sold" unde a fost si mai este nevoie. Nu suntem nici macar din zona "gri" gen Serbia, Belarus, ci membru NATO si, cica, beneficiari ai unui parteneriat strategic cu SUA. Atunci de ce acest tratament?3. Mai sunt si alti nemultumiti (cu greu am gasit pe net discutii pe tema asta). De obicei hacker-ii se descurca si pana la urma reusesc sa intre. Cei pagubiti raman nu ei, ci cei care doresc doar sa se informeze in mod corect. De curiozitate, angajatii MApN care, poate, au nevoie de informatiile (care su caracter public, nu sunt secretizate) de pe pagina USArmy.mil, cand incearca sa o acceseze dau peste acelasi text?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusAm vazut şi eu chestia asta, şi e valabil nu doar pentru site-ul US Army, pentru mai multe păstorite de ei. Initial crezusem ca e ceva legat de I.P.-ul meu, sau oi fi vreun purtător de viruşi, ceva....Un romanaş de-ai noştri a ridicat problema pe un forum cu specific militar din U.S. Citez: "Seriously now, blocking country-wide IPs is a pretty stone age cyber defense move, if that's what this is meant to be. First, those were unclassified military history or militarily-related publications, not sure what was there to hack. Secondly, this only hurts regular Ion Romanian users of the internet, not the hackers."Toată discuţia, care nu duce la nici un rezultat, aici LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuE exact forumul peste care nimerisem si eu. Oricum, multumesc, Terentius . Eu am vazut ca sunt blocate doar paginile care trimit la USArmy. Or mai fi si altele, nu neg asta.Stiu ca suna a naivitate, dar tot nu ma pot abtine: se poate face ceva pentru a se indrepta situatia? Ar servi la ceva daca cineva le-ar atrage atentia? si pe ce canale?Cum spuneam, parca totusi nu ma mira. PR tip USArmy. dupa cum remarcase si Robert Kaplan. In pofida eforturilor unora mai neortodcsi precum Stanley McChrystall, David Petraeus (cu siguranta, multi trebuie sa fie fericiti ca a calcat pe bec), iar mai nou, Herbert McMaster, USArmy e o institutie extrem de birocratizata ca reflexe, dominata de lideri timorati, carora nu le prea place sa "rock the boat", si care, din pacate, a dat dovada de multe inconsecvente si balbaieli.Din ce am mai citit pe diferite forumuri, se pare ca la varf domina conformismul si gandirea de tip managerial impusa in anii '50. Se tem de multe ori de ceea ce "makes us look bad", motiv pentru care se pare ca la multi paramentri se multumesc doar sa bifeze. Nu inseamna ca toti sunt asa iar reducerile de efective care au inceput si vor continua ii vor face sa ridice standardele la testele de selectie. Experienta ultimolor 14 ani in Afganistan si Irak a schimbat multe; problema e sa nu isi doreasca sa uite prea repede.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSchimbare din toamna in fruntea Pentagonului. Obama l-a nominalizat pe actualul comandant al USMarine Corps, generalul Joseph Dunford, in fruntea Comitetului Intrunit al Sefilor de State Majore (mai pe scurt SMG-ul SUA), functie care este detinuta in prezent de generalul US Army Martin Dempsey.Este pentru a doua oara in istoria Pentagonului in care un puscas marin este numit in cea mai inalta pozitie. Generalului Peter Pace (2005-2007), primul puscas marin numit in fruntea SMG-ului, nu i-a fost prelungit primul mandat cu alti doi ani asa cum se procedeaza de obicei. Se spunea ca, desi un tip dragut (sau poate tocmai de asta), Peter Pace nu era ceea ce trebuia sa fie. "Fighting Joe", asa cum este numit Dunford, se pare ca este croit din alta stofa si se bucura de admiratia si respectul tuturor.Mai intai, anuntul (redau din text doar partea referitoare la Dunford): LINKObama Nominates New Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffBy Cheryl PellerinDoD News, Defense Media ActivityWASHINGTON, May 5, 2015 – President Barack Obama today nominated Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. to serve as the 19th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force Gen. Paul J. Selva to serve as the 10th vice chairman.During an announcement in the White House Rose Garden, the president said that among military leaders, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to him and his national security team.Members of that team, including Defense Secretary Ash Carter, were in the audience.“In recent years, I have been deeply grateful for the service of our chairman, Gen. Marty Dempsey, and our vice chairman, Adm. Sandy Winnefeld. Marty and Sandy will complete their terms later this year,” Obama said.Navigating Urgent ChallengesTo Dempsey and Winnefeld, the president said he’s relied on their advice, counsel and judgment as the nation has navigated the urgent challenges of recent years. Obama also thanked their families for decades of support.“From ending our combat mission in Afghanistan to leading the international coalition to destroy [the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant], conducting humanitarian operations from typhoon relief in the Philippines to fighting Ebola in West Africa, and strengthening our security alliances from Europe to Asia,” Obama said, “at every step, you have been critical to our processes, and I have valued not only your counsel but your friendships.”Introducing his choice to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Obama called Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. one of the military’s most admired officers.“Fightin’” Joe DunfordDunford has served as commandant of the Marine Corps since Oct. 17, 2014.Dunford is a Boston native, the son of a retired Boston police officer and Marine veteran of Korea, the president said, adding, “Joe followed in his father's footsteps and has distinguished himself through nearly 40 years of military service.”Dunford has commanded Marines in the field from the platoon level to a Marine expeditionary force. During the invasion of Iraq, he led Marines in the charge to Baghdad, Obama said.According to a post on MarinesBlog, the official Marine Corps blog, it was in Iraq that he earned the nickname “Fightin’ Joe,” while serving in 2003 under Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis and leading Regimental Combat Team 5 during the initial invasion.‘Unvarnished Military Advice’“I have been extraordinarily impressed by Joe, from the situation room where he helped to shape our enduring commitment to Afghanistan, to my visit last year to Bagram, where I saw his leadership first-hand,” the president said.“I know Joe. I trust him. He's already proven his ability to give me his unvarnished military advice based on his experience on the ground,” Obama said.Under Dunford’s steady hand, the president added, Afghanistan achieved key milestones, including the taking the lead for their own security, historic elections, and the drawdown of U.S. forces, all of which set the stage for the end of the U.S. combat mission there.Obama thanked Dunford and his wife Ella for their continued service to the nation before introducing his choice to be vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Paul Selva.Iata si o scurta biografie a personajului (de pe site-ul USMC, care spre deosebire de cel al US Army, poate fi accesat) si o fotografie:36th Commandant of the Marine Corps LINK General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. assumed the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps on October 17, 2014. A native of Boston, Massachusetts, he graduated from St. Michael's College and was commissioned in 1977. He previously served as the Commander, International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces- Afghanistan from February 2013 to August 2014.General Dunford has served as an infantry officer at all levels. He commanded 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, he commanded the 5th Marine Regiment.His Joint assignments include service as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman, JCS, Chief, Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (J5), and Vice Director for Operations on the Joint Staff (J3).He has also served as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division, Marine Corps Director of Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations. He commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the Commander, Marine Forces U.S. Central Command. From 2010-2012, he served as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.General Dunford is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and the U.S. Army War College. He holds a M.A. in Government from Georgetown University and a M.A. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuGata, s-a terminat si asta:LINKFemale Soldiers Fail to Pass Phase One of Army Ranger SchoolMay 08, 2015 | by Matthew CoxAll eight female soldiers participating in the first co-ed class of U.S. Army Ranger School failed to advance to the second phase of the grueling infantry course.On the male side, 115 male students met the requirement to begin the Mountain Phase of Ranger School in Dahlonega, Ga., on Saturday, May 9, according to a Fort Benning press release.The eight female candidates, along with 101 male candidates, will be recycled to repeat the Darby Phase of Ranger School.Approximately 35 male Ranger students failed to meet the standards of Ranger School and will not be recycled, the press release said."They will return to their units having learned a great deal about themselves and small unit tactics, patrolling, leadership, and team work," according to the release.No changes have been made to the deliberate evaluation process used to determine which students are dropped, recycled or allowed to move forward to the next phase, the release states."I had the opportunity to visit the Ranger students yesterday and was impressed that whether going forward to the mountains or recycling the Darby phase they were motivated to continue training and focused on successfully completing the Ranger Course," Maj. Gen. Scott Miller, Commanding General of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Benning, said in the release."They're a strong group of soldiers, who are working their way through the U.S. Army's most physically and mentally demanding course."The eight females were among the 19 that showed up Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade's first co-ed Ranger course April 20. Three failed to pass the Ranger Physical Fitness Assessment, a requirement to enter Ranger School.Eight out of 16 female soldiers completed the Ranger Assessment Phase, or RAP week, which consists of day and night land navigation, obstacle courses, skill tests and a 12 mile road march with a rifle, fighting load vest and rucksack weight approximately 47 pounds.The male and female candidates being recycled through the Darby Phase will not have to repeat RAP week, according to Benning officials. They will begin the phase on May 14 after the next class completes RAP week."Ranger School is the Army's toughest course, and this iteration is no exception," Benning officials said in the release.Senior Army leaders recently decided to allow females to attend the historically male-only, infantry course. The effort is a result of former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's January 2013 directive that all services open combat-arms roles to women that so far have been reserved for men. The services have until 2016 to make this happen.-- Matthew Cox can be reached at -email-Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNa, ca pana la urma s-a intamplat!Sunt convins ca stirea e cunoscuta de toata lumea, dar m-am gandit ca nu ar strica sa o postez si aici. LINKFirst Two Women to Graduate Friday from Army Ranger SchoolAug 17, 2015 | by Matthew CoxTwo female officers will make history on Friday by becoming the first women to graduate from the traditionally all-male U.S. Army Ranger School, officials said.The West Point graduates, who have not been identified, are in their final days of the grueling two-month leadership training program. Two separate sources told Military.com that they will receive the highly coveted Ranger tab on Friday.The service later confirmed in a press release that two women and 94 men completed the 62-day course, which includes everything from PT and swim tests, to land navigation exercises and a 12-mile foot march, to obstsacle courses and parachute jumps, to mountaineering tests and mock patrols.“Congratulations to all of our new Rangers," Army Secretary John McHugh said in the release. "Each Ranger School graduate has shown the physical and mental toughness to successfully lead organizations at any level."He added, "This course has proven that every Soldier, regardless of gender, can achieve his or her full potential. We owe Soldiers the opportunity to serve successfully in any position where they are qualified and capable, and we continue to look for ways to select, train, and retain the best Soldiers to meet our Nation’s needs."The Army had already sent out invitations to more than 30 media outlets, including Military.com, to attend the ceremony. The female candidates and their male Ranger buddies plan to sit down for an interview the day before the event.The two were among a trio of women who since April have been participating in the physically and mentally exhausting leadership course held in three phases at Fort Benning in Georgia and Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The third woman is currently repeating the second or "mountain" phase of the program.Fort Benning began its first co-ed Ranger course on April 20. Nineteen women and 380 men were pre-screened for the program. Eight women made it through the first week, called Ranger Assessment Phase, but didn't pass the subsequent Benning Phase. They were "recycled," or allowed to attempt the Benning Phase a second time, but failed. Five women were then dropped from the program and three were invited to start over from day one, along with five male candidates.The Army said more than a third -- or 34 percent -- of students who enter Ranger School recycle at least one phase of the course, adding to the student’s physical and mental fatigue.The integration of women at Ranger School is a key part of the Army's effort to study how to open direct-action combat jobs such as infantry to women. Under a 2013 directive from then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the military services must open all combat jobs to women by next year or explain why any must stay closed.While the female Army officers will be entitled to wear the Ranger tab, they still won't be allowed to serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment, the special operations forces unit, or receive the special skill identifier code added to the end of their military occupational specialty -- unless existing rules and regulations are changed.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuLINKFemale Ranger Grads Make Case for Opening Infantry Jobs to WomenThe performance of the two women who passed U.S. Army Ranger School bolstered the case for opening up more direct-action combat jobs to women, including infantry and special operations, advocates say.Even before the Army officially announced Monday that the two women had passed, Navy Adm. Jonathan Greenert, who will retire soon as chief of naval operations, said the service's elite SEALs may soon be open to women who can meet the standards of the demanding training.On a farewell visit to San Diego Monday, Greenert said he had been briefed on the preliminary findings of the Coronado Naval Special Warfare Command's study on whether women should be accepted into the SEALs."I see no reason (not) to say: 'Here are our standards. Who wants to be a SEAL? You've got to meet the standards,'" Greenert told the San Diego Tribune. "Frankly, that's the path we are headed down, but we're not done yet."Last week, retiring Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno made similar remarks in stating that standards, and not gender, should be the guideline in qualifying for an MOS.The two 20-something women who passed Ranger School, both officers and West Point graduates, have been identified as Capt. Kristen Griest, a military police officer from Connecticut, and 1st Lt. Shaye Haver, an Apache helicopter pilot from Texas, according to an article in The Washington Post. They've already changed the opinions of some involved in the Ranger course.he performance of the two women who passed U.S. Army Ranger School bolstered the case for opening up more direct-action combat jobs to women, including infantry and special operations, advocates say.Even before the Army officially announced Monday that the two women had passed, Navy Adm. Jonathan Greenert, who will retire soon as chief of naval operations, said the service's elite SEALs may soon be open to women who can meet the standards of the demanding training.On a farewell visit to San Diego Monday, Greenert said he had been briefed on the preliminary findings of the Coronado Naval Special Warfare Command's study on whether women should be accepted into the SEALs."I see no reason (not) to say: 'Here are our standards. Who wants to be a SEAL? You've got to meet the standards,'" Greenert told the San Diego Tribune. "Frankly, that's the path we are headed down, but we're not done yet."Last week, retiring Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno made similar remarks in stating that standards, and not gender, should be the guideline in qualifying for an MOS.The two 20-something women who passed Ranger School, both officers and West Point graduates, have been identified as Capt. Kristen Griest, a military police officer from Connecticut, and 1st Lt. Shaye Haver, an Apache helicopter pilot from Texas, according to an article in The Washington Post. They've already changed the opinions of some involved in the Ranger course.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuO a treia domnisoara va absolvi Ranger School:LINKThird Female Enters the Final Phase of Army Ranger SchoolAug 28, 2015 | by Matthew CoxAnother female U.S. Army officer has passed Mountain Phase of Ranger School and is advancing to the final phase of the all-male infantry course.The West Point graduate follows two other West Pointers – 1st Lt. Shaye Haver and Capt. Kristen Griest, who made history recently at Fort Benning, Ga., by becoming the first women to earn the prestigious Ranger Tab on Aug. 21.The female, who has not been identified, will join 103 men at Swamp Phase of Ranger School, located at Camp Rudder, Fla., on August 29, according to a Aug. 28 Fort Benning press release.Additionally, 45 men will be recycled, or given a second attempt at Ranger School. The Swamp Phase is located in the coastal swamp environment near Valparaiso, Florida. The phase consists of two jumps for airborne qualified personnel; four days of waterborne operations; small boat movements and stream crossings; a 10 day field training exercise with student led patrols. Students who meet the standards of the Swamp Phase will travel back to Benning on Sept. 18 to graduate at Victory Pond.The third female is the last of the original 19 female volunteers to go through the first co-ed class of Ranger School beginning April 20. In addition to the 19 women, there were 380 men who started the course.Ranger School is a 62-day course that's described as the Army's premiere infantry leadership course, an ordeal that pushes students to their physical and mental limits. Over the past two years, only about 40 percent of males successfully completed the course, according to leaders from the Airborne and Ranger Training Brigade.During the three-phase course, the students learn how to operate in three environments -- woodlands in Fort Benning, mountainous terrain in Dahlonega, Georgia, and coastal swamp at Camp Rudder in Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.The accomplishments of Griest and Haver come at a time when all of the services are preparing to make recommendations of how to open direct-action combat jobs such as infantry to women. Under a 2013 directive from then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the military services must open all combat jobs to women by next year or explain why any must stay closed.For now, the Army is planning on sending more females to Ranger School. The service will hold another gender-integrated course in November.Maj. Gen. Scott Miller, the commander of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Benning, has maintained from the beginning that the standards for Ranger School have not changed. The former Delta Force leader acknowledged recently that Griest and Haver earning their Ranger Tabs has changed the landscape of Ranger School forever."It's not exclusively a male domain here," Miller said Aug. 20. "We have shown that two women can make it as well."Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMarines nu se dezmint. Spiritul de corp si integritatea au ramas vii in aceasta categorie de forte. Vad ca sunt singurii a caror sinceritate aspra pune in fata adevarul asa cum este el, care manifesta continuitate in materie de leadership, spre deosebire de USArmy, USNavy si USAir Force care s-au acomodat cu foarte mare usurinta agendei PC impuse Pentagonului. Interesant este ca niciunul dintre aceste trei servicii nu a catadicsit sa efectueze testele desfasurate de USMC. Iar desteptul ala de Mabus, care s-a plimbat si el prin USNAvy vreme de doi ani a expediat acest test printr-un singur gest. Altfel, vad ca se simte bine cand se rade la glumele lui. Un bufon jalnic...Bine ca a venit timpul ca Dempsey sa se retraga. Misiunea lui Dunford ca Chairman of the JCS in raport cu colegii sai nu va fi una usoara, avand in vedere pozitia actuala. Marines to Seek to Close Some Combat Jobs to Women, Officials Say Associated Press | Sep 18, 2015 | by Lolita C. BaldorWASHINGTON -- The Marine Corps is expected to ask that women not be allowed to compete for several front-line combat jobs, inflaming tensions between Navy and Marine leaders, U.S. officials say.The tentative decision has ignited a debate over whether Navy Secretary Ray Mabus can veto any Marine Corps proposal to prohibit women from serving in certain infantry and reconnaissance positions. And it puts Gen. Joseph Dunford, the Marine Corps commandant who takes over soon as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at odds with the other three military services, who are expected to open all of their combat jobs to women.No final decisions have been made or forwarded to Pentagon leaders, but officials say Defense Secretary Ash Carter is aware of the dispute and intends to review the Marine plan. The Marine Corps is part of the Navy, so Mabus is secretary of both services.The ongoing divide has put Dunford in the spotlight as he prepares to start his new job next week. And it puts him in a somewhat awkward position of eventually having to review and pass judgment -- as chairman -- on a waiver request that he submitted himself while serving as Marine commandant.The debate includes jabs at Mabus for his public criticism of the Marine plan that triggered a call for his resignation from a member of Congress.Officials say the Army, Navy and Air Force are expected to allow women to serve in all combat jobs and will not ask Carter for any exceptions. They say that Special Operations Command is also likely to allow women to compete for the most demanding military commando jobs -- including the Navy SEALs -- though with the knowledge that it may be years before women even try to enter those fields.The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to discuss the matter publicly.Mabus on Monday made his position clear."I'm not going to ask for an exemption for the Marines, and it's not going to make them any less fighting effective," he said, adding that the Navy SEALs also will not seek any waivers. "I think they will be a stronger force because a more diverse force is a stronger force. And it will not make them any less lethal."Mabus' comments angered Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., who has asked Carter in a letter to demand Mabus' resignation because he "openly disrespected the Marine Corps as an institution, and he insulted the competency of Marines by disregarding their professional judgment, their combat experience and their quality of leadership."Hunter, who served as a Marine in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Mabus' comments raise questions about whether he can be objective and continue to lead the Marine Corps. And he said Mabus should have no role in any decisions about women in the Marine Corps.Under the current plan, the service chiefs will present their plans to the service secretaries, who will then forward recommendations to Carter. He will make the final decisions by the end of the year.If Dunford does seek the exception, it puts the new Joint Chiefs chairman at odds with public statements by Carter asserting that anyone, regardless of gender, who meets the standards and requirements for a job should be allowed to do it.Informing Dunford's decision is the Marine Corps' yearlong study on gender integration. It concluded that, overall, male-only units performed better than gender-integrated units. It found that the male-only infantry units shot more accurately, could carry more weight and move more quickly through specific tactical movements. It also concluded that women had higher injury rates than men, including stress fractures that likely resulted from carrying heavy loads.The report acknowledged that "female Marines have performed superbly in the combat environments of Iraq and Afghanistan and are fully part of the fabric of a combat-hardened Marine Corps after the longest period of continuous combat operations in the Corps' history."Women make up less than 8 percent of the Marine Corps, the smallest percentage across the four active-duty services.But the report also pointed to the 25-year-old report by a presidential commission on women in the armed forces that concluded: "Risking the lives of a military unit in combat to provide career opportunities or accommodate the personal desires or interests of an individual, or group of individuals, is more than bad military judgment. It is morally wrong."Mabus, however, told the City Club of Cleveland that while the Marines did a long study of the matter, it relied on averages -- such as the average woman can't carry as much or perform as quickly as a man."The other way to look at it is we're not looking for average," said Mabus. "There were women that met this standard, and a lot of the things there that women fell a little short in can be remedied by two things: training and leadership."The services have been slowly integrating women into previously male-only roles, including as Army artillery officers and sailors on Navy submarines. Adding to the debate was the groundbreaking graduation last month of two women in the Army's grueling Ranger course.In January 2013, then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey signed an order wiping away generations of limits on women fighting for their country, ordering a quarter-million positions open regardless of gender. They called for sweeping reviews of the physical requirements for combat jobs and gave the military services until January 2016 to argue if any positions should remain closed to women.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisAhh,femeilee.Is cateva probleme.1.Femeile,pot sa lupte? Da,atat alea care isi apara copiii,cat si alea luate cu arcanul.S-a dovedit de catre rusoaice,pe frontul de est,vietnameze in razboiul de gherila si au fost ceva doamne lunetiste prin Bosnia.As we speak,sunt femeile kurde care isi fac de cap cu califatii, Prin definitie,astea is exceptii2.Za intrebarea este daca merita sa te complici cu tot circul in unitati mixte?Alta intrebare este cum se vor purta doamnele in operatiuni conventionale de inalta intensitate?Pana acum,nu au participat la asa ceva.3.In zisele operatiuni e de vazut cum se vor purta barbatii in unitatile mixte?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00PisicaNeagra.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelDa doamna, dar pana sa apreciem acele alte calitati trebuie sa carati un rucsac de 40 kg in spate.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00PisicaNeagra.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelSa le povestiti chestia asta cu motivatia pf-istelor care dupa o luna de fasie s-au orientat spre birouri sau locuri mai linistite. Fiecare are locul lui in cultura organizationala, dar feminismul asta dus la extrem nu e constructiv. Aici vorbim de Rangeri, SEAL, etc. Nu stiu daca daca aveti vreo idee despre domeniul asta, dar, la un "coxage" mai serios, e posibil sa se sparga.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisDoamna/domnisoara,barbatii au demonstrat ca pot trece prin Stalingrad,Kursk sau Debaltsevo mai recent.Textele cu woman power mai trebuie validate printr-o mica chestie numita practica.Sa vedem intai cum se comporta unitatile mixte in lupta,apoi sa judecam. Si strict de carat,va sugerez sa zvarliti o privire de care sunt sigur ca e superba catre montaniarzi/de.Va e la indemana.Veti observa acolo o mica mare diferenta de performanta.Iar asta e floare la ureche.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelMihais wrote ...Sa vedem intai cum se comporta unitatile mixte in lupta,apoi sa judecam. Se pare ca israelienii au incercat ideea, dar au renuntat la ea: cica efectul unei femei ranite este devastator asupra psihicului unui barbat. Nu-mi cereti referinte ca n-am.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00bushesio vroiam sa le intreb pe femeile astea care daca isi propun realizeaza orice ,cum ar rezista unui interogatoriu incrucisat unde s-ar folosi clesti de taiat sirma ghimpata sau nu e nevoie de clesti, ci doar de a le suprima oglinda si fardurile pentru o perioada nedeterminata ?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Boribumdjebel wrote ...Mihais wrote ...Sa vedem intai cum se comporta unitatile mixte in lupta,apoi sa judecam. Se pare ca israelienii au incercat ideea, dar au renuntat la ea: cica efectul unei femei ranite este devastator asupra psihicului unui barbat. Nu-mi cereti referinte ca n-am. Nu numai ca nu au renuntat,dar au mai facut una,Bardalas o cheama.Mai e Karakal,tot mixta,si înca una al carei nume îmi scapa. Numai la tancuri nu vor femei,din pricina promiscuitatii. Cam ca la submarine... . Dar Israelul e (iar) un exemplu aparte ; deja în Haganah erau femei în unitati cu vocatie combatanta,anii '40 !Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuDa, doamnelor, carati 40 kg. Ok, dar cat timp? Nu asa, o ora, de fason, ci o zile intregi, pe distante mari, eventual in teren accidentat, cand limitele epuizarii nervoase si ale celei fizice au fost deja depasite. Si mai apar situatii, mai ales in operatiile speciale, cand tot ce trebuie luat in spate ajunge la 90 kg (Thomas Rathsack, "At war with the elites") si sa urci un versant abrupt carand asta. Cum vi se pare? Dar daca trebuie sa carati un camarad masiv ranit in spate o zi intreaga? Un test mai simplu (deja efectuat): caratul proiectilelor de artilerie de 45 kg. Femeile au avut cu 25% mai putina viteza decat barbatii (cele care au putut suporta ritmul, pentru ca majoritatea au cedat). Cele doua domnisoare care au absolvit recent Ranger School au cazut de cel putin doua ori la fiecare din primele doua faze ale cursului (Darby phase si Mountain Phase). Se pare ca nici echipamentul purtat in spate nu avea greutatea de lupta (40-45kg), ci doar vreo 15-20. Pentru fiecare proba sunt bareme cu valori minimale si optime. Dupa cum arata lucrurile, doamnele respective au trecut cu minimum. Mai citind eu pe cate un forum, am aflat ca, de obicei, cei care erau selectati treceau probele obtinand punctaj maxim. Mai mult, increderea reciproca ce constituie liantul unei unitati era generata de asemenea rezultate. Nimeni nu isi doreste alaturi pe cineva care a trecut la limita. E ca si cum intr-un concurs scolar ai avea langa tine pe cei care au trecut clasa cu 5. Si nu uitati, aici miza sunt numeroase vieti, nu o coronita. Sa nu uitam ca, datorita spiritului sau mai compliant, adica managerial si inclinat spre compromisuri nu tocmai onorabile, USArmy e mai dispusa la scaderea standardelor. Ati vazut ca US Marine Corps nu au inteles sa cedeze, mai ales dupa ce un studiu efectuat pe perioada a 6 luni a demonstrat ca performantele unitatilor mixte sunt inferioare celor constituite doar din barbati. Nicio femeie nu a trecut inca de Infantry Officer Course, cel mai riguros curs de pregatire pentru ofiterii de infanterie din SUA, organizat de USMC.Asadar, daca faci un bilant, rezulta:1. Procent extrem de mic de reusita.2. Scaderea standardelor.3. Acordarea mai multor incercari la fiecare proba (punctul 3 e strans legat de 2), fortand astfel regulile fixate anterior pentru a elimina pe cei neperformanti.4. Scaderea valorii combative a unitatilor si vulnerabilizarea lor inutila.5. Cheltuieli nejustificat de mari, cu randament minim, doar pentru "a acorda sanse egale".Nu pledez eliminarea din start a femeilor din competitie, ci doar pastrarea intacta a standardelor. Nu conteaza ca e femeie, transgender, mascul macho sau martian. Poate? Ok, trece, orice ar fi. Nu poate, nu trece. Insa, in realitate, lucrurile functioneaza mai pervers: "Cum, nu pot? Pai e vina voastra! Ia faceti un studiu de 'fezabilitate' si explicati-mi mie, un ageamiu, de ce e nevoie, dom'ne, de atatea standarde?! Demonstrati, matematic daca se poate, ca baremele fixate de voi sunt necesare. Astea sunt mofturi! Iar voi niste retrogazi sexisti si pricinosi! Dinozaurilor!" (discurs gen Ray Mabus)Cum bine spunea cineva, armata nu e un loc al sanselor egale, ci o institutie a sacrificiului in comun. Asa ca axiologia agendei Political Corectness nu doar ca nu face nici cat o ceapa degerata in acest caz, dar este iresponsabila si criminala.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisAsta e decizia de acum.O fi bine,nu o fi,vedem.In schimb aia de obiecteaza sustin ca femeile ranite ruineaza eficienta mult disproportionat.Iar patrulatul prin Negev si ocazionale incidente cu Hamas nu-s chiar razboiul de Yom Kippur.Accidentele la antrenament sunt mult mai dese si mai grave in cazul femeilor. Asa incat exista argumente pro si contra.Pro ar fi ca da la numar si ca nu mai e discriminare.Ma rog,legea nu mai discrimineaza,dar naturii nu-i pasa de ce decretam noi. Vedem la vreun Ilovaisk viitor care sa implice mixturi pe de o parte si doar barbati pe alta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinOff topicTot cam asta spuneam si eu cu ceva timp in urma pe alt topic:Pârvu Florin wrote ...Si fiindca s-a discutat si despre pregatire fizica, s-a discutat despre femei la pompieri si se va mai discuta si despre scoala de pompieri, imi vin in minte chestiile alea, cu inaltimea minima pe care trebuie sa o aiba un candidat pentru scoala de la Boldesti, cand are omul cu o jumatate de centimetru mai putin decat standardul si trebuie sa mearga in audienta la IG, care-i da (sau nu! ) derogare, dar care sunt oare criteriile care stau la baza acordarii derogarilor astora? Nu era mai frumos daca IGSU spunea:"Stimate domnule candidat, sau de ce nu, candidata! Sunteti in stare sa tarati un manechin de 90 de kile pe o distanta de treizeci de metri in mai putin de treizeci de secunde?Sunteti in stare sa .... sa.... sa....?LINKLINKDaca raspunsul este da, inseamna ca sunteti demn de a fi un viitor pompier, caci de ce mi-ar pasa mie, angajator, de faptul ca dumneavostra aveti 1,30 metri, sau ca sunteti tintuit intr-un scaun cu rotile daca reusiti sa indepliniti aceasta sarcina, poate chiar folosind telekinezia?"LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuUite o fata care stie ce vorbeste (si mai sunt multe ca ea):LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAm citit pe undeva (nu mai stiu unde), ca, la un moment dat, o unitate formata din femei a USMC a fost atacata de insurgenti. S-au luptat admirabil si au respins atacul, nimeni nu neaga asta. Ba chiar au fost elogiate. Dar asta nu inseamna ca sunt automat calificate pt MOS 3011 (rifleman). Insa, potrivit doctrinei USMC - every marine, a rifleman - anterior parcurgerii cursului care iti da viitoarea MOS (Military Occupational Specialty), toti trec printr-un curs general care ii invata minimum necesar din instructia unui infanterist. Asta inseamna ca, la nevoie, daca baza in care te afli e atacata, toti (bucatari, mecanici, contopisti, artileristi, genisti etc.) pun mana pe arma si stiu cum sa o foloseasca. Nu sunt performanti ca un "grunt", dar fac fata onorabil. Mie, unul, treaba asta mi se pare sanatoasa. Si, inca ceva. Cam prin 2010, un destept de general din US Army, Mark Hertling, a reusit sa determine scoaterea din formarea infanteristilor din US Army instructia luptei cu baioneta (armata britanica a pastrat-o), sub motiv ca in contextul razboiului actual, nu mai e...actuala.Stiti cum e, descoperi ca un lucru pe care nu il mai credeai necesar se dovedeste a fi necesar mai ales cand esti la inghesuiala. Ca nu s-a mai folosit din razboiul din Coreea sau Vietnam, ca una, ca alta. Hertling a introdus, in schimb, mai multe calisthenics, pe motiv ca, in materie de fitness, multi militari ai USArmy lasa de dorit, lucru care nu e prea departe de adevar. Insa, prin 2013, soldatii unui pluton britanic din Grenadier Guards, ramasi fara munitie, au riscat si au atacat un compound al talibanilor cu baionetele fixate la arma si le-a iesit. Evident ca USMC a pastrat instructia cu baioneta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00VrednicFoarte interesante ultimele postari. De asemenea, ar fi interesant de urmarit cum anume ar influenta legaturile interpersonale, intr-o unitate de lupta mixta, stresul psihic si fizic ridicat si aproape constant cauzat de razboi. E destul de previzibil ca treaba ar mirosi rau de tot intr-o unitate ai carei membri au ajuns acolo in urma scaderii nejustificate sau chiar a ignorarii standardelor, dar cum ar fi daca toti ar fi conform standardelor? Si-ar spune natura (you're a woman, I'm a man s.a.m.d.) cuvantul, in detrimentul randamentului?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuExemplu de responsabilitate si integritate:General Chuck Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995-1999): "Our women make tremendous contributions to the Corps. I had 201 women under my command during Desert Shield and Storm and I would nothave been combat-effective without them. To a Marine, they were superb. As the Commandant, however, I am tasked to train, equip, and provide fighting forces to the regional commanders-in-chief. I have to consider this as we select and procure the right equipment and train the right people to do the job the nation expects of us. It is also my responsibility to ensure the we maximize the effective utilization of those resources. I do not believe that I am maximizing the utilization of the limited resources of the Marine Corps by putting women at the point of a rifle platoon or in units that engage in direct ground combat".Tom Clancy, "Marine. A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit", Written with John Gresham, Berkley Publishing, New York, 1996, pag. 23. Lucrurile spuse acolo sunt perfect adevarate si astazi. Sublinierea imi apartine.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn sfarsit! Pagina oficiala a US Army (http://www.army.mil/) poate fi accesata din nou.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn forumul in car eam gasit asta, cineva spunea in gluma ca nu ar strica sa ii recruteze inca de la cresa New Army Program Allows Recruits To Join Delta ForceAddison BluJanuary 15, 2015Army, Video10 CommentsFORT BRAGG, N.C. — Critical manpower shortages have resulted in Delta Force allowing brand new soldiers to attend their selection and training pipeline right out of basic training, according to US Army Public Affairs.“With the wars drawing down, the pool of seasoned candidates for CAG has grown too small,” reported Public Affairs spokesman Capt. Oliver Jones.“Initial-entry enlistment has worked for years for Navy SEALs, Rangers, and Special Forces,” remarked Jones.“And not that it matters, but just so you know, soldiers that fail at any point in Delta Force training will still fulfill their service obligations as Army supply clerks,” Jones mentioned in passing.Supply clerks suffered the worst personnel shortage of any Army specialty for Fiscal Year 2014.“Delta Force’s updated Assessment and Selection includes a 350-mile ruck march, six triathlons, and an equipment inventory,” claimed Jones excitedly.“I’m also obligated to tell you that soldiers that perform too well during the inventory are failed and sent directly to supply Advanced Individual Training,” he quickly added.“We get a mixed bag of CAG Babies here,” said Staff Sgt. Sonny Brown, an Army recruiter, in an interview with Duffel Blog. “Once in a while we get a professional athlete or a Ph.D., but most of the recruits that ship are just huge Black Hawk Down fans. Either way, I’m getting record numbers of enlistments.”To enlist as a Delta Force Candidate, also known as a CAG Baby, a recruit must have a minimum Clerical score of 80 points and a total PT score of 90. The minimum commitment is six years.Brown likes to remind his recruits that soldiers who finish the entire Delta Force Qualification Course will be given the standard promotion to E-7 and shaving profile.Although recruiters do not share statistics with their recruits, the success rate for CAG Babies is rumored to be .0001% with a 2% margin of error.Failing the first time is not always the end, though. “Now that I’m going supply, I’m gonna try out to work in CAG’s S-4,” said Pvt. Tommy Rocheleau in his exit interview for the Delta Force Assessment and Selection. “I won’t be a door kicker, but I can still be a box kicker, an elite Fork Lift Operator in CAG.”Read more: LINKLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00VrednicEram convins ca e duffelblog.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuSoldier Killed in Iraq Raid Belonged to Delta ForceThe U.S. Army soldier killed in the raid that freed 70 hostages from an ISIS prison in northern Iraq was a highly-decorated, veteran member of the elite Delta Force, U.S. military sources told ABC News.Master Sergeant Joshua L. Wheeler is the first American combat death in Iraq since American troops returned in mid-2014 to train, advise and assist the Iraqi military to fight ISIS, military officials said.Wheeler, 39, of Roland, Oklahoma, "died Oct. 22, in Kirkuk Province, Iraq, from wounds received by enemy small-arms fire during an operation," the Defense Department said in a statement, which also noted that he was assigned to "Headquarters U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina." He is survived by his wife and four sons, the Army said.Two military officials have told ABC News that Wheeler was a team leader for the elite Army special operations unit commonly known as "Delta Force," which is based at that command at Fort Bragg.Wheeler was one of 30 American special operations forces personnel who served as advisers to a similar sized force of Kurdish Peshmerga forces that were leading the raid on a compound outside of Hawlijah, where it was believed ISIS was holding 20 Kurdish hostages, officials said. The Kurdish government believed that the hostages were facing imminent execution at the hands of their captors. That information was corroborated by U.S. intelligence that spotted as many as four mass graves at the compound, officials said.According to biographical information for Wheeler released by Army Special Operations Command, Wheeler joined the Army at 19 and was just a month short of turning 40 when he died -- a long, 20-plus-year career in combat. In the course of that career, Wheeler earned a stunning 11 Bronze Stars, including four with the "Valor Device" for particular acts of heroism.He served as a U.S. Army Ranger and then joined U.S. Army Special Operations Command in 2004, after which he deployed 11 times in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army said. Those deployments would have been as part of Delta Force, according to U.S. military sources.Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook told reporters Thursday that Defense Secretary Ash Carter had approved a request from the Kurdish Regional Government to help with a raid to rescue the hostages.Carter made the decision after citing that the request had come from a close partner and fell within the broader mission of fighting ISIS and because “lives were at risk,” Cook said.The Kurdish and U.S. special operations teams were transported to the prison site aboard Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters, officials said.According to Col. Steve Warren, the U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad, the U.S. team members were serving as advisers to the mission and following rules that called for them to stay behind the last concealed position.They joined the fight after the Kurdish forces sustained what Warren called "withering fire." Wheeler was killed in the intense firefight that ensued, Warren said.Afterwards, the U.S. and Kurdish forces discovered that the ISIS prison actually held more than 70 hostages, all of them Sunni Arabs, officials said. They included 22 members of the Iraqi security forces and the rest were Iraqi civilians."It is always a tragedy when we lose one of our own," Warren said. "In the end, we saved 70 people from execution that was planned in a few hours."LINKDincolo de nenorocirea pe care a patit-o omul asta, mi s-a parut interesant ca si Delta indeplinesc rolul de consilieri militari pe langa diferite forte si grupari armate straine. Stiam ca, potrivit distributiei rolurilor, misiunea asta le revenea celor de la Beretele Verzi. Grupul 10 Forte Speciale, mai ales, a colaborat mult cu Peshmerga. Delta au avut si ei programe asemanatoare, cel putin mai pe la inceputurile unitatii, in anii '80.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisDa,dar sa privim altfel.Toata comunitatea de forte speciale stie Irak si A-stan mai bine decat isi stiu gradina si copiii.Amalgamul asta nu e musai semn de tarie.Poate fi mai degraba semn de uzura.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumRadu Patrascu wrote ...Dincolo de nenorocirea pe care a patit-o omul asta, mi s-a parut interesant ca si Delta indeplinesc rolul de consilieri militari pe langa diferite forte si grupari armate straine. Stiam ca, potrivit distributiei rolurilor, misiunea asta le revenea celor de la Beretele Verzi. Grupul 10 Forte Speciale, mai ales, a colaborat mult cu Peshmerga. Delta au avut si ei programe asemanatoare, cel putin mai pe la inceputurile unitatii, in anii '80. Delta Force instruieste si se pregateste cu omologi militari straini dar si cu forte speciale de politie si/sau jandarmerie din unele tari europene. De vreo 25 de ani o tot fac.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIata si secvente ale filmului actiunii:LINKDespre programe de instruire mai citisem si chiar au aparut si imagini de la unele exercitii comune. Insa ceea ce m-a mirat este asistenta oferita in cursul unei operaiuni militare si, probabil, coordonarea acesteia. In acest sens mi s-a parut ca aici seamana mai mult a misiune pentru Beretele Verzi. Asta mai ales ca au si ei unitati pentru "direct action", asa-numitele Combatant Commander's in Extremis Force (CIF), forte de dimensiunea unei companii prezente in fiecare cele cinci grupuri active ale Fortelor Speciale.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumÎn principiu,atunci când mentoring-ul se face în zone de conflict,exista niste ROE pentru consilieri,care uneori sunt imuabile,alteori sunt elastice,la aprecierea sefului mentorilor în teren. Uneori sunt excluse angajarile potentialului inamic,alteori sunt "deconsiliate" ,alteori eventualele lupte fac parte din procesul de verificare a temelor. Si cum e imposibil sa observi o lupta fara sa te bagi printre participanti,participi ! În cazul asta,al Delta Force în Irak,un baiat tinerel care vorbea în numele DoD ( sau al Casei Albe,nu retin exact dar trebuie ca se poate gasi referinta pe internet) spunea ca detasamentul respectiv avea misunea de asistenta si obligatia de autoprotectie. În auto asta intra si detasamentul irakian pe care îl sustineau,adica Q.E.D . Nu e ciudat ca Delta a participat la asemenea operatiuni,ei având o componenta antiterorista importanta si obisnuinta colaborarii cu militari straini.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAm inteles. Multam, Boribum. Cred ca toata lumea care a urmarit acel clip a auzit in fundal voci ale unor vorbitori nativi de limba engleza cu accent american inconfundabil. Cred ca erau mentorii Delta. Mi-ar fi placut sa apara si ei in imagini fie si cu fata blurata sa vad ce echipament mai poarta. Asta in afara de castile de tip Airframe.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumDin ce se vede în filmarile alea,în obscuritate si fara focalizare,par a purta multicam. Varietatea de modele nu e chiar mare,si gasesti cam aceleasi haine si aceleasi ghete la cam toti operatorii de forte speciale si mai putin speciale. Misiunea asta a fost una în uniforma,dar în alte vremuri si în alte tari,cu toate ca 5.11 nu exista pe vremea aia,tot parea ca blugii lor erau "speciali" (si nu erau) si camasile din cine stie ce material extraterestru erau facute.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusExperienţa nord-americană? Luaţi de aici: Să-ţi găseşti inspiraţia în biografia renascentistului Benvenuto Cellini, potrivit căruia un bărbat, pentru a fi împlinit trebuie să fie un războinic, un artist şi un filosof, asta da cale de urmat în viaţă. Jason Everman, chitarist al trupelor Nirvana şi Soundgarden, membru al Army Rangers şi Green Berets, studiind filosofia la Universitatea Columbia: “It’s the Platonic ideal of the tripartite soul. Wisdom, courage, and temperance. Those are Plato’s words, not mine.”Rebecca Mead - Theatre Of WarBlack Watch,” a play about the famed Scottish regiment’s deployment in Iraq, received rapturous reviews during its initial three-week run at St. Ann’s Warehouse, in Brooklyn, last fall. (“In the final marching sequence, as the men moved forward and stumbled in shifting patterns, I found to my surprise that I was crying,” Ben Brantley confessed in the Times.) All well and good; but, as a result, Susan Feldman, the theatre’s artistic director, said, “we felt it didn’t have a chance to have a diverse audience.” So this season, when the National Theatre of Scotland brought the show back, Feldman instituted a “Pay for a Vet” program, whereby patrons could procure tickets for veterans who felt inclined to revisit what they had already experienced in the theatre of war in the theatre of Dumbo. One recent Sunday night, forty-odd vets attended the show. Dressed in mufti, they were not always easy to distinguish from the rest of the audience, though there were certain indicators. (The burly guy wearing a sweater into which a stars-and-stripes pattern had been knitted was surely not a season-ticket holder at St. Ann’s, at least not yet; and, for once, not every close-cropped head betrayed a hipster coping with early-onset male-pattern baldness.) During the show—which is based on interviews with Scottish soldiers but which includes plangent songs in dialect, and incorporates something approaching ballet in the representation of a fistfight—there was also loud laughter from certain quarters at the play’s linguistic vérité. (A typical line: “Fucking hell ay. If this is the Quick Reaction Force we’re fucked. What the fuck are youse cunts dayin’?”) After the performance, the vets, gathered at the theatre bar, were drafted as theatre critics. “I really liked it, and I didn’t think it was over the top,” Kris Hrones, a former marine who served in Iraq, and who is now an assistant U.S. attorney, said. Hrones had particularly appreciated the depictions of the soldiers’ limited entertainment options (dismembered paperbacks, porn). “Sex is the common denominator when everyone is scared or bored,” he said. “Especially bored.” Tony Davis, a Vietnam veteran, said that he had been moved by the concluding marching sequence. “They kept regrouping, even though they got shot at and killed—I kind of teared up at that,” he said. In one scene, soldiers used gesture to articulate responses to letters from home, miming the rocking of babies or the aching of hearts. “Except you had to visualize the ‘Dear John’ part, because most of those letters were ‘Dear John’ letters,” Davis said. At least one veteran declared himself a conscientious objector to the general approval of the play. “I didn’t join the Army because I didn’t want to work the deli counter at a convenience store,” Jason Everman, a heavily tattooed, bearded veteran of the Army Rangers and the Special Forces, who served in Afghanistan and Iraq, said, referring to the play’s depiction of soldiers as having been motivated to enlist by the lack of alternatives. “I joined the Army because I had a specific agenda: to develop the warrior aspect of my persona.” As a teen-ager living in Washington state, Everman explained, he had been inspired by the “Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini.” “He was the quintessential Renaissance man: an accomplished warrior, an artist, a philosopher,” he said. Everman had already taken care of the artistic aspect of his persona, a friend who was with him said, at which Everman admitted that he had been a guitarist. (No kidding: post-encounter intelligence reveals that in the early nineties he played with Nirvana and Soundgarden.) Having left the military in 2006, he is now studying philosophy at Columbia University. “It’s the Platonic ideal of the tripartite soul,” he said. “Wisdom, courage, and temperance. Those are Plato’s words, not mine.” When pressed, he took issue with the antiwar sentiment that the play ultimately expresses. (“This is nay fucking fighting,” one soldier says, while watching a four-hour assault by American forces. “This is just plain old-fashioned bullying like.”) “War sucks—I can say that with empirical knowledge—but there are alternatives that are worse in the world,” Everman said, and added that he had done nothing as a soldier that compromised his ethics. It was suggested that perhaps the playwright, Gregory Burke, was developing the artistic aspect of his persona, and had yet to progress to the warrior aspect. “If he did that, he might have written a different story,” Everman replied, in an answer that was both philosophical and artful, and which deployed the very special force of tact. LINKClay Tarver - The Rock 'n' Roll Casualty Who Became a War HeroLINKLINKLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuOverruled on Women in Combat, Marine Corps Prepares to Integrate UnitsDec 03, 2015 | by Hope Hodge SeckThe U.S. Marine Corps lost its bid to keep some combat fields closed to women, but officials said the service will waste no time in adapting to the new policy.Headquarters Marine Corps issued a statement Thursday announcing the service's intention to align itself with the policy change immediately, and to share its plans and lessons learned with the other services to help with their integration process."We are well-informed by our combat experience, as well as our objective approach and data obtained from the past two years of study," Marine Corps spokesman Capt. Philip Kulczewski said in the statement."As we move forward with full integration, we'll continue to maintain our standards, while leveraging every opportunity to optimize individual performance, talent and skills to maximize the warfighting capabilities of our [Marine air-ground task forces] in an increasingly complex operating environment," he said.The same outlook applies to the Marines' elite special operations unit."Our party line is, we're in lockstep with the Marine Corps on this," said Capt. Barry Morris, a spokesman for Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. "Once they roll the implementation plan out, that will let everybody know what MARSOC is doing."Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's historic announcement Thursday that all military combat jobs would open to women at the start of next year has the most impact for the Corps, which was the only service to request exceptions to a Defense Department-wide combat integration mandate set to take effect Jan. 1.Of the U.S. military's 52 remaining military occupational specialties to be opened to women, 22 are in the Corps -- the most of any service -- followed by 19 in the Army, six in the Air Force and five in the Navy, according to information released by the Pentagon."While the Marine Corps asked for a partial exception in areas such as infantry, machine gunner, fire support, reconnaissance, and others, we are a joint force, and I have decided to make a decision which applies to the entire force," Carter said during a briefing at the Pentagon.This fall, the Marines released preliminary data from a lengthy research study showing that combat units with female members underperformed all-male counterpart units in nearly every capacity -- women, for example, were found to be more injury prone than men at certain tasks. However, the study's methodology was criticized and Carter characterized the research as "not definitive."Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, who oversaw the request for exceptions earlier this year during his tenure as commandant of the Marine Corps, notably did not appear beside Carter during his Pentagon announcement.But a Marine official said the Corps has had implementation plans ready since the end of last year to proceed with any determination Carter made. The official, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the matter, said the Marine Corps had assembled operational planning teams last year to develop three separate courses of action based on the secretary's decision."It was basically, ‘if this, then that,'" the official said of the planning process. Marine planners examined questions ranging from whether assignment to various combat job fields should be voluntary or involuntary to how gender integration of ground combat units might affect recruitment and how to place female leaders within previously all-male units.Those options were ultimately put before the commandant of the Marine Corps, who will make a final decision on how to proceed following Carter's announcement.With a force of just 6 percent women, an institutional resistance to change and a variety of physically demanding combat jobs, the Marine Corps is positioned to be one of the most intensive testing ground for combat integration.Carter alluded to several challenges the Corps and other services may face as they prepare to meet the integration deadline."We will have to address the fact that some surveys show some service members, men and women, worry integration would come at the cost of combat effectiveness," he said. "Leaders have to be clear that mission effectiveness comes first."Carter also noted that the physical differences between men and women were real and meant that only a small number of women might qualify to meet the physical standards of certain combat jobs.However, the secretary said the data from the Marines' ground combat integration study was not enough to justify keeping certain fields closed to women."I came to a different conclusion with respect to those specialties in the Marine Corps," Carter said during the press conference. "I believe that we could, in implementation, address the issues that were raised."Results of experimental efforts to qualify female Marines for combat have so far been mixed.During a two-year period from 2013 to 2015, enlisted female volunteers made it through infantry training in North Carolina at a rate of 36 percent, compared to a 99-percent pass rate for male Marines. And over a two-and-a-half year testing period, none of the female officers who attempted the Infantry Officers Course were able to complete it.The Marine Corps does have one advantage over the other services, however. The service has dozens of female Marines who spent time in experimental integrated ground units as part of its integration study and are familiar with those units' conditions and physical demands.And multiple volunteers from that experiment have indicated their willingness to move into active ground combat units if they are offered the opportunity.One of the infantry volunteers, Lance Cpl. Callahan Brown, said she would jump at the chance to return to a Marine grunt unit."Anything, just to be back there doing that exact same stuff," she said.LINKIata si comentariul unei doamne la articolul respectiv:"In the 90's I did an obstacle course at Fort Ord with teams of 6 women from DLI, followed by teams from local ranger squadrons. It took us (the gals) 2 hours to get through the course. It took the teams of rangers (guys) 10 minutes flat. Looks like the Marines are being forced to lower the bar real far. The people that make these decisions have an agenda, and don't give a hoot who will get hurt, or killed, in the process of carrying it out. But when the women get torn apart on the battle field, and come home in bags, watch while the PTB use this to further the same agenda, which is to ramp up a false sense of patriotic fever in the nation, so they can use our military men and women in places that we don't belong, for reasons that have nothing to do with national security. If you can get out, go."Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Mihais"Leaders have to be clear that mission effectiveness comes first." Sigur ca da.Dar sunt 2 feluri de lideri.Aia care inteleg ''sugestiile'' sistemului si aia care pleaca.Mission effectiveness e o vorba in vant pt baietii veseli cu putere-n pix. La noi,rezultatele is de la FB in sus.Ma rog,hartia suporta orice prostie.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuLINKStudiul facut de USMC a fost foarte complex si detaliat. Si, in plus, cei care l-au elaborat, sunt oameni cu ani grei de serviciu la centura. Si cu toate astea, pe Carter si pe stapanul lui politic i-a durut fix in basca. "Ei, si ce daca?". Imi pare rau pentru Dunford, supranumit si "Fighting Joe". In 2003, comanda regimentul 5 Infanterie Marina, in subordinea lui James Mattis, aflat atunci in fruntea Diviziei 1 USMC si a carei inaintare pana la Bagdad nu a fost cu nimic mai prejos fata de cea a Diviziei 3 Infanterie a US Army. In preajma lui Mattis nu erau acceptati decat oamenii care isi cunosteau bine treaba. Mattis nu a ezitat sa demita un ofiter atunci cand acesta nu a actionat conform asteptarilor. E vorba de comandantul regimentului 1 Infanterie Marina, colonelul Joe D. Dowdy.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuUS Special Operators Say No to Women in Special Operations Jobs Associated Press | Dec 11, 2015 | by Lolita C. BaldorWASHINGTON -- The men in the U.S. military's most dangerous jobs care little about political correctness or gender equality. And they have a message for their political leadership.When they are fighting in the shadows or bleeding on the battlefield, women have no place on their teams.In blunt and, at times, profanity-laced answers to a voluntary survey conducted by the Rand Corp., more than 7,600 of America's special operations forces spoke with nearly one voice. Allowing women to serve in Navy SEAL, Army Delta or other commando units could hurt their effectiveness and lower the standards, and it may drive men away from the dangerous posts.An overwhelming majority of those who agreed to respond to the RAND survey said they believe women don't have the physical strength or mental toughness to do the grueling jobs.Some of the broader conclusions of the survey, taken from May through July 2014, were disclosed by The Associated Press earlier this year, but the detailed results and comments written by respondents had not been released.The Pentagon released the summer survey and other documents when Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced last week that he was opening all combat jobs to women. That decision was based on recommendations by the military service secretaries and the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Operations Command. Only the Marine Corps asked to exempt women from certain infantry and frontline positions, but Carter denied that request.Half the men who got the 46-question survey responded to it, and Rand did not identify any of them. In some cases, people who feel most strongly about an issue are more inclined to answer surveys.Some 85 percent of the respondents said they oppose opening the special operations jobs to women, and 70 percent oppose having women in their individual units. More than 80 percent said women aren't strong enough and can't handle the demands of the job. And 64 percent said they aren't mentally tough enough."I could list hundreds of reasons why women cannot do the job that a Green Beret is required to do, but as I only have 1,000 characters, I will choose the one that I think is the most important," said one respondent. "I weigh 225 pounds, and 280 pounds in full kit, as did most of the members of my ODA (a 12-man Army Green Beret unit). I expect every person on my team to be able to drag any member of my team out of a firefight. A 130 pound female could not do it, I don't care how much time she spends in the gym. Do we expect wounded men to bleed out because a female soldier could not drag him to cover?"Another said politicians don't win the covert wars."Gender equality is not an option when the bullets are flying," he said. "Most males in the area of the world I work in would rather back hand a female than listen to her speak. There is a reason we send men to do these jobs."Some were even more blunt."No one wants this. Do us a favor and listen to what we are saying for a change. Can Washington really afford to take that risk so politicians can brag to the public that they brought gender equality to SOF?" said one, who continued profanely.Some saw it as inevitable."This integration will happen eventually and we might as well embrace it while we have current solid leadership and incoming solid leadership at the top to facilitate the transition," one said.The deep challenges the survey revealed with integrating women into tight-knit commando teams are not lost on the Pentagon. Gen. Joseph Votel, head of U.S. Special Operations Command, posted a memo and video online last week after Carter's announcement, explaining the decision and vowing that the qualifying standards for special operations jobs will remain the same.He noted that women have already moved into some special operations jobs, including as helicopter pilots and crew, members of cultural support teams in Afghanistan and in civil affairs and information operations.And he added, "If candidates meet time-tested and scientifically validated standards, and if they have proven that they have the physical, intellectual, professional, and character attributes that are so critical to special operations -- they will be welcomed into the special operations forces ranks."The bulk of those who responded to the survey were young, white married men. They worry that having women in their small teams could fuel jealousy at home or create problems with sexual harassment or illicit affairs. And they rely on and trust their teams and units as family.Ninety-eight percent agreed that their unit is united in trying to accomplish its missions. But when asked whether men and women in a unit would be united to accomplish a mission, only 48 percent said yes. Nearly 33 percent said no, and almost 20 percent were undecided.And nearly 60 percent said they expected that women assigned to their unit would be "treated unfairly" at least some of the time.Some, however, said they might be willing for women to serve in some, more peripheral special operations jobs. Several suggested that women could be used as attachments or additions to some units, just not as actual members, such as the cultural support jobs they fill now.But that's where they drew the line."They have no place in a team room. We all know this but nobody has the b(asterisk)(asterisk)(asterisk)s to say it," said one man. "We are hunter killers, we are coarse, we bleed, we get blown up, we fight together. And we do the same with our HN (host nation) counterparts. At the end of the day we want to crack a beer and talk, joke about very unpolitically correct things. They are not going to feel part of the team. They will feel alienated, and they will be frustrated, and they will be angry. And before you know it the whole team is falling apart."LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCe spuneam eu? Recunoasteti pattern-ul, nu-i asa?Marine Corps Ordered to Make Boot Camp Coed, Remove 'Man' from TitlesJan 07, 2016 | by Hope Hodge SeckNavy Secretary Ray Mabus has given Marine Corps brass two weeks to submit a plan to train male and female recruits together at boot camp and fully integrate officer candidate school.He's also calling for the Marines to make all job titles gender-neutral as the service opens currently closed ground combat jobs to women.In a Jan. 1 memo obtained by Military.com and first reported by Marine Corps Times, Mabus ordered the Corps to send him a detailed plan by Jan. 15 for making boot camp and officer training coed. He also requested that the Marines provide him with a "subject matter expert" on the issue. The plan should identify where training is already integrated by gender, where it is separate, and how the Marines will work to fully integrate all training, Mabus said."Colocation does not meet the requirement for gender integrated training," Mabus wrote. "This plan will complete [the Department of the Navy's] implementation plan and ensure full integration of female sailors and Marines within the DON in accordance with [Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's] guidance."A Marine Corps spokesman, Capt. Philip Kulczewski, confirmed that the Corps had received the memo but offered no further comment.Mabus also included a memo for Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller requesting that he review Marine Corps job titles and remove "man" from applicable job titles to make them "gender-integrated." This means military occupational specialties ranging from 0311, infantryman, to 0321, reconnaissance man, could soon get new names. Mabus demanded this be done and a report submitted to him no later than April 1, 2016, the services' final deadline for opening all jobs to women.The Navy Secretary also sounded a warning note to Neller about a list of "critical information requirements" the Corps included in the integration plan submitted to Carter this month.That list of developments to be monitored closely include:--Indications of decreased combat readiness or effectiveness;--Indications of increased risk to Marines in previously closed units, including incidents of sexual assault and harassment, and hazing;--Indications of a lack of career viability for female Marines in newly opened ground combat jobs;--Indications that Marine commands and culture is unreceptive to the inclusion of women in ground combat units; and--Indications that moral or cohesion is degrading in newly opened units.None of those potential problems should serve to hinder the rollout of the new integration policy, Mabus said."As the Marine Corps adds elements such as the leadership plan that includes the goals of female leadership teams, cohesive cohorts, and mentors, I expect you will ensure that a worthwhile goal does not unreasonably delay or prevent the execution of a policy imperative," he wrote.The strongly worded admonition underscores tensions between the Marine Corps and Mabus' office over the issue of women in combat jobs.The Marine Corps was the only service to request that some combat job fields remained closed to women, citing data from an internal experiment that showed that mixed-gender groups of Marines performed combat tasks more slowly and even shot less accurately than all-male groups.Mabus made clear he wouldn't countenance the Marines' objections to women serving in combat and publicly criticized the Corps' study, saying negative attitudes towards women on the part of those overseeing the research had served to "almost [presuppose] the outcome."To date, the Marines have strongly defended their choice to keep enlisted boot camp segregated by gender, even though all the other services conduct coed recruit training.In August, Marine officials told this reporter that dividing boot camp by gender allowed recruits to learn from same-sex role models, limited distractions, and created a safe space to discuss topics such as sexual assaults that had occurred prior to enlistment."In general, [recruits] arrive with immature, undeveloped and unfocused thoughts on professionalism and professional conduct," Marine Corps Training and Education Command spokesman Anton Semelroth said at the time. "The only thing they have in common is their desire to be a Marine. By capitalizing on that desire, recruit training transforms these individuals from many diverse backgrounds into Marines imbued with a common set of values and standards."That reasoning came under scrutiny this summer with the firing of Lt. Col. Kate Germano, commander of 4th Recruit Training Battalion at Parris Island, South Carolina -- the only unit in the Marine Corps in which female recruits are currently trained.An investigation into Germano's conduct at the battalion found she was "hostile" and "abusive," but her supporters claim she came under fire for trying to bring training standards in her unit up to the level of the three male recruit battalions at Parris Island. In an editorial published by The New York Times, Germano said the incident and her experience at the unit served to prove that training female Marines separately encouraged underperformance and lower expectations.Notably, the issue of coed training has been studied before by the Pentagon.In 1997, the Defense Department assembled a bipartisan panel to examine the implications of gender-integrated enlisted training. At the time, the panel concluded that the coed approach used in Army, Navy and Air Force recruit training resulted in "less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from the training programs."--Hope Hodge Seck can be reached at -email-. Follow her on Twitter at @HopeSeck.Related Topics LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00apkahPai si GI Jane nu e adevarat atunci????Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumNu, ala e un film artistic. L-ai luat drept documentar ?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNoi figuri la Operatiile Speciale. Votel, care conduce acum USSOCOM, e cel care ii canta in struna lui Dailey (a comandat JSOC in perioada 2000-2003) cand acesta ii cerea lt.col.-ului Pete Blaber in aprilie 2003 sa intre in Tikrit de unde se tragea ca la Verdun cu o mana de operatori Delta si cateva tancuri (la ideea lui Blaber, pentru prima data Delta a condus in comun o operatiune cu tanchistii). Evident, Blaber a refuzat. Lui Votel (pe atunci colonel) nu-i venea a crede cand Blaber i-a zis "nu" lui Dailey (general cu 2 stele). Blaber era pe atunci ofiter pentru operatii al Delta dar si comandant interimar al unitatii dupa ce comandantul en titre facuse un anevrism cerebral. This Army general is likely to lead the shadowy Joint Special Operations Command By Thomas Gibbons-Neff January 11 at 12:36 PMMajor General Austin “Scott” Miller is likely to be the next head of the U.S. military’s secretive Joint Special Operations Command, according to sources close to the matter.Miller would replace Fort Bragg-based Army Lt. Gen. Raymond Thomas III, who is slotted to lead Special Operations Command out of MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla in the coming months.A decorated Special Operations soldier, Miller is currently the commanding general of the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and of Fort Benning, Ga. His most recent billets have pushed him into the public light as the Army’s Ranger School, which falls under his watch, recently graduated the first three women in the storied course’s history.With Miller’s ascension to JSOC, his public persona would likely fade—and quickly.As the commander of JSOC, a section of the U.S. military often relegated to the shadows, Miller would oversee the deployment of commandos called the National Mission Force and its supporting assets such as aircraft and drones in search of terrorists around the globe. The National Mission Force is a catch-all term for units like SEAL Team Six (also known as DEVGRU) and the Army’s Delta Force–a unit that is still not acknowledged publicly. Miller declined to comment for this article.An infantry officer by trade, Miller graduated West Point in 1983 and went on to serve in a variety of units such as the 82nd Airborne division, the 2nd Infantry Division, the 75th Ranger Regiment and the Army’s Special Operations Command.Thomas, Miller’s predecessor at JSOC, had a similar background–serving in the Rangers as well as Delta, albeit Thomas never commanded a traditional infantry battalion. This career path is in keeping with the background of former JSOC commanders (Vice Adm. William H. McRaven not withstanding) including Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who led the unit from 2003 to 2008–the longest stretch in the command’s history. In 1993, as a captain, he led a contingent of the Army’s elite Delta Force in the Battle of Mogadishu, a day-long running gun battle famously recounted in Mark Bowden’s book, Black Hawk Down. For his actions during the battle Miller was awarded a Bronze Star with a V (for valor) distinguishing device.Aside from his deployment to Somalia, Miller has combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and has supported ‘contingency’ operations in Bosnia and Latin America, according an official Army bio. His staff assignments include the Deputy Director of Special Operations and he was in charge of all special operations in Afghanistan from June 2013 to June 2014.According to “Relentless Strike,” a book that details JSOC’s history, Miller helmed Delta Force during some of its bloodiest years in Iraq, when the elite unit oriented its operations extensively throughout the restive Anbar province.His other personal awards include the Purple Heart, the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (with a star) and the Expert Infantryman Badge.Wesley Morgan contributed to this reportLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIata cine ii ia locul lui Votel. Dupa parerea mea, e o alegere mai inspirata. US Army ar avea mult de castigat daca ar promova mai frecvent genul asta de oameni.The shadowy JSOC general expected to be next leader of America’s special operations forcesBy Wesley Morgan January 7 It’s a big week in the world of special operations: the Army’s two most senior special operations officers, Gen. Joseph Votel and Lt. Gen. Raymond “Tony” Thomas, are the Pentagon’s new picks to lead two of its most influential four-star headquarters. The moves are not yet official, but they would put Votel and Thomas in charge of U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command respectively, both based in Tampa, Florida.The Washington Post has profiled Votel, who will be leaving the latter command to lead the former. But Thomas, the heir apparent to SOCOM, is a more shadowy figure. Like Votel, he is a veteran of the Army’s elite Ranger light infantry force. He has also held key posts in the top-secret counterterrorism unit popularly known as Delta Force.Since last year, Thomas has headed up SOCOM’s most prestigious component, the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, which oversees terrorist-hunting missions from North Africa to Afghanistan and beyond. As head of SOCOM, Thomas will no longer be directing the day-to-day activities of commandos and drone fleets in the field; the four-star command’s role is to train and administer commando units, not employ them.Asked to describe Thomas’s personality outside the command post, one former subordinate would only say that the JSOC general is “business-oriented” and an avid hockey fan loyal to the Philadelphia Flyers. The red-faced, even-keeled officer is widely known for his candor and, by all accounts, inspires deep loyalty among his subordinates.A 1980 graduate of West Point, Thomas completed a brief stint with a mechanized infantry unit before entering the elite Ranger battalions, where he participated in two combat parachute jumps, into Grenada in 1983 and Panama six years later, before trying out for Delta Force, the Army’s super-secret counterterrorism unit. After commanding a squadron in Delta and leading Delta operators searching for war criminals in the Balkans, he returned to the Rangers as a battalion commander in time to lead the first Ranger contingent to Afghanistan three months after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. He never led an infantry battalion in the conventional Army, usually a prerequisite for Ranger command.“He was the epitome, even as an officer, of what every young Ranger aspired to be,” wrote Nate Self, a soldier who served under Thomas in Afghanistan in early 2002, in his memoir, “a no-frills operator, a former track star with strawberry-blond hair, piercing eyes, complex thoughts, and plain words.” The first thing he did with new officers was take them on a five-mile run and give them assigned reading: “Gates of Fire,” a novel about the famous last stand of 300 Spartan hoplites at Thermopylae, and a chapter written by a Navy SEAL colleague, William McRaven, about the 1970 Son Tay prison raid in North Vietnam.Thomas spent much of the twelve years that followed in and out of Afghanistan and Iraq, serving as a senior JSOC staff officer and deputy commander before doing a stint as the top military liaison at the CIA. Stanley McChrystal, the retired general who was JSOC’s longest-serving commander, waxed poetic in his book “My Share of the Task,” gushing about Thomas’s “amazing vision, unwavering loyalty, and personal courage.”The only year of the war on terror during which Thomas didn’t spend time in Afghanistan was 2008, according to information Army officials shared with the press when he gained his third star last year and took command of JSOC. That was the year Thomas spent overseeing U.S. troops in Iraqi city of Mosul, where he survived a head-on attack on his armored vehicle by a car bomb.“I loved working for him,” said an Army colonel who asked not to be named because he served under Thomas in JSOC units. “When leaders say they provide top cover, some really do it and some pay lip service. Tony Thomas really does it. When I was working for him and I screwed up, what he expected me to do was come clean, tell him what I was doing about it, and he took care of the rest. That was liberating, especially in an Army that often has a zero-defects mentality.”“I think over the years he’s been challenged a bit with some of his peers and superiors because of his candor and bluntness,” the colonel added. McChrystal hints at that too, noting that when the two were captains together in the Rangers in the late 1980s, their “relationship was initially strained.” In a 2008 blog post, former Ranger Andrew Exum, who served under Thomas in Iraq, remarked admiringly on the more senior officer’s “reputation for pissing important people off.”Suggesting his famous candor, Thomas described some of his own frustrations as JSOC’s commander in the war against the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other extremists in a rare interview at West Point last spring. “From a leadership standpoint, if we can’t explain to the nation, to subordinates, to the collective whole what we’re trying to accomplish, then our strategy is by nature ill-defined and harder to achieve,” the general told an interviewer from the military academy’s Combating Terrorism Center – a surprisingly harsh assessment from a serving commander, let alone the one at the helm of the shadow war.“I’m told ‘no’ more than ‘go’ on a magnitude of about ten to one on a daily basis,” Thomas continued, apparently referring to missions for which JSOC sought but did not receive Pentagon approval. “I have to regulate my own frustration there to make sure it doesn’t trickle down to the force.”"An Army that continues to promote this man is an Army that will win wars,” predicted former Ranger Exum, who is now deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy, in his 2008 blog post. Thomas does not think the United States is beating various terrorist and insurgent foes today, however, he made clear in the West Point interview.“We’re losing across the board,” he told the interviewer evenly, citing the Afghanistan-Pakistan, “ironically,” as one relatively bright spot. “But across the board we’re not winning.”Thomas’s striking assessment—that the U.S. military is losing its wars at the same time that it is relying on special operations forces more than ever before—buttresses the argument that the commandos are a band-aid, used to patch over long-term problems with temporary fixes. This may be especially true with the “direct action” raid forces of JSOC, which draw more resources and more acclaim than Green Berets and other less classified special operators who specialize in training foreign armies.But Thomas’s promotion, if confirmed, would appear to affirm the primacy not only of special operations within the military, but of JSOC’s hunter-killer units within the bigger special operations community. That trend began under the George W. Bush administration — it was who Bush famously told the Washington Post’s Bob Woodward, “JSOC is awesome” — and has only intensified during the Obama years.Thomas would be the third former JSOC commander in a row to head up SOCOM; a career Green Beret has never held the post, even though Green Berets account for by the far the plurality of SOCOM’s special operators and are seeing increased use from Africa to Afghanistan as the military tries to shape the war efforts of allied militaries and irregular forces.“Even more than other guys who’ve made the JSOC-to-SOCOM leap like Votel, Thomas has spent a disproportionate amount of his career in JSOC units,” explained Sean Naylor, a journalist whose recent book “Relentless Strike” chronicles the hunter-killer command’s rise. “If confirmed, it underlines how much senior leaders identify with the direct action side of special operations, as much lip service as they may pay to the indirect approach guys,” like Green Berets. “No president has relied on JSOC as heavily as Obama has.”LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00apkahBoribum wrote ... Nu, ala e un film artistic. L-ai luat drept documentar ? ..da...am gresit? Ca si antrenamentele de airsoft le-am facut conform dupa el...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MeseDa. era d.t. istorie. Eu fost cel puţin 2 sec în care ar fi putut trage. cu o h.g. mica ar fi tras cel puţin 10 cartuse şi atunci era pa...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNu va suna cunoscut? Seamana cu ce spuneam, parca:"gender-neutral fitness tests", mai bine zis Lowering standards. Sublinierile imi apartin. Sper doar sa nu fi inteles eu bine. Trainers Hope for Revisions to Army Fitness Test Stars and Stripes | Feb 24, 2016 | by Seth RobsonCAMP ZAMA, Japan -- Strength, power and agility drills will be part of revised Army physical fitness tests if the service's top trainers get their way.New job-specific, gender-neutral fitness tests could be "good to go by June," acting Army Secretary Patrick Murphy told the Army Times this month, although the Defense Department must approve the changes.Soldiers must take the test yearly and score at least 60 points out of a possible 100 in each component. Test scores, which take age and gender into account, are awarded based on run times and sit-up and push-up repetitions. Test failures can result in a soldier being discharged from the Army for unsatisfactory performance. Scores can also affect a soldier's promotion chances.Sgt. 1st Class Jacob Barner, 35, one of four master fitness trainers from Fort Jackson, S.C., came to Japan this month to share his training skills with soldiers here. He said that while endurance is only one component of physical fitness, it is the main focus of the Army Physical Fitness Test, which rates troops based on two-mile run times and the number of sit-ups and push-ups they can complete in two minutes."Soldiers train for [the test] but don't train for other factors that would help in combat," said Barner, an Erie, Pa., native who deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan as an aircraft mechanic before becoming a fitness trainer."In combat, you need strength because you are wearing a full combat load and possibly a rucksack," he said. "Clearing a room, you might have to get up and down. In a firefight, you might need to sprint. You need a lot of core strength, but you aren't running five miles."A better test would look at a soldier's power, strength, anaerobic endurance and agility, Barner said."A lot of people want [a new test] to happen," he said.If and when change comes, the master fitness trainers plan to be ready.At Camp Zama, headquarters of U.S. Army Japan, Barner and his team conducted a two-week course, training three dozen soldiers to become master fitness trainers who will be responsible for mentoring their units and advising commanders on physical fitness issues.The trainers showed the Zama soldiers how to run assessments that are very different from the Army Physical Fitness Test."We look at soldiers' 10-rep maxes for bench, squats and deadlift to test strength," Barner said. "We also make them do the broad jump to test power, and we have a 'T-test' where soldiers run forward, backward and side to side between cones to test agility."They also test soldiers' anaerobic endurance by having them run two 300-yard sprints five minutes apart and calculate their average time. The troops also climb a 30-foot rope -- something that every soldier should be able to do in combat, Barner said."Most soldiers can do these activities, but not many are maxing them out," he said. "People who get 300 points on the Army Physical Fitness Test only score average on our test."Strength, power and agility are the sort of things master fitness trainers already incorporate in programs they design to get soldiers in shape for combat tasks, Barner said."It's geared toward getting soldiers to their peak fitness right before deployment," he said.The Zama troops taking the master fitness trainer course this month performed well on the Army Physical Fitness Test. A typical master fitness trainer can run two miles in 15 minutes, complete 60 sit-ups in two minutes and a similar number of push-ups in the same time, although female soldiers get a little more leeway on the push-ups, Barner said.Sgt. Andrew Dixon, a Zama soldier from Brooklyn, N.Y., looked like he had pushed himself to his limit during a timed two-lap swim in the base pool last Wednesday."I'm not a keen swimmer," he said after emerging from the water exhausted. "I was trying for a good time and didn't use proper form."Dixon, who installs communications gear for U.S. Army Japan, will head up physical training for a handful of other soldiers in his unit now that he's a master fitness trainer. He said he appreciates the new tools he picked up during the course."Plenty of soldiers are focused on getting their physical training out of the way in the morning rather than trying to improve," he said. "If they understand how they can progress by doing things properly, they will be more interested."Another Zama soldier, Capt. Elizabeth Marlin, 31, of North Little Rock, Ark., said she will help oversee physical training for a dozen soldiers, both enlisted and officers, in the U.S. Army Japan intelligence section.Marlin said she supports a move away from the focus on endurance in physical training."It's not just run, run, run like the old Army, which is why a lot of our senior soldiers are hurt," she said.Marlin also supports a common standard for male and female soldiers but doesn't think there's too much wrong with the Army Physical Fitness Test as it stands."If you can max your run you will do pretty well at other events, but if you can only lift weights and not run, that's going to be a problem," she said.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusTot din experienţa nord-ameriană, ceva despre leadership. Stanley McChrystal - Listen, Learn ... Then Lead Four-star general Stanley McChrystal shares what he learned about leadership over his decades in the military. How can you build a sense of shared purpose among people of many ages and skill sets? By listening and learning — and addressing the possibility of failure.00:11 Ten years ago, on a Tuesday morning, I conducted a parachute jump at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It was a routine training jump, like many more I'd done since I became a paratrooper 27 years before. We went down to the airfield early because this is the Army and you always go early. You do some routine refresher training, and then you go to put on your parachute and a buddy helps you. And you put on the T-10 parachute. And you're very careful how you put the straps, particularly the leg straps because they go between your legs. And then you put on your reserve, and then you put on your heavy rucksack. And then a jumpmaster comes, and he's an experienced NCO in parachute operations. He checks you out, he grabs your adjusting straps and he tightens everything so that your chest is crushed, your shoulders are crushed down, and, of course, he's tightened so your voice goes up a couple octaves as well. Then you sit down, and you wait a little while, because this is the Army. Then you load the aircraft, and then you stand up and you get on, and you kind of lumber to the aircraft like this, in a line of people, and you sit down on canvas seats on either side of the aircraft. And you wait a little bit longer, because this is the Air Force teaching the Army how to wait. 01:22 Then you take off. And it's painful enough now -- and I think it's designed this way -- it's painful enough so you want to jump. You didn't really want to jump, but you want out. So you get in the aircraft, you're flying along, and at 20 minutes out, these jumpmasters start giving you commands. They give 20 minutes -- that's a time warning. You sit there, OK. Then they give you 10 minutes. And of course, you're responding with all of these. And that's to boost everybody's confidence, to show that you're not scared. Then they give you, "Get ready." Then they go, "Outboard personnel, stand up." If you're an outboard personnel, now you stand up. If you're an inboard personnel, stand up. And then you hook up, and you hook up your static line. And at that point, you think, "Hey, guess what? I'm probably going to jump. There's no way to get out of this at this point." You go through some additional checks, and then they open the door. 02:10 And this was that Tuesday morning in September, and it was pretty nice outside. So nice air comes flowing in. The jumpmasters start to check the door. And then when it's time to go, a green light goes and the jumpmaster goes, "Go." The first guy goes, and you're just in line, and you just kind of lumber to the door. Jump is a misnomer; you fall. You fall outside the door, you're caught in the slipstream. The first thing you do is lock into a tight body position -- head down in your chest, your arms extended, put over your reserve parachute. You do that because, 27 years before, an airborne sergeant had taught me to do that. I have no idea whether it makes any difference, but he seemed to make sense, and I wasn't going to test the hypothesis that he'd be wrong. And then you wait for the opening shock for your parachute to open. If you don't get an opening shock, you don't get a parachute -- you've got a whole new problem set. But typically you do; typically it opens. And of course, if your leg straps aren't set right, at that point you get another little thrill. Boom. 03:15 So then you look around, you're under a canopy and you say, "This is good." Now you prepare for the inevitable. You are going to hit the ground. You can't delay that much. And you really can't decide where you hit very much, because they pretend you can steer, but you're being delivered. So you look around, where you're going to land, you try to make yourself ready. And then as you get close, you lower your rucksack below you on a lowering line, so that it's not on you when you land, and you prepare to do a parachute-landing fall. Now the Army teaches you to do five points of performance -- the toes of your feet, your calves, your thighs, your buttocks and your push-up muscles. It's this elegant little land, twist and roll. And that's not going to hurt. In 30-some years of jumping, I never did one. (Laughter) I always landed like a watermelon out of a third floor window. 04:07 (Laughter) 04:09 And as soon as I hit, the first thing I did is I'd see if I'd broken anything that I needed. I'd shake my head, and I'd ask myself the eternal question: "Why didn't I go into banking?" (Laughter) And I'd look around, and then I'd see another paratrooper, a young guy or girl, and they'd have pulled out their M4 carbine and they'd be picking up their equipment. They'd be doing everything that we had taught them. And I realized that, if they had to go into combat, they would do what we had taught them and they would follow leaders. And I realized that, if they came out of combat, it would be because we led them well. And I was hooked again on the importance of what I did. 04:55 So now I do that Tuesday morning jump, but it's not any jump -- that was September 11th, 2001. And when we took off from the airfield, America was at peace. When we landed on the drop-zone, everything had changed. And what we thought about the possibility of those young soldiers going into combat as being theoretical was now very, very real -- and leadership seemed important. But things had changed; I was a 46-year-old brigadier general. I'd been successful, but things changed so much that I was going to have to make some significant changes, and on that morning, I didn't know it. 05:34 I was raised with traditional stories of leadership: Robert E. Lee, John Buford at Gettysburg. And I also was raised with personal examples of leadership. This was my father in Vietnam. And I was raised to believe that soldiers were strong and wise and brave and faithful; they didn't lie, cheat, steal or abandon their comrades. And I still believe real leaders are like that. But in my first 25 years of career, I had a bunch of different experiences. 06:10 One of my first battalion commanders, I worked in his battalion for 18 months and the only conversation he ever had with Lt. McChrystal was at mile 18 of a 25-mile road march, and he chewed my ass for about 40 seconds. And I'm not sure that was real interaction. But then a couple of years later, when I was a company commander, I went out to the National Training Center. And we did an operation, and my company did a dawn attack -- you know, the classic dawn attack: you prepare all night, move to the line of departure. And I had an armored organization at that point. We move forward, and we get wiped out -- I mean, wiped out immediately. The enemy didn't break a sweat doing it. And after the battle, they bring this mobile theater and they do what they call an "after action review" to teach you what you've done wrong. Sort of leadership by humiliation. They put a big screen up, and they take you through everything: "and then you didn't do this, and you didn't do this, etc." I walked out feeling as low as a snake's belly in a wagon rut. And I saw my battalion commander, because I had let him down. And I went up to apologize to him, and he said, "Stanley, I thought you did great." And in one sentence, he lifted me, put me back on my feet, and taught me that leaders can let you fail and yet not let you be a failure. 07:27 When 9/11 came, 46-year-old Brig. Gen. McChrystal sees a whole new world. First, the things that are obvious, that you're familiar with: the environment changed -- the speed, the scrutiny, the sensitivity of everything now is so fast, sometimes it evolves faster than people have time to really reflect on it. But everything we do is in a different context. More importantly, the force that I led was spread over more than 20 countries. And instead of being able to get all the key leaders for a decision together in a single room and look them in the eye and build their confidence and get trust from them, I'm now leading a force that's dispersed, and I've got to use other techniques. I've got to use video teleconferences, I've got to use chat, I've got to use email, I've got to use phone calls -- I've got to use everything I can, not just for communication, but for leadership. A 22-year-old individual operating alone, thousands of miles from me, has got to communicate to me with confidence. I have to have trust in them and vice versa. And I also have to build their faith. And that's a new kind of leadership for me. 08:41 We had one operation where we had to coordinate it from multiple locations. An emerging opportunity came -- didn't have time to get everybody together. So we had to get complex intelligence together, we had to line up the ability to act. It was sensitive, we had to go up the chain of command, convince them that this was the right thing to do and do all of this on electronic medium. We failed. The mission didn't work. And so now what we had to do is I had to reach out to try to rebuild the trust of that force, rebuild their confidence -- me and them, and them and me, and our seniors and us as a force -- all without the ability to put a hand on a shoulder. Entirely new requirement. 09:30 Also, the people had changed. You probably think that the force that I led was all steely-eyed commandos with big knuckle fists carrying exotic weapons. In reality, much of the force I led looked exactly like you. It was men, women, young, old -- not just from military; from different organizations, many of them detailed to us just from a handshake. And so instead of giving orders, you're now building consensus and you're building a sense of shared purpose. Probably the biggest change was understanding that the generational difference, the ages, had changed so much. I went down to be with a Ranger platoon on an operation in Afghanistan, and on that operation, a sergeant in the platoon had lost about half his arm throwing a Taliban hand grenade back at the enemy after it had landed in his fire team. We talked about the operation, and then at the end I did what I often do with a force like that. I asked, "Where were you on 9/11?" And one young Ranger in the back -- his hair's tousled and his face is red and windblown from being in combat in the cold Afghan wind -- he said, "Sir, I was in the sixth grade." And it reminded me that we're operating a force that must have shared purpose and shared consciousness, and yet he has different experiences, in many cases a different vocabulary, a completely different skill set in terms of digital media than I do and many of the other senior leaders. And yet, we need to have that shared sense. 11:21 It also produced something which I call an inversion of expertise, because we had so many changes at the lower levels in technology and tactics and whatnot, that suddenly the things that we grew up doing wasn't what the force was doing anymore. So how does a leader stay credible and legitimate when they haven't done what the people you're leading are doing? And it's a brand new leadership challenge. And it forced me to become a lot more transparent, a lot more willing to listen, a lot more willing to be reverse-mentored from lower. And yet, again, you're not all in one room. Then another thing. There's an effect on you and on your leaders. There's an impact, it's cumulative. You don't reset, or recharge your battery every time. 12:12 I stood in front of a screen one night in Iraq with one of my senior officers and we watched a firefight from one of our forces. And I remembered his son was in our force. And I said, "John, where's your son? And how is he?" And he said, "Sir, he's fine. Thanks for asking." I said, "Where is he now?" And he pointed at the screen, he said, "He's in that firefight." Think about watching your brother, father, daughter, son, wife in a firefight in real time and you can't do anything about it. Think about knowing that over time. And it's a new cumulative pressure on leaders. 12:45 And you have to watch and take care of each other. I probably learned the most about relationships. I learned they are the sinew which hold the force together. I grew up much of my career in the Ranger regiment. And every morning in the Ranger regiment, every Ranger -- and there are more than 2,000 of them -- says a six-stanza Ranger creed. You may know one line of it, it says, "I'll never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy." And it's not a mindless mantra, and it's not a poem. It's a promise. Every Ranger promises every other Ranger, "No matter what happens, no matter what it costs me, if you need me, I'm coming." And every Ranger gets that same promise from every other Ranger. Think about it. It's extraordinarily powerful. It's probably more powerful than marriage vows. And they've lived up to it, which gives it special power. And so the organizational relationship that bonds them is just amazing. 13:48 And I learned personal relationships were more important than ever. We were in a difficult operation in Afghanistan in 2007, and an old friend of mine, that I had spent many years at various points of my career with -- godfather to one of their kids -- he sent me a note, just in an envelope, that had a quote from Sherman to Grant that said, "I knew if I ever got in a tight spot, that you would come, if alive." And having that kind of relationship, for me, turned out to be critical at many points in my career. 14:21 And I learned that you have to give that in this environment, because it's tough. That was my journey. I hope it's not over. I came to believe that a leader isn't good because they're right; they're good because they're willing to learn and to trust. This isn't easy stuff. It's not like that electronic abs machine where, 15 minutes a month, you get washboard abs. (Laughter) And it isn't always fair. You can get knocked down, and it hurts and it leaves scars. But if you're a leader, the people you've counted on will help you up. And if you're a leader, the people who count on you need you on your feet. 15:14 Thank you. 15:16 (Applause) LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuExtraordinara reactia comandantului de batalion dupa esecul tanarului comandant de companie de atunci, capitanul Stanley McChrystal, in exercitiul de la Fort Irwin (National Training Center)! Niciun tanar ofiter, aflat la inceput de cariera, nu e vreun Napoleon, chiar daca unii au nebunia sa se considere astfel. Diferenta dintre comandantul inept si viitorul lider este ca al doilea stie sa invete din lectia umilintei, ca accepta ca poate gresi, ca are de invatat si se lasa modelat. Nimeni nu e infailibil. S-a ajuns uneori, in al doilea razboi mondilal ca unii comandanti care au fost schimbati din functie sa se dovedeasca mai tarziu lideri neintrecuti. O greseala nu te condamna la ratare. Trebuie sa existe, insa, cineva in ierarhie care sa stie sa valorifice un asemenea om, sa intrevada momentul cand cel care a suferit un esec este pe deplin capabil sa faca fata unei situatii mai complexe cu succes.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00djebelBoribum wrote ... Foarte bun Trump asta, are un discurs care scoate tot ce-i mai bun din om . O fi bun si la exorcizari?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisLINK Cum vi se pare miscarea baietilor din SS? Oricum,se vede destul de clar ca prevenirea e baza.Daca idiotul ala ar fi putut patrunde cu o arma,nu era timp fizic pt a impiedica atacul asupra obiectivului.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumFoarte bun Trump asta, are un discurs care scoate tot ce-i mai bun din om . Aia care-l pazesc nu par foarte convinsi ca obiectivul lor nu merita niste suturi în fundRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumLa îndraciri (!!!) este,asta e sigur. Toti nebunii, heil cu Trump : LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisE nitel,off-topic,dar intre aia ce i se opun sunt cei de agita steagul negru al califatului si steagul rosu,cu secera si ciocan.Trump nu exista fara aia. Cand vezi steagul rosu,auzi de alde Trotki,Mao,Che,din principiu nu pot fi decat contra.Fata de diavol,orice altceva nu poate fi rau.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00apkahMihais wrote ... LINK Cum vi se pare miscarea baietilor din SS? Oricum,se vede destul de clar ca prevenirea e baza.Daca idiotul ala ar fi putut patrunde cu o arma,nu era timp fizic pt a impiedica atacul asupra obiectivului.Oricine care nu a facut asa ceva in viata lui, poate da verdicte(nu ma refer la Mihais,ci o spun in general).Dar,din pacate nu e ca in filme.Shit happens...Si garzile alea sunt oameni...Si ei pot fi surprinsi.Rutina,plictiseala...lipsa pregatirii..toate converg in punctul in care se poate ajunge la pierderea VIP-ului.Zic si eu...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisCa sa nu fiu gresit inteles,nu criticam echipa de paza si protectie. Imi aminteam un mare om,mare caracter:''cand ai ajuns la asa ceva,cam ai probleme''.Nu-i exact citatul,dar cam asta era intelesul.Nu era ideea mea,doar am vazut confirmarea in clipul respectiv. Daca ar fi ceva bun e tocmai ca masurile de prevenire au dat rezultat.Berbecu' ala nu a avut cu ce sa atace VIP-ul.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumMihais wrote ... E nitel,off-topic,dar intre aia ce i se opun sunt cei de agita steagul negru al califatului si steagul rosu,cu secera si ciocan.Trump nu exista fara aia. Cand vezi steagul rosu,auzi de alde Trotki,Mao,Che,din principiu nu pot fi decat contra.Fata de diavol,orice altceva nu poate fi rau. Adica H. Clinton sau B. Sanders sunt niste comunisti, eventual islamisti ? Si Obama e facut comunist, e drept. Trumpi, Vadimi,Funari, Jirinovski,Georg Haideri sau LePeni si toata cohorta europeana de Zori Azurii sau Noi Drepte si alte asemenea formatiuni "patriotice" au existat si vor exista cât va exista omenirea. Daca la unii mai mici si nevolnici nu e mare problema daca îsi aleg un sef idiot, la altii , al caror cuvânt si fapta pe scena internationala pot schimba radical cursul istoriei, este. (Un Trump primar la Tecuci, merge, macar o vreme.La Casa Alba -aia din Washington, nu de la Baneasa- nu). De fapt, sunt si alegerile astea U.S tot o experienta nord-americanaRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumMihais wrote ...Berbecu' ala nu a avut cu ce sa atace VIP-ul. Berbecul respectiv pare sa astepte start-ul dat de cel care filma, sau al unei persoane din axa camerei care filmeaza. O fi vrut sa se dea în spectacol, cam ca omul ala care i-a aruncat un pantof lui Bush (banuiesc ca Bush în Irak era protejat relativ bine ) . Daca cineva vrea sa omoare pe altcineva si pentru asta e dispus sa-si dea viata, e cvasi-imposibil de oprit. Conditia necesara e sa fie dispus sa moara pentru a-si îndeplini "misiunea". Remember Lucchesi's deathRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00apkahSi eu cred ca daca ala era hotarat sa moara,murea si Trump. Tipiul in schimb e un pacalici care s-a dat in spectacol...e un francez-nu imi amintesc acum numele ...Remy nustiucum- care face asemenea faze ca sa se filmeze...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisBoribum wrote ...Mihais wrote ...Berbecu' ala nu a avut cu ce sa atace VIP-ul. Berbecul respectiv pare sa astepte start-ul dat de cel care filma, sau al unei persoane din axa camerei care filmeaza. O fi vrut sa se dea în spectacol, cam ca omul ala care i-a aruncat un pantof lui Bush (banuiesc ca Bush în Irak era protejat relativ bine ) . Daca cineva vrea sa omoare pe altcineva si pentru asta e dispus sa-si dea viata, e cvasi-imposibil de oprit. Conditia necesara e sa fie dispus sa moara pentru a-si îndeplini "misiunea". Remember Lucchesi's death Practic mitingul era filmat din orice pozitie.Pe langa camere,zeci sau sute filmau cu telefonul. Ca e greu de oprit un kamikaze e alta discutie.Si e foarte posibil sa avem atentate serioase la viata lui Trump.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumVorbeam despre filmul pus de tine, nu am cautat altele cu toate ca e foarte posibil sa fie o multime de alte filmari. Totusi, chiar si în patria armelor pentru oricine, nu cred ca se poate merge la un miting d-asta înarmat. Din ce am citi/vazut despre mitingurile lui Trump, iese cu îmbrânceli si batai cam de fiecare data. Nu e de mirare,daca ascultam cam ce zice nenea ala. @Remy Gaillard LINK Ca experienta nord-americana (putin probabila si de nesperat) : cum ar fi sa iasa Trump presedinte si sa zica ca pe lânga mexicani,musulmani, arabi si cam 3/4 din mapamondul care îl deranjeaza, ar fi bine ca U.S sa nu se mai certe cu Rusia (tipul îl apreciaza pe Putin, zice-se) si ca sa aiba un motiv de disputa mai putin, sa lase Europa de Est pe mâna rusilor ? Hm ?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumEu unul vad din ce în ce mai greu "stânga" sau "deapta" ca idei politice distincte. Ideile bune (bune pentru oameni, si binele e bine sau nu e, oricât am glosa pe tema asta) ideile bune sunt din ce în ce mai rare, stânga si dreapta permuteaza functie de interesele de moment si amândoua au liberalismul tembel drept numitor comun iar coerenta ideilor politice e cam ioc. Pe de alta parte, sper sa apuc ziua când comunismul va fi condamnat ca ideologie criminala. Tot à posteriori, cum a fost condamnat si nazismul, ca argumentele sunt gârla. Dupa ce o sa ne punem de acord ca ambele idei sunt criminale (fapt demonstrat experimental) si ca nu exista alegere între extreme, atunci poate ca o sa ne revenim un pic la cap. Noi toti, oamenii, zic. Eu cred ca Trump face bani cu campania asta, mai ales ca stie si el ca presedinte nu prea are sanse sa fie ales.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisBoribum wrote ...Mihais wrote ... E nitel,off-topic,dar intre aia ce i se opun sunt cei de agita steagul negru al califatului si steagul rosu,cu secera si ciocan.Trump nu exista fara aia. Cand vezi steagul rosu,auzi de alde Trotki,Mao,Che,din principiu nu pot fi decat contra.Fata de diavol,orice altceva nu poate fi rau. Adica H. Clinton sau B. Sanders sunt niste comunisti, eventual islamisti ? Si Obama e facut comunist, e drept. Trumpi, Vadimi,Funari, Jirinovski,Georg Haideri sau LePeni si toata cohorta europeana de Zori Azurii sau Noi Drepte si alte asemenea formatiuni "patriotice" au existat si vor exista cât va exista omenirea. Daca la unii mai mici si nevolnici nu e mare problema daca îsi aleg un sef idiot, la altii , al caror cuvânt si fapta pe scena internationala pot schimba radical cursul istoriei, este. (Un Trump primar la Tecuci, merge, macar o vreme.La Casa Alba -aia din Washington, nu de la Baneasa- nu). De fapt, sunt si alegerile astea U.S tot o experienta nord-americana E fascinanta o chestie.Un nene care a fost membru in KKK acum 40 de ani[intre timp s-a retras] a zis ca e de acord cu unele pozitii ale lui Trump.Domnul respectiv a fost destul de nuantat in argumente.Toata presa la frecat pe Trump la ridiche saptamani la rand pe chestia asta.Ca ce chestie accepta el sustinerea rasistului nenorocit... In acelasi timp,agitatorii de steaguri rosii si altii aceasi teapa isca violente organizate la mitingurile lui Trump.Nu doar ca nimeni nu-i intreaba de sanatate pe Bernie si pe Hillary,dar toti dau vina pe Trump.Desigur,cand mitingul cu pricina e anulat pt a nu da ocazia unor incidente si mai violente,Trump e de vina pt ca-i fricos. Obama si ailalti democrati nu-s comunisti de moda veche.Ca stanga moderna are pozitii comune cu unele idei din manifestul comunist[unele nerealizate de tovaraseii stiuti de noi] e alta discutie.Io doar am zis ca nu vad nici un motiv de amicitie cu unii care au adepti ai lui Mao si Che prin preajma.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumViziunile personale sunt diferite,cert, dar situatiile sunt si ele diferite ce e valabil pentru US nu e pentru ROU , FR sau D. Personal sunt pentru ce e bun pentru tara respectiva, si ce functioneaza într-o parte nu e valabil în alta. De exemplu, nu cred ca monarhia reinstaurata în FR în anii '80 ar fi rezolvat ceva, dar sunt convins ca monarhia reinstaurata în ROU în 1990 ar fi cernut rahatul din societatea româneasca. Sunt oportunist, utilitarist sau pacifist ? Nu stiu nici eu, cred ca sunt doar democrat dar sunt convins ca nu legea junglei e ce ne trebuie, chiar daca la un moment dat am sfârsi toti de aceeasi parte.La dreapta ori la stânga toti, am sfârsi prin a ne da în cap la un moment dat caci baza gândirilor astea e dusmanul : comunistul care vrea egalitate între oameni, iarba, vaci si boi, pentru extrema dreapta, si supravietuirea posibila numai pentru excelenti si (de multe ori) puri -în toate felurile- ale extremei drepte. Ceea ce vad e ca oamenii politici sunt primo oameni si secundo politicieni. Iar societatile (americana, româna, franceza,etc.) au nevoie de directii, de valori, de cap magnetic. Fara a fi american si fara a fi practicat vreodata SUA (nu am trait niciodata acolo) nu cred ca un Trump ar fi capabil sa imprime tarii aleia o directie buna. Daca era vorba de Andora, Romania, Trinidad Tobago ori Albania, puteau sa aleaga pe oricine. U.S însa (tara care stranuta azi si a doua zi mapamondul întreg merge la doctor) are o responsabilitate mondiala care nu poate fi neglijata. Trump e bun -poate- pentru vacarul din Montana sau veteranul din Irak ori politistul texan, dar cert va fi rau pentru românul din Sinaia, francezul din Poitiers ori italianul din Florenta. Pe termen lung, în mod sigur. Sa fim optimisti : ce bine ca suntem români ! Putem alege cam pe oricine, nu se schimbaa fata lumii din atâta lucru. N-avem nici putere economica, nici arma nucleara, putem face spumeRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisStii ce-i tare?E diviziunea asta la nivelul intregii lumi vestice.Din state pana la noi vezi treaba asta.Toti,dar toti,sunt de acord ca sistemele de guvernamant is o apa si-un pamant.''Niste hoti corupti,domne''.Toti is de acord ca nu mai e competenta.Si apoi vii tu si spui ''niste liberali tembeli,dom'le''.Io vin si spun ''niste socialisti ce de la Che se trag''. Si nu putem cadea de acord. Asta nu-i o chestie personala.Doar ca ce prapastie se largeste intre viziuni personale e cam tot aia ce imparte societatea. Ziceai de Trump si scandal.Am cascat ochii la alegerile americane cam din 2000 incoa' .De la un ciclu electoral la altul,radicalismul s-a amplificat.Nu e vreo persoana care sa fie vinovata direct de asta.Candidatii nu-s decat oglinda electoratului. Trump e unicat.Are cele mai mari multimi.Si le are cu siguranta pe cele mai inflacarate.Is aceea clasa de mijloc,care a luat-o peste bot de la toti.Coincidenta dracului face sa fie albi.De la ailalti avem lupta de clasa,tipica marxismului,cu toti proletarii ce vor sa-i combata pe chiaburii lui Trump.Avem lupta de rasa,pt ca mai toti coloratii voteaza pe criterii tribale cu democratii.Avem lupta intre culturi,pt ca ce e tipic si definitoriu pt un american se cam regaseste in tabara lui Trump.Nu in a celorlalti republicani si nu in a ''noului om''. Strict legat de mitinguri,tinand cont de patimi,bataile nu exista.Daca e ceva remarcabil e sa vezi 25000 de oameni cum se abtin sa nu le arda o mama de bataie unor provocatori.Daca e violenta fizica,e initiata de gasca adversa.De cateva luni,cu zeci de mitiguri ce strang jdemii de oameni e un singur incident in care un trumpist i-a dat un pumn in freza unui cocalar de asta.Puii mei,la un concert rock is mai multe batai decat la zeci de mitinguri ale ''barbarilor'' de americani.Si aia is toti cu arma in masina.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumPoate nu am fost limpede ori m-am pierdut în fraze alambicate : nu cred ca Trump e bun, nici pentru restul lumii, nici pentru U.S Nu e vorba despre ce avem noi în ROU. Ca sunt 10 Marines zapaciti la M.K cu statut protejat (ca orice soldat US abroad,nu ?)ori 10 divizii gata de lupta, faptul ca oamenii respectivi fac pipi la baza copacilor din ROU înseamna ca e teritoriul lor (de putere mondiala care este) si cine vrea sa faca si el pipi în acelasi loc risca un sut în fund. Daca primesc ordin de repliere, atunci devenim teren viran (cu toate miliardele noastre pe care am fi putut sa le investim în aparare -dar nu am facut-o- sau alea câteva F-16 cu care o sa facem poezie pe bloguri cu eroi si asfintituri frumoase peste câmpii,ca de altceva oricum nu ajung). Nu are România nici marina militara, nici armata, nici aviatie, nici oameni politici seriosi si nici bani. Fix un geambas prost fardat la cârma partii bune a lumii ne lipseste !Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisDaa,multi cred ca nu ar putea sa imprime o directie buna.Dar hai sa vedem ce s-a intamplat.Am ajuns intr-un punct in care societatile sunt divizate.Apropos,nu am zis ca sunt problema identice peste tot.Dar similare sunt in buna parte.Deci,ce avem pana acum a creat o diviziune de nu ne mai intelegem.Daca continuam cu aceleasi politici nu avem cum obtine rezultate diferite ci doar o si mai mare radicalizare. E oarecare contradictie in ce spui.Ori e bun Trump pt americani,ori nu e capabil sa imprime tarii o directie buna.Pana una alta vrea sa fie presedinte la amerikanski,nu la noi.Iar noi avem ca misiune sa cascam ochii la ce se intampla in lume,sa nu ne prinda evenimentele nestiutori si saraci cu duhul. In al doilea rand,in clubul ala de-i zice NATO e cica scris cum trebe 2% buget al apararii.Mai toti au ignorat cu succes aceea prevedere.Cum io is pe principiul stravechi ''prin noi insine'',adaptat la situatia de acum ''pe cat de mult posibil'',nu e neaparat rau sa ne intarim noi.De aveam macar 5-6 miliarde investite in aparare in ultimii 12 ani,stateam asa relaxati... Iar cu americanii care pleaca,de ce ar pleca?Ce au la noi de-i asa fantastic?Cateva baterii de rachete si un batalion?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisCum ar zice unii amigos te-ai tai,o revolutie nu este posibila fara o situatie revolutionara.Nu Trump ca persoana este relevant.Ci cauzele care l-au propulsat. Politica americana fata de noi nu se schimba in absenta unui soc major.Gen un razboi in Asia. Trump ca persoana e un tip complex.Ca mare parte din ce face e teatru,provocare si inscenare nu e prea important decat pt a arata ca tipul intelege arta de a conduce oameni.Ceea ce in pozitia lui este o calitate. Trendurile americane ma intereseaza din 3 motive:1.is un tip curios 2.in functie de trendurile din SUA se misca in parte economia mondiala.Legatura dintre ce se petrece prin state si badea Gheo de la Cucuieti este ca unii din badiile Gheo vand sau cumpara cu 6 luni in avans doar cascand bine ochii la americani.3.In functiile de zisele trenduri se misca si strategia noastra de securitate.Aici,din experienta trebe spus,strategii cu n-spe doctorate nu manifesta atat intelepciune precum unii Gheo de la cucuieti. Amu,de ceva decenii incoace se pune presiune dintr-o parte a societatii pe alta,sub toate formele,mai subtil sau mai brutal.Chestie ce in timp genereaza starea revolutionara de care ziceam.Si nu-i o observatie de ieri de azi ci un trend confirmat dupa ani la rand de chiombit la ce se intampla prin lume.As vrea sa iasa Trump pt ca sa nu avem peste 10 ani turbulente si insurgente in State.Ca el pe persoana fizica face actorie e ceva ce pt mine e irelevant.Dupa cum irelevant e ca Putin face sport sau Base a condus pilit.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumUnii spun ca Trump e posibil din cauza lui Obama, iar Obama a fost posibil din cauza lui G.W Bush. Personal sunt înclinat sa cred Trump ar fi posibil din cauza lui G.W Bush : aceeasi linie directoare, acelasi stil, aceleasi probleme. Îndraznesc sa întervad aceleasi rezultate spectaculare, în eventualitatea unei învestituri la Casa Alba. E posibil ca Gheo sa aiba o viziune mai "sanatoasa" asupra lumii decât cine stie ce doctori într-ale strategiei (nu vorbesc de doctorii nostri, cu aia stim cum sta treaba). Dar Gheo nu e degeaba doar Gheo, si ma gândesc ca e posibil ca domnul respectiv sa aiba niste mari lacune în formatia-i (sanatoasa, dealtfel) si o lipsa de informatie (neimputabila lui, à priori). Lacune în prezenta carora sa nu poata "manageria" lumea asa cum îsi managerizeaza ograda. N-am fost niciodata presedintele unei tari si nici nu voi fi, dar am avut ocazia sa vad situatii si organizatii diverse (marunte, nimic grandios) de la ambele capete. De jos în sus, am stiut întotdeauna ce ar trebui facut pentru ca lucrurile sa mearga bine, mai bine. De sus în jos, constrângerile, impunerile si obligatiile (invizibile si imposibil de închipuit de jos) schimbau mult paradigma. Nu, nu l-as pune pe Gheo sa conduca lumea.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumPromit sa continuam discutia, dar nu azi (sunt triplu K.O, fizic, fizic si iar fizic ) . Totusi, o remarca legata de ultimul tau paragraf, cu bolsevismul (care ar pândi America. Am ceva retineri în privinta asta). Bolsevicii si-au spus asa, bolsevici, prin antagonie cu mensevicii. Bolsevicii, adica cei multi, majoritatea. Mensevicii, adica cei putini, minoritatea. În realtitate era exact pe dos, bolsevicii erau cei putini (iar revolutia lor, o lovitura de stat, in fapt). Nu te impacienta, bolsevicii sunt în continuare putini Asa au fost, asa sunt si asa vor ramâne.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisNu-i nevoie de condus.Legat de informatii,din ce am bantuit si io pa lumea asta,informatiile cam tot alea sunt.Exceptie facand ce vine pe din surse confidentiale,dar si alea nu schimba radical imaginea. Aia unii dupa mine sunt o parte a problemei.Pt ca presupun ca domnii cu pricina sunt platiti sa utilizeze chestia dintre urechi.Chestiunea la imperialisti de piste balta are deja vechime vreo 50 ani.E un proces gradual de erodare a unei parti din societate in defavoarea alteia. Faptul ca republicanii au luat drept etern si neconditionat sprijimul unei mari parti a societatii americane,desi semnale s-au tot transmis,mai subtil sau mai vehement.E inca o dovada in sustinerea ideii ca pe undeva pe sus ''impunerile si obligatiile'' s-au separat prea tare de interesele natiei. E oricum interesant ca violenta,cata e pana acum,vine din tabara iubitorilor de oameni.Ca idiotii is doar masa de manevra e una.Dar tradeaza modul de a gandi al baietilor si fetelor din spate.Adie o briza de bolsevism.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusDonald Duck ăsta nu şi-a construit el imperiul (apelând la dansul prin hăţişurile politicii atât de de concis descris mai sus de Mihăis sau la cine ştie ce minuni ale managementului yankeu). L-a primit moştenire, ceeace este cu totul şi cu totul altceva. Trump, în afară de a se da în bărci la emisiunea aia a lui cu "You're fired!"....Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisMno,n-am zis ca vreau ca Gheo sa conduca tarile.Am zis doar ca in practica niste Gheo iau uneori decizii mai bune pt ca inteleg directiile lumii mai bine.Uneori,nu totdeauna.Pe care directii,tot soiul de pseudo-experti le dau de toate gardurile. Avantajul chestiei astora complicate,numite libertate si democratie este ca nu permit[cel putin cata vreme functioneaza cat de cat in parametri ] aparitia unei clase de mandarini,osificata si rigida. Nu cred ca m-am manifestat vreodata ca un mare fan al sistemului nostru.Care e plin de fufe de ambele sexe.Iar de o vreme vad ca si sistemul mult visat de noi,romanii,cel din vest e cam cu gauri.Nu pt ca el ar fi prost la origini,ci pt ca aproape nu mai poate fi recunoscut. Amu,strict legat de Donald Duck asta.Io din experienta putina cata am adunat,am putut observa ca dansul in hatisurile politicii pt a obtine un r...t de 2 bani e lucru complicat.Inutil de dificil si complicat,imperfect si numai bun de schimbat,dar asta e sistemul.Necesita o cunoastere a factiunilor implicate,a toanelor fiecaruia,a intereselor personale si de grup,cum sa negociezi prin interpusi simpatizati de respectivii,atunci cand stii ca mutra proprie le provoaca antipatie etc...E o mare diferenta de nivel[dar nu de mecanism] intre 2 firfirici la noi si miliardele lui Trump,dupa cum e diferenta intre Cucuietii de Vale si grupul lui Trump intins pe toate continentele.Adica pt a face un lucru de asemenea amploare,ajungi volens-nolens la filosofie,sociologie,intrigaraie politica,informatii,abilitatea de a analiza si sintetiza,capacitatea de a conduce oameni,abilitatea de a gasi oamenii potriviti sau de a-i concedia pe aia nepotriviti si n-spe altele.Ce nu se dezvolta e abilitatea militara,dar cel putin exista unele suprapuneri.Asa,ca observatie,politrucii lu' peste au comis-o al mai tare si mai rau in materie de militarie si razboaie,cel putin in ultimele decenii[alea de la criticam]. In patria-muma reprosam des[ma rog,tot timpul] ca nici unul din frecatorii de hartii de ne conduc nu a muncit pe bune in viata lui.Toti au fost functionari,apoi politruci.Ii lovi si pe ianchei boala asta.As fi vrut si io sa vad unii care respecta banul pt ca stiu cum se produce el de fapt.Pt politruc e simplu.Mareste taxele. Amu,e foarte adevarat ca tu ziceai de relatiile intre tari,iar eu raspundeam despre abilitatea de administra.Si ca se poate argumenta in continuare daca e sau nu asa.Dar la modul concret,americanii nu prea au de ales.Hillary are calitatea de nevasta,secretar de stat ratat[si la modul crancen].Sanders e un r...t comunist,oricat ar incerca el sa mai cosmetizeze imaginea.Iar la republicani,nu a aparut nici unul mai rasarit. Situatia e in general tragica.Daca te uiti la nivelul de pe timpul lui Eisenhower,Nixon,Kennedy sau Reagan devine evident regresul.Nu pt ca ar fi oamenii in sine mai prosti.Ci pt ca electoratul devine tot ma tampit,pe masura ce decade clasa de mijloc.Daca Trump incepe sa inverseze acest trend de decadere a clasei de mijloc,poate-poat isi revine si nivelul de complexitate. Legat despre relatii si impactul in lume.Drept e ca se poate mai rau.Dar hai sa vedem ce s-a facut pana acum.Rusia isi face de cap.OM e pe cale sa o u puna de un califat.Africa vrea a migreze in Ioropa.China se uita urat la toti vecinii si le mai scapa cate un cot in ficati. Iar Trump e pana acum un tip moderat.A sustinut ca vrea sa fie un arbitru fair-play intre arabi si evrei.A zis ca nu mai risipeste bani si oameni vanand babulani.Asta e in avantajul nostru.CE gheseft avem noi in est din risipa asta?Daca Doamne fere incepe vreun razboi in Pacific,ramane de vazut,dar tensiunile de acolo preced visele prezidentiale ale lui Trump.Iar un prezident iancheu sa dea cu flit NATO,nu prea o cred.Deci,ce poate face rau,intr-un mod original?Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumNu stiu unde e locul discutiei asteia. Aici nu prea e, poate la "geopolitica" ? Nu e nici geopolitica. La "off-topic"? Nici asta nu prea e. Nu prea e...nicaieri ! Tu ai mai mare încredere într-un "nea Gheo" pentru a conduce o tara (un continent, uneori) si am înteles ca te bazezi pe bunul-simt si întelepciunea native ale acelui Gheo pentru împlinirea misiei (relative, dar sa le luam ca certitudini). Eu cred ca nea Gheo e lipsit de multe cunostinte, ca nu are studii (sociale, economice,filozofice) si ca ce îi e suficient pentru a-si organiza gospodaria nu e pentru o tara întreaga. Gheo are în general -toti Gheo de peste tot sunt asa- o viziune binara. Ori lumea de azi e plina de nuante si de contradictii pe care acel Gheo nu cred ca le poate : primo sesiza si secundo negocia. Gheo are tendinta de a taianoduri gordiene (si e plin de asa ceva) iar nevoia e mai degraba de a le dezlega. Poate, el ? Asta e o mare problema în lumea mondializata de azi : în unele tari politica e o meserie de foarte mult timp, iar politicienii sunt rupti de multe din realitatile vietii. Studiaza viata, dar nu o traiesc. În alte tari (precum România) politicienii nu au niciun fel de studii si nu au studiat niciodata nimic , doar au trait (si au trait prost, în general). Ei bine, între conducatorii lumilor alea conduse de teoreticieni care practica si lumile conduse de practicieni incapabili sa gândeasca, nu cred ca un "nea Gheo" ar fi capabil sa (se) organizeze în asa fel încât lucrurile sa nu o ia rau de tot razna. La nivelul unei tari mici si fara mare greutate pe harta lumii (sunt tari mici si tari mici, Israel si Bulgaria, de pilda, dar greutatea e total diferita) un nea Gheo n-ar putea face decât ce stie el ca e bine sau rau. Si, daca e un om bun intrinsec, ar face ce crede el ca e bine, dar binele ala ar putea sfârsi în niste mari probleme. Trump e un fel de Gheo, mi se pare. Si nu îmi pare un Gheo bun, nici intrinsec nici extrinsec. Na, am revenit la U.S.ARe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumEu unul stiu sa fac dintr-un milion cinci mii. De unitati, nu de milioane. Asa ca nu pot decât sa admir talentul altora. În ultimii 30 de ani, puterea de cumparare a americanului mediu a stagnat sau a scazut, indiferent de orientarea politica. În materie de politica externa, daca ne uitam unde s-a abtinut Obama (o interventie la sol în Siria, de pilda, dar exemplele sunt multe) cred ca vedem unde Trump s-ar arunca cu capul înainte. Discursul lui populist place, dar între ce zice ca ar face si ce ar face concret este sau o incoerenta (adica zice una si va face altceva, iar situatia politica interna ar deveni dificila) ori un pericol (nu detaliez, cred ca e evident). Oricum ar face, nu-mi pare convenabil. O explicatie pentru votul pro-Trump (amuzanta, e drept) : LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisCu toata stima,insa doar partial e asa.Sa primesti cateva milioane si sa le faci multe miliarde necesita o oarecare abilitate.Ca nu a pornit de la 0 e alta treaba.Dar nu doar in teorie si din citite am vazut baieti de bani gata care au spart mostenirea mai iute decat putea taticul sa zica ''stai,tembelule''. Si cati din noi pot sa ia 5000 de euro si sa-i faca 1 milion?Cam asta ar fi proportional cu posibilitatile noastreRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumMistoul ala e facut din pricina enormitatilor pe care le clameaza nenea si al populismului ala care prinde, iata. La H. Clinton nu prea e de facut misto, pentru ca atunci când are momente de mare contradictie (ex. : pentru TAFTA ca senator si împotriva TAFTA candidat la presedintie) realizezi ca politica e ...hai sa-i spunem usuratica. Si atunci nu mai e de facut misto, ci de plâns. Nu de plâns, dar sigur nu de râs.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisAmuzament sau nu,nu am auzit de misto facut pe seama altora.Iar asta e un criteriu infailibil asupra notorietatii unui politician.Momentan nu exista publicitate negativa.Hihaiala contra voturi e o afacere excelenta Tin minte ca acum 10 ani ajunsese Base sa-l inlocuiasca pe Ceausescu in bancuri.Pacat ca a bipuit meciul si a rispit cu tot soiul de prostii capitalul ala de popularitate. La capitolul amuzament : LINK Sincer sa fiu,as prefera sa am dreptate iar Donald chiar sa fie un tip rezonabil,care sa nu se bage ca habaucul in mizerii.Pt ca e indoielnic ca mai poate fi oprit sa castige nominalizarea republicana.Iar de madame Clinton deja imi e mila[vorba vine].Pt ca daca era sa existe ceva nasol despre Trump,iesea la iveala.Hillary pana acum a fost acoperita de presa amica.Cand or incepe bataia directa tare imi e ca va fi saptamana si upercutul la ficati pt doamna cu pricina. Adica,nu am avea noi ceva de facut decat sa manevram in noua realitate de piste balta.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisNasol cu populismul.Dar restu' filosofilor,sociologilor si strategilor ce bantuie intre San Francisco si Barlad,via Bruxelles,Paris si Berlin,ce au invartit 20 de ani? Io nu zic ca e bine cu Trump,Hillary sau mai stiu eu ce.Pe persoana fizica ma intereseaza sa pricep ce se intampla ca sa ma pozitionez unde e un profit de facut.In viata privata fix cu asta ar trebui sa ma ocup.Da' despre treaba asta din State si esecul studiosilor stiu ca discutam periodic de cand suntem pe semper.si sunt ceva anisori,iaca.Ca un astfel de moment va veni stiam,desi nu stiam exact cand. Intamplator sau nu,argumentele domnului cu mistoul au cam fost demontate in buna parte,la modul serios.Amuzamentul e una,dar nu prea conteaza.Iar ''a better president'',ia-l de unde nu-i. Daca din toata bulibaseala asta va iesi distrugerea corectitudinii politice,ii trimit lui Donald o palinca d'aia de Bihor si un vin de Cricova.Nu ma deranjeaza sa-mi zica lumea marlan.Dar as vrea sa le zic romilor cum imi vine la gura fara sa fie lege ce amendeaza chestia asta.VIVE LA LIBERTERe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumÎmi permiti o sugestie, ca directie de gândire ? În loc sa te concentrezi pe desfiintarea legii care te pedepseste daca îi faci pe tigani cum îti vine la gura, concentreaza-te pe aplicarea legii care sa-i împiedice pe acei tigani sa face ceva care sa te provoace pe tine în a-i înjura. În felul asta ei nu te vor mai supara (si daca o vor face, vor fi pedepsiti) iar tu nu îi vei mai înjura (iar daca o vei face, vei fi pedepsit). Mi se pare o idee buna de societate, una catre care sa tindem, nu crezi ? Una care sa protejeze cetateanul si sa-i garanteze si proprietatea (tie) si demnitatea (în cazul asta, celor de etnie tiganeasca). Si care calca pe bec, raspunde. Sigur, stiu ca în practica tu ramâi cu înjuratul tiganilor (pentru care nu cred ca te amendeaza seful de post) iar ei continua sa te fure (chestie pentru care nu cred ca-i amendeaza ori retine acel sef de post). Si ce e realmente trist e ca tu (care esti departe de a fi un cetatean lambda care gândeste doar de Paste si Craciun) te concentrezi pe ce îti mai lasa statul posibilitatea sa faci : sa fluieri a paguba, si macar sa poti si tu sa-njuri (ceea ce e omeneste de înteles, desigur). Dar nu dreptul tau îngradit de a înjura e problema, sa stii.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00MihaisProprietatea e una.Dar eu as vrea sa nu mai ne prefacem ca legiferam bunul simt.Nu-i altceva decat impunerea unei ideologii nocive.Depasind un pic de la viata amoroasa personala,e un pic mai vasta problema.In primul rand nu vreau o societate cum o descrii tu.Adica nu vreau nici o lege care sa ''protejeze demnitatea'' pt ca e din oficiu o restrictie a libertatii de gandire si exprimare.Pt ca io,pe persoana fizica n-am nici o problema daca imi zice careva ca-s roman hot si cersetor.Il bag linistit undeva pe respectivul si-mi vad perfect relaxat de viata.N-am nevoie sa fac crize de isterie,sa-l dau in judecata pe rasist,sa critic toata societatea si sa pretind concedierea profesorului din scoala primara pt. ca nu l-au educat pe dobitoc.Nu e nici un castig pt societate ca pitipoancele frustrate de liceu,indiferent de varsta si sex, sa aiba o putere atat de mare.Am in schimb nevoie ca expertii in genetica sa nu fie concediati de jurnalisti de cancan atunci cand afirma ca unii sunt mai destepti,iar altii mai prosti,in medie.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumS-a demonstrat experimental ca vorbele construiesc si conduc la actiuni (de la Manifestul barbosului ala la "Mein Kampf" al nebunului mustacios, totul a început cu niste cuvinte). Si e bine ca exista legi care sa încadreze expresia, caci nu toate cuvintele duc la ceva bun. Tu nu esti de acord cu legiferarea bunului-simt, altii (poate speriati de relativitatea simtului acesta) sunt. În democratie, ne adunam fiecare în jurul celui care ne exprima mai bine ideile, votam si cel ales decide. Daca cel pe care l-am votat nu ne reprezinta, iesim în strada si-l schimbam. De cele mai multe ori, merge. Nu cred ca a interzice cuiva sa spuna tigan împutit sau jidan (tot împutit, noi românii având niste standarde de curatenie foarte înalte) sau poponar sau pitic handicapat e un lucru rau. Nu-i spui asa, el nu se supara ca-l înjuri de rasa si neamuri si lucruri pe care nu el le-a decis, si ramâne fapta : un om te-a nedreptatit, iar Statul face justitie. Daca te supara doar faptul ca unul e tigan, altul evreu, altul are un handicap sau altul e negru sau galbe sau verde la piele...iar nu e bine sa fii lasat sa o spui în gura mare : s-a demonstrat (tot experimental, din pacate) ca lucrurile rele (negativismul, în general) polarizeaza mult mai repede si mai bine decât lucrurile bune. Oamenii aia de stiinta cu genetica lor au pierdut din vedere un lucru : conditiile dezvoltarii nu sunt aceleasi, nu au fost si nu prea cred ca vor fi vreodata aceleasi pentru toata lumea. Tot experimental (din nou!) am vazut ca putem face dintr-un ciadian mic si negru un mare general rus si poate sa mai fie si strabunicul unui mare scriitor (aproape alb) : Puskin. Educatia e aproape totul. Restul poate fi natura, dar procentajul e neglijabil. Vorbeam despre creier si ce putem face (ori nu,cu el). Cu trupul e mai diferit, ca unii suntem mai buni la înot, altii la alergare, functie de milioanele de ani petrecuti în zone de pe glob. Dar de învatat putem toti învata si sa alergam, si sa înotam. La niveluri chiar bune !Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00TerentiusBoribum wrote ... ..... putem face dintr-un ciadian mic si negru un mare general rus si poate sa mai fie si strabunicul unui mare scriitor (aproape alb) : Puskin. Educatia e aproape totul. Restul poate fi natura, dar procentajul e neglijabil.străbunicul lui Puşkin, steaua întunecată a Epocii Luminilor, cum i-a spus Voltaire.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumExact, si daca e ceva dificil în cazul expresiei asteia a lui Voltaire , este de spus daca era batjocoritor sau glumet (Voltaire având pe alocuri niste scrieri de o mare intoleranta). Spre deosebire de Tratatul despre toleranta, care e scurt, Eseul asupra Spiritului Natiunilor are câteva sute de pagini, iar în Eseul asta Voltaire e foarte întelegator si cu rasismul, si cu sclavagismul, si cu antisemitismul. Nu e chiar limpede-limpede domnul Voltaire, în cazul cartilor astea doua, si nici în legatura cu parerea lui despre generalul rus Ganibal nu putem sti (eu cel putin, nu stiu) cum gândea. Despre negri (ca si despre evrei, laponi, indieni, tigani) Voltaire avea atunci, la 1756, o parere execrabila. Sapte ani mai târziu, nu mai era asa de convins ca are dreptate "Cine e Voltaire ? Voltaire, trebuie s-o spunem cu bucurie si tristete, e spiritul francez". Unul de-al lui a spus-o, HugoRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinA fost candva pe forum o discutie despre presupusul psihic mai fragil al luptatorilor din zilele noastre.Sebastian Junger, regizorul documentarului "Restrepo" are un punct de vedere alternativ, extrem de corect in opinia mea, poate problema nu e la luptatori, ci la societatea in care se intorc.https://www.ted.com/talks/sebastian_junger_our_lonely_society_makes_it_hard_to_come_home_from_war#t-794943Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuVi se pare ok? Mie nu:Army Looks to Deactivate Long-Range Surveillance Companies Stars and Stripes | Jul 16, 2016 | by Alex HortonSAN ANTONIO -- The Army is moving to cut all nine of its Long-Range Surveillance companies from the active duty and the National Guard this year as part of a plan to restructure its force, Army officials told Stars and Stripes.The Pentagon will finalize a decision to deactivate three active-duty and six National Guard Long-Range Surveillance companies in the next 60 days."Every year there are capabilities that must be added, but unfortunately this means the Army must divest some," Army spokesman Troy Rolan said. Commanders identified operational LRS units as a low priority, he said, adding that the decision to cut LRS companies was aided by "extensive computer models using combatant commander plans to determine what the Army needs."Army LRS companies are comprised of 15 six-man teams led by a staff sergeant. The teams specialize in navigating forward positions to monitor enemy movement and gather intelligence for commanders. Roughly 882 soldiers serve in the nine remaining LRS companies, Rolan said.Current and former LRS soldiers have criticized the pending deactivation, saying the loss of surveillance-trained troops will erode readiness and battlefield-intelligence gathering. Another concern: The Pentagon will rely too much on technological monitoring, not human surveillance, in a larger conventional war.Todd Harrison, a defense budget expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed to a growing preference for technology to replace humans on the battlefield."We're willing to put drones and, in the future, unmanned vehicles in more dangerous situations because they don't have mothers," he said. "That makes them more useful to the country and the president."The American way of war emphasizes technology and industry as its primary strengths, and new concepts of force structure have sprung from that doctrine, said Col. David Maxwell, a retired Army Special Forces officer and professor at Georgetown University."Having a handful of LRS companies is not something the Pentagon thinks will have sufficient impact when we can produce battalion after battalion [of conventional infantry units] and surveillance drones," he said.Yet some experts question whether the push for digital surveillance over LRS companies - the man vs. machine debate -- is based in commanders' concerns about risking lives on the modern battlefield.Thomas E. Ricks, a senior adviser on national security at the nonpartisan New America think tank in Washington D.C., says swapping out boots on the ground for eyes in the sky does not mitigate danger."Commanders think technology is the cure for what ails them," Ricks said, but "depriving yourself of any form of reconnaissance increases your battlefield risk. The essence of combat is redundancy," and without human intelligence, commanders will have blind spots, he said.Conventional assets to EuropeAll this comes as the Pentagon ramps up U.S. military presence in Europe on Russia's western flank.Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced in May that 2,000 more U.S. troops could soon be deployed to Poland and several Baltic states, bolstering the 60,000 troops stationed mainly in Germany and Italy.The expansion is in line with the European Reassurance Initiative, which quadrupled in budget to $3.4 billion for 2017 in an effort to shift from reassurance of NATO allies to deterrence of a Russian threat following their aggression in Crimea and Ukraine, according to Peter Cook, Pentagon press secretary. Last month, NATO troops held the biggest exercise in Eastern Europe since the Cold War.The strategic move of troops and positioning warfighting equipment in Europe is an acknowledgment of Russia's long-term threat in Europe and other regions, according to the CSIS think tank in Washington.A military such as Russia's is far more advanced than the Islamic State group and al-Qaida -- from unit tactics to armor and surveillance technology -- and could neutralize many of the advantages used daily in the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Harrison said.For example, troops can take advantage of air dominance while surveilling low-tech enemies fighting over patchwork terrain in Helmand province. But a conventional battle involving hundreds or thousands of troops could rise to the full spectrum. Cyber warfare attacks could compromise U.S. networks, and communication satellites could be jammed or overtasked with bandwidth from commanders demanding detailed imagery. Air weapons platforms could hunt surveillance drones over immense territory where units fight for control over roads, bridges and ports, Harrison added."One thing we'll lose with LRS is the all-weather, all-environment ability to put eyes on the target," said 1st Sgt. Chris Buchness of the Maryland National Guard, who spent 15 years in the LRS company there before it was deactivated through separate force restructuring."The Army is basing their decision [to deactivate LRS companies] on the fight we've had for the last 15 years," Buchness said. "We have drone impunity. In a force-on-force fight, that may not happen, or it might take years after the fighting starts."Matt Pelak, a senior noncommissioned officer assigned to a LRS company in the Texas National Guard, said battlefield information could bottleneck without LRS companies to give reliable intelligence to commanders as technology becomes compromised in a fight."By getting rid of them entirely, you're leaving no conventional asset trained in reconnaissance" for brigades of thousands of soldiers, he said.The sole remaining option would be reconnaissance-focused units in Special Operations Command, such as Army Ranger Regimental Reconnaissance Companies, which operate within the 75th Ranger Regiment.But tasking those units to assist conventional assets would prove challenging, if not impossible, Maxwell said. Units such as Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs are too few in number to support conventional ground operations at the expense of prioritized special missions, he said.Using those strategic assets to support conventional missions would be against the Army's operating doctrine, he said. Tasking them with duties formerly held by LRS units also would require a rewrite of U.S. code outlining the function and capabilities of special forces, he said."If you don't have recon, you can't win. It's a truism," Maxwell said. "If you don't have your own eyes on the ground, then the commander has limitations and cannot always depend on someone else's resources. When you consider what is all-weather day or night, that is usually the human eyeball."But Maxwell stressed the importance of hard looks at historical resources that may not fit on a modern, technological battlefield when other capabilities are available."This gets to a fundamental question," he said. "How does the Army envision fighting in the future, and what kind of reconnaissance capability does it need on the next battlefield?"Erosion of elite skillsReconnaissance and surveillance skills honed in LRS companies are among the most elite in the Army outside special operations, and soldiers in those companies enjoy outsize responsibility relative to their rank. Those skills will erode and largely disappear as the companies are deactivated, LRS soldiers said.The operation of LRS companies is unique to conventional Army infantry units. The companies report directly to brigade and corps commanders in order to directly provide reliable intelligence without working through layers of bureaucracy at lower levels of command.It is common for a private first class or specialist in a LRS company to brief the brigade commander on battle plans, Pelak said, which normally is done by a company commander or captain on a battle staff.There is essentially no equivalent to that level of responsibility for junior soldiers in the Army, and those soldiers are generally able to move on to higher levels of responsibility faster than peers outside of LRS companies, Pelak added.All LRS soldiers are airborne qualified, and many have graduated from Ranger and Pathfinder schools. Most LRS soldiers end up attending at the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course at Fort Benning in Georgia -- a schoolhouse that also trains units such as Navy SEALs and Marine Force Recon.When a LRS company is deactivated, the soldiers are not forced out of the Army, Rolan said, but some will leave. When the Maryland National Guard's LRS company folded after a restructuring decision, it touched a nerve, Buchness said. Most of the soldiers left to join units in their home states, reclassified their job specialty or left the Army. Few of them remained in Maryland to serve as line infantrymen because they saw the assignments as downgrades for their skills, Buchness said."I came to the Maryland LRS company as a specialist. I left the company as the first sergeant," he said. "Had you asked me my intentions two years ago, I would've said I wanted to be a command sergeant major. Now I'm putting in my retirement packet."The impact years down the road on readiness would be difficult to gauge, Buchness said. More than half of all Ranger-qualified soldiers in the Maryland National Guard were in the LRS company -- and now most of them have departed, he said, and their skills will be missed if Maryland's soldiers are asked to serve in combat or strengthen allies. Last year, soldiers in the Maryland LRS company trained with Estonian troops to hone small unit reconnaissance techniques.Soldiers from the small NATO nation, which shares a border with Russia and is home to an air base used by U.S. forces, told the Maryland soldiers that human-based reconnaissance is a top priority in the face of the more technologically advanced Russians, Pelak said.In peacetime, LRS skills are not necessary, Maxwell said. That could flip during the next fight when commanders realize a historic asset is no longer reachable on the brigade radio frequency.The epiphany could cost lives, Buchness said."What's the price in blood we're going to pay when we have to retrain soldiers to do the things we lost?" he asked.LINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00BoribumMai demult, niste razboinici puri (chiar asa erau) au considerat ca armele de foc sunt un mijloc nedemn de a duce razboiul. Uite ca s-a dus puritatea alora, si-l ducem numai cu arme de foc. Azi consideram ca omul e esential pe câmpul de lupta. Asta e azi. Mâine, la un moment dat, ne vom bate din fotolii, niste dolofani sau scheletici cu degete lungi care vor apasa numai pe butoane. Ca sa nu le intre unor soldati în cap ca tehnica face totul, era demult un caporal-chef batrân care îi punea pe aia din birou sa ia calculatorul în brate si sa faca 10 ture de stadion cu el. Neah, nu te poti împotrivi mersului lumii. Scopul e victoria totala si 0 mort. Asta e doctrina , momentan.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuPentru un om care a trecut putin si prin Special Forces, nu ma asteptam la Mark Milley sa sustina asa ceva.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinUn articol interesant despre doctrina americana referitoare la modul de ducere a razboiului neconventional. unconventional_warfare_in_the_gray_zone.pdfPoate fi citit online aici LINKA Gray Zone “win” is not a win in the classic warfare sense. Winning is perhaps better described as maintaining the U.S. Government’s positional advantage, namely the ability to influence partners, populations, and threats toward achievement of our regional or strategic objectives. Specifically, this will mean retaining decision space, maximizing desirable strategic options, or simply denying an adversary a decisive positional advantage.In these human-centric struggles, our successes cannot be solely our own in that they must be largely defined and accomplished by our indigenous friends and coalition partners as they realize respectively acceptable political outcomes. Successful culmination of Gray Zone conflicts will not be marked by pomp and ceremony, but rather should, ideally, pass with little or no fanfare or indication of our degree of involvement.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinReplica mutata dintr-un topic inchis:spy100 wrote ...Multi-domain operationsLINKRe: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuNu stiu daca se mai uita cineva pe acest topic. Nu am mai trecut de mult pe aici, desi am mai citit din cand in cand ce se posteaza pe forum. Continui cu acest topic pe care l-am deschis cu ani de zile in urma. Pentru inceput, o galerie a comandantilor 1st SFOD-D alias Delta Force, alias Combat Applications Group (CAG), alias Army Compartmented Element (ACE) - desi cred ca identificarea este incorecta si am sa explic undeva de ce - si care, se pare ca, mai nou, se numeste, se pare, 3r Operations Support Group (Airborne) - 3rd OSG(A). Reiau, mai intai, din punctul unde m-am oprit cu lista comandantilor unitatii. Ultimul mentional era James H. Schwitters, care a comandat unitate intre 2000-2002. In iulie 2002 i-a succedat loctiitorul sau, Ron Russell. Acesta, insa, a suferit un anevrism cerebral la numai cateva luni dupa ce a preluat comanda unitatii, motiv pentru a care a fost inlocuit ad interim de loctiitorul sau, Charles "Chuck" Sellers.Aceasta situatie nu a durat mult, mai ales ca atunci SUA se pregateau sa declanseze operatiunea Iraqi Freedom. Era nevoie de un comandant cu prerogative depline, asa ca in fruntea unitatii a fost adus un ofiter care servise in unitate incepand din 1990. Este vorba de Bennet S. Sacolick.Cateva lucruri despre acest personaj. In primul rand, este surprinzatoare statura sa. La 1,98 m intaltime, este ceva atipic pentru operatiile speciale in care, din cate am vazut si am citit, majoritatea o formeaza oamenii de statura mica sau medie. Este un evreu de pe coasta de vest care afirma, intr-un interviu acordat in momentul retragerii, in 2016, cand era deja general-locotenent (3 stele) si avea 60 de ani, ca nu a obtinut niciodata jobul pe care si l-a dorit, ci a primit joburi mai bune. La 8 decembrie 1980, Sacolick, care absolvise in San Francisco o facultate cu profil economic si lucra in timp ce isi facea masteratul, a intrat, pentru a se adaposti de ploaie, intr-o cladire. Tanarul in varsta de 25 de ani, nemultumit de viata sa si dornic de ceva cu totul diferit, a observat ca se afla intr-un oficiu de recrutare al US Army, unde a gasit un afis publicitar pe care scria "Go Ranger". Nu stia prea mare lucru despre ce inseamna sa fii Ranger, dar a acceptat provocarea. S-a inrolat in batalionul 2 al Regimentului 75 Ranger, din Fort Lewis, statul Washington. Dupa un an, superiorii sai au vazut ca Sacolick are aptitudini de ofiter si l-au trimis la cel mai rapid scurt de formate pentru ofiteri, Officer Candidate School (OCS). A absolvit in 1982. A fost apoi comandant de pluton in batalionul 4, din cadrul regimentului 509 Aeropurtat, la Vicenza, in Italia. Din nou, voia sa renunte si sa se reapuce de scoala cand, la Fort Bragg, l-a intalnit pe Ed Reeder, care avea sa ajunga general si comandant al Beretelor Verzi. Acesta l-a convins sa incerce sa incerce sa intre in Fortele Speciale/Beretele Verzi. Sacolick a acceptat si aceasta provocare, iar in 1986, dupa absolvirea SFQC, a fost repartizat in grupl 7 Special Forces, cu care a operat in Peru, Columbia si El Salvador. Un detaliu interesant. Sacolick detine doua insigne de specialitate care se regasesc rar la acelasi purtator: cea de absolvent al cursului Special Forces Combat Diver Course (curs de scufundari de lupta, despre care multi spun ca este cel mai dificil curs de specializare pentru Beretele Verzi), si cea de parasutist calificat pentru salturi HALO/HAHO (Military Freefall School). Cei care absolva ambele cursuri sunt numiti Whiskey 9, iar Sacolick este unul. In interviul mentionat, spunea ca nu i se pare ca ar avea ceva special, dar ca toti cei 12 care formau detasamentul Alfa pe care il comanda puteau face impreuna lucruri uimitoare. In poza de mai jos se vad cele doua insigne de specialitate, cea de Combat Diver e in dreapta, sub baretele de decoratii, iar cea din mijloc, tot de sub barete, de absolvent al Military Free Fall School. In stanga este insigna de parasutism "normal" pe un background galen cu negru care sunt culorile regimentului 509 aeropurtat. In decembrie 1989, era in Panama si participa la operatiunea Just Cause. Trimisese deja la Fort Bragg scrisoarea cu aplicatia pentru Foreign Area Officer, ceea ce ar fi presupus un curs de doi ani la Instititul de Limbi Straine al armatei de la Monterey, unde urma sa invete una din limbile zonei in care avea sa fie trimis. In cursul luptelor din Panama, a vazut cum in fata sa a ars oficiul postal unde se afla scrisoarea cu aplicatia. Peste cateva zile a fost abordat de un ofiter care l-a invitat la o discutie. Sacolick nu avea habar despre ce este vorba, dar ofiterul respectiv l-a invitat sa aplice pentru selectia in Delta Force. A trecut de selectie in 1990, iar 1993 era in escadronul C, care a participat la nefericitul episod de la Mogadishu din 3-4 octombrie. Apare in poza de mai jos, facuta in Somalia, in 1993. Este tipul blond, cu ochelari de soare, al doilea dinspre dreapta, pe al doilea rand al celor care stau asezati in genunchi. Primul tip din dreapta, in primul rand al celor care stau in genunchi, este Austin Miller, care i-a fost loctiitor la comanda Delta, inainte de a-i fi succesor la comanda unitatii. A ocupat diferite pozitii in unitate, incepand cu cea de ofiter asistent pentru operatii, apoi comandant de troop (detasament de 20-24 de operatori, format din 4 echipe plus element de comanda), apoi a participat la operatiunea Joint Endeavour, in Bosnia, ca sef de troop, adjunct al ofiterului cu operatii si apoi comandant de escadron (formatiune de 75-80 de operatori formata din doua troops de asalt si unul de lunetisti/cercetasi). Dupa un scurt stagiu de stat major la JSOC, cam intre 1999-2001, se astepta sa preia comanda unitatii. S-a imbolnavit, insa, de maladia Hodgkinson, iar cea mai mare parte a timpului in care cat a luptat cu boala, a trait cam ca in ceata. Si-a revenit, iar in aprilie 2003, in timpul Operatiunii Iraqi Freedom, a luat comandat Delta Force. A condus unitatea in acea perioada dificila cand a suferit mari pierderi in lupta cu insurgentii irakieni, pana in iulie 2005. Ulterior, intre 2006-2008 a fost director adjunct la Centrul de Contra-Terorism din cadrul CIA. A fost, pe rand, adjunct si apoi comandant al Scolii de Instruire pentru Operatii Speciale JFK de la Fort Bragg (JFKSWCS) (2008-2012). Dupa un post in statul major al Comandamentului Operatiilor Speciale, intre 2012-2014, a detinut ultima pozitie, avand gradul de general cu 3 stele, ca Director pentru Planificare Operatioanala al Centrului National pentru Contraterorism, intre 2014-2016. De observat, ca in cazul tuturor ofiterilor care au ca specializare Fortele Speciale, ca nu a ajuns la gradul de general cu 4 stele.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAm anticipat putin in postarea precedenta. Cel care i-a succedat lui Bennet Sacolick la comanda Delta Force este Austin Scott Miller. Spre deosebire de predecesorul sau, nu a ajuns in Delta pe filiera Beretelor Verzi, ci a servit in unitati conventionale ale US Army si, pentru scurt timp, in regimentul 75 Ranger (75th RR). In plus, este mic de statura, este in activitate si, mai mult, a ajuns la cel mai inalt grad, cel de general cu 4 stele, pe care il detine din 2 septembrie 2018. Faptul nici nu este surprinzator. Orice ofiter care serveste intr-o pozitie de comanda in cadrul 75th RR (comandant de pluton, companie, batalion) trebuie sa fi detinut anterior o functie similara intr-o unitate obisnuita din Big Army. Singurul pentru care nu exista aceasta cerere este comandantul regimentului, deoarece aceasta functie este mai curand administrativa, intrucat Rangers, care sunt o unitate de elita, nu actioneaza niciodata ca regiment in operatii, ci numai cu subunitati de nivel batalion, companie sau pluton. Rangers detin legaturi stranse cu Big Army, motiv pentru care pentru ei sunt mai multe oportunitati de avansare, plaja de optiuni fiind mai larga. Asta si explica de ce din randul lor vei gasi o multime de ofiteri care ajung la gradul de general, inclusiv la cel de general cu 4 stele. In momentul de fata, doi fosti comandanti ai 75th RR sunt generali cu 4 stele, unul comandand Comandamentul Operatiilor Speciale, celalalt US Army Pacific, unul este general cu 3 stele si comandant al corpului XVIII Aeropurtat, unul este general de brigada si loctiitor al comandantului unei divizii. Cei mai multi comandanti ai Delta Force provin din randul Rangerilor, cu care coopereaza strans in operatiuni, avand in comun spectrul de misiuni in care sunt trimisi si caracterul cinetic al actiunilor de lupta. Un fost comandant Delta, provenit din randul Rangers, despre care voi vorbi mai tarziu, este general cu 2 stele si comandant al Diviziei 82 Aeropurtate. Delta si Rangers opereaza direct sub Autoritatea Nationala de Comanda, iar raza lor de actiune este globala. Spre deosebire de ei, Fortele Speciale formeaza o lume aparte. Ei urmeaza o pregatire si o cariera diferita, care ingusteaza campul lor de expertiza si ii indeparteaza de procedurile si doctrina Big Army. In plus, nu actioneaza direct sub Autoritatea Nationala de Comanda, iar jobul lor e specializat regional si nici nu e atat de glamoros si spectaculos. Misiuni precum razboi neconventional si apararea interna in strainatate presupun rabdare, discretie, efecte pe termen lung, un grad ridicat de asimilare si cunoastere a limbii si culturii zonei in care se opereaza, calitati diplomatice, atribute pe nedrept neglijate de inaltii responsabili militari si politici. Cert e ca, odata ajunsi la gradul de general, plaja optiunilor de cariera scade pentru ei; au operat mereu intr-un context specializat, iar pregatirea "generalista", de arme combinate pe care o reclama Big Army le lipseste de multe ori sau cel putin aceasta este perceptia. Sunt perceputi ca o lume oarecum straina. A intra in Delta nu te scapa de eticheta pe care ai capatat-o, deoarece Delta nu este o specialitate, ci "Skill qualifications identifier T". Ca operator Delta, in continuare specialitatea ta este ca ofiter de infanterie (11-A), sau de ofiter de forte speciale (18-A). Ai fost in Beretele Verzi, ca operator Delta porti bereta verde, ai fost in Rangers, porti bereta bej, ai fost in unitatile aeropurtate, porti bereta visinie (asta in foarte rarele ocazii cand se poarta uniforma de oras). Astea raman lipite de tine si dupa ce pleci din Delta. Prin urmare, un infanterist are de unde alege si este preferat pentru comenzi in Big Army, in timp ce fata de cei din Beretele Verzi exista rezerve. De aceea, dupa cum am mai zis, pana la ora la care scriu, niciun 18-A nu a ajuns la gradul de general cu 4 stele. Acum sa revin la Austin Scott Miller. Este mentionat in cartea lui Mark Bowden, "Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War", drept capitanul Scotty. Acum toata lumea il stie: este comandantul fortelor americane si NATO (ultimul, dupa cum stim) din Afganistan. Vizibil, nu? Cariera lui este binecunoscuta, inclusiv stagiile efectuate in Delta, dintr-un document oficial din 2010, cred, al carui link nu mai este activ, Am reusit, insa, sa descarc pdf-ul de pe acel link cu cativa ani in urma. In el sunt cuprinse in detaliu toate etapele carierei lui Miller pana in 2009. Postez aici 3 print-screen-uri care redau aceasta biografie. Nascut in mai 1961, tocmai a implinit 60 de ani. E la primul job ca general cu 4 stele, si s-ar putea sa nu fie ultimul. La fel de bine, se poate ca dupa incheierea retragerii fortelor SUA din Afganistan, sa fie trecut in retragere. La urma urmelor, parasirea Afganistanului nu e tocmai o victorie. Asta insa nu inseamna neaparat ca nu i se va gasi un job, daca se doreste. Aprecierile la adresa sa sunt la superlativ. Iata cateva poze din perioada in care a activat in Afganistan:Faptul ca poarta la el arma nu e un simplu moft. In primul rand, tine de background-ul lui de operator Delta timp de 12 ani, apoi acest obicei s-a dovedit a fi salutar intr-un context extrem de critic. Cand era in compania unui general afgan, a avut loc un atac armat al unor insurgenti. Generalul afgan al murit, dar Miller a avut timp sa se eschiveze, sa se plaseze in spatele unui adapost si se pregatea sa se apere. Nu a fost nevoie, pentru ca membrii detail-ului au eliminat amenintarea. Faptul ca avea arma in acel moment critic a fost, insa, un gest inspirat. Ce a facut Miller intre anii 2009-2018: Dec 2009-Sept 2011: commander, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. September 2011-August 2012: Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization in Arlington VirginiaAugust 2012 - June 2013: Special Assistant to the Deputy commanding general, United States Special Operations Command in Washington D.C.June 2013 - June 2014: commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan/North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), Operation Enduring Freedom, AfghanistanJune 2014- March 2016: commanding general of the United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort BenningMarch 2016- Sept 2018: commanding general of the Joint Special Operations CommandSept 2018: Commander, Resolute Support Mission (RS) and Commander, U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Cam atat pentru astazi. Continuarea, in serile urmatoare.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuMi-a luat mult timp s aflu cine a fost succesorul lui Austin Miller la comanda Delta. Insa informatia era mult mai aproape decat credeam. Spre deoesbire de predecesorii care aveau ca background o cariera in Beretele Verzi sau in cadrul regimentului 75 Ranger, Mark Erwin, care a comandat Delta Force intre 2007-2009, provenea din Big Army. Sean Naylor, autorul cartii "Relentless Strike: The Secret History of the Joint Special Operations Command" scrie ca background-ul "conventional" se vedea si din atitudinea sa "spit and polish" mai pronuntata decat a celor cu experienta in Operatiile Speciale. Nascut in 1962, Erwin a devenit ofiter in 1984, prin filiera ROTC. A servit in divizia 82 Aeropurtata, iar in 1995, a fost admis in Delta, unde a comandat o troop in escadronul B. Insa 11 septembrie 2001 l-a prins in functia de comanant al unui batalion de instructie din Fort Jackson, cand comandantul Delta de atunci, James Schwitters, care dorea ca talentul lui Erwin sa nu se iroseasca, l-a readus in unitate. Mai intai a comandat Operational Support Troop, devenita ulterior escadronul G, adica subunitatea de recunoastere din cadrul Delta, ai carei operatori sunt infiltrati in prealabil, in locurile unde urmeaza sa aiba loc o operatiune a unitatii. Actioneaza mereu in civil, iar in randul acestui escadron activeaza si femei (cunosc un caz in care o fata din aceasta subunitate s-a casatorit cu un operator din escadroanele operative). A comandat ulterior sectiunea nordica a unei structuri de recunoastere a JSOC, Advance Force Operations, in Afganistan, iar intre anii 2003-2005, a comandat escadronul A in Irak, pentru ca in anul urmator sa devina loctiitor al comandantului unitatii pentru o perioada de un an. In 2007 a preluat comanda Delta Force, iar in 2009 a avut un ultim job ca sef de stat major al US Army Special Operations Command. In 2010 a trecut in rezerva cu gradul de colonel.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuGeneralul-maior Mark O'Neill, trecut in rezerva cu 1-2 ani in urma, a comandat 1st SFOD-D intre 2009-2011. Nascut la 12 iunie 1964 la New York, a devenit ofiter in 1986 tot prin filiera ROTC. A servit, ca locotenent, in divizia 1 Cavalerie, iar dupa ce a ajuns capitan, in divizia 25 Infanterie, iar din 1994, in regimentul 75 Ranger. A fot admis in Delta in iunie 1998, cand deja era maior. A servit ca ofiter de operatii pentru un escadron (job de debut pentru ofiteri in Delta), apoi comandant de troop, comandant al detasamentului de selectie si instructie al unitatii, loctiitor pentru operatii al comandantului unitatii, iar intre iulie 2009-iulie 2011, a comandat Delta Force. Intre timp, intre anii 2004-2006, a fost ofiter de operatii in cadrul JSOC. A fost ofiter executiv al sefului statului major al US Army (2011-2012), loctiitor al comandantului diviziei 10 Munte (2012-2015) la Fort Drum, statul New York, loctiitor al comandantului Centrului de Instructie pentru Arme Intrunite de la Fort Leavenworth, statul Kansas (2015-2016), sef de stat major al US Army Pacific, la Fort Shafter, Hawaii (2016-2017), iar ultimul job a fost cel de comandant al US Army Alaska, la Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, intre 2017-2019.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuCe urmeaza, este ceea ce as numit speculatie cu grad ridicat de plazibilitate, dar si de probabilitate. Pana in 2015, a continuat tendinta, intrerupta, se pare, doar sporadic, de a numi in fruntea unitatii comandanti cu background infanterie-Ranger, in detrimentul celor cu background Special Forces. Despre debuseul de care au avut parte acestia din urma, voi vorbi cand termin cu comandantii Delta. Pentru perioada 2011-2013, cel mai probabil, comandantul 1st SFOD-D a fost actualul general-maior James B. Jarrard. Nascut la 2 noiembrie 1966, a devenit ofiter in 1988 si a comandat, ca locotenent, un pluton in Compania B, Batalionul 7 din cadrul Regimentului 6 Infanterie al Diviziei 1 Blindate, in Germania, apoi un pluton in batalionul 5 instructie Rangers (faza instructie montana pentru cursantii de la Ranger School), la Dahlonega, statul Georgia*. Ajuns capitan, a fost loctiitor al ofiterului pentru operatii al brigazii 3 din cadrul diviziei 25 de la Fort Schofield, Hawaii, apoi comandant de companie in batalionul 2, regimentul 27, al acelei divizii. Ulterior, admis in Delta Force, probabil in 1996/1997, a fost ofiter de operatii al unui escadron, comandant de troop, loctiitor al ofiterului de operatii al unitatii, comandant de escadron, loctiitor al comandantului unitatii, iar in final, comandant (2011-2013).Director pentru operatii in cadrul JSOC (2013-2014), a devenit general de brigada si loctiitor al comandantului Diviziei 7 Infanterie, director al biroului de cooperare Pakistan si Afganistan, in cadrul J-5 din statului Major Interarme, la Washington D.C. (2016-2017), comandant al Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve in Kuwait (2017-2018), Director al operatiilor in cadrul Comandamentului pentru Operatii Speciale de la MacDill AFB, statul Florida (2018-2019), iar din noiembrie 2019 a comandant divizia 25 infanterie de la Fort Schofield, Hawaii. Recent, a fost numit sef de stat major al US Indo-Pacific Command**. * Nu a comandat un pluton in Batalionul 5 Ranger avand gradul de capitan. A servit, pe toata perioada in care a fost sublocotenent si, apoi, locotenent, in Divizia 1 Blindata, cu care a participat la Operatiunea Desert Shield si Desert Storm. Batalionul 5, ca unitate de instructie nu avea cum sa participe si nici nu a participat la campanii in teatrele de operatii. De altfel, cum am vazut si din cariera altor ofiteri, James B. Jarrard a comandat o campanie in Batalionul 6 Ranger cand avea deja gradul de capitan. Apoi a servit ca loctiitor al ofiterului cu operatiile in Brigada 3 a Diviziei 25 Infanterie la Fort Schofield, si apoi in functia de comandant de companie in Batalionul 2 din Regimentul 27 Infanterie, in aceeasi divizie. Un reper cronologic in acest sens il constituie faptul ca Batalionul 4 din Regimentul 27 Infanterie (Wolfhounds) a fost dezactivat in 1991 si reactivat in 1996 ca Batalionul 2, care fusese dezactivat in 1993. Am gasit informatiile si poze cu acest personaj din perioada respectiva in pagina de Facebook a Regimentului 27 Infanterie. In comentarii scriau fosti militari ca au servit sub el, pe cand comanda Compania B a Batalionului 2/27. Prin urmare asta nu se putea intampla mai intainte de 1996. Daca tinem cont ca durata medie a unei comenzi de companie este de 18-24 de luni, intrarea sa in Delta Force nu a avut loc mai devreme de 1998, poate chiar 1999. ** La sfarsitul lui iulie 2022 a fost avansat general locotenent (3 stele) si numit loctiitor al comandantului US Army Pacific. (USARPAC).Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuGeneralul-maior Christopher T. DonahueA absolvit West Point in 1992, apoi a servit ca locotenent mai intai in Coreea, in divizia 2 infanterie, apoi la Fort Polk, in Louisiana, si, in fine, ca loctiitor de comandant de companie in batalionul 3, regimentul 75 Ranger. Promovat capitan, a comandat o companie in batalionul 5-87 infanterie, in Panama, iar incepand din 1998 a servit, succesiv, ca loctiitor al ofiterului de operatii, comandant al unei companii de infanterie si apoi al companiei de stat major in batalionul 2, regimentul 75 Ranger. 11 septembrie 2001 l-a gasit la Washington, in pozitia de aghiotant al sefului Statului Major Interarme de atunci, generalul de aviatie Richard Myers. Incepand cu 2002, cel mai probabil, a indeplinit o serie de functii in Delta Force: a fost asistent al ofiterului cu operatiile, ofiter cu operatiile intr-un escadron, loctiitor al comandantului unui escadron si comandant de troop. Intre 2005-2006 a absolvit cursul de comanda si stat major al Colegiului Naval, iar ulterior s-a intors in 1st SFOD-D, probabil tot in functia de comandant de troop, apoi a condus detasamentul de selectie si instructie al unitatii, a fost ofiter de operatii, comandant de escadron si apoi loctiitor al comandantului unitatii. A absolvit colegiul de razboi al armatei cu o bursa la Harvard intre 2012-2013. Un memorandum incheiat intre conducerea Universitatii Norwich din Vermont si US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), incheiat la 4 martie 2014, il mentioneaza pe comandantul 3rd OSG(A), colonelul Christopher T. Donahue. Coreland cu data absolvirii US Army War College, in iulie 2013, mi-am dat seama ca Donahue a ajuns la comanda acestui obscur 3rd OSG(A) curand dupa aceea. CV-ul sau mentioneaza, eliptic, ca a detinut o comanda de brigada sau, pur si simplu, de unitate. Dupa cautari indelungi si insistente pe Internet, am dat peste cativa militari care au servit in 3rd Operations Support Group, organizatie despre care nu apare nicio informatie, cu exceptia faptului ca apartine USASOC, mentiune care aminteste de Delta Force. Si Delta Force apartine administrativ de USASOC, dar nu si operativ, motiv pentru care Delta nu apare in nicio organigrama USASOC (pe langa faptul ca are un nivel mai inalt de legendare). Apoi, am gasit un document referitor la finantarea US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) datand din 2019 sau 2020, unde 3rd OSG(A) apare mentionata alaturi de alte unitati din cadrul JSOC, precum DEVGRU, 24th Special Tactics Squadron, si alte unitati asociate, precum regimentul 75 Ranger, dar si SAS si SBS britanice. In al treilea rand, am vazut un comandant al 3rd OSG(A) care, spre deosebire de Donahue, care are un background Big Army/Rangers, este "la baza" ofiter din Beretele Verzi. Singura organizatie din USASOC unde carierele unor fosti Rangers si Berete Verzi se intersecteaza este Delta Force. Din toate acestea rezulta, cu un mare grad de probabilitate, ca Delta Force = 3rd Operations Support Group. Identificarea e plauzibila, daca avem in vedere si noul nume dat acum ISA (Intelligence Suppport Activity), ce pare tributar aceluiasi pattern lingvistic. Cum 3rd OSG(A) a.k.a. Delta Force a avut intre 2015-2017 alt comandant despre care voi vorbi ulterior, rezulta ca Donahue a comandat unitatea intre 2013-2015. In perioada 2015-2016, Donahue a fost director pentru operatii al JSOC. In 2016, cand a fost avansat general de brigada, a devenit loctiitor pentru operatii al comandantului Diviziei 4 Infanterie, la Fort Carson, statul Colorado.august 2017-august 2018: comandant al Scolii de Infanterie, din cadrul U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, la Fort Benning, GeorgiaAugust 2018-Iulie 2019: director adjunct pentru Operatii Speciale, in cadrul Directoratului pentru Operatii (J3) din Statul Major Interarme (JCS) la Washington D.C.A fost avansat in iunie/iulie 2019 la gradul de general-maior. Iulie 2019-iulie 2020: comandant al Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan si comandant al Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan, Resolute Support Mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, in AfganistanIncepand cu 23 iulie 2020 este comandant al diviziei 82 aeropurtate*.*In martie 2022 a fost avansat general-locotenent (3 stele) si numit comandant al Corpului XVIII Aeropurtat. Un ofiter tanar (e nascut la 13 august 1969) va ajunge cu siguranta general cu 4 stele.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuIn fine, ultimul comandant 1st SFOD-D a.k.a. 3rd OSG(A) pe care il cunosc. In conditiile in care durata comenzii acestei unitati este de doi ani, de atunci au mai exista doi, iar un un al treilea urmeaza sa fie numit curand (pentru majoritatea, durata numirii a fost luna iulie). Cel care a comandant unitatea intre 2015-2017 este actualul general de brigada Josha Rudd. Este primul ofiter cu background in Beretele Verzi care comanda Delta Force din 2007 incoace.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinO sa-i placa lui Radu Patrascu asta, chiar daca, pe cat imi dau seama eu, care am citit doar concluziile studiului si alea in diagonala, realitatea nu bate complet cu opiniile lui.Ma rog... realitatea nu bate nici cu opiniile celor care sustin accesul neingradit al femeilor in fortele speciale...Ea, realitatea, e mai degraba gri si interpretabila si ca oriunde si oricand in privinta lucrurilor noi, depinde de cat de deschisi sunt oamenii si de cat de mult isi doresc sa o schimbe...Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations ForcesLINKCea mai tare si previzibila, dpdv-ul meu, e asta:Although opposition exists across all services, elements, specialties, and rank groups, SEALs, Air Force Special Operations Command Special Tactics Team members, and noncommissioned officers appeared most strongly opposed.Subofiteru', coloana vertebrala a armatei, urland:"Nu vreau femei in unitatea mea!!!!" Terentius wrote ...Credeam că sunt io mai de nişă, aşa, şi de aia îi citesc pe capitaliştii de la RAND Corporation. Creşte inima în mine când văd că nu sunt singurul "ciudat". Inca ii citesc pe capitalistii de la RAND Corp, si pe la RUSI LINK mai dau cand si cand cate o raita...Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuAm citit studiul. Cunosc cum functioneaza de multe ori lucrurile in cercetare. Iti fixezi o tinta (in cazul in care ele nu ti-au fost deja fixate de adeptii imperativelor ideologice ale zilei, aflati la butoane) si ajustezi arhitectura rationamentului si argumentele cu care iti construiesti demonstratia astfel incat ele sa te conduca spre concluzia de la care, in mod paradoxal, ai pornit. Literatura stiintifica, a carei deviza poate fi rezumata prin sintagma "publish or perish", contine o pletora de articole si studii produse sub presiunea standardelor academice cuantificabile prin punctajul acordat lucrarilor aparute in publicatii indexate. Din pacate, asa cum pertinent remarca un laureat al Premiului Nobel pentru Chimie (si nu doar el), parametrii de indexare ai publicatiei in care apare studiul nu constituie o garantie, de multe ori, a calitatii articolului gazduit in paginile acesteia, iar, de multe ori, calitatea lipseste. Dimpotriva, remarca acelasi cercetator, vei putea gasi studii de reala valoarea stiintifica in publicatii care nu poarta zorzoanele unor coeficienti de top in ierarhia revistelor indexate. Revenind la studiul cu pricina, ceea ce m-a frapat a fost lipsa de corelatie intre abundenta de date si statistici si "adevarul" afirmat. Elementele care contrazic concluzia sunt evocate, dar ideile pe care le contin nu sunt apoi dezvoltate, analizate, si sunt ocolite asemenea curentilor care scalda coastele unei insule aflate in mijlocul oceanului.As adauga aici concepte nule ca valoare epistemica, dar acut ideologizante, extrase din discursul actual precum "hipermasculinitate", preluat fara discernamant, fara explicatie, ca axioma pe baza careia este construit rationamentul. Corectitudinea politica substituie, ca sa nu zic uzurpa, obiectivitatea stiintifica si nu poate tine loc de metodologie. Sincer, prefer sa citesc opiniile unui "man of the ground". Ma indoiesc ca acest studiu va avea vreodata valoare practica. De, o mai dau si cei de la RAND in bara. La urma urmei, indemnul "follow the money" se aplica si cercetarii stiintifice.Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Pârvu FlorinNu-s familiarizat cu rigorile cercetarii stiintifice, dar fiindca stiu cat de usor pot fi manipulate rezultatele unui sondaj de opinie doar nuantand intrebarea, tind sa-ti dau dreptate.Pe de alta parte, daca as fi parte a focus grupului aluia si daca as fi intrebat"Sunteti de acord ca functii din cadrul FOS sa fie ocupate de femei?"raspunsul meu ar fi"Sunt de acord sa le dam ocazia de a demonstra ca pot face asta"doar ca eu sunt, absolut evident, mai atipic, asa...Pe de alta parte (asta o stiu de la fii-mea, fiindca subiectul asta nu e tocmai in aria mea de preocupari) multe dintre fetele care aspira la o astfel de cariera se sterilizeaza voluntar ca sa scape de inerentele probleme feminine si inghit hormoni androgeni, dar in fine...E genul de subiect foarte-foarte-foarte complicat si orice decident militar si cu atat mai mult politic care trebuie sa aiba o pozitie referitoare la el va incerca sa gaseasca un compromis, compromis care inevitabil va sfarsi prin a nemultumi pe mai toata lumea....Re: Experienta nord-americana
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2024-03-29T13:44:06+02:00Radu PatrascuGeneral de brigada Jefrrey A. Van AntwerpAbsolvent al Academiei Militare de la West Point, a avut o ascensiune destul de de rapida. A servit numai (fapt nou si surprinzator) in Divizia 25 Infanterie ("Tropical Lightning") de la Fort Schofield, Hawaii. In perioada 1999-2002 a condus mai intai un pluton de infanterie, apoi pe cel de cercetare al batalionului, iar ulterior a fost loctiitor al comandantului de companie. Dupa cursul de pregatire pentru cariera de capitan a revenit in Divizia 25 Infanterie, unde a servit in perioada 2003-2006, mai intai ca loctiitor al ofiterului cu operatiile la nivel de brigada, apoi in cea de comandant al unei companii de infanterie. Intre 2006-2008 a efectuat un stagiu de masterat la Universitatea Columbia si a servit ca ofiter de tactica la nivel de companie la Academia West Point. In 2008 a fost selectat in Delta Force unde a servit continuu in mai multe functii pana in 2020, cu exceptia anului 2016-2017, cand a absolvit Colegiul de Razboi al US Army. Avand in vedere ca Joshua Rudd a comandant Delta Force/3rd Operations Support Group intre anii 2015-2017, cel mai probabil Van Antwerp a comandat unitatea intre anii 2017-2020.In perioada iulie 2020-mai 2023 a fost loctiitor pentru operatii al comandantului Diviziei 25 Infanterie. In noiembrie 2021 a fost avansat general de brigada, iar din mai serveste ca adjunct al sefului Statului Major al US Army Pacific pentru operatii, planuri si instructie. Interesant este ca personajul a beneficiat, cel mai probabil, de sprijinul celui care, fara indoiala, i-a fost superior in mai multe stadii ale carierei, generalul-locotenent James B. Jarrard. E probabil ca Van Antwerp, la inceputul carierei, in 1999, cand era comandant de pluton in Divizia 25 Infanterie, in 1999, sa il fi avut comandant de companie pe Jarrard. Dupa ce Jarrard a ajuns in Delta Force (in 2008 era, cu siguranta, comandant de escadron in unitate, iar in 2010-2011 loctiitor al comandantului ei, inainte de a prelua comandat unitatii in perioada 2011-2013), Van Antwerp a fost admis si el in aceeasi unitate, unde a servit pana in 2020. Ulterior, il regasim pe Jarrard in diferite pozitii de comanda in divizia 25 Infanterie si in US Pacific Command si in US Army Pacific, in care a servit si serveste si Van Antwerp in ultimii 3 ani. E un om de incredere, cu potential, a avut ca "pila" pe Jarrard, despre care, de altfel, fosti subordonati spun ca este un comandant integru?Pentru cine intereseza, am introdus niste errata la James Jarrard si Christopher Donahue.